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Introduction1
Christel Baltes-Löhr, Erik Schneider 
The present publication is based on selected contributions for the 2012 confer-
ence ‘Gender Normativity and its Effects on Childhood and Adolescence’, which 
was held in cooperation between the association Intersex & Transgender Luxem-
bourg and the University of Luxembourg.2 The conference helped release syner-
gies, an occurrence which is still unusual for not only Luxembourg, but also the 
spheres beyond it: the collaboration and joint discussion between people whose 
own biographical circumstances led them to engage with the conference topic, 
political activists aiming at establishing equal rights for all those who do not 
conform to the normative notions of a binary sex/gender order and at removing 
the taboos around their ways of life, and finally members of the scientific com-
munity who dedicate themselves to this subject in their research and teaching. 
During the exchange of innovative ideas and concepts regarding the subjects 
and topics related to ‘inter- and trans-sex/gender-related constitutiveness’,3 the 
aim was to avoid any hierarchizing speech about so-called affected persons by 
so-called professionals, and to strive for an equal exchange of all conference par-
ticipants regardless of their sex/gender affiliation.
Around 200 attendees from various European countries (Belgium, Germa-
ny, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Great Britain), 
Canada and Cuba, as well as speakers from such diverse disciplines as biology, 
medicine, law, education, psychology, sociology and philosophy, made it possible 
to embark on a comprehensive and multi-faceted debate. The conference was 
met by considerable media interest, even far beyond the borders of Luxembourg. 
Following the event, a desire for a continued international exchange between 
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speakers, researchers and interested persons remained. This led to the devel-
opment of international and pluridisciplinary connections which also included 
parents’ groups of trans children. Thus the present publication can serve as a 
landmark for raising further awareness of issues of inter- and trans-sex/gen-
der-related constitutiveness within scientific and public debates.
What is particularly remarkable about the conference is its focus on the 
life situations of children and adolescents, whose subjective self-attributions of 
sex and gender do not conform to the binary normative sex/gender matrix, but 
who live – are forced to live – lives that are strongly delimited, and often even 
constricted, by this very matrix. This indicates a more comprehensive perspec-
tive offered by the conference and the present publication: the questioning of 
currently accepted sex/gender norms.
Generally, sex/gender and the corresponding norms seem to be an integral 
part of life – like the air we breathe. It seems normal to have a sex/gender – and 
only one at that. The power of such normative notions becomes particularly clear 
in encounters with people who do not seem to conform to these norms, or who 
even seem to resist them altogether. This observation brings up questions about 
the necessity of such norms and the consequences resulting from their blind, i.e. 
unreflected implementation.
Particularly with regard to children, adolescents and their families, an in-
tersectional perspective quickly reveals correlations regarding the potency of 
normative attributions of sex/gender with other interrelational dimensions such 
as ethnicity, age and physical constitutiveness. On the other hand, normative 
notions, processes of norming, of approaching variation and otherness, as well 
as confirmation and affirmation can also be elucidated with such a perspective 
on children and adolescents.
Without trying to establish yet another classification of people with affiliations 
to particular groups of sex/gender, we will in the following present two groups, 
regarding those who do not conform to the hitherto predominant sex/gender 
norms, that this publication is primarily concerned with: people who feel they do 
not belong to the sex/gender assigned to them at birth are in the following referred 
to as trans persons. Those whose physical features cannot be reduced to one of 
the two standard sexes, i.e. female or male, are referred in the present publication 
as intersex persons. Correspondingly, children and adolescents are referred to as 
trans children/adolescents or intersex children/adolescents. Their situation re-
mains, even in the year 2014, largely uncharted territory, which only very few par-
ents, families or professionals have had a glimpse of, often through the presence 
of a child who does not conform to the hitherto valid, binary sex/gender order.
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The conference and the present publication continue the cooperation between 
the association Intersex & Transgender Luxembourg (resp. its precursor Trans-
gender Luxembourg) and the University of Luxembourg, which has been main-
tained since 2010, and open a new chapter for gender research in Luxembourg. 
From the very beginning, the association Intersex & Transgender Luxembourg 
has, apart from the distribution of information for and the support of children, 
adolescents and adults and their families, devoted itself to the further education 
of professionals in all those occupational areas which are relevant for intersex 
and trans persons, particularly in the fields of medicine, law and the educational 
sector, and has conducted debates with policy makers. In addition, the associa-
tion has consistently sought contact with research institutions. The embedding 
of these gender issues in a scientific and empirical context has been achieved by 
the university research group Gender Studies, established in 2003, which has 
since become the Institute of Gender, Diversity and Migration at the University 
of Luxembourg, in cooperation with the University’s Gender Representative. 
On the part of the university, the thematic focus on research of intersex and 
transgender issues represents a consistent advancement of women’s studies to-
wards a research initially guided by a binary, and later a more plural approach to 
sex/gender orders.
The conference of 2012 was preceded by two jointly organized conferences 
in the years 2010, ‘All sexes/genders are present in nature ... but not equal before 
the law’ (‘Alle Geschlechter sind in der Natur ... aber nicht gleich vor dem Ge-
setz’), and 2011, ‘Identities Beyond Facts & Ideologies’ (‘Identitäten jenseits von 
Fakten & Ideologien’). 
These events, which remained largely unnoticed by the public and profes-
sional circles, had from the very start been geared towards an international, in-
terdisciplinary, empirically based, theory-forming and practical orientation. The 
collaboration further comprised the organization of joint teaching events which 
met with a highly concentrated and sustained interest on the part of the students.
We would like to thank the President of the University of Luxembourg 
(2005-2014), Prof. Dr. Rolf Tarrach, not only for supporting the matter of all 
these events and the present publication, but also for his long-standing and con-
stant encouragement to include issues beyond the gender mainstream in the 
spotlight of scientific and social debates. Our thanks also go to Mars Di Barto-
lomeo, the minister of health at the time, for the patronage of this conference, 
as well as to the Luxembourg Fonds National de la Recherche (FNR) for providing 
extra financial funding, enabling us to stage the conference on which this publi-
cation is based. We thank all authors, translators, and the layout designer. Many 
Introduction
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of those who helped and supported us in accomplishing the wide range of tasks 
necessary for the success of a publication of this kind remain unnamed here. 
We would at this point like to thank them sincerely for their dedication, as well 
as the team of the publisher ‘transcript’ for its unfailingly patient, creative and 
pleasant support.
In the first of six chapters, the present conference proceedings ‘Normed 
Children’ suggest the topic of a conceptual understanding of gender as a con-
tinuum, as changeable, polypolar and plural, without disregarding the problem 
of a simplifying and labeling attribution. Subsequently, the question of complex 
forms of existence that can become muddled to the detriment of normative or-
ders is discussed, followed by issues of sex/gender identities in connection with 
human rights. The topical framework concludes with the examination of aspects 
of non-discrimination in the context of gender debates.
The second chapter is devoted to a more detailed discussion of categorization 
and places it in relation to non-compliance with normative precepts and the pos-
sible consequences resulting from it. The term ‘human sex/gender-related con-
stitutiveness’ is examined for its epistemological and ethical relevance, followed 
by reflections on if and how it is possible for anyone to avoid categorizations. The 
chapter concludes with replies to the questions ‘Who has a disorder? Who gets to 
decide this?’ and finally presents an artistic take on sex/gender.
Biomedical approaches constitute the focus of the third chapter, which be-
gins with an investigation of the sexuation of anatomy, goes on to discuss the 
predictive power of genes and DNA on the development of the genital tract, and 
presents the example of a Cuban government-funded project in the health sector 
as an innovative way of dealing with plural forms of sexuality, sexes and bodies 
by making and questioning connections between sex/gender norms frequently 
regarded as universal, and medicine, as well as changes in approaching norms.
The fourth chapter addresses issues of sex/gender normativity with regard 
to trans identity from various perspectives, with one particular focus being on 
aspects of definitional power and self-determination of trans children, and an- 
other on the presentation and discussion of innovative concepts dealing with 
hormone blockers at the beginning of puberty, as well as on issues of reproduc-
tive medicine in the context of genetical and biological trans parenthood.
The fifth chapter centers around a multi-faceted discussion of sex/gender 
normativity and inter-sex/gender-related constitutiveness. The emphasis in this 
chapter lies on the representations of personal realities from the perspective of 
intersex persons, including the accompanying demands for the recognition of 
non-normative notions which are not reflected in the framework of a heteronor-
Christel Baltes-Löhr, Erik Schneider
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mative and binary matrix of sexes. The legitimacy of medical measures is ques-
tioned in view of this, followed by a discussion of the rights of intersex persons 
as well as the resistance of the medical field against criticism of intersex activists 
whose actions target operations on the frontline of credibility.
The sixth chapter is devoted to the field of education and shows the influence 
of sex/gender norms, particularly in the context of school and over the course 
of childhood and adolescence. This chapter explores the significance of the par-
ent-child bond for the development of humans, describes the conveyance of gen-
der competency in the education of biology teachers using a practical example, 
subsequently investigates the connection between cultural sex/gender-related 
constitutiveness and trans children, presents gender-plural educational offers 
beyond a binary sex/gender order and discusses the connection between trans 
identity and puberty.
The publication concludes with an unusual review of the conference, reflec- 
ting on optimism, happiness and other cruelties of a conference on gender norms.
As editors of this volume we hope to reflect the diversity of the conference 
held in September 2012 in Luxembourg, which continues to reverberate to this 
day, and thus to contribute to a debate which has only just begun and which 
offers a chance to do more justice to the plurality of life forms.
Introduction

CHAPTER 1: THEMATICAL FRAMEWORK

Always Gender – Always Different1 
An Attempt at a Definition 
Christel Baltes-Löhr
SUMMARY
The present article attempts to define sex/gender in its physical, psycholog- 
ical, social and sexual dimensions. It draws on pluridimensional concepts of 
identity that regard gender, age, ethnic orientation, economic status and phys-
ical constitutiveness as interwoven and mutually influencing each other (Bal-
tes-Löhr 2006, 2009), and further, on an understanding of constitutions of 
the subject that form identities and differences via processes of attribution and 
appropriation. Gender is thus perceived as situated along a continuum and as 
modifiable, polypolar and intersectionally situated. The point is not to arrive 
at specific definitions of femininity, masculinity, transgender or intersex, but 
rather to attempt to establish a definitional framework which could apply to all 
genders and seeks, in the sense of doing gender, to combine a discursive-per-
formative perspective of processes of gender construction with a symbolic-in-
teractional one.
CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION – UNAMBIGUOUS AMBIGUITIES
Before, during, and in the aftermath of the conference ‘Gender Normativity 
and Effects on Childhood and Adolescence’ (‘Geschlechternormativität und 
Effekte für Kindheit und Adoleszenz’) that this publication is based on, it be-
came evident that there is currently a considerable struggle within the field 
of transgender and intersex, but also in Gender Studies in general, to resolve 
issues around the nomenclature of key concepts. The terms ‘transgender’ and 
1 | Original version in German. A further developed approach is published in Cultural and Religious Studies, Vol 6, 
Number 1, January 2018; New York: David Publishing, DOI:10.17265/2328-2177/2018.01.001, pp. 1-32; entitled: 
What We Are Speaking About When We Speak About Gender? Gender as a Continuum. There the author also de-
veloped the new terms ‘transity’ in order to replace ‘transsexuality’ or ‘transgender’, in German ‘Transgeschlecht- 
lichkeit’ and ‘interity’ in order to replace ‘intersexuality’, in German ‘Intergeschlechtlichkeit’. 
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‘intersex’ and the concept of homosexuality are frequently mentioned in one 
breath, often utterly disregarding the fact that transgender and intersex per-
sons do not wish to see themselves reduced to a particular sexual orientation, 
however it may be defined. Helga Bilden for example speaks of the “great varie-
ty of genders and sexualities” and mentions “lesbians, gays, bisexuals, intersex 
persons, transsexuals, transgender persons”2 in one breath and without fur-
ther comment (Bilden 2001: 144). Michael Becker, too, bundles “a-, bi-, homo-, 
inter- and trans-sexuality”3 (Becker 2008: 18) together without any attempt at 
differentiation. The extent of this entanglement of trans- and intersexuality 
with homoerotic orientations is also evident in the name of the so-called IDA-
HO Day. IDAHO Day stands for ‘International Day against Homophobia’ and 
has been, after continuous and widely-debated extensions, expanded to IDA-
HO-TI, ‘International Day against Homo-,Trans*- and Inter*phobia’. A simi- 
lar concept applies to the self-description of non-heterosexual persons in the 
so-called LGBT community, which refers to the terms ‘Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
and Transsexual’. In this too, there is a current discussion over the expansion 
of the acronym to LGBT-I, in order to include the group of intersexual persons 
in all its diversity. However, this in itself does not yet resolve the necessity of 
avoiding the reduction of intersexuality and transsexuality to the aspect of sex-
ual orientation. Nor does it further the point for queer theoreticians to empha-
size that queer approaches consciously seek to avoid categorization, since cate-
gories always need to exclude as well. This assumption, in its connection with 
the proposed definition of the term ‘gender’, will have to be reassessed when 
discussing the permeabilities of categorical delimitations. The abolishment of 
the categorial order which has been partly demanded within the field of queer 
theory seems (Butler 2009: 18f.), particularly in the light of the persistence 
of heteronormative, categorially supported forces of influence (Baltes-Löhr et 
al. 2010), to be of little use if the goal is to achieve a removal of taboos and an 
equal presence of preferably all forms of gender.
The novel ‘Stone Butch Blues’ (1993) by Leslie Feinberg allows an insight 
into the complexity of the issue of terminology. Against the backdrop of the 
McCarthy era (1947-1956) and the associated persecutions of homosexuals 
in the USA, the novel describes the protagonist, who is living as a lesbian, 
bio-morphologically female woman, wanting to change her sex, and the con-
flicts this creates with her lesbian, bio-morphologically female girlfriend, who 
does not want to live with a man. The novel shows very poignantly how deeply 
homoerotic relationships can remain entrenched in a binary logic as well and 
2 | Personal translation of: “Vielzahl der Geschlechter und Sexualitäten”; “Lesben, Schwule, Bisexuelle, Inter-
sex-Personen, Transsexuelle, Transgender-Personen.”
3 | Personal translation of: “A-, Bi-, Homo-, Inter- und Transsexualität.”
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how productive it could be to release gender as well as sexual orientations out 
of a rigid heteronormative brace.
The influence of this heteronormative discourse is also evident when 
searching for films addressing the subject of transsexuality. The internet shows 
a list of 43 titles which, beginning in 1953 and including several coproductions, 
were directed in Argentina, Australia. Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Great Britain, Iran, Japan, Canada, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Thai-
land and the USA.4 We are not concerned with film analysis in this context, 
but rather with the fact that the search for films on the topic of intersexuality 
does not produce such a neatly organized list and instead, specific films are 
discussed on the internet. It is furthermore noteworthy to mention that many 
of these films are listed on the list of transgender films.5 This, then, suggests 
that everything which is not considered hetero is easily subsumed in a differ-
ent category, in this case the term ‘transgender’, and this regardless of whether 
and how the subsumed parts or aspects fit together or not.
A further example of ambiguous terminology is provided by the magazine 
GEO – Seeing the World with Different Eyes.6 In the edition of December 2013 
GEO headlined: ‘The search for personality. The girl within the boy: The joy 
and suffering of gender-variant children’7 and ran the accompanying article 
‘Boy? Girl? I am me!’.8 The issue of gender variance is illustrated via the exam-
ple of a holiday camp in the USA where gender-variant children can meet and 
live the way they want to – without omnipresent binary gender norms, without 
gender-connoted hostilities and without being teased. Parents of children who 
do not want to be fitted into one of the two dominant gender roles share their 
experiences and ask themselves: ‘Why does the question of an unambiguous 
gender identity bear such incredible weight?’9 (GEO 2013: 106). However, this 
article still refers to the concept of the child in the wrong body (GEO 2013: 
108), which suggests that there exists such a thing as the child in the right body 
and that every other, variant child has something that is not right. The body 
normatively defined as the right one marks all other bodies as wrong and thus 
not conforming to the norm. What becomes very obvious here is that norms do 
not, as it were, serve to display the pluralities lived by different people, but that 
people are measured by the degree to which they are able to comply with these 
4 | See URL: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_von_Transgender-Filmen, in 2014. 
5 | For instance the films XXY (Germany, 2007) and Tintenfischalarm (Austria, 2006).
6 | Personal translation of: “Die Welt mit anderen Augen sehen.”
7 | Personal translation of: “Persönlichkeitssuche. Das Mädchen im Jungen: Vom Glück und Leid geschlechts-
varianter Kinder.”
8 | Personal translation of: “Junge? Mädchen? Ich bin ich!”
9 | Personal translation of: “Warum bloß wiegt die Frage nach einer eindeutigen Geschlechtsidentät so unglaub- 
lich schwer?”
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norms. Back to the GEO edition of December 2013: In addition to the report 
on the holiday camp, the terms ‘intersexual’, ‘gender-variant’, ‘transvestite’ and 
‘transsexual’ are discussed in a glossary (GEO 2013: 112). It becomes all too 
clear how the naming of intersexual, gender-variant, transsexual, trans-identi-
cal persons as well as transvestites – despite the editors’ assumed education- 
al intention – implicitly upholds the normative standard of the two-gender 
system, if an unambiguous biological gender is given as a point of departure 
for variances or changing gender identities. The same pattern is displayed in 
explanations about transvestites, who according to GEO are marked by the 
feature that they wear clothes of the opposite gender without wanting to physi- 
cally belong to another gender (GEO 2013: 112). The prevailing binarity of the 
gender order of female/male is not questioned. This may also serve as a clear 
example of what it means to stabilize the own (German: das Eigene) by decla- 
ring what is not one’s own’ (German: das Nicht-Eigene) as different or variant. 
In 2008 Janina Stührmann alternatively interprets transsexuality and trans- 
identity as a perceived deviation from the gender assigned at birth (Stührmann 
2008: 9). Here the entry in the civil register becomes the normative guideline 
from which the perceived gender deviates. If, until the beginning of the 21st 
century, in Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries children with am-
biguous physical sexual characteristics were often assigned one gender via sur-
gery, this also means that they were not granted the space to develop a gender 
of their own and that major surgery, for instance the creation of a vaginal struc-
ture, was performed on their healthy bodies. Parents had to make momen-
tous decisions for their children, frequently in a still completely tabooed space 
invariably marked by wrong or partial information or a lack of it. For a long 
time this space had been dominated by the power of medical professionals, 
who during their education had usually only been presented the pathologizing 
perspective on ambiguous physical genders, and only fairly recently has this 
dominance been, at least in some small degree, challenged by the emergence 
of parent self-help groups and so-called ‘affected’ adult parties. In the light of 
all this it is of far-reaching significance that the amendment of the German 
civil register law of 1 November 2013 (§ 22, 3) provides for the following: “If 
the child can be assigned neither to the female or the male gender then the 
civil status event shall be recorded without this information in the registry of 
births.”10 (Federal Law Gazette 2013 Part I, p. 1122).
10 | Personal translation of: “Kann das Kind weder dem weiblichen noch dem männlichen Geschlecht zugeord-
net werden, so ist der Personenstandsfall ohne eine solche Angabe in das Geburtenregister einzutragen.”
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So far, we have established that firstly there is a lack of terminological clarity 
regarding the terms ‘transgender’, ‘transsexuality’ and ‘intersex’, and secondly 
that anything that does not fit into the grid of the still dominant heteronorma-
tive discourse is quickly considered different, variant, deviating, or even wrong. 
It further became clear that genders which are not conceived as either female 
or male are often sexually connoted and frequently located in the proximity of 
homosexuality, which may not correspond to the lived realities of intersex and 
transgender persons. However, the strong effect of heteronormative sexual du-
alism should not obscure the fact that even the definitions of the two genders 
female and male have somewhat faltered. The apparently unambiguous physical 
sex has been called into question, since not all persons with a vagina also have an 
elevated bosom and ovaries as adolescents or adults, a similar estrogen concen-
tration or the same set of XX chromosomes. Similarly, persons with an XY chro-
mosome do not always have a penis, testicles and the corresponding testosterone 
level. This variance in the combination of the various corporal-biological compo-
nents suggests that one can no longer speak of a biologically unambiguous sex 
(see Henke et al. 1998: 43-64). All these assessments support the assumption 
that a terminological definition of gender that encompasses all possible genders 
is needed. If this term is difficult to define, then it can be assumed that this dif-
ficulty reflects the complexity of the matter itself. All the more reason to attempt 
as comprehensive a definition as possible.
GENDER AS A DIMENSION OF IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE  
AND SUBJECTIVITY
It seems obvious that for many people, gender is connected to what they un-
derstand, comprehend, feel, perceive, accept or reject as their self, their I, their 
identity, their own subjectivity, their difference from others. Personality as well 
as individuality continue to be viewed as being strongly connoted with gen-
der. For a long time gender was regarded as the structural category not only 
for societal orders, but also for the personality, individuality and identity of 
every human being. Besides gender, dimensions or sections such as age, eth-
nic origin, corporal and physical disposition, religious and ethical and moral 
orientations, together with a pluridimensional and intersectional conception 
of identity, play a significant role when it comes to finding an understanding 
of what comprises or can comprise human beings in their human being-ness. 
Thus, what we are concerned with here is to explain which identities or dif-
ferences are assigned to human beings and which they appropriate, and how 
these negotiation processes should be defined.
Always Gender – Always Different
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And again: identities and différance
Refers to Zirfas (2001), concepts of identity such as formulated by Mollenhau-
er and Welsch, concepts of core identities and fixed self-identities have been 
abandoned. Nevertheless, notions of the term ‘identity’ as based on a “coherent 
and continuous performance of synthetization and integration which allows the 
individual to address themselves across space and time as ‘I’”11 (Zirfas 2001: 52) 
continue to remain virulent. On the other hand, deconstructivist concepts of 
identity following Derrida should not serve as the band to unify these differences 
in the sense of Welsch. Identity consists “of the dispersing bands of the differ-
ences themselves: in this sense the search for identity is a search for traces.”12 
(Zirfas 2001: 61). This trace runs, writes Zirfa, “from the integrating identity to 
the disintegrating difference, from the I to the other.”13 This is therefore a ques-
tion about an identity “which is marked by differences and differentiations of the 
other.”14 (Zirfas 2001: 60). Representing the own in the other and the other in 
the own and thereby wanting to do justice to oneself and the other – according to 
Zirfas drawing on Derrida, this may be what is meant when we speak of identity 
as an experience of the impossible. Derrida is not concerned with relationaliza-
tion, like Mead's symbolic interactionism (1934) is with the relationship between 
I and Me, wherein the I is reacting to the attitude of others and representing the 
will, the uniqueness of a person, their own aspirations and their biographical 
uniqueness, and the Me, the Generalized Other, is indicating conventions and 
habits, social adaption and recognition and the functionality of the individual in 
society. Derrida however points out that “in the idea of the I [...] there is always 
a different idea at work.”15 (Derrida quoted by Zirfas 2001: 53). If Derrida uses 
the term ‘différance’ to denote “that every meaning can only ever be expressed 
within a deferral, a delay, a deliberation or a retrospect”16 (Derrida quoted by 
Zirfas 2001: 55), then différance also means repetition, interval and distance. 
Différance signifies an event which is repeated in language through the act of 
speaking, but can never be represented in its entirety, so that one can speak 
of continuous shifts of meaning (Zima 1997: 167). Identity, the construction of 
which depends on events, experiences and the act of speaking, thus seems to 
11 | Personal translation of: “Identität liegt eine kohärente und kontinuierliche Synthetisierungs- und Integra-
tionsleistung zugrunde, die es dem Individuum erlaubt, zu sich selbst über Raum und Zeiten hinweg ‘Ich’ sagen 
zu können.”
12 | Personal translation of: “Identität besteht aus den zerstreuenden Bändern der Differenzen selbst: Iden-
titätssuche ist insofern Spurensuche.”
13 | Personal translation of: “Die Spur geht von  der integrierenden Identität zur desintegrierenden Differenz, 
vom Ich zum Anderen.”
14 | Personal translation of: “Die sich durch Differenzen und Differenzierungen des Anderen auszeichnet.”
15 | Personal translation of: “In der Vorstellung des Ich ist immer schon eine differente Vorstellung am Werke.”
16 | Personal translation of: “Différance meint, dass jeglicher Sinn immer nur in einem Aufschub, einer Ver-
zögerung, einem Kalkül oder einer Nachträglichkeit zum Ausdruck kommen kann.”
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congeal into a fleeting occurrence. Following Deleuze (1968) it should also be as-
sumed that repetition can never be repetition of the same, because the repeated 
elements cannot be encompassed by a term common to all of them as an origin. 
Consequently he wants repetition to be seen as a repetition of the not-same, 
the non-identical, the diverse. This view of repetition corresponds to the diverse 
subject. “The subject of the eternal recurrence is not the same, but the different, 
not the similar, but the dissimilar, not the one but the many, not the necessity but 
the coincidence.”17 (Zima in reference to Deleuze, Vattimo, Lyotard 1997: 169). 
We could add: The subject is not that which is confined, but rather that which is 
not defined within its confines. However, these performative repetitions harbour 
possibilities to bring forth multiple new aspects of an object, so that dually and 
dichotomically arranged hierarchies can change, shift, dissolve, but also stabilize 
themselves. In this sense, repetition can have a de-homogenizing and heteroge-
nizing effect, can make room for plurality and differences, and at the same time 
bring out similarities or reject them. The new is thus always created in relation 
to something, mostly to what is old, traditional, known. The new emerges within 
slowly shifting changes. The now is now past. The new now, that which is con-
ceived in the future, is now already the past now of just a moment ago.
Performance and repetition
If events, the world, realities, representations of realities are embedded in pro-
cesses of linguistic performance, this does not signify the denial of materiality, 
but rather the reality-constructing effect of performative actions. If a performa-
tive action is “one which produces or stages that what it names” (Butler 1993: 123) 
then repetitions become significant, and with them subversive shifts of meaning 
which then become possible. Diversities can be represented, in the full knowl-
edge that a performative action, a performative act and the concomitant descrip-
tions and definitions can never claim to represent the entire object or the object 
in its supposedly correct or indeed true meaning. Originals that existed prior to 
the performative act are negated. The performative repetition always refers to a 
something which is considered different.
With an approach like this, combined with the ethno-methodologically and 
interactionistically oriented assumptions, one could explain the production and 
construction of realities by showing how what appears to be a virtually unlimited 
range of possibilities can, in reality, transform into very concretely ascertainable 
facts. Gender could be conceived of as both interactively and discursively/per-
formatively produced (Meissner 2008). Regarding the construction processes of 
17 | Personal translation of: “Das Subjekt der ewigen Wiederkehr ist nicht das Selbe, sondern das Differente, 
nicht das Ähnliche, sondern das Unähnliche, nicht das Eine sondern das Viele, nicht die Notwendigkeit, sondern 
der Zufall.”
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gender one could, besides ethno-methodological and interactionist approaches 
of doing gender (West/Zimmermann 1991) and discourse-analytical and per-
formative approaches, consider psychoanalytical approaches that build on the 
inner experiences of individuals (Bilden 2001: 144). With reference to Goldner, 
Bilden points to the possibility that “an unambiguous gender identity [...] is a 
result of pathological processes, in which everything that does not fit into the 
respective cultural or environmental idea of gender is denied, dissociated or rel- 
egated to the underground through other defensive reactions.”18 (Bilden 2001: 
142). Drawing on Dimen, Bilden emphasizes the possibility that adhering to one 
pole of the gender dualism could hint at a split in the self (Bilden 2001: 142). In 
order to overcome a suspected split such as this, Dimen offers the concept of 
interstitial spaces, spaces that are occupied by differences, i.e. spaces between 
male and female, active and passive, subject and object (Dimen quoted by Bilden 
2001: 142 f.). What is remarkable is that according to Dimen, the interstitial 
space is inhabited exclusively by differences but not similarities, and that the 
differences are considered as situated between the two poles of female and male.
Potentialities and factualities
These two terms are by no means to be understood as a dualistic opposition, but 
instead as interwoven aspects of a continuum. People can be regarded as being 
equipped with a broad range of possibilities, potentialities. This is also relevant 
for gender and gender relations. Based on the assumption of the construction 
of gender as a continuum, normatively legitimizing and categorizing bundlings 
contribute to producing femininity and masculinity, which then often create the 
impression as being laid down by the laws of nature. At a certain point – de-
Potentialities
Facts
turn / at a particular point in time / 
in a particular place/ constrained by / 
culture / normality / normativity / into
▶Repetitions ▶ Repetitions
Figure 1: From potentialities to facts (see Baltes-Löhr 2006: 30)
18 | Personal translation of: “Dass eine eindeutige Geschlechtsidentität ein Ergebnis von pathologischen Pro- 
zessen sei, in denen alles, was nicht in die jeweilige kulturelle oder Milieu-Vorstellung von Geschlecht passt, 
verleugnet, abgespalten oder durch andere Abwehrreaktionen in den Untergrund geschickt wird.”
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pending on the socio-cultural notions of a certain place, depending on what is 
regarded as normality and depending on which values and ideas are recognized 
as norms – possibilities become characteristics and abilities or facts.
The relevance of assumptions of performance theory for gender
If definitions, the production and stagings of, for instance, gender can be seen 
as repeated performative acts in time and space, then potentially subversive rep- 
etitions also harbor possibilities of breaking through dominant discourses, for 
example regarding gender, and to multiply the bipolarity of the gender order by 
making other facets of gender visible. In this way diversities can be represented, 
differences can become legitimate, and not least be regarded as normal. Women, 
men, transgender and intersex persons need not be understood as a homoge-
nous group, characterized by essential features. Gender images and ideas about 
individual gender groups are also variable. The borders between categories are 
porous and permeable. Via namings, matters become, for instance, bodies and 
gendered bodies, bodies become genders, spaces become national territories, 
sinners become pure once more through the three words “Ego te absolvo”. Peo- 
ple become couples by a third person saying: “I hereby pronounce you husband 
and wife”. It is not contrition that liberates sinners from their supposed burden 
of sins, and it is not love that makes a couple become a couple, but rather the 
spoken word of the registrar. One particular, remarkably performative phrase is 
familiar to all Roman Catholics when every year at Christmas the Gospel of John 
is quoted: “And the word became flesh.” (Gospel of John 1,14), thereby announc-
ing the birth of Jesus. Back to our subject: With regard to gender we have to em-
phasize Jutta Hartmann's statement that “performativity generates the subject, 
but it does not determine it.”19 (Hartmann 2001: 76). Performative construction 
processes are therefore always regarded as open-ended.
If facts or realities are constructed out of potentialities via performative acts, 
then this, with regard to the construction of gender, can mean that people are 
born with the possibilities of constructing a gender. A subject can be perceived 
or perceive itself as belonging to a gender, depending on the point in time (gen-
der variability: in this context historicity of birth); on socio-culturally prevailing 
discourses and orientations (gender variability: in this context normativity of 
gender); on spatial circumstances (a dimension of an intersectionally conceived 
gender); on corporal circumstances (corporal/physical dimensions of gender); 
on social attribution and individual subjective appropriation (social dimension 
of gender; aspect of attribution and appropriation of gender); and depending 
19 | Personal translation of: “Es gilt zu unterstreichen, dass Performativität das Subjekt zwar erst hervorbringt, 
sie determiniert es aber nicht.”
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on sexual desire, sexual orientation and sexual practices (sexual dimension of 
gender). Combinations of the various gender dimensions are conceivable. Thus, 
a person with a penis but without testicles can dress in a skirt, put on makeup, 
speak in a deep voice, be forceful and competitive, musically gifted and live het- 
erosexually with a person with a vagina, an elevated bosom, facial hair and a 
socially more prestigious professional status, who is dwarfing the former person 
by a head’s length. Groups with similar characteristics could then form a gender 
group or attribute themselves to a group with similar combinations of gender 
dimensions. These self-attributions could vary depending on the situation and 
change over the course of a biographical life. Affiliations could be attributed or 
personally appropriated. They can change just as much as the understanding or 
the notions of what is considered, at a certain point in time, as normality in a 
particular place, depending on the socio-cultural notions, on which values and 
notions are recognized as norms and on what is to be understood as a particu-
lar gender in a particular place and at a particular time, and how subsequently 
appropriated genders can in turn influence exactly these factors and aspects in 
a particular place and at a particular time etc. This is what is meant by mutual 
construction processes of gender, constitutions of the subject and categorial or-
ders. This is what is meant by construction processes in which aspects of perfor-
mance, of repetition and of norming play remarkable roles.
This makes clear which significant role human beings themselves can play 
in the construction process of their subjectivity, their individuality, when rec- 
ognition processes are considered in the context of attributions – appellations, 
according to Althusser (1977) – and appropriations in the sense of reversals or 
denials of the appellation. Recognition processes and thus construction pro- 
cesses of genders need to be seen in their polyphony, and it is the task of science 
and academics to reveal these polyphonies and retrace their variability.
Fields of tension surrounding a definition of gender
Since the early 1990s and with the realization of the constructedness of gen-
der, the differentiation between sex, gender and desire became a familiar one, 
particularly through the writings of Judith Butler (1991, 1995, 1997); sex often 
referred to the so-called biological gender, gender stood for the so-called social 
gender, and desire for the expression of sexual desire or sexuality.
In the understanding of doing gender, the so-called social gender signified 
the assumption that people are, in a way, socialized into specific gender roles. 
The assumption that people are turned into women and into men, as Simone 
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de Beauvoir already claimed in 1949 with regard to women when she said: “One 
is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.” (de Beauvoir 1949). By contrast, 
sex, i.e. the so-called biological, corporal, physical gender, continued for a long 
time to be perceived as unambiguous, meaning either unambiguously female 
or unambiguously male. With Judith Butler’s equally seminal work “Bodies that 
Matter” (Butler 1993) and with expanding research in the field of biology (see 
Streckeisen 1991: 158 and Henke et al. 1998: 43-64), the constructedness and the 
supposed unambiguity of biological gender was deconstructed. It became evi-
dent that neither the body nor the biological gender or the gendered body could 
be defined by the bipolar order of a biological male and female gender. Desire, 
sexual desire and sexuality were for a long time neglected in a debate that was 
often reduced to sex-gender, and were discussed most frequently in the context 
of discriminations of persons with homoerotic orientations and lifestyles.
The blocking out of transgender and intersex persons
Transgender and intersex persons are the subject matter of queer theory, which 
has established itself since the 1990s, in most cases rejects all categorial orders 
whatsoever and “opposes those who would regulate identities or establish episte-
mological claims of priority for those who make claims to certain kinds of identi-
ties.” (Butler 2004: 7). In approaches adopted by developmental psychology and 
pedagogy these gender groups often remain unmentioned (Abriß 2006; Gesell 
2008; Hoffmann 1997; King 2013; Kühn 2006; Sporbert 2009), are regarded as 
disruptions as well as disorders (Hartmann/Becker 2002; Vetter 2010), and in 
the field of health practice are frequently considered a phenomenon to be dealt 
therapeutically (Averkamp 2012). Additionally, transgender and intersex persons 
are defined as competing groups: “One tension that arises between queer theory 
and both intersex and transsexual activism centers on the question of sex assign-
ment and the desirability of identity categories. If queer theory is understood, by 
definition, to oppose all identity claims, including stable sex assignment, then 
the tension seems strong indeed.” (Butler 2004: 7). What transgender persons 
are in part fighting for, i.e. a life in a male or female gender and corresponding-
ly in the respective gender body, which should, if necessary, be produced with 
the help of hormone intake or surgery, seems at first glance to be in opposition 
to intersex persons who often insist on being recognized in the, with respect 
to the prevalent bipolar gender order, ambiguous situatedness of their gender. 
The question now is how to include and regard as equally legitimate within a 
theoretical foundation both the desire for unambiguity and the desire for the 
recognition of a gender hitherto defined as ambiguous in terms of bipolarity.
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Connotations of transgender and intersex persons with homosexuality
Even though according to Laura Adamietz homosexuality and transsexuality 
should, thanks to the early 20th century works of Krafft-Ebing, Hirschfeld und 
Ellis, be regarded as separate phenomena (Adamietz 2011: 102), with the emer-
gence of psychoanalysis around Sigmund Freud a notion of transsexuality as a 
flight from homosexuality, combined with a supposed fear of castration, led to 
an erotization of cross-dressing that endured long into the 1970s and seems to 
have remained virulent to this day (Adamietz 2011: 103). If transsexuality was 
again established as an independent concept in the medical field, primarily due 
to the work of the American doctor Harry Benjamin, who furthered the develop-
ment of surgical possibilities and harbored a certain disillusionment with the ef-
fectiveness of psychotherapeutic measures (Adamietz 2011: 103), then one should 
note that Benjamin’s concern was a surgery that transformed men into women 
and the creation of a “class of transsexuals […] who were [according to Benjamin] 
absolutely in need of treatment and whom he sought to demarcate from other 
less severe cases.”20 (Adamietz 2011: 103).
Assumptions about transsexuality have shifted to a more open concept since 
the 1970s, not least due to the debates of the women's movement. If transsexual-
ity as such was understood primarily in medical terms and as a gender identity 
disorder (Adamietz 2011: 34, 37), then Adamietz notes that the term ‘transgen-
der’ could induce a depathologization and that the pronounced differentiations 
between pre- and post-operative phases, and thus between so-called transvestites 
and transsexuals, become irrelevant. She further points out that not all those per-
sons she refers to as transidentical seek a surgical or hormonal adjustment of their 
body (Adamietz 2011: 37). Adamietz emphasizes that the term ‘transgender’ is not 
regarded as conclusively defined either; according to her there is “among those 
concerned no consensus about its meaning.”21 (Adamietz 2011: 38). She goes on to 
say that this umbrella term should denote a range of subjectivities that are in con-
flict with traditional gender norms and stereotypes and should not be used as an 
instrument for exclusions (Adamietz 2011: 38). Intersexuality, the phenomenon to 
be understood as a gender that can be attributed neither to one nor the other of the 
two prevalent genders, is considered by Adamietz as evidence for the “faultiness 
of the assumption of absolutely natural sexual dualism.”22 (Adamietz 2011: 105). 
Intersexual persons, she writes, are often forced to reassign themselves to 
one of the two prevalent genders by means of surgery, since, at least as yet, “the 
20 | Personal translational of: “Klasse von Transsexuellen […], die unbedingt behandlungsbedürftig seien, und 
diese von anderen weniger schlimmen Fällen abzugrenzen.”
21 | Personal translation of: “Unter den Betroffenen besteht kein Konsens über seine Bedeutung.”
22 | Personal translation of: “Transsexualität ist nach Adamietz zu verstehen als Beleg für die Fehlerhaftigkeit 
der Annahme absoluter natürlicher Zweigeschlechtlichkeit.”
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reigning order of sexual dualism is unable to recognize a ‘third gender’.”23 (Ad-
amietz 2011: 105). Thus we must at this point differentiate between those persons 
who do not wish to assign themselves to either a male or female gender, and 
those who disagree with the gender attributed to them mostly on the grounds of 
present physical features, and who may or may not seek a surgically or hormo-
nally produced change.
Other cultures – other genders
From 25 November 1997 to 8 March 1998 the Rautenstrauch-Joest-Museum 
für Völkerkunde (Ethnological Museum) in Cologne, Germany, hosted an ex-
hibition titled ‘She and He. Woman power and male domination in a cultural 
comparison.’24  The exhibition as well as the accompanying volume specifically 
addressed the issue of ‘third gender and changing identities’25 – a novelty and at 
the same time an expression of the changing debate in the context of the  women 
and gender research which was virulent at the time (Völger 1997).
The exhibition acquainted visitors with the Guevedoces, a term used for a 
group of people living in the Dominican Republic. At birth they cannot be un-
ambiguously identified as either male or female. Often, a masculinization sets 
in with puberty, which however does not change the respective person's status of 
being a Guevedoce, a status which allows some leeway between being a woman 
and being a man. Another group represented in the exhibition were the Kwo-
lu-Aatmwol of Papua New Guinea who, in expectation of a pubertary masculini-
zation, are raised in a gender-spanning fashion with a tendency towards the male 
principle and thus develop identities beyond the familiar concepts of femininity 
and masculinity. As a third gender they are neither discriminated against nor 
particularly highly esteemed. Additionally the exhibition highlights the Muxe in 
Juchitán, Mexico, and the Hijra in India. What was remarkable was there being 
no mention of a third or fourth gender in the European region, which nowadays, 
more than 25 years later, seems hardly conceivable, considering that since the 
1990s debates within women’s and gender studies have changed and binary, 
heteronormative patterns have been increasingly questioned while pointing to 
the constructedness of genders, with the term ‘gender’ continuing to be unam-
biguously ambiguous.
23 | Personal translation of: “Die geltende Ordnung der Zweigeschlechtlichkeit vermag keine ‘dritten Geschlech-
ter’ anzuerkennen.”
24 | Personal translation of: “Sie und Er. Frauenmacht und Männerherrschaft im Kulturvergleich.”
25 | Personal translation of: “Drittes Geschlecht und wechselnde Identitäten.”
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ATTEMPTING A DEFINITION OF GENDER
Gender comprises,
in its physical dimensions, bio-
morphological, genital, chromo-
somal, gonadal and hormonal 
characteristics (corporal or phys-
ical gender),
in its psychological dimensions 
emotions and cognition; these 
psychological dimensions de-
scribe the feeling as well as the 
self-perception of gender and thus 
oscillate between attribution and 
appropriation, or put differently, 
between attribution by others and 
self-attribution, and turn into self-designations which may or may not more 
or less agree with the definitions or descriptions by others (psychological 
gender),
in its social dimensions the gender roles that describe a person's behavior 
as belonging to a certain gender; this role behavior includes facial expres-
sions, gestures, speech volume, posture; this also comprises societal pres-
ence, as for instance gender presence in various areas of society, and also 
attributions of functions such as certain forms of division of labor, but also 
the attribution of responsibilities regarding various areas of society, such as 
politics/public sphere, private life/family, job market, educational sphere, 
science/research, art (social gender),
in its sexual dimensions sexual desire or sexual orientation such as mon-
osexual, asexual, bisexual, heterosexual, pansexual, but also sexual practic-
es such vis a fronte and vis a tergo forms of sexual intercourse, sadomas- 
ochism, exhibitionism; these dimensions also concern the relational forms 
of sexual gender such as monogamy, polygamy, polyamory and correspond-
ing institutionalized forms of relational sexual gender such as marriage, 
registered partnerships, non-registered partnerships with one or more part-
ners, singles (sexual gender).
To indicate that this definition of gender is to be regarded as open-ended, two 
boxes have been left blank in the figure ‘Gender and gender dimensions’.











Having defined gender in this way, it is possible to conceive of a great variety of 
combinations between the elements of the different dimensions. This definitional 
framework aims to enable an equal representation of existing and lived pluralities.
The gender attributed to a person and appropriated by them can be per-
ceived as a part of their identity, without assuming, as explained above, the ex-
istence of an identitary identity. A person’s gender can comprise dimensions of 
the corporal/physical, psychological, social and sexual gender and is considered 
modifiable, polypolar, plural and intersectional, terms which will be briefly dis-
cussed in the following.
A modifiable, polypolar, plural and intersectional gender continuum
Gender is considered:
modifiable in the sense that it can shift depending on the historical, so-
cio-cultural, spatial and normative context and can in turn impact these 
respective contexts. Gender can change in the course of a life's biography, 
although it should also be emphasized that a gender appropriated in a situ-
ation, in a phase of life of shorter or longer duration, can in turn change the 
life biography. One could thus also speak of a punctual or situative gender 
(gender variability: historical and normative; punctual/ situative gender);
polypolar in the sense that gender is understood as situated on a continu-
um, without any binary, bipolar framing, without binary markers such as 
unambiguously female or unambiguously male (polypolar gender);
plural in the sense that polypolar genders are thought of as being situated 
on a continuum, whereby the individual gender dimensions can shift with 
respect to each other and multiple forms of gender can be constructed de-
pending on time, space etc. (gender as a continuum);
gender should also be regarded in the context of an intersectional per-
spective, with categories such as age, ethnic orientation/ cultural origin, 
socio-economic status, education and general physical constitution, in or-
der to speak of an intersectionally constituted gender. This also includes 
the spatial and material dimension of gender (intersectional constitution 
of gender).
In defining gender in its physical, psychological, social and sexual dimensions 
as modifiable, polypolar, plural and intersectional in its disposition, as well as 
in its location on a continuum, we take our leave from the gender category as a 
binary, dichotomous and heteronormative structural category of societal orders.
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Gender as a continuum
As already mentioned several times, gender is regarded as being situated on a 
continuum. For the range of characteristics of the category of gender this signi-
fies that all human possibilities/potentialities with regard to the body, psyche, 
social behaviour, sexuality located on this continuum can become, in the most 
diverse combinations, genderized characteristics via discursive/performative 
labeling practices and interactive doing. These characteristics then signify one 
gender – for a varying period of time, with a more or less far-reaching situational 
ambit, for a more or less numerous group of people. Specific aspects/character-
istics of the physical, psychological, social and/or sexual gender can be joined 
and combined into one specific gender category. A segment or clusters of char-
acteristics of possibilities situated along the continuum such as this can generate 
stereotypes which can then, depending on time, place and culture, be attrib- 
uted as specific characteristics of a certain gender. These segments can comprise 
elements of the various dimensions of gender (physical, psychological, social 
and sexual). Such clusters of characteristics that until the 1970s stereotyped, for 
instance, the female sex as gentle, emotional, weak, maternal, domestic, caring, 
desiring one – and only one – man, equipped with an elevated bosom, vagina, 
ovaries and uterus, would, according to the definition attempted above, in the 
future not be regarded as arranged in a bipolar or binary way, but rather in a 
polypolar order, which means that the opposition of female and male is void and 
that other gender configurations, as for instance transgender and/or intersex, 
can also be regarded as a pole. The clusters of characteristics can encompass 
the most diverse combinations of human possibilities and be considered as a 
gender. A person with a beard and bust breastfeeding a child would no longer 
be regarded as somehow weird   or as a sensation. Categorial permeability is no 
longer considered to be compact, as it was in the previously dominating two-gen-
der order, but rather to be porous, and the categorial boundaries between possi-
ble genders are no longer fixed but open and fluid.
In the definition of gender attempted here, plurality is considered the norm, 
which means that all kinds of genders are considered normal or recognized as 
normative, and that masculinity and femininity are not regarded as the only 
valid norms. While the currently still existing gender order assumes that the 
attributed gender is also appropriated and that everything else is treated as ab-
normal, deviant or pathological, the suggested definition of gender offers the 
possibility of representing a higher variance with respect to the attribution and 
appropriation processes, in the sense that so-called deviations can more easily be 
regarded as differences that may possibly be considered as belonging to another 
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gender or another gender configuration. Appellations as defined by Althusser 
(Althusser 1977) can equally easily be followed by reversals, i.e. acceptance, as by 
non-acceptance of the gender attributed through appellation. An ontologization 
as a consolidation of a fixed way of being or of an indissoluble nature of a gender 
is rejected, so that the true world of believers transforms into an uncertain world 
for non-believers.
In conclusion, we will once more briefly illustrate the significance of such a 
definition of gender for the relation of the sexes/genders to one another: The posi-
tioning of possible genders towards each other is considered polypolar; all possible 
genders are regarded as equivalent. At times one gender has a greater force of 
influence, and at other times it is another one; from this circumstance, however, 
no structural primacies are derived. The categorial demarcation of the possible 
genders towards each other is considered to be fluid, permeable and adjustable 
and thus flexible. The gender order is regarded as plurally constituted; the logic of 
‘as-well-as’ applies; normative patterns emerging in the construction process are 
considered to be open  and reversible and make no universalist claims on validity.
LOOKING AHEAD
The new definition of gender suggested here aims to do justice to the plurality 
of gender without one particular gender per se taking precedence over another 
or being considered superior. This definition is intended as a contribution to-
wards deconstructing the prevalent heteronormative gender order and achieving 
a gender order of diversity. Genders and gender orders constituted in this way 
could lead to depathologizations, the removal of taboos and to the general rec-
ognition of all those genders which have until now not fitted into the rigid brace 
of dual sexuality; moreover, this present brace of a rigid bipolar femininity and 
masculinity could be dissolved. This could also be reflected in linguistic symbol-
izations. While until the beginning of the 1970s the so-called male speech forms 
always included everyone, it was in no small part due to the women’s movement 
that female speech forms came into use in order to make women, at that time 
still understood as a collective subject, visible. In German, Lehrer (male teach-
ers) became Lehrer(innen) – male(female) teachers –  male/female teachers 
(Lehrer/innen), female and male teachers (Lehrerinnen und Lehrer) and also fe/
male teachers (LehrerInnen). Eventually the form ‘teaching persons’ (Lehrende) 
became prevalent, for the first time highlighting the bipolarity of the female and 
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male designations and replacing them with a form that was able to comprise 
more than two sexes or genders. The form ‘male_female teacher’ (Lehrer_innen) 
was also intended to contribute to this; however, it can ultimately be read as a 
preservation of the male and female concepts in their supposed significance as 
cornerstones or even a limitation of the sexes/genders. In accordance with the 
attempt to redefine sex/gender as situated on a continuum, the appropriate rep-
resentation would be to write ‘_male_female_teacher_’ or ‘_teaching_persons_’ 
(_Lehrer_innen_). This present attempt at a definition of sexes/genders could 
also have an impact on the field of research, something not explicitly discussed 
here due to lack of space. This much we can say: as long as _male_female_re-
searchers_ (_Wissenschaftler_innen_) continue to presume a sex/gender binary, 
they will construct “binarities against this background where we could also see 
a continuum.”26 (Meissner 2008: 10). A binary sex/gender assumed in the eyes 
of the beholder leads to the “discovery of a biological, psychological and social 
binarity.”27 (Meissner 2008: 10). We hope the present attempt at a definition will 
contribute to a future in which researchers will set their eyes on diversity, in 
order to be able to recognize diverse genders.
This moment might also be a good one to consider what a world that got by 
without the category of gender would look like, if there were no gender whatso- 
ever in the sight of anyone's eye. The amendment of the German civil register 
law of 1 November 2013 mentioned above has provoked a great deal of debate. 
Ralf Schuler, for instance, asks in the edition of Bild online from 13 August 2013:28 
“Is Germany abolishing the sexes?”29 and reassures us by quoting the family 
expert of the CDU, Peter Tauber, who said to Bild: “The provision enables in-
tersexual people to later decide without pressure how they want to live. Keeping 
the gender column open was expressly chosen in order not to break with the 
basic principle of two genders, but to keep it open.”30 A clear example of how, 
despite progressive provisions, one can continue to adher to traditional patterns 
depending on one’s political persuasion – and depending on what is in the eye 
of a particular beholder. Nevertheless, the Bild article points to similar provisions 
in India, Brazil, Kosovo and Belgium and says about Australia: “So far Australia 
26 | Personal translation of: [konstruieren sie] “vor diesem Hintergrund Binarität, wo auch ein Kontinuum gese-
hen werden könnte.”
27 | Personal translation of: “Entdeckung einer biologischen, psychologischen und sozialen Binarität.”
28 | See URL: http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/geschlechtsumwandlung/schafft-deutschland-die-geschle 
chter-ab-31864862.bild.html [03.02.2014]. Bild is a populistic daily newspaper in Germany.
29 | Personal translation of: “Schafft Deutschland die Geschlechter ab?”
30 | Personal translation of: “Die Regelung ermöglicht intersexuellen Menschen, sich später ohne Druck zu 
entscheiden, wie sie leben wollen. Das Offenhalten der Spalte Geschlecht ist extra gewählt worden, um das 
Grundprinzip der zwei Geschlechter nicht zu durchbrechen, sondern eben offen zu halten.”




is the only country in the word that officially recognizes a third gender.”31 If we 
may at this point mention the fact that this country is, after all, an entire conti-
nent, then we can observe a general tendency which is also expressed in the GEO 
edition of 13 December 2013 mentioned above, where Fred Langer, in his com-
ment on the cover topic in which the aspect of hormone treatment of children is 
investigated, notes with respect to gender reassignment: “The question could be 
so much less loaded if that of gender – man? or woman? – would lose some of 
its weight.”32 (GEO 2013: 108). The regional press has also discovered the issue 
of the gender order, covering it through remarkable oversimplifications. In the 
daily paper Trierischer Volksfreund of 30th December 2013 Jacqueline Maron, a 
student at the University of Trier, is introduced in her capacity as a co-consultant 
of the feminist women and lesbians department of the student's union. When 
she states in the text: “I want to see us moving away from the binary system of 
gender. I don’t see a man, I don’t see a woman, I see the person”33 (Trierischer 
Volksfreund 2013: 12), then the article’s headline reads: “Moving away from the 
gender system.”34
As long as this utopia of a world without powerful gender categories is still a 
dream, one can only reiterate that gender is neither God-given nor preordained 
by nature, but should be considered as a constantly changing result of construc-
tion processes. These construction processes should be regarded both as doing 
gender and as discursive-performative, and they can do justice to the diversity of 
human possibilities, because it is this diversity which can be considered natural, 
as Mariela Castro Espín so succinctly put it: “Diversidad es natural” – diversity 
is natural.
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Human Diversity: To the Detriment of Norms1
Janik Bastien Charlebois
SUMMARY
Based on the assessment that trans and intersex persons currently often do not 
see themselves regarded as equal and normal human beings this contribution 
explores the question of what taboos and stereotypical conceptions are still in 
effect in the contexts of family, education, school, medicine, biology, and law, 
and which would need to be dissolved for society to be able to move towards 
greater democracy for all groups of people. The contribution also examines the 
question which role scholarship and research play or should play here.
DIVERSITY AND NORMATIVITY
In the past decades norms of sex/gender and sexuality saw themselves under 
pressure from the societal and political emergence of social groups that deviated 
from them or challenged them head on, as constructivist feminists, gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, transsexual, transgender and intersex persons have done. It is only re-
cently that a number of realities and issues which many of us would never have 
anticipated have begun to demand our attention. Children and teenagers have 
been expressing their discomfort with the sex/gender assigned to them at birth 
and wish for their bodies to develop differently or their preferred sex/gender 
identity to be acknowledged. Persons whose sex had been judged as ‘ambigu-
ous’ by doctors and who were subjected to surgery or hormonal treatment are 
demanding the required provision of informed consent prior to medical inter-
vention as well as the depathologization of their bodies. Same-gender couples 
are starting families and some parents are having their registered sex/gender 
changed. This raises the question whether these persons should have the right to 
1 | Original version in French.
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self-determination of how they present themselves to the world and how they in-
teract with it, for instance allowing children to be addressed with the sex/gender 
they identify with, and to dress and play the way they want to. The same applies 
to the question whether teenagers who want hormone blockers to affirm their 
gender as they wish should be granted access to them, or whether people born 
with intersex traits are allowed to grow up intact and be welcomed as they are, 
with the possibility to affirm the gender they identify with (be it woman, man or 
other), as well as be openly intersex.
These issues involve many social actors: primarily those demanding this 
autonomy for themselves, and then parents, educators, teachers, psychologists 
and doctors, to name but a few. Evading these concerns under the pretext that 
there are but a few intersex and trans persons is not an option, because the 
situations that engender these issues are not abstract and require from many 
people that they concretely reflect on them and respond to them. Parents and 
teachers are obligated to find a way of reacting to a child or adjusting to a child 
which they have so far treated as a boy, but who identifies herself as a girl and 
wants to wear a dress at school. And kindergarten educators have to find a way 
of dealing with the transition of one parent.
An adequate response to these issues requires reassessing deeply rooted 
assumptions about the connections between the individual and the collective 
benefit on the one hand and sex/gender norms on the other. In other words: It 
is the very understanding of sex, gender and sexuality that guides our everyday 
life behaviour as well as our comprehensive relationship with others as sexual/
sexualized beings who are challenged by what first seems like ‘exceptional sit-
uations’. If we wish to find productive and satisfactory answers it is important 
that we become aware of the extent of emotions that this issue sparks in all 
of us, ranging from those who strive for a direct autonomy of gender to those 
who bring their institutionalized expertise to this field. No one can claim to 
hold an entirely objective position in these matters. If we as researchers were 
to lack every emotional attachment to this issue we would be emotionless to-
wards what we consider to be notional misconceptions about the outer and in-
ner sex/gender and sexuality, and we would content ourselves with a one-time 
statement on what these signify to us. Instead of claiming to hold an objective 
perspective and presuming that this simple utterance is enough to produce it, 
we should aim for intellectual integrity. This demands thoughtfulness, humil-
ity and an awareness of our personal sensitivities and cultural embeddings as 
well as the lens through which we observe these issues – or, for that matter, 
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any other issue we direct our attention to. Kuhn2 has shed light on the cultural 
premise of scientific paradigms in his classic work ‘The Structure of Scienti- 
fic Revolutions’. Do we presume now that we have successfully detached our-
selves from culturally-induced perspectives? How do we reflect our methods 
for selecting variables or indicators for a study? On the basis of which criteria 
do we consider them relevant, particularly when examining the well-being of 
individuals with respect to their sex/gender identity, sex/gender-based dynam-
ics and sexuality? Have we directed our attention to the premises a major part 
of our research on outer and inner gender and sexuality builds on? On what 
basis do we distinguish between healthy and pathological, presence and lack, 
formation and deformation, variance and condition, normal and abnormal, or-
der and disorder or disruption, correctness and errors, natural and unnatural? 
For which reason do we show a strong preference for some words and a neglect 
of others? And where in the end lies the origin of the problem or the suffering? 
Does it lie in the embodiment of an unusual sex/gender or sexual variation or in 
the shame imposed on us by people who react negatively to this variation?
If we cast an epistemological look on the way trans and intersex issues are 
often regarded, we can identify a conjunction of a developmental and a com-
plementarian understanding of sex and gender. For instance, intersex persons 
are presented by medical science as men and women whose sex development 
is incomplete, while trans persons supposedly suffer from a mental illness or 
a psychic disorder. In other words: They deviate from a course which should 
have taken them to medically defined male and female bodies, respectively as-
sociated normative masculinity and femininity, as well as heterosexuality. An 
idealized course that gives little or no room to variability. The general formula: 
‘The meaning of life is procreation’ exemplifies this developmental and comple-
mentarian view by which living organisms develop according to a program. It 
is however essential that we be aware of the teleological character of this line of 
thought as well as the fact that we have unwittingly substituted God with Nature 
as a guiding figure and organizational power of life. If we regard things from 
the perspective of purpose, goal or program we unquestioningly assume the un-
derlying existence of a sentient being that forges plans or points out directions.
Yet we do not possess the instruments to prove the existence of such a be-
ing, which only seems to be possible by a leap of faith. Maybe it is easier to com-
prehend the critique of the theological way of thinking if we apply it to an area 
which is for the most part devoid of the emotional attachment present here, such 
as astrophysics. Astrophysicists do not explain gravity with the statement that 
2 | Kuhn, T. (2012): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 50th 
Anniversary Edition.
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its purpose is to maintain order among celestial bodies. Instead they describe 
its mechanics and effects. If we transfer this insight to our subject matter then 
it is more appropriate to say that there exists a process among living organisms 
that can produce new generations. The consequence of this is that assumptions 
about incompleteness and defectiveness are defeated and require us to reflect on 
this with other terms.
This leads to the observation about the traditional differentiation between 
nature and nurture, between what biology exerts its influence on and what is 
formed and organized by society. This differentiation is often interwoven with 
the teological observation of nature in which a living organism not merely es-
tablishes a program but also what is desirable in terms of the organization of its 
life or even social life. Yet as Stephen Jay Gould pointed out appropriately: “[…] 
everything we do lies within our biological potential” (1977, p. 277), meaning 
that vastly different cultural behavior and social systems all originate from our 
collective biological fabric, which allows much variability. He also shed light on 
the values judgment scientists often make when they interpret physical traits 
and biology, calling for an ‘acknowledgment of diversity’.3 
I am not saying here that everything that a human being can imagine and 
produce is desirable and good for the ecosystem or for our individual and social 
life. Nevertheless everyone is called upon to be aware of the lens through which 
they observe issues of sex, gender and sexuality. This applies particularly to those 
who as researchers are attributed authoritativeness, since our perspectives carry 
more weight in the life and fate of people in a marginalized position. The desire 
to act for the ‘own good’ of a given population has in the course of time repeat-
edly led to injustices and traumas, as one can see with peoples divided by race, 
indigenous tribes and women, and is more than anything an expression of the 
social ideals that we cling to or have internalized, even if from time to time we 
dare to criticize them gently. As a result we think it important to carefully listen 
to the voice of people who experience precisely these issues that concern us, and 
to be prepared to see some of our most entrenched certainties shattered. It is 
through contact with diverging thoughts and ideas that our own thoughts grow 
and acquire refinement.
A special feature of the conference ‘Gender Normativity and its Effects on 
Childhood and Adolescence’ was that it brought together people with very di-
verse backgrounds and horizons. Trans persons, intersex persons and cisgender 
people4 attended, as well as parents, delivery nurses, educators, teachers and 
institutional experts from various areas. Biology, psychology, social work and sci-
3 | Stephen Jay Gould (1977): Ever Since Darwin. New York: W. W. Norton.
4 | See the contribution by Natacha Kennedy in this volume. 
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entific research came together here, since all of them are concerned with gender. 
This conference expertly emphasized the centrality of these issues in our lives, 
since binary and complementarian representations of gender dominate the lives 
of each and everyone of us, including those of trans-, intersex and cisgender 
persons.
A cultural premise in the conference program which will hopefully con- 
tribute to further discussion was revealed in the attention given to the subject of 
the well-being of gender-nonconforming children, as well as in the discussion of 
the issue of bad treatment by surrounding persons or the systemic environment 
which the so-called sex and/or gender-nonconforming child is a part of. That is 
because intellectual discipline should not do away with a commitment to the 
well-being of these children and the fulfillment of their human rights.
Criticism directed against biological determinism cannot ignore the impor-
tance of the fact that we need to initiate the debate there where it should most 
logically take place, i.e. in the discipline of biology. And examining already on-
going debates we see that there are various schools of thought competing with 
each other and producing further additional nuances (e.g. Bagemihl 1999; Faus-
to-Sterling 2000; Haraway 1991; Gould 1981; Vidal 2007; Voß 2010).5 In addition 
crucial questions concerning the concrete relation between parents and child as 
well as the way in which their adult self-forms need to be discussed. Whoever de-
viates from the sex and/or gender norm does not live in a vacuum, as the experi-
ences of parents who are often confronted with the vulnerability of their children 
show. The perspective broadens as we deal with the societal treatment of intersex 
and trans persons with particular attention to medicine and law. We can expect 
these two areas to be the focus of reflected action in the near future since many 
intersex groups from different countries worldwide have the common desire to 
protect children’s human right to bodily integrity.6 We are well-advised to delib-
erate these matters in the framework of scientific conferences and not remain 
within the closed circle of academia, but rather to act on an equal footing with 
intersex and trans persons, as well as enable the latter access to research and 
teaching. Lived-based perspectives and field research are crucial for forming a 
way of thinking that does not suffer from detachment. Moreover, people working 
in a specialized area but having never been seriously exposed to these issues and 
5 | Bagemihl, B. (1999): Biological Exuberance. Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press; Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000): Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality, 
New York: Basic Books; Gould, S. J. (1981): The Mismeasure of Man, New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Har-
away, D. J. (1991): Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, New York: Routledge; Vidal, C. (2007): Hommes, femmes: 
avons-nous le même cerveau ? Paris: Le Pommier; Voß, H.-J. (2010): Making Sex Revisited. Dekonstruktion des 
Geschlechts aus biologisch-medizinischer Perspektive, Bielefeld: transcript. 
6 | Demands concluded by the second Intersex Forum ILGA. URL: http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/news/
for_media/media_releases/intersex_forum_2012_media_release [06.09.2013].
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realities benefit from experiences or reports from intersex and trans persons far 
more than from ethereal, disconnected theories built on assumptions. For this 
reason, field and lived based experience should always be a solid part of such 
conferences in order to complement theoretical approaches. In my view this 
balance is necessary for forming enlightened and practical knowledge.
There is a final concern I wish to express here: I want to emphasize how 
important the voices of intersex and trans persons are and that they be taken 
seriously. Regardless of their level of development there are elements in their 
and our life reality that only they/we can convey since only they/we experience 
their/our own life.
For the sake of intellectual transparency, I wish to emphasize that I am shar-
ing these thoughts from the standpoint of an intersex researcher.
Janik Bastien Charlebois
Gender Identities and Human Rights1 
Jean-Paul Lehners
SUMMARY 
In the light of continuing discrimination against trans people this article ex-
plores the question which human rights are violated when trans persons still 
see themselves subjected to extensive stigmatization. The contribution discusses 
the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as well 
as the Yogyakarta Principles and ends with eleven closing remarks that outline 
a way forward for taking necessary steps to reduce still prevalent discrimination 
against trans and intersex persons.
SEX/GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The group of trans persons is not only in Luxembourg society a minority group 
that has been discriminated against and stigmatized for centuries. The preju-
dices are deeply entrenched: Trans persons are portrayed as irresolute and ec-
centric, as people without a desire to have children and thus as somebody who 
jeopardizes the future of our society. By going against all norms they threaten 
our young people. From this perspective, restrictions against trans persons are 
not seen as discrimination, since they are perceived to be sick, immoral and 
unbalanced. I here refer to the International Statistical Classification of Diseases 
and Related Health Problems of the World Health Organisation (WHO). In this 
context I would also like to mention the article “Transsexualisme et droit eu-
ropéen” which begins with the following definition: “Also known under the term 
of Harry Benjamin Syndrome, transsexualism defines itself as the unwavering 
conviction of belonging to the opposite sex, and as consequence the desire for 
1 |Original version in French.
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gender reassignment. Transsexualism is therefore seen as an illness and not as 
a perversion or a kind of homosexuality.”2 
My contribution examines the issue primarily from a human rights perspec-
tive and deals with the question which human rights are violated with respect to 
trans persons.
Before turning to a number of relevant pieces of legislation I would like to re-
fer to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
discriminatory laws and practices and actions of violence against individuals based 
on their sexual orientation and gender identity (A/HRC/19/41).3 This report has a 
chapter on violence, starting with killings, rapes and other acts of discriminatory 
violence. Navi Pillay here differentiates between two aspects of violence, physical 
and psychological, and clarifies: “These attacks constitute a form of gender-based 
violence, driven by a desire to punish those seen as defying gender norms.”4 She 
also distinguishes between ‘street’ violence and organized abuse and emphasizes 
in this context the acts of violence coming from families and communities. She 
notes: “Lesbians and transgender women are at particular risk because of gender 
inequality and power relations within families and wider society.”5 She empha- 
zises the particularly barbaric character of these acts of violence, compared to oth-
ers committed based on prejudices. In this context she also mentions the “so-called 
‘honour’ killings” carried out against those seen by family or community members 
to have brought shame or dishonour on a family.6 A further point of concern are 
the “denigration campaigns and violent threats against defenders of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender rights.”7 The report also mentions the hate rhetoric’s 
used by political and community leaders to instigate hate and violence contribut-
ing to homophobia and harassment of individuals (see ibid. pp. 11-12). The chapter 
on torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment deals pri-
marily with the dehumanization of the victim and the High Commissioner also 
emphasized the aspect of violence in detention facilities. A particular feature here 
is “the susceptibility of male-to-female trans prisoners to physical and sexual abuse 
if placed within the general prison population.”8 
Navi Pillay quotes incidents that have been reported by several special rap-
porteurs. Transsexual women for instance were deliberately beaten on their 
2 | Dubos, O. (Ed.) (2007): Sexe, sexualité et droits européens – Enjeux politiques et scientifiques des libertés 
individuelles. Paris: Edition A. Pedone, p. 55.
3 | United Nations (Ed.) (2011): Discriminatory laws and practices and actions of violence against individuals 
based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. URL: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Regular-
Sessions/Session19/A-HRC-19-41_en.pdf [27.11.2013].
4 | Ibid. p. 8.
5 | Ibid.
6 | Ibid. p. 9.
7 | Ibid. p. 11.
8 | Ibid. p. 12.
47
breasts and cheekbones in order to burst their implants and release the toxins 
into their bodies (see ibid. p. 12). Another example from El Salvador: Here a trans 
woman was placed in an all-male prison, in a cell together with gang members 
who raped her more than a hundred times, sometimes with the support of the 
prison guards (see ibid. p. 12).
The chapter about discrimination in health care points out that therapies for sex/
gender reassignment – if they exist at all – are often prohibitively expensive and only 
rarely covered by state funding or insurance. Health care personnel are often poorly 
sensitized to the needs of trans persons and lack necessary professional training. In 
addition, intersexual children which already at birth display atypical sex/gender dis-
tinguishing features, are also often discriminated against, and unnecessary surgery 
is performed on them to fix their sex and gender. The latter often happens without 
the consent of these children or that of their parents and – one could add – often 
without any knowledge of which gender identity the child will develop in the future.
Regarding discrimination in education, “it is often in the primary school 
playground that boys deemed by others to be too effeminate or young girls seen 
as tomboys endure teasing and sometimes the first blows linked to their ap-
pearance and behaviour, perceived as failing to fit in with the heteronormative 
gender identity.”9 This could also go on to include children whose gender iden-
tity deviates from the sex/gender assigned at birth, as well as those whose sex/
gender identity does not deviate but who do not act according to the still pre-
vailing stereotypes. Isolation and stigmatization engender depression and other 
health problems and contribute to absenteeism or even removal from school. In 
extreme cases they can even lead to suicide or suicide attempts.
The High Commissioner’s report also contains examples of discriminatory 
practices in the family and community. These discriminations show themselves 
in different ways, for instance by trans persons “being excluded from family 
homes, disinherited, prevented from going to school, sent to psychiatric institu-
tions, forced to marry, forced to relinquish children,10 punished for activist work 
and subjected to attacks on personal reputation.”11 Here too, the risk is high for 
women due to the deeply rooted imbalance of the genders, and their self-de-
termination is in particular jeopardy when it comes to crucial choices such as 
sexuality, reproduction and family life.
9 | Ibid. p. 19. See also International consultation on homophobic bullying and harassment in educational 
institutions, UNESCO concept note, July 2011. See Review of Homophobic Bullying in Educational Institutions. 
URL: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002157/215708e.pdf [02.12.2013]. 
10 | “Relinquish” is here most certainly meant to imply abandoning existing children rather than renouncing the 
desire to have children. This is also corroborated by the experiences of some transgender persons with children. 
The French version of this passage is less ambiguous here: “obligées d’abandonner leurs enfants”, p. 23. URL: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HR [15.12.2013].
11 | Ibid. p. 21.
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After having outlined the various forms of discrimination listed in Navi Pillay’s 
report, I will now examine how the violation of human rights of trans persons is 
addressed in a number of conventions and international norms.
First I would like to point to the issue paper12 by Thomas Hammarberg, for-
mer Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe as well as to the 
document about ‘good practices’ that was drafted at Hammarberg’s recommen-
dation. It is also necessary to examine the recommendations of the Council of 
Europe on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
or gender identity,13 as well as the publications of the European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights in Vienna. The latter was involved in 2012 in a European 
LGBT study14 which was published in 2013. In 2012, the European Commission 
also presented a document on this subject with the title “Trans and Intersex 
People. Discrimination on the Grounds of Sex, Gender Identity and Gender Ex-
pression”.15 In 2008 ILGA-Europe (The European Region of the International 
Lesbian and Gay Association) and TGEU (Transgender Europe) carried out the 
study “Transgender EuroStudy: Legal Survey and Focus on the Transgender Ex-
perience of Health Care”16 on this subject. Finally the Belgian Institute for the 
Equality of Women and Men carried out in 2009 the transgender study “Being 
Transgender in Belgium. Mapping the Social and Legal Situation of Transgender 
People”.17
All the texts mentioned above are based on the Yogyakarta Principles18 which 
I will discuss in more detail below. The idea to set these up first came from a 
coalition of NGO’s active in the area of human rights. The process of drafting 
the Yogyakarta Principles was accompanied, among others, by an international 
commission of jurists. In 2006 the idea was taken up in a speech by United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour.
12 |Hammarberg, T. (2009): Human Rights and Gender Identity. URL: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1476365 
[02.12.2013].
13 | Council of Europe (2010): Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. URL: https://
wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1606669. [02.12.2013].
14 | Agency for Fundamental Rights (Ed.) (2013): European Union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender sur-
vey - Results at a glance. URL: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu-lgbt-survey-results-at-a-glance_
en.pdf [18.03.2014].
15 | Agius, S., Tobler, C. (2011): Trans and intersex people. Discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender 
identity and gender expression. Directorate-General for Justice of the European Commission (Ed.). URL: http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/trans_and_intersex_people_web3_en.pdf [18.03.2014].
16 | Whittle, S., Turner, L., Combs, R., Rhodes, S. (2008): Transgender EuroStudy: Legal Survey and Focus on 
the Transgender Experience of Health Care. The European Region of the International Lesbian and Gay Associa-
tion/Transgender Europe (ed.). URL: http://www.pfc.org.uk/pdf/eurostudy.pdf [18.03.2014].
17 | Motmans, J. (2009): Être transgenre en Belgique. Un aperçu de la situation sociale et juridique des per-
sonnes transgenres. Institut pour l’égalité des femmes et des hommes (Ed.). URL: http://igvm-iefh.belgium.be/
fr/binaries/34%20-%20Transgender_FR_tcm337-81094.pdf [02.12.2013].
18 | The Yogyakarta Principles (2007): The Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity. URL: http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/ [27.11.2013].
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The Yogyakarta Principles fulfill three functions:
1. The mapping of human rights violations that people with different sexual 
orientation or gender identities have been subjected to.
2. The strict and clear application of international law with respect to these 
experiences.
3. The detailed description of the obligations of States to effectively guarantee 
human rights.
For 12 months, from 2006 to 2007, 29 experts from 25 countries from all regions 
of the world worked together on drawing up the principles. Communication was 
frequently effected via electronical means and a final meeting took place from 6 to 9 
November 2006 at the University Gadja Mada in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The defini-
tive text was adopted unanimously and published on 26 March 2007. The Yogyakar-
ta Principles were translated into the six official languages of the United Nations.
The text comprises 29 principles, beginning with three principles on the 
universality of human rights and their application to all human beings without 
discrimination. The principles 4-11 list the various fundamental rights, including 
the right to life, the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment, the right to security of the person, the right to privacy, the right to a 
fair trial, and the right to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The princi-
ples 12-18 emphasize the significance of nondiscrimination with respect to social, 
economic and cultural rights, including the right to adequate housing, the right 
to work, the right to social security and other social protection measures and the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health. The principles 19-21 are devoted 
to the freedom of opinion and expression, the principles 22-23 to asylum seekers 
and the principles 24-26 to the right to found a family, the right to participate in 
public life as well as the right to participate in cultural life. Principle 27 recognizes 
the right to promote human rights. And finally, the principles 28 and 29 confirm 
the importance of the accountability of those who violate these human rights.
All these principles naturally refer to those people who have a different sexu-
al orientation or gender identity that do not conform to heteronormativity.
In an article on the Yogyakarta Principles, Michael O'Flaherty,19 the rappor-
teur of the group of experts, gives a critical assessment of the principles and com-
ments that some of them could have been more extensive. For instance Principle 
18 on the role of the media does not deal with all media but only with those con-
trolled by the state. Some principles are also phrased a little vaguely. For instance 
Principle 21B on the expression and the promotion of different opinions leaves 
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the question open whether and in how far a religious community can exclude 
someone on the grounds of their sexual orientation. Other aspects are completely 
disregarded: Domestic violence in homosexual households or access to medical 
care in developing countries remain unmentioned. Also aspects discussed during 
the drafting of the text, such as the right to marriage between homosexual part-
ners, were not incorporated. The principles were phrased neutrally in terms of 
gender to avoid binary gender constructions. The result of this was however that 
there is now no explicit reference to the particular situation of women.
The dissemination of the text was extremely successful and the Yogyakarta 
Principles are mentioned in almost every document on gender identities from a 
human rights perspective. There were also official reactions from many countries, 
from the bodies of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and from civil soci-
ety. One should however also mention that the reaction to the Principles was not 
always a positive one. The American ‘Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute’ 
for instance calls it a dangerous document. Other press releases of this organiza-
tion are in the same vein and for instance condemn UN General Secretary Ban 
Ki-Moon's address in defense of LGBT rights before the Human Rights Council in 
Geneva.20 Fortunately there are also Roman Catholic organizations that distance 
themselves from the fundamentalist views of this American institute.
At this point I would like to mention only briefly the definitions of transgender 
as specified by the European Commission. It differentiates between: transsexual, 
transgender, travestite/cross dressing people, androgynous, polygender as well as 
genderqueer, agender people, gender variant and intersex people. The Yogyakarta 
Principles, which many other texts refer to, work with the following definition:
“Sexual orientation is understood to refer to each person’s capacity for profound emotional, af-
fectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different 
gender or the same gender or more than one gender. Gender identity is understood to refer to each 
person's deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond 
with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely 
chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and 
other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.”21
19 |O’Flaherty, M., Fisher, J. (2008): Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Con-
textualising the Yogyakarta Principles. In: Human Rights Law Review 8:2. Oxford, pp. 207-248.
20 |Gennarini, S. (2012): UN Secretary General Defies UN Member States on LGBT Rights and Reproductive Rights. 
URL:http://c-fam.org/en/2012/7179-un-secretary-general-defies-un-member-states-on-lgbt-rights-and-repro-
ductive-rights [18.12.2013].
21 | The Yogyakarta Principles (2007): The Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity. URL: http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/ [27.11.2013].
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In the legislative resolution of the European Parliament of 12 September 2012 
on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of vic-
tims of crime22 the gender term is used, to my knowledge for the first time, in a 
legislative text of this significance.
It should be underlined that the various human rights declarations and con-
ventions are universal – they naturally also apply to trans persons.
The first Yogyakarta Principle clearly emphasizes the right to the universal 
meaning of human rights and specifies: “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. Human beings of all sexual orientations and gender 
identities are entitled to the full enjoyment of all human rights.”23 
In the various international agreements, gender identity, as opposed to sex-
ual orientation, is rarely mentioned as a motive for discrimination. The United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights confirms: “In ad-
dition, gender identity is recognized as among the prohibited grounds of dis-
crimination; for example persons who are transgender, transsexual or intersex 
often face serious human rights violations, such as harassment in schools or in 
the work place.”24 
It is clear then that the anti-discrimination provisions, in so far as they are 
not limiting, also apply to transgender. Besides the agreements we should also 
mention the court decisions, in particular those of the Human Rights Court 
in Strasbourg, that have repeatedly dealt with transgender issues, for instance 
regarding the recognition of changed sex/gender features on identity cards or 
the question whether a total sex/gender reassignment operation can be regarded 
as a medically necessary treatment and is therefore eligible to be covered by in-
surance. This raises the question whether a person needs to undergo surgery in 
order to be able to benefit from such measures.
This is also addressed in Principle 3, one of the key Yogyakarta Principles: 
The right to recognition before the law:
“Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Persons of diverse 
sexual orientations and gender identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects of life. Each per-
son’s self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality and is one 
22 | European Parliament (2012): Legislative resolution 12.09.2012. URL: http://europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2012-0327+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [27.11.2013].
23 | The Yogyakarta Principles (2007): The Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity. URL: http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/ [27.11.2013].
24 | United Nations (2009): Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. URL: http://www1.umn.edu7humanrts/gencomm/esgencom20.html 
[10.12.2013].
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of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom. No one shall be forced to 
undergo medical procedures, including sex reassignment surgery, sterilization or hormonal therapy 
as a requirement for legal recognition of their gender identity. No status, such as marriage or par-
enthood, may be invoked as such to prevent the legal recognition of a person’s gender identity. No 
one shall be subjected to pressure to conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or gender 
identity.”25
To mention all human rights aspects with relation to transgender would exceed 
the scope of this article, which is why I will in the following discuss only the 
most important aspects:
A first example is the right to correct the registered gender on the birth 
certificate as well as the identity document. The denial of this right constitutes a 
violation of Article 8 of the European Human Rights Convention which states: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.” This is about two formal procedures, changing the first 
name and changing the registered gender. Some countries oblige these persons 
to comply with certain requirements, including undergoing sex/gender reas-
signment surgery under medical supervision, or an irreversible sterilization. 
These are often very protracted and lengthy procedures which means that peo-
ple's identity documents are withheld from them for a long time. In addition 
they have to submit themselves to physical and psychological examinations that 
do not always respect their integrity. This forms a serious infringement of peo-
ple's privacy by the state. Forcing trans persons to undergo surgery in order 
to have their registered gender changed constitutes a human rights violation. 
The same applies in the case when mentally healthy people who want to have 
their registered gender and first name changed in the civil register are obliged 
to consult a psychiatrist or psychologist in order to be issued a certificate about 
a (presumed) scientifically not conclusively established disorder.26 The familial 
consequences have also to be considered. There are countries that oblige a trans 
person who is married to a partner of the other sex/gender to get divorced for 
their new gender to be recognized.27 The problem arises in those countries that 
do not or not yet recognize same-sex marriages. Needless to say that a forced 
divorce also affects the children of such a couple.
25 | The Yogyakarta Principles (2007): The Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity. URL: http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/ [27.11.2013].
26 | Drescher, J., Cohen-Kettenis, P., Winter, S. (2012): Minding the body: Situating gender identity diagnoses 
in the ICD-11. In: International Review of Psychiatry, December 2012; 24(6), p. 573.
27 | Hammarberg, T. (2009): Human Rights and Gender Identity, 3.6. URL: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.
jsp?id=1476365 [02.12.2013], p. 21.
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Another important aspect is the access to health care. The normal medi-
cal classifications regard transsexuality as a mental disorder. Here we should 
mention in particular two international classification systems: The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Clas-
sification of Diseases (ICD) of the World Health Organisation (WHO) where 
transsexuality is listed in Chapter V (mental and behavioural disorders) in the 
category F64.28 The last mentioned classification is expected to be changed in 
2015. Are we here dealing with a stigmatization of a person on the grounds of a 
mental disorder diagnosis or does the diagnosis facilitate access to health care? 
It is a continuing debate.29
Setting a minimum age for gender assignment surgery and hormonal 
therapies constitutes a further serious restriction that does not do justice to the 
physical wellbeing and the ability to work of adult transgender persons or the 
wellbeing of a transgender child (as laid down in the Convention of the Rights 
of the Child, Art. 3), since this often increases and prolongs suffering. It would 
exceed the scope of this contribution to enter into a more detailed discussion of 
discrimination relating to access to employment, harassment and insults, acts of 
violence already described earlier, hate rhetoric against the background of trans-
phobia, i.e. the irrational fear of and/or hostility towards transgender persons or 
persons who go against traditional gender norms in other ways.30
Fear is a corollary of ignorance, which also points to the role of education. 
This brings me to a number of concluding remarks:
1. In LGBT the ‘T’, which stands for transgender persons and their concerns, 
is often given little space or even forgotten; something similar applies re-
garding the concerns of intersex persons; the concept ‘LGBT’ has not yet 
established itself comprehensively.
2. An important notion for me is that of dignity. Transgender persons deserve, 
just as anyone should, that one takes an interest in them, speaks of them, 
not in the sense of misplaced commiseration, but so that they can safeguard 
their rights. That is the advantage of a legal perspective: You can go to court 
when your rights have been violated. 
3. Besides the aspect of dignity there is the aspect of non-discrimination, of 
physical and mental integrity. But one has to transcend these notions and 
bring the concept of social justice into the equation.
28 | Ibid. p. 24.
29 | Ibid. p. 25.
30 | Ibid. p. 34.
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4. The medicalization of the transgender issue has to be re-assessed as soon as 
possible and the classification of mental disorders revised.
5. The advantage of an approach from the human rights perspective is that 
the latter is based on a whole series of declarations and conventions that 
guarantee the rights of all persons and protect against discrimination. The 
disadvantage of such an approach is that these texts often do not reflect the 
specific concerns of LGBT, and most documents of the past 60 years do not 
explicitly mention aspects of sexuality, gender identity and also the intersex 
status. In the last years, however, efforts have increased to conduct empir-
ical studies on the specific problems of LGBT that allow an approach from 
the perspective of social sciences and thus enable to break open the rigid 
frame of international norms. Such a study is the one conducted in 2012 
by the Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), which primarily focused on 
the discrimination of gays and lesbians.31 The peculiarities of bisexuals and 
transgender remained for the most part unconsidered, unless they over-
lapped with the concerns of gay or lesbian persons. This is why many trans 
persons did not care to participate in this study. So we can say that the 
personal situations of transgender people were not or not sufficiently por-
trayed. The data collected in the study are being evaluated separately since 
November 2013. In general one should note, however, that emotions and 
feelings by themselves do nothing to remedy the problems of this world, 
even though they might have an important collateral effect.
6. A further concern is that research should not limit itself to European stud-
ies. We should examine whether the LGBT categories, which could be ex-
tended by adding an I for intersex or a Q for queer, are not too eurocentrist 
or dominated by a Western perspective.
7. Guaranteeing LGBT rights occurs mostly on an international or European 
level and less so on a national one. The decisions of the Strasbourg court do 
not always go into the same direction, or as Ioanna Mincheva notes in her 
master thesis, “whose case-law is ever so often weakened by inconsistency.”32 
8. The LGBT categories are social constructs and could therefore be questioned.
9. With regard to the rather long time it is taking to put the Yogyakarta Princi-
ples into practice one should bear in mind how long it took to establish the 
dispositions for the rights of women in society. Patience is required here. A 
top-down approach is probably faster, but it does not guarantee the accep- 
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31 | Holzhacker, R. (2011): Gay Rights are Human Rights. The Framing of New Interpretations of International 
Human Rights Norms, p. 3. URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902165 [02.12.2013].
32 | Mincheva, I. (2012): Beyond equality and non-discrimination: Escaping narrow human rights framings in 
the context of sexual orientation and gender identity, p.33. URL: http://www.eiuc.org/research/publications/
ema-awarded-theses.html [02.12.2013]. 
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tance among the wider population which is still very skeptical in particular 
towards the T in LGBT.
10. I also wish to emphasize the role of Article 14 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The article mentions gender as well as any other status. 
Although the term gender identity may be included in various directives it 
will be difficult to incorporate it in the Charter of Fundamental Rights itself 
if it is the only proposed change to an article.
11. One can see the LGBT movement as a new social movement with demands 
for social justice, for participatory parity which breaks through identity 
politics – one should also observe the parallel to the women's movement 
(Mincheva 2012: 64).
Let us take a brief look into the past :33 In many countries the LGBT movement 
(initially LG) embraced the concept of identity. Activists saw their actions as part 
of the liberation movements of the 60s of the 20th century. Later the movement 
went beyond the concept of personal identity and took the demands to another 
level: The focus was now on the notion of protection of a public identity by the 
state, bringing the demands onto the level of civil law. Today it is necessary to 
move beyond the limited frame of equal treatment and non-discrimination as-
pects that the LGBT demands are still far too frequently based on. Unfortunately, 
it is often vague or general recommendations that win through instead of refor-
mulating or deconstructing them to promote a better understanding. In addition 
to the emotional and personal claims to equity and fairness that invoke an inner 
sense of right and wrong, academic research should be encouraged in the field of 
social theory. We should, as Mincheva emphasizes, “move beyond looking at the 
LGBT movement through the prism of victimisation and start viewing it instead 
as a legitimate branch of new social movements, with a unique complexity and 
implications for the social and political environment.”34 
33 | Holzhacker, R. (2011): Gay Rights are Human Rights. The Framing of New Interpretations of International 
Human Rights Norms, S. 3. URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902165 [02.12.2013].
34 | Mincheva, I. (2012): Beyond equality and non-discrimination: Escaping narrow human rights framings in 
the context of sexual orientation and gender identity, p. 67. URL: http://www.eiuc.org/research/publications/
ema-awarded-theses.html [02.12.2013].
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This contribution written from the perspective of a Luxembourg politician with 
considerable national and international experience explores the question of what 
is needed to accept and respect being different. The contribution emphasizes 
that – as the history of the 20th century pointedly shows – in democratic na-
tions legal provisions alone, despite their undisputed necessity, are not sufficient 
to prevent discrimination, but that a humanistically constituted public spirit is 
needed which objects and revolts when human beings continue to be subjected 
to discrimination on the grounds of supposed deviations from the norm.
THE SEX/GENDER ISSUE AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
First of all I would like to remark that I feel somewhat insecure among this 
academic community. Due to my farming background I may not be able to mus-
ter the necessary sensitivity in dealing with the subject of your colloquium. For 
this reason I would instead prefer to endorse here what has already been said 
before. As a non-member of your scientific community, but as a member of the 
European parliament, I would like to share with you my convictions regarding 
this subject.
I thought I would be able to do this with a little understanding and a lit-
tle empathy. Moreover, I have also accustomed myself to not attaching exces-
sive value to polls. When, for instance, a survey indicates that only a small 
minority of five percent of the population regard themselves as openly racist, 
this is for me no reason not to be worried. In Luxembourg five percent equal 
1 | Original version in French.
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25 000 people. Very much in contrast to a purely quantitatively-oriented statistical 
evaluation, this for me means that we have 25 000 reasons to be worried.
I can image this is not much different regarding the trans issue. There is 
no lack of paragraphs and legislation against discrimination on the grounds of 
race or invalidity, or, as in this case, against discrimination on the grounds of sex 
and gender. What we need is an acceptance of otherness and the respect towards 
others. One of the most significant texts in this regard are the recommendations 
of the Council of Europe of 2010 already mentioned by Jean-Paul Lehners.2 Let 
us also not forget the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and the EU treaty which secure the principle of non-discrimination. This raises 
the question with which tools we can engage ourselves in the most efficient way 
for an acceptance of otherness and against discrimination. In my view there are 
two different possibilities: First of all, discrimination has to be fought with legal 
steps, i.e. on the basis of pertinent legislation that, if necessary, has to provide for 
punitive measures. In this sense both the work of the Council of Europe as well 
as that of the European Union is contributing in creating a very valuable judicial 
area for people, a judicial area we can now enjoy.
Even if non-discrimination today represents one of the most significant 
achievements of the European Union we should not forget that in some coun-
tries that have meanwhile joined the EU homosexuality was considered an in-
dictable offence until the end of the 1990s. This absurdity could even go as far 
as combatting homosexuality with medication. Since then we have made con-
siderable progress in the respect of fundamental rights. I wish to emphasize 
that without the particular influence of the Copenhagen criteria that make the 
principle of non-discrimination a condition for EU membership this would not 
have been possible. It has to be noted here that some of the fundamental rights 
laid down in the European Human Rights Convention had been a dead letter 
before their inclusion in the Copenhagen criteria. A similar case is the abolition 
of the death sentence in Turkey. In the light of the currently existing legislation 
and practices persons who violate the principle of non-discrimination cannot 
plead attenuating circumstances, even though there continues to be room for 
improvement, as Professor Lehners has so eloquently shown. Nevertheless we 
could be tempted to assume that everything seems to be in perfect order.
But are we really immune against regressions in the area of non-discrimi-
nation? In my view we must not let down our shields. The applicable law only 
remains in force until it is changed. Far from wishing to trivialize this idea, the 
reality of the 20th century, in particular the 1930s, reminds us over and over 
2 | See the article from Jean-Paul Lehners in this publication.
59The Gender Issue, a Question of Non-Discrimination
again that the most serious attacks against civil liberties can be launched from 
the legislative organs themselves. For this reason attitudes that counteract the 
spirit and the contents of applicable legislative provisions have to be dealt with 
from the outset. The dehumanization process Europe’s authoritarian regimes 
gradually led their citizens into should stir us to heightened vigilance. Numer-
ous voices remind us that this dehumanization, characteristic for the 1930s and 
1940s, did not come about overnight, but rather through an insidious process of 
successive curtailing of civil liberties und fundamental rights. As we know, not 
only Jews were murdered in Auschwitz but also thousands of individuals who 
had become victims of discrimination on the grounds of their sex and gender.
With my second point I would like to emphatically remind ourselves that 
it is not sufficient to take a formal legalistic stance in these matters. If such 
a stance is understood as acting in accordance with the law then the question 
arises whether the law actually carries values of tolerance and respect towards 
minorities. In a society where the number of legal regulations, regimentations, 
rules and guidelines is on a continuous increase the conformity to the legal re-
gime is less significant than its actual contents. This means that a society based 
on these fundamental values such as ours should be able to always stand up 
in protest and revolt whenever these legal foundations are called into question.
Civil disobedience then means opposing such laws if they go against ethi-
cal principles. The crimes committed against humanity in the recent past have 
underscored the vulnerability of our societies. The crucial question here is how 
normal people behave in unusual situations. When drawing lessons from the 
history of the 20th century we also have to discuss how it was possible that a 
climate of tolerance and respect of human dignity came to be destroyed. In other 
words: “We have to nip these sort of things in the bud”. Seen this way, a vigilant 
civil society is more essential for the protection of our fundamental rights than 
opportunistic protest movements.
Europe possesses guidelines for the respect of fundamental rights as well 
as a strong will to use these as a fundamental principle for action. The European 
system, far from perfect, is nevertheless making progress. Let us therefore ask by 
which means already accomplished achievements can be secured permanently.
There are many, such as the French historian Georges Bensoussan, who as-
sume that the major crimes against humanity and in particular the Shoah were 
favoured by several interwoven factors; factors that also strongly mark our period.
A totally organized state, a collective conformism reinforced through mass me-
dia, the fragmentation of responsibilities and assignment of disjointed task ar-
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eas to individuals who were unaware of the impact of their limited perspective 
on the rest of society, have led to the most horrific crimes in the history of man-
kind. The continuing technological advances of the 21st century and the special 
role of social networks cannot provide absolute protection of our rights and lib-
erties. There is no alternative to a critical public spirit. A society that has commit-
ted itself in its entirety to humanism and is capable of rising in protest when a 




The Concept of Human Gender:  
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Michael Groneberg
SUMMARY 
This contribution presents a terminology intended to permit an adequate de-
scription of the realities of inter and trans persons. The epistemological appro-
priateness creates, at the same time, a basis for acquiring a fitting ethical attitude 
towards these persons. To this end, it is argued to be necessary to make a clear 
distinction between the concepts of ‘sexuality’ and of ‘gender’2 and to acknowl-
edge a third, phenomenal dimension of gender besides the physical and social 
one. It is argued that a person’s experienced gender should be accepted as their 
gender. Since the experienced gender is often understood as gender identity, 
which also induces criticism, the contribution concludes by presenting argu-
ments in favor of conceiving the experienced or psychological dimension of gen-
der as an identity.
INTRODUCTION
Philosophy does not only, but first of all deal with concepts. Words are impor-
tant, particularly in everyday and public communication, but concepts are equal-
ly important in scientific and ethical respects. Different words or expressions3 
such as hermaphrodite, intersexual or person with a sex development variation 
evoke different images and connotations for the same subject area and produce 
1 | Original version in German.
2 | In this contribution, the term ‘gender’ also implies the physical dimension usually named ‘sex’ in English, 
as will be argued for. On the level of words, any derivative of ‘sex’ will be avoided when talking of the domain of 
gender, in order to clearly distinguish the two subject matters. The author thus proposes a terminological strat-
egy that differs from that of the editors. His perspective is inspired by historical conceptual research showing 
that since Antiquity, matters of gender (being female, male or other) have always been reduced to matters of 
sexuality (intercourse, fertility, procreation), thus obliterating a proper investigation of the problems of inter or 
trans persons.
3 | An expression is a word or combination of several words.
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different value judgments. Between the words and the objects signified by them, 
the concept reflects our understanding of this object.4 Since a term does not have 
a meaning but in connection with others, we denote by ‘terminology’ the frame-
work of terms (in the sense of concepts), that structures a subject area.
When the terminology is not appropriate to a subject matter, the latter is un-
derstood incorrectly or not at all. As a result, we cannot do justice to the objects 
or we even violate them by attempting to align them to our terminology. The 
following analysis of concepts is therefore not only of epistemological but also 
of ethical relevance.5 It can contribute to avoiding violence – including symbolic 
violence – rooted in ignorance, and to reducing the suffering of persons who are 
subjected to inappropriate terminologies.
A glance at the numerous publications on the subject of gender reveals 
the following issue: Many texts in a wide range of disciplines use the triad sex/
gender/sexuality (or in German: körperliches Geschlecht/soziales Geschlecht/
Sexualität) for describing a person’s sexual and/or gender constitution. This tri-
partition is confusing and does not correspond to any scientifically grounded 
and ethically justifiable terminology. The conceptualization presented now aims 
at satisfying these requirements.
As a first step it is necessary to make a clear analytical distinction between 
the concept of ‘sexuality’ and that of ‘gender’ (social, phenomenal and physical, 
i.e. including the so-called ‘sex’). It is important to avoid mixing them, as for 
instance Hirschfeld (1914: ch. 19) has done with his concept of ‘intermediate 
stages of sexuality’ under which he subsumed homosexuals, transvestites and 
hermaphrodites, as if they manifested comparable phenomena with a common 
etiology.
Following this line of thought, we are confronted with the question what 
could serve as umbrella term for ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’. Since the disciplines 
that deal with sexuality, such as medicine and sexual studies, also address issues 
of gender, such as inter or trans gender topics, under the heading of sexuality, 
it seems appropriate to take ‘sexuality’ as a broadly conceived notion that also 
includes issues of gender.
On the other hand, gender studies not only analyze gender, social and physi-
cal, but also sexuality in a narrow sense, such that in this domain, ‘gender’ seems 
to be the general term.6
4 | Term and concept are roughly used as synonyms in this text, although term is more ambiguous in that it can 
mean both word and concept.
5 | The analysis was already carried out in Groneberg 2003, 2008, 2012a, 2012b, 2014 and 2015, however with-
out defending the identity aspect of the experienced gender.
6 | See Christel Baltes-Löhr’s contribution in this publication: Always gender – always different.
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Even if the umbrella term varies relative to disciplines and discourses, it con-
tains, in each case, the reference to both domains, that of gender and that of 
sexuality. The relationship of terms is thus the following:
7 | See Foucault 1984.
8 | The English language renders difficult the necessary distinction between what there is (entities, phenom-
ena) and the theories about it (ontology, phenomenology, psychology etc.). The term ‘phenomenal’ refers to 
self-conscious experience, that is, to a person’s inner life or psyche. In German and French ‘psychisch’ or ‘psy-
chique’ would be adequate adjectives, but the English ‘psychic’ does not work, for obvious reasons, neither does 
‘mental’. ‘Psychological’, on the other hand, refers to the discipline of psychology, as ‘phenomenological’ refers 
to the philosophical discipline of phenomenology, which tries to verbalize and conceptualize the experiences 
of the life-world. In any case, life-world experience (the phenomenal) is not to be reduced to what scientific or 
philosophical disciplines say concerning it.
Sexuality / 
Gender in the 
broadest sense
Gender: 




Figure 1: Differentiation of Gender and Sexuality.
What is at stake in the following analysis is not the umbrella term but the separa-
tion of issues of gender in the narrow sense from those of sexuality in the narrow 
sense. Hence, sexuality and gender are always understood in their narrow sense 
unless specified otherwise.
Since this contribution is about the conceptualization of gender, the subject 
of sexuality will only be briefly mentioned now in order to demarcate the subject 
matter. In its area are discussed questions of sexual orientation, sexual identi-
ties, sexual preferences as well as the social organization, cultural norming and 
historical development of what we today refer to as sexual intercourse or sex, 
conceived in medieval times as carnal desire and in Greek and Roman Antiquity 
as matters of Aphrodite or Venus.7
In a second step we need to complement the conceptualization of gender, 
within which the differentiation of physical and social gender (‘sex’ and ‘gender’) 
is widely acknowledged, by the third element of the experienced, phenomenal8 
or psychological.
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Gender is thus differentiated as follows: 
Figure 2: Dimensions of Gender: physical or bodily gender / ‘sex’; psychological - experi-
enced or phenomenal gender identity 9; social gender.10
9 | ‘Gender identity’ is a term used in legal texts, in psychology and phenomenology, i.e. it is a juridical, 
psychological and phenomenological term conceived to express a part of personal experience (not to be 
confused with the sociological term denoting social gender identity).
10 | This is formulated on a disciplinary background that presumes as generally recognized the distinction 
of physical and social gender, which is at least the case in social sciences and Gender Studies, where the 
psychological dimension needs to be respected in its own right in order to obtain the proposed triangula-
tion. Psychology, medicine and law, on the other hand, recognize the psychological gender identity as a 
self-evident factor, such that only the distinction of social and physical gender need be recognized, as well 
as the descriptive independence of the psychological from the physical and social.









Every person occupies, at a given moment, a particular place in each of the three 
dimensions that are, in turn, each differently structured. The physical (syno-
nyms: corporal, somatic) dimension assembles a series of somatic features 
connoted with gender: gonads, chromosomes, internal and external sexual or-
gans as well as physique/build. The physical so-called sex, also misleadingly 
referred to as biological sex, is in itself multidimensional. By contrast, the so-
cial dimension is, in our ‘Western’ culture, one-dimensional and marked by the 
male/female dichotomy, traditionally ruled by a logic of either/or excluding any 
in-between. Third genders are known in many cultures, however (Herdt 1996). 
Current amendments to existing laws that provide for a third gender entry are 
also moving away from the exclusive dichotomy.11 Finally, the third phenomenal 
dimension, i.e. the self-experience of the individual, reflects the social dichotomy 
with its traditional expectations to be either male or female on the one hand, and 
the development of the own physical gender characteristics on the other, without 
being determined by it in every person. 
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Inter persons are confronted with physical developments with contradictory 
gender coding (the social aspect). Their self-experience confronts us with the 
question of the possible self-positioning (the phenomenal aspect). Studies show 
that the social dichotomy is not always reproduced one to one by the subject’s 
self-experience, but can be broken up into a bipolar continuum.12 But masculin-
ity and femininity can also be represented on two independent coordinate axes. 
Such independence requires to no longer see masculinity and femininity as op-
posite ends of a spectrum. Moving a step further, the question arises whether, 
corresponding to the physical multidimensionality, a multidimensional self-po-
sitioning is also to be considered as a possibility (living oneself as a puzzle). In 
this regard we should expect more insights from future empirical longitudinal 
research on inter and trans gender issues.
12 | See Quindeau 2012; Giordano 2008.
13 | Self-help groups use the term Zwischengeschlecht (see www.zwischengeschlecht.org) in German speaking 
contexts. Using the term Intergeschlecht has the advantage of corresponding to the English and French terms 
intergender and intergenre. Both terms are currently used as synonyms.
14 | See in particular de Beauvoir who developed this aspect for the first time in phenomenology in her “Le 
deuxième sexe” (1949).
THE DISTINCTION OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY
The situation of inter and trans persons can be understood independently of a 
reference to issues of their sexuality. Their constitution is not defined as sexu-
al, but as gender-based. The conceptual separation of gender and sexuality has 
consequences for the choice of words: Instead of transsexuality the term ‘trans’ 
or ‘transgender’ is increasingly used, and instead of intersexuality the term ‘in-
tergender’ should be used, if we follow this line of thought.13
The ambiguity of the English and French words ‘sex’ and ‘le sexe’, which de-
note the physical sexual apparatus as part of the physical gender on the one hand, 
and intercourse on the other (in German: das Geschlecht and Geschlechtsver-
kehr), has contributed to reducing one area to the other: the physical gender dif-
ference has been related to sex in the sense of sexual practices, the topic woman 
has – in a male heterosexual perspective – been reduced to the topic intercourse, 
and sexuality has been narrowed down in a phallocentric way. These ambiguities 
and reductions tend to reinforce the still common confusions of trans persons, 
so-called transsexuals, with homosexuals, and of inter persons, so-called inter-
sexuals, with bisexual persons. Moreover, the distinction of gender and sexual-
ity allows us to formulate empirical relations between the two areas that have 
been established since the last century in science and philosophy: gender dif-
ferences between man and woman do not only concern the area of sexuality;14 
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the gender of an individual does not determine their sexual orientation, iden-
tity or preference;15 gender assignment surgery in children can have disastrous 
consequences for their sexual sensibility later in life.16 The desire of trans per-
sons for a reassignment of their somato-social gender is not motivated by their 
sexuality but rather by their need to make their somato-social gender existence 
correspond to their self-experience.17
Last not least, it is important to distinguish gender and sexuality, because 
the conceptual and imaginary connection of trans- and inter gender with collec-
tive erotic phantasms is deeply rooted in the traditional discourses and practices 
of our culture and has obscured the understanding of their real situation. The 
terms ‘androgynous’ and ‘hermaphrodite’ have since classical Greek antiquity 
denoted real and fictional bi-gendered persons who symbolized the sexual and/
or marital union of man and woman. The remnants of this connotation of the 
hermaphrodite with sexual matters have impeded scientific understanding of 
the life realities of trans and inter persons well into the 20th century.18
The three components of sex/gender
If sexuality as a separate domain is secluded from the conceptual triad ‘sex/gender/
sexuality’, a theory of the genderedness of human beings (in the narrow sense) 
is left with the notions of physical and social gender. As is evident in the cases 
of trans and inter persons, however, a person’s gender constitution is not fully 
described by referring only to the corporeal and the social.19 For in that case 
it is neglected how persons establish themselves, i.e. how they experience and 
define themselves: as a girl or as a boy or as something else. The gender that is 
assigned after birth and then trained and acted out, can deviate from how the 
child experiences itself – regardless of whether social and physical gender are 
concordant or not.
The psychological gender
The experienced subjective gender has to be regarded as the defining criterion 
of a person’s gender.20 The last century’s failed attempts at an alternative defini-
tion have shown that a person’s gender is not defined by social gender identity 
nor by physical features such as chromosomes, gonads or build, nor by their 
15 | As assumed by Ulrichs (1864) (see Groneberg 2008); Butler 1993, ch.8, pp.181 ff.
16 | See German Ethics Council, NEK statement, Richter-Appelt 2008, Schweizer/Richter-Appelt 2012.
17 | See the contributions in this volume with references to new literature; Groneberg 2003, 2008.
18 | See Groneberg 2008a, 2009, 2014, 2015.
19 | Details and literature in Groneberg 2003 und 2008.
20 | This does not depend on the term used by the persons to name what we here call gender; if they refuse the 
term gender and talk of sex, then their experienced ‘sex’ is what should be accepted as defining their gender.
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combination.21 The fact that an individual’s gender cannot be defined somato-so-
cially (through physical gender features and social gender) does not exclude the 
possibility that the psychological gender interacts with somato-social compo-
nents or is even caused or determined by them in certain persons. But what, 
in the final analysis, has to be acknowledged as a person's gender is the one 
experienced by that person – and this is an entity within her psyche –, formed 
in the first years of life on the basis of one’s individual corporeality and of one’s 
interactions.22 As a consequence, when human beings are born they do not yet 
have their gender.23 
The acknowledgement of this third element, the experienced gender, is epis-
temologically necessary in order to adequately describe the lived gender realities 
of trans and inter persons in all their complexity. It also lays the foundation for 
an appropriate ethical attitude that leads to respecting individuals’ genderedness 
instead of violating them or denying them help and assistance.
Acknowledging experience as defining a person’s gender (or so-called sex) 
implies a revision of our understanding of the gender of every human being: 
Being a woman, a man or else is not to be understood as a physiological given 
nor as a social fact, nor as a combination of both, but ultimately as a question 
of subjective experience influenced by corporeality and sociality. However, the 
acknowledgement of the psychological dimension, analytically an obvious step 
to take, continues to be the object of a struggle over definitional sovereignty, i.e. 
over who has the power to define if someone is to be regarded as female or male 
or other. This power, which in modern times had been delegated to medicine 
(see Foucault 1978), was questioned in the course of the 20th century by the 
social sciences and feminism by invoking social gender against the biological 
(‘sex’). All positions, however, have a hard time transferring the power of defi-
nition to the individuals themselves. As current legal discourses illustrate, the 
experienced gender can be regarded as the place where the protection of the 
individual against somato-social ordering tendencies is anchored.24 Only when 
sexuality and gender are decoupled conceptually and the individual’s self-expe-
rience is acknowledged as an indispensable descriptive and defining factor, can 
inter and trans genderedness be described and understood adequately. This is 
the necessary condition for resolving the issues of violence related to the previ-
ously used terminology.
21 | Details in Klöppel 2002; Groneberg 2008.
22 | Formulated for the first time in this way in Groneberg 2003.
23 | In how far the future gender identity is already prenatally inherent or predetermined at birth is a question 
that the empirical sciences need to answer.
24 | For details see the end of this contribution: Legal and ethical anchor point.
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Inter persons (‘Intersex’)
A plurality of physical features, primarily chromosomes, gonads, internal and 
external genitalia and build, but also voice and movements are gender coded, i.e. 
coded as male or female. Intergender is defined purely on this physical level as 
non-concordance, discordance or incongruence of the primary sexual traits. This 
means that an inter person is living with physical gender features of a contrary 
gender coding, for instance with female breasts and internally located testicles. 
The discordance does not need to be manifest for the individuals or their sur-
roundings. If it is or comes to be this way it can result in problems for gender 
identity on a psychological or a social level or both – but these consequences do 
not define their constitution (Groneberg 2008; 2009; 2012a; 2012b).
Trans persons
Trans can also be defined as non-congruence. Often it is understood as one be-
tween the subjectively experienced and the physical gender, as a conflict between 
the phenomenal and the physical dimension. Trans people can indeed suffer 
from this, but the cause of their suffering can just as well lie in the discordance 
between their psychological and their assigned social gender identity.25 We could 
also speak of a conflict of these two identities, suggested by the alternative term 
of ‘transidentity’. In any case, the constitution of transgender or transidentical 
persons cannot be characterized, like that of inter persons, within only one di-
mension. It is rather an incongruence between the psyche on the one hand and 
the body26 and/or sociality on the other.27 As the opposite pole to transidentity, 
the term ‘cisidentity’ (Sigusch 1991) refers to people whose experienced gender 
conforms to their somato-social one (without preceding reassignment). A fur-
ther term is ‘person with AGIO’ – the acronym stands for ‘atypical gender iden-
tity organization’ (German: Atypische Geschlechts-Identitäts-Organisation’), 
coined by Giordano in 2008. The conceptual pair discordant-concordant has an 
advantage over atypical-typical in not referring to normality and in naming, with-
out pathologizing, the specific cause of the suffering or the pressure to act. The 
term ‘transman’ and ‘transwoman’ describe the two most frequent forms of liv-
ing trans. They are to be understood as abbreviations for a man or a woman with 
25 | This definition also covers the so-called forced transsexuality, if inter children and persons who have been 
assigned medically or educationally to one gender (i.e. who are equipped with either a male or a female social 
identity), cannot identify with it.
26 | ‘Body’ can be rendered in German by Körper or Leib, terms that are generally, as in the original German 
version of this contribution, used synonymously. The same applies for the nouns Psyche and Seele (‘psyche’ and 
‘soul’) and the adjectives and adverbs derived from them, psychisch and seelisch (‘psychological’). The latter 
denote (self)consciousness, (self)awareness, the ‘internal’, experience, qualia and so on and do not imply any 
theological or metaphysical claims like immortality. The soul is the object domain of psychology, psychoanalysis 
or psychiatry and of the philosophical domain of phenomenology.
27 | Giordano (2008:269) assumes that the suffering can already begin at the age of four or five.
Michael Groneberg
71
a trans constitution. A transwoman experiences a female gender identity that 
does not correspond to her somato-social gender at first, but that does so after a 
desired transition. By contrast, the abbreviations MTF (male to female) and FTM 
(female to male) do not refer to the experienced but to the ‘objectively’ observed 
somato-social dimension. Hence, a post-OP transwoman is called MTF. These 
expressions are appropriate for describing the purely external gender transition 
in absence of knowledge about the person’s experienced gender, for instance if 
it is imposed. Finally, there is also talk of a social gender identity. If we use this 
term, we have to keep in mind, however, that ‘social identity’ is a different term 
than ‘psychological identity’. Both concepts have in common to denote stabili-
ty: From a certain age onwards, most people are either identifiable as male or 
female for the rest of their lives; in that sense they have a stable social gender 
identity – even if the latter does not correspond to the individual’s experienced 
gender, the one assigned by the outside is (at least initially) in general acted out.
The physical level is the only one among the three where we cannot speak 
of an identity, but only of a series of gender features that are more or less concor- 
dant among each other and with the social and psychological gender identities.
Trans is often misunderstood: Trans persons have not necessarily changed 
their physical sex, i.e. have acquired via surgery and hormones the physical features 
of the opposite sex. Trans persons should not be reduced to a performed physical 
gender reassignment. The term ‘trans’, with respect to a person, says that the psy-
chological gender and the somato-social gender of that person can only correspond 
after a transition of the latter. Before this transition is performed, the trans person 
may possibly experience agonizing conflicts that may even lead to suicidal tenden-
cies. The term sex change is also frequently used. It is questionable, since it pre-
sumes that there are two sexes and that a change is made, or planned to be made, 
from one to the other, implying that the target sex constitutes a point of attraction. 
However, other identities (e.g. androgynous combinations of male and female) are 
not mere theoretical possibilities, but observable, and not only in cases of inter per-
sons.28 Hence we have to ask, concerning every trans person, whether the prevail-
ing physical gender features do not rather constitute a point of repulsion, because 
they do not conform to the experienced gender identity. In other words, we have to 
distinguish whether a person wants to transition to the opposite gender or rather 
wants to discard their own physical gender. In case the latter is still developing 
during puberty, the person might want to prevent its further reinforcement, which 
is experienced as alien and repulsive. Finally, it is important to assess whether the 
trans person needs a reassignment of the physical gender. For even if this may be so 
in most cases, possibly the person only needs another social gender identity.
28 | See Quindeau 2012; Giordano 2008.
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REASONS FOR INTERPRETING THE EXPERIENCED GENDER AS IDENTITY
The self-experienced gender is mostly denoted by the expression ‘gender iden-
tity’, which is also the target of strong criticism, particularly from within the so-
cial sciences.29 We confront a problem of interdisciplinary communication here, 
since social sciences and psychology employ different concepts of identity. For 
the benefit of promoting a constructive interdisciplinary discussion and mutual 
understanding, I will in the following name the most important reasons for con-
sidering the experienced gender as an identity.
Stability
Psychological and philosophical concepts of identity imply the continuity and 
stability of a property30 across various moments and contexts. Experiencing one-
self as belonging to a gender does as a rule not change like the mood of the day 
and can in that sense be considered as an identity. Being cheerful or sad, or 
having mood swings are accidental features, i.e. they come and go. They become 
a feature of a person’s identity only if the mood or its swinging is permanently 
present. The self-experience as male or female is connected with an open-ended 
complex of self-positioning, choice of dress, physical comportment, behavior, 
ways of speaking etc. In this respect one usually adopts a long-term and stable 
stance.31 A person’s gender is not simply a characteristic like any other, but a 
permanent and rather stable feature which justifies calling it identity: it usually 
stays identical over long periods of time.
According to this terminology, we can say that if a trans person succeeds 
in making their social gender identity correspond to their self-experienced gen-
der, the psychological gender identity possesses a higher stability than the social 
one. In such cases it is adequate to speak of a change of identity and not of a ‘sex 
change’. Trans gender and transidentity can therefore be considered synonymous 
expressions, if we bear in mind that it is the social gender identity that is changed 
or performs a transition,32 while the psychological one remains constant.
Concerning the social dimension, the main objects of criticisms are role 
attributions as well as the partly violent imposition of social identities, as demon-
strate the therapeutic guidelines for the treatment of inter children in the last 
29 | See for instance Klöppel 2002.
30 | ‘Property’ (syn. ‘quality’) is here to be understood in a philosophical (more precisely ontological) sense, 
i.e. as distinguished from objects, events, points in time or other types of entities.
31 |If a person should continually change her (social or psychological) gender as others change their mood, then this 
transtemporal feature would constitute her gender identity.
32 |Phrased in role jargon, the person takes on the male or female gender role. I do not use role terminology here 
because there is a wide range of male or female role expectations and roles to be played (mother, lover, sister ...), 
addressed to persons who have already been pre-identified as either male or female. It is this prior gender identity 
present in the social space, which can deviate from the psychological identity that is questioned here.
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century. With respect to gender, this concerns the historically and culturally 
variable gender roles, but also social gender identity, for the attribution of gen-
der specific roles to persons presupposes their identification as male or female. 
However, this criticism of identity-impositions only concerns the social and not 
the psychological dimension. Moreover, we should bear in mind that psychologi-
cal concepts of identity differ generally from those of the social sciences.
The endeavor to minimize the importance of social gender identity, for in-
stance by deleting the gender entry in personal documents, insurance or appli-
cation papers, in no way excludes appreciating the fact that persons in a given 
gender system can have problems in finding a place that corresponds to their 
experienced gender identity. 
The expression ‘psychosocial gender identity’ does not constitute a compro-
mise, but rather confuses analytically what should be distinguished. At best it can 
be used where psychological and social identity concord; it is thus precisely not suit-
able for an adequate conceptualization of the realities of trans and inter persons.
The term ‘sexual identity’ is sometimes used to denote gender identity, but 
mostly for the identification of a person as homo- or heterosexual, the current-
ly still dominant distinction in the area of sexuality. As stated above, the term 
should for reasons of clarity remain reserved for the discussion of sexuality, 
which would contribute to putting an end to the already mentioned confusion 
of trans genderedness with homosexuality and of inter genderedness with bi-
sexuality. While trans and inter persons do have specific problems with sexual 
categorizations, their situations are not defined by these.
The subject’s autodetermination
Psychological gender identity is to be understood, more so than the social one, 
as the result of a construction process the individual participates in. This implies 
a departure from role theories that presume social role expectations to be simply 
adopted by the subject. The psychological gender identity is the temporary result 
of a process and is produced by individuals engaging with their surroundings.33 
It is an individual effort ,34 which does not mean, however, that it is a matter of 
33 | According to Money/Hampson/Hampson (1957) at the age of 18 months to 3 years; Kreisler (1973, p. 
186) mentions two and a half years; according to Beier/Bosinski/Loewit (2005, p. 99) children can tell the dif-
ference between men and women at 18 months, and at three and a half years that they themselves will one day 
be a man or a woman. Money and Ehrhardt (1973) assume that the “gate to gender identity” remains open for 
a year after birth, but then closes forever. Cases of changing psychological gender identity of intersex persons 
contradict this assumption, as well as the identity theories of Erikson, Habermas or Kohnstamm (see Rieben 
2008, p. 172) or the theory of Stoller (1968).
34 | According to Rieben (2008, p. 173). The result is based on a broad analysis of the different psychological 
identity concepts, drawing on Piaget, Kohlberg, Erikson, Habermas, including Oerter, as well as concepts of 
gender identity and the interplay of social, personal and I-identity. For the development of psychoanalytical 
theory see Eckert (2010) or Quindeau (2012).
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random choice. Psychological gender identity is just as far from being some-
thing essential or natural as nationality is. Whoever insists on understanding 
identity in an essentialist way, i.e. as preordained and immutable, cannot do 
justice to the lived gender realities. We know that for inter persons the self-posi-
tioning in the gender system can take longer than usual, that it can (particularly 
in puberty) change and that it can deviate from male or female.35 
We also know that trans people’s adaptations of their somato-social gender 
to their psychological gender identity do not necessarily remain within the gen-
der dichotomy. Even when complete concordance in the physical dimension is 
given, the self-positioning can adopt intermediary values on an assumed contin-
uum between male and female or even go beyond this range (see above).36 
Independence from the somato-social gender
Acceptance of the psychological dimension of gender expresses respect for the 
special way of being of the particular person we are facing. This being cannot 
be reduced to the person’s physical features or social position or, for that matter, 
to categories of the natural and the social sciences. Acceptance has not yet been 
achieved, however, if one only respects the experienced gender of the other as a 
feeling. Identity is more than merely a feeling or an impression of something 
that is somato-socially given. If one were to describe the situation of a trans boy 
as the feeling of a somato-socially clearly female young person of being a boy, 
this could – as has been the case for a long time – be interpreted as a delusion.37 
Experiences, impressions, feelings may change, they can delude and lead astray. 
The psychological concept of identity, by contrast, denotes a psychological re-
ality that has highly positive significance for the individual. Thus understood, 
the concept of gender identity safeguards against the error of taking gender as 
something naturally given and of which the experienced gender would be purely 
a mental representation. For we may be inclined to see psychological gender as a 
pure proprioception, i.e. as a self-perception of one’s own body. This view should 
be questioned, however, since it ignores the complexity of the human being. The 
conscious self-experience of its own gender is conveyed to every child from the 
very beginning through sociocultural interpretation patterns, so that it can never 
be a pure proprioception of the body. It is always also a positioning in the sur-
rounding gender system, with all its accompanying meanings and implications 
35 | See Beier/Bosinski/Loewit 2005, p. 62; Quindeau 2012, pp. 126 and 129; Richter-Appelt 2008, p. 59; 
Schweizer/Richter-Appelt 2012; Stoller 1968; Guhde (2002) describes a lived intergender identity.
36 | Giordano 2008, p. 253.
37 | In 1956 Jean-Marc Alby, a psychiatrist working with Lacan, introduced the term of transsexuality in the 
psychiatric nosography and treated it as a delusion (Fautrat 2001, p. 25).
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of having to fit into a category, of having to be a girl, daughter, woman, potential 
mother, to wear pink dresses, to play with dolls etc., if you have a vagina; and if 
you have a penis, to be a boy, son, man, conqueror, potential hero, ruffian etc. 
As soon as proprioception reflects one’s own physical gender in one’s mind, 
these features and expectations found in the surrounding gender system are 
applied to oneself. But even this always already interpreted proprioception does 
not stand by itself but is accompanied by acceptance or refusal. The acceptance, 
up to the love for one’s own physical gender features, is mostly too obvious to 
be noticed. In the case of trans persons, rejection can be profound, up to being 
repulsed by one’s own bodily gender features and/or the position these imply in 
the given gender system. In contrast to proprioception that presents the body to 
the mind, gender identity contains the judgmental and emotional appropriation 
or rejection of one’s own physical gender. When hormonal changes of the body 
occur, the individual proprioception also changes, and with it the knowledge of 
what it means to have a female body, or a male body, or an intergender body, 
and this is possible without a change in the awareness of being a girl or being a 
boy.38 Only by differentiating the aspect of self-experience in gender-based pro-
prioception on the one hand and gender identity on the other, are we capable of 
understanding and describing the situation of trans people adequately, without 
considering them as delusional or otherwise pathological. In inter adolescents it 
is in particular during puberty, due to the contradictory corporeal signals, that a 
questioning of their experienced gender identity is to be expected. Inter persons 
then have to re-establish, as they already did in early childhood, their place in the 
existing gender system.
Legal and ethical anchor point
The human right to live according to one’s own gender ties in with the psycho-
logical gender identity with its relative stability, auto-determination and concep-
tual independence vis-à-vis the social and physical dimensions. Gender identity 
is defined as “each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gen-
der, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth [...]”.39 This 
38 | See the accounts of transmen about hormone treatments in the context of physical gender transitions.
39 | The Yogyakarta Principles of March 2007, p. 8 “Understanding”. These principles define the human rights 
in matters of sexuality and gender identity. According to Principle 18F “States shall ensure that any medical 
or psychological treatment or counseling does not, explicitly or implicitly, treat [...] gender identity as med-
ical conditions to be treated, cured or suppressed.” (p. 23). The Argentine gender identity law of May 2012 
implementing this principle (sanctioned on 9 May and promulgated on 23 May. URL: http://www.infoleg.gov.
ar/infolegInternet/anexos/195000-199999/197860/norma.htm [06.12.2013]) uses the same definition of 
(psychological) gender identity. In Germany, the problems of inter persons are formulated as those of “the right 
to individual development of an own gender identity” (Plett 2012, p. 137). A ruling of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court on the country’s transsexual law also puts “finding and recognizing one’s own gender identity” 
under the protection of the German constitution (BVerfG 2011, Rn 51; quoted in Plett 2012, p. 137).
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identity is, as soon as it has formed, to be respected as a person’s gender, and 
they must be given the right to live according to their gender identity. But first of 
all it must be given the chance to develop, without being preempted, imposed or 
impeded by parents or the medical establishment.40 Ethics commissions, basing 
their assessment on psychological research findings,41 have also come to use the 
concept of gender identity in this psychological sense, claiming that it should be 
put under the protection of the law.42
LOOKING AHEAD
The scope of this paper did alas not permit a discussion of the arguments ad-
vanced against the interpretation of psychological gender as an identity. The 
analysis of the reasons that speak in its favor thus only aims to stimulate further 
discussion on this issue, which should be led with its critics.
The current debates in politics and legislation suggest that the term of 
‘psychological gender identity’, already present in legal, ethical and medical dis-
courses, will play an increasing role in the framework of the discussion on the 
well-being of children, since it serves to embed and clarify the protection of child 
well-being against societal, family or other interests. With growing awareness 
that neither the sciences nor ethics nor law can do without the psychological 
gender dimension, the interpretation of psychological gender will become more 
and more important. The ‘identity’-controversy being rather an issue of interdis-
ciplinary communication, it is of minor importance for the acute problems of 
trans and inter persons. The increasing acknowledgement of the psychological 
dimension of gender or so-called sex, no matter how interpreted, should in itself 
be conducive to improving their legal situation and lived reality.
REFERENCES
Beauvoir, S. de (1949): Le deuxième sexe. Paris: Gallimard. (English edition 
2009: The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde / Sheila Malovany-Chevalier. 
New York: Random House).




Butler, J. (1995): Körper von Gewicht. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp (Original (1993): 
Bodies that Matter, New York: Routledge).
Deutscher Ethikrat (2012): Stellungnahme Intersexualität. URL: http://www.
ethikrat.org/dateien/pdf/stellungnahme-intersexualitaet.pdf [15.07.2013].
Eckert, C. A. (2010): Intervening in Intersexualization: The Clinic and the 
Colony. Universität Utrecht. URL: http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/disserta 
tions/2010-0517-200233/eckert.pdf [15.07.2013].
Fautrat, P. (2001): De quoi souffrent les transsexuels? Paris: éditions des ar-
chives contemporaines. 
Foucault, M. (Ed.) (1978): Herculine Barbin dite Alexine B.. Paris: Gallimard (dt. 
in Schäffner/Vogl 1998).
Foucault, M. (1984): Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 2-3. Paris: Gallimard. (dt. Sexuali- 
tät und Wahrheit, Bände 2-3. transl. Raulff/Seitter. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.)
Giordano, S. (2008): Ethics of Management of Gender Atypical Organisation in 
Children and Adolescents. In: Boylan (Ed.): International Public Health Policy
and Ethics, pp. 249-272.
Groneberg, M. (2003): A propos du sexe de l’âme. In: Studia Philosophica Vol. 
62 – Le corps dans la philosophie – Der Körper in der Philosophie. Bern: Haupt, 
pp. 197-209.
Groneberg, M. (2008): Mythen und Wissen zur Intersexualität. Eine Analyse re-
levanter Begriffe, Vorstellungen und Diskurse. In: Groneberg/Zehnder (Eds.), 
pp. 83-145.
Groneberg, M. (2009): Das Geschlecht des ersten Menschen. Zur mytholo-
gischen Herkunft der Ausdrücke Androgynie und Hermaphrodit. In: Zeit-
schrift für Sexualforschung 22, 2, pp. 121-150.
Groneberg, M. (2012a): Empfehlungen zum Umgang mit Zwischengeschlecht-
lichkeit. In: Schweizer/Richter-Appelt (Eds.) (2012), pp. 485-500.
The Concept of Human Gender: Its Epistemological and Ethical Impact 
78
Groneberg, M. (2012b): Das Recht auf Freiheit zur Selbstverortung. In: 
Deutscher Ethikrat (Eds.): Dokumentation – Intersex im Diskurs, pp. 45-46. 
URL: http://www.ethikrat.org/veranstaltungen/anhoerungen/intersexuali-
taet [14.07.2013].
Groneberg, M. (2015): Les leçons de l’hermaphrodite. Le corps et le genre entre 
fantasme et réalité. In: Krüger/Weibel (Eds.): Die Körper der Religionen – Corps 
en religion. Zürich: Pano, pp. 89-115.
Groneberg, M., Zehnder, K. (Eds.) (2008): ‘Intersex’: Geschlechtsanpassung zum 
Wohl des Kindes? Fribourg: Academic Press.
Guhde, H. (2002): Körper – Gefühl. Leben in einer intersexuellen Realität. In: 
polymorph 2002, pp. 45-52.
Herdt, G. (Ed.) (1996): Third sex, third gender. Beyond sexual dimorphism in 
culture and history. New York: Zone Books. 
Hirschfeld, M. (2001, orig. 1914): Zur Homosexualität des Mannes und des Wei-
bes. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Klöppel, U. (2002): XX0XY ungelöst. Störungsszenarien in der Dramaturgie der 
zweigeschlechtlichen Ordnung. In: polymorph, pp. 153-180.
Kreisler, L. (1973): L’enfant et l’adolescent de sexe ambigu ou l’envers du mythe. 
In: Pontalis, pp. 173-200.
Money, J., Ehrhardt, A. (1975): Männlich – Weiblich: Die Entstehung der Ge-
schlechtsunterschiede. Reinbek: Rowohlt (orig. 1973, Man & Woman; Boy & Girl: 
Differentiation and dimorphism of gender identity from conception to maturity, 
4th edition).
Money, J., Hampson J.  G., Hampson J. L. (1957): Imprinting and the Establish-
ment of Gender Role. In: AMA Arch. Neurol. Psychiatry 77, pp. 333-336. 





Plett, K. (2012): Geschlecht im Recht: eins, zwei, drei, viele? Rechthistorische 
und gendertheoretische Betrachtungen. In: Schweizer/Richter-Appelt (Eds.), pp. 
131-150.
Polymorph (Eds.) (2002): (K)ein Geschlecht oder viele? Transgender in poli-
tischer Perspektive. Berlin: Querverlag.
Pontalis, J. B. (Eds.) (1973): Bisexualité et différence de sexes. Paris: Gallimard.
Quindeau, I. (2012): Geschlechtsentwicklung und psychosexuelle Zwischen-
räume aus der Perspektive neuerer psychoanalytischer Theoriebildung. In: 
Schweizer/Richter-Appelt (Eds.), pp. 119-130.
Richter-Appelt, H. (2008): Medizinische und psychosoziale Aspekte der Interse-
xualität. In: Groneberg/Zehnder (Eds.), pp. 53-81.
Rieben, J. (2008): Geschlecht und Identität. Die Genese der Geschlechtsidentität 
als individuelle kognitive Leistung im soziokulturellen Kontext. In: Groneberg/
Zehnder (Eds.), pp. 146-177.
Schäffner, W., Vogl, J. (1998): Herculine Barbin. Michel Foucault. Über Herm-
aphroditismus. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
Schweizer, K. (2012): Sprache und Begrifflichkeiten. Intersexualität benennen. 
In: Schweizer/Richter-Appelt (Eds.), pp. 19-39.
Schweizer, K., Richter-Appelt, H. (Eds.) (2012): Intersex kontrovers: Fakten, Er-
fahrungen, Positionen. Gießen: Psychosozial. 
Sigusch, V. (1991): Die Transsexuellen und unser nosomorpher Blick. In: 
Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung, pp. 225-256 and pp. 309-343.
Stoller, R. (1968): Sex and Gender. On the Development of Masculinity and Fe-
mininity. New York: Science House.
Ulrichs, K.-H. (1994, orig. 1864): Forschungen über das Rätsel der mann-männ-
lichen Liebe. Berlin: Rosa Winkel (here: Inclusa: Anthropologische Studien über 
mann-männliche Geschlechtsliebe. Leipzig: Mathes, 1864).
The Concept of Human Gender: Its Epistemological and Ethical Impact 
80 Michael Groneberg
UN-Zivilpakt: Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte. D: 
BGBI 1973 II 1553; CH (›UNO-Pakt II‹): SR 0.103.2. URL: http://www.admin.ch/
ch/d/sr/0_103_2/index.html [05.08.2011].
Werlen, M. (2008): Rechtlicher Schutz für Kinder mit bei Geburt uneindeutigem 
Geschlecht. In: Groneberg/Zehnder (Eds.), pp. 178-215.
Yogyakarta (2007): Les Principes de Jogjakarta sur l’application de la législation in-
ternationale des droits humains en matière d’orientation sexuelle et d’identité de 
genre. URL: http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_fr.htm [29.01.2012].
The Art of not Being Categorized Quite So (Much) 1
Éric Fassin
SUMMARY
In France the movement against Marriage for All has accused the so-called ‘the-
ory of gender’ of being an unscientific ideology. This paper addresses three im-
plicit premises of this polemic: 1. The opposition of science and politics is a 
misreading of Weber: the social sciences cannot be ‘neutralized’; they must be 
considered as ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway, Harding). 2. The epistemological 
question (from Durkheim to Bourdieu): The categories that organize knowledge 
are based on a social process of categorization – both with respect to sexuality 
(Kinsey) and sex (Fausto-Sterling). 3. Sex is socially constructed: This is not about 
identifying a ‘true sex’ (Foucault), but about representation, which is always con-
ventional. We inevitably categorize; critique, however, is the art of not being so 
categorized (Foucault): neither so much nor quite so. 
THE GENDER CONTROVERSY 
In France, opponents of Mariage pour Tous (Marriage for All) also mobilized 
against ‘gender’, more precisely against that what the Manif pour Tous (Demo 
for All) liked to call ‘gender theory’. Banners against equal marriage displayed 
slogans such as ‘We want sex, not gender’ or ‘Marriage for All = Gender Theory 
for All’. This attack began even before the debate over the 2013 Taubira law that 
was to open marriage to same-sex couples in France. In fact, the Roman Catholic 
right had already launched a campaign in 2011 soon to be joined by the secular 
right, including many in the parliamentary majority supporting then-president 
Nicolas Sarkozy (80 MPs followed by 113 senators!). The campaign was aimed 
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against the new school curriculum in biology for 16-year-olds that included a 
section entitled: ‘Becoming a man or a woman’.
The title is reminiscent of the famous pronouncement from the 1949 femi-
nist classic The Second Sex: “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman.” But 
Simone de Beauvoir did not use the term ‘gender’. This concept was developed 
in the 1950s in the United States at the crossroads of psychology, psychiatry, and 
medicine, first by John Money (from Johns Hopkins University) and then by 
Robert Stoller (at the University of California, Los Angeles).
Starting from ‘exceptions’, namely intersex and trans persons (they spoke 
of ‘hermaphroditism’ and ‘transsexualism’ as people did at the time) whom they 
considered as pathological, this concept purported to analyze the discrepancy be-
tween (social) gender and (biological) sex. It was only in the 1970s that feminists 
appropriated the concept: they transformed this clinical approach meant to nor-
malize individual anomalies, whether biological or psychological, into a critical 
one that questions the order of things. What is remarkable is that this feminist 
critique today is once again articulated through trans and intersex issues. This 
turns the history of gender upside down: today, the point is not to address abnor-
mality, but rather the norm.
Since the United Nations World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 
1995, the Vatican has become aware of the importance of the concept of gender 
– and the threat it poses from its perspective. The Roman Catholic Church has 
thus launched a crusade against (so-called) ‘gender theory’. Speaking of gender, 
or simply claiming that we are not born, but rather become what we are, implies 
a denaturalization of the world, in other words, questions the purported natural-
ness of its norms and laws. This democratic ‘trouble’ is a defining feature of our 
society manifested in the globalized issue of gay marriage, which is about equal 
recognition of sexualities. In other words, the social order no longer appears as 
grounded in ‘nature’ (here: heterosexuality), but rather as defined by the demo-
cratic principles of freedom and equality that can be mobilized against sexist and 
homophobic norms.
This is what I have called ‘sexual democracy’.2 Liberty and equality do not 
actually define democratic societies; however, they are legitimately invoked in 
political battles. As a consequence, it becomes apparent that the order of things 
is not given by Nature, nor by God or Tradition; we are the ones who define the 
world in which we live. Democracy thus implies an awareness that laws and 
norms are established immanently, not transcendentally. They can be changed, 
negotiated, disputed, and challenged: they turn out to be historical, social, and 
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political. Sexual democracy is the extension of this democratic logic to gender 
and sexuality: far from being outside of politics, they are democratic issues, just 
as much as those pertaining to the economy, education, immigration, demog-
raphy, etc. – if not more so, as sex has become a primary battleground in the 
struggle about the limits of democracy.
With this in mind, let us return to the war waged by ‘Demo for All’ against 
what it calls gender theory or gender ideology. While gender scholars may legiti-
mately take some pride in becoming a target, we still need to point out that there 
is no unified theory or ideology in our field. Gender is a concept, and gender 
studies are defined by the confrontation of various theories but also ideologies. 
Beyond these simple remarks, what sense should we make of this attack against 
gender? The position of the conservatives can be summarized in three points: 
The first refers to the term ‘ideology’ and points to the connection between truth 
and politics. The second, linked to the term ‘theory’, has to do with epistemology 
– just like in the polemic launched by the religious right in the United States, 
which pits the theory of intelligent design against the theory of evolution. The 
third point has to do with the parallel oppositions of sex and gender, nature and 
culture, and biology and society. In short, this is about three things: the nature 
of truth, science, and society.
Countering these attacks on an intellectual level is not difficult. First, how 
can the enemies of ‘gender theory’ claim to speak in the name of science, given 
the fact that none of them belong to the world of science? And how could Demo 
for All speak in the name of pure truth against ideology, given that this is a po-
litical movement that federates the secular and the religious right? Second, why 
should the term ‘theory’ disqualify gender studies, given the fact that science 
always relies on theories? These may not be eternal (Einstein revises Newton); 
nevertheless, acknowledging this entails no skepticism: they still have to do with 
truth, albeit a provisional one. Third, there is something paradoxical about a 
biological defense of heterosexual marriage in the name of religion, not only 
because it implies conflating God and nature, which is rather unexpected in 
Catholic theology, but also because it assumes that there is such a thing as a 
‘natural institution’ – an oxymoron that defies traditional logic.
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Science and Politics
Intellectually, the critiques leveled by the opponents of so-called ‘gender theory’ 
may not be very challenging; however, they can provide a starting point for other 
reflections. The first has to do with the relation between science and politics. 
This opposition is often associated with Max Weber – especially in France. ‘Value- 
freedom’ has been translated into French as ‘axiological neutrality’. In this per-
spective, politics has or should have nothing to do with science. Of course, a 
political interest can be a starting point for research (ex ante); conversely, the re-
sults can be used politically (ex post). But science itself is supposed to be apoliti-
cal; the scientific process, we are told, ‘neutralizes’ ideology. This is an argument 
that is often used against gender studies, whose feminism is under attack in the 
name of ‘neutrality’ – a most eloquent metaphor in terms of gender.
This is why it is worth going back to this imperative of ‘value-freedom’ be-
queathed to us by a ‘founding father’ of sociology (to use an equally significant 
metaphor), relying on the work of Isabelle Kalinowski.3  ‘Science as a Voca-
tion’(1917) and ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (1919) were published together in French 
as one volume under the title Le savant et le politique in 1959, translated by 
Julien Freund. Raymond Aron not only suggested ‘neutralité axiologique’; he 
also wrote an important preface. Inspired in part by Talcott Parsons, who pre-
sented Weber as a critic of Marx, Aron thus opposed neutrality to ‘intellectuels 
engagés’in the context of the Cold War: the French translation of Weber thus 
became a war machine against Marxists.
There is something puzzling about this political neutralization. Like Aron, 
Weber himself was an intellectual who actively participated in public debates. 
This is why ‘value-freedom’ in his text does not refer to scholarship itself, but 
to the imposition of values to students in the context of teaching: this might be 
called propaganda. Professors should not abuse the power bestowed upon them 
by their profession. The question has to do with pedagogy, rather than research. 
By contrast, political values can actually be productive in the practice of science, 
as he suggested in his discussion of ‘value-freedom’ in 1917:  
“One of our foremost jurists once explained, in discussing his opposition to the exclusion of socia- 
lists from university posts, that he too would not be willing to accept an ‘anarchist’ as a teacher of 
law since anarchists deny the validity of law in general – and he regarded his argument as conclu-
sive. My own opinion is exactly the opposite. An anarchist can surely be a good legal scholar. And if 
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he is such, then indeed the Archimedean point of his convictions, which is outside the conventions 
and presuppositions which are so self-evident to us, can equip him to perceive problems in the 
fundamental postulates of legal theory which escape those who take them for granted.”4 
In short, a political positioning does not constitute a bias to be neutralized, but 
rather a perspective that sheds light on blind spots.
Claiming that science is not neutral but rather defined by political values 
does not mean disavowing its autonomy in order to praise its heteronomy. In-
deed, one must clearly distinguish between scientific and political fields, in order 
to understand their specificities. Both are governed by distinct rules. The produc-
tion of scientific truth is both subject to internal constraints (empirical proof and 
theoretical coherence) and external ones (control by the scientific community). 
What is at stake though is not neutralizing, but objectifying, that is, accounting 
for (instead of denying) the values that inspire as well as organize knowledge. 
This perspective invites us to reconsider the meaning of scientific autonomy. 
There is a common assumption in the social sciences that ‘the more scientific, 
the less political’, and conversely, ‘the more political, the less scientific’ – as if this 
were a zero-sum game: this is generally what the term ‘autonomy’ implies.
What if we understood the term differently – not through this opposition, 
but rather as a requirement that the inevitably political nature of science comply 
with the rules of scientific work? Instead of rejecting demands from society as a 
distraction from true scholarship, taking them into account can be scientifically 
productive: they can be a stimulus rather than an impediment. Of course, this 
does not mean that the social demands determine the answers given by scien-
tists, nor even the questions they study. However, these external interpellations 
may encourage them to think anew. ‘Gay marriage’ has encouraged sociology 
and anthropology to consider new perspectives on marriage and family, just like 
feminism has led to think through the concept of gender, and more recently 
trans and intersex movements have fueled new approaches to the category of 
sex itself. Therefore, the goal is not to protect science against society, but on the 
contrary to reformulate social demands in terms that make sense scientifically.
Certainly, one has to remain cautious regarding the improper uses of scien-
tific expertise that may deceive us into confusing truths and values. But so-called 
neutrality, whether in the name of ‘value-freedom’ or ‘scientific autonomy’, har-
bors other risks: science understood as value-free could also be free from value 
for society; interest-free, but at the same time devoid of interest, like socially 
useless speculation. As early as 1893, in another foundational work, Émile Durk-
4 | The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics’, see Shils, E.A., Finch, H.A. (Eds.) (1949): 
The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, p.7.  
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heim proclaimed in the preface to the first edition of ‘The Division of Labour in 
Society’: ‘We would esteem our research not worth the labour of a single hour 
if its interests were merely speculative.’5 By definition, the social sciences speak 
about society; it is all the more necessary that they also speak to and with society.
Let us now return to the issue of gender. Far from offering a weapon for 
the fight against gender studies, Weber’s political epistemology echoes feminist 
epistemology first developed in English. This can be seen in the work of Sandra 
Harding and Donna Haraway.6  The former speaks of ‘standpoint epistemology’, 
while the latter introduces ‘situated knowledge’; as their analyses have grown 
through their dialogue, both converge on a crucial aspect. Feminist epistemolo-
gy is not limited to unveiling and criticizing the androcentric biases of scientific 
knowledge; more fundamentally, it questions the notion of objectivity. However, 
it does not replace it with a celebration of subjectivity. 
What this means is that knowledge is not elaborated through a process of 
abstraction – independent of the researchers’ perspectives. Haraway vindicates 
‘the privilege of a partial perspective’ against what she calls ‘the God trick’, that 
is an overarching, opinion-free view of the world. This ‘partial’ approach in no 
way constitutes a limitation of science: on the contrary, it includes suppressed 
perspectives, thus making visible what is invisible from a dominant standpoint. 
This should not be understood as a glorification of relativism. Rather, while ‘ob-
jectivity’ is usually contrasted to openly political knowledge, such as feminist 
science, this critique of ‘the God trick’ makes it possible to claim what Harding 
calls ‘strong objectivity’ – both because of the illumination of blind spots by alter-
native perspectives and on account of the dissolution of the illusion of neutrality 
through ‘standpoint epistemology’.
Categories of knowledge
With Harding and Haraway, the inquiry into the relationship between science 
and politics already leads to the question of epistemology, which is the second 
point mentioned in the beginning. If the notion of ‘theory’ is taken seriously, 
what is the consequence in terms of knowledge, rather than truth? This question 
will now be approached through a discussion of categories through which we 
apprehend reality – first, society, second, sex.
5 | Durkheim, É. (2014): The Division of Labour. Lukes, S. (Ed.): Society. New Yoork: Free Press, p. 4.  
6 | Harding, S. (1986): The Science Question. In: Cornell University (Ed.): Feminism. Ithaca/London: Cornell 
University Press, chapter 1 and 6. Harding, S. (1993): Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is Strong 
Objectivity? In: Feminist Epistemologies. Alcoff/Potter (Eds.). London/New York: Routledge, chapter 3, pp. 49-
82; Haraway, D. (1988): Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective. In: Feminist Studies, vol. 14, Nr. 3 (autumn 1988), pp. 575-599.
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Categories and categorization have long been central in sociological theory. In 
1903, Durkheim and his nephew Marcel Mauss analyzed ‘primitive forms of 
classification’. In ‘primitive’ societies, intellectual categories prove to be social 
ones - whether it be the structure of a village, the cosmology or the totemic sys-
tem. “Society was not simply a model which classificatory thought followed; it 
was its own divisions which served as divisions for the system of classification. 
The first logical categories were social categories; the first classes of things were 
classes of men, into which these were integrated”.7 
However, in 1912 Durkheim, in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 
goes even further. Not only are the logical categories organizing our notion of the 
world always already social categories, but conversely, society itself is founded 
on categorization. On the one hand, for the French sociologist, Kant’s categories 
such as time and space are social indeed; on the other hand, categorization itself 
is the necessary condition for life in society: it makes it possible to connect the 
individual and the collective.
“If men did not agree upon these essential ideas at every moment, if they did not have the same 
conception of time, space, cause, number etc., all contact between their minds would be impossible, 
and with that, life altogether. Thus society could not abandon the categories to the free choice of the 
individual without abandoning itself. If it is to live there is not merely need of a satisfactory moral 
conformity, but also there is a minimum of logical conformity beyond which it cannot safely go.” 8  
The political consequence of Durkheim’s argument is clear: outside of us and 
inside of us society “sets itself against these revolutionary fancies”. This does 
not go without brutality: “Does a mind ostensibly free itself from these forms of 
thought? It is no longer considered a human mind in the full sense of the word, 
and it is treated accordingly.”9 A footnote even points to the connection between 
‘social disorder’ and ‘psychological disorders’.10 The fact that these categories are 
social does not imply for Durkheim that we are ‘free’ to change them: this would 
endanger society. In other words, sociology may show that the world’s construc-
tion is a mere convention, but this in no way allows altering categories. 
In order to move behind the conservatism that links moral with logical con- 
formism in the work of this French ‘founding father’, and before turning to sex-
ual categories, it is useful to discuss two sociological models of classification that 
7 | Durkheim, É., Mauss, M.: Primitive Classification, (translated and edited with an introduction by Rodney 
Needham), (first publ. 1963) London: Cohen & West, 2009, p. 49.
8 | Durkheim, É: The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (translated by Joseph Ward Swain) London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd. (1915), p. 17.
9 | Ibid.
10 | Durkheim, É., Mauss, M. (1974, orig. 1903): De quelques formes primitives de classification. Contribution 
à l’étude des représentations collectives. L’année sociologique, 6, 1903, reprinted in Mauss : Œuvres, volume 
2, presented by Victor Karady, Paris: Minuit, p. 83. Durkheim, É. (1960, orig. 1912): Les formes élémentaires 
de la vie religieuse. Paris: PUF, p. 24.
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11 | Boltanski, L. (1982): Les cadres. La formation d’un groupe social. Paris: Minuit, pp. 51-52.
12 | Bourdieu, P.: In Other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Stanford/Cal.: University Press & 
Cambridge/UK: Polity Press, p. 180.
13 | Ibid.
14 | Ibid., p. 181.
15 | Ibid.
derive and depart from Durkheim. The first model stems from Luc Boltanski, 
who in 1982 analyzed the social group of managers. The author observes how 
difficult it is to define the group and that this ‘haziness’ proves to be a necessary 
feature, rather than an accidental one. That is why “one must first renounce the 
idea of the definition as a starting point”: “Instead of trying to determine the ‘cri-
teria’ that ‘should’ define the group and the ‘boundaries’ that ‘must’ be drawn in 
order to obtain a tangible and clearly defined object”, one should rather
“describe the form the group has acquired by investigating its group formation, the work of inclusion 
and exclusion that produces it, and by analyzing the social work of defining and circumscribing 
during the formation of the group that has contributed to objectify it and thus made it exist in a 
self-evident, matter-of-fact way.”11
Does not the same hold for all social classifications? It no longer suffices to pro-
claim the social nature of categories; far from insisting on their necessity, by de-
naturalizing them, sociology makes them less obvious – and thus less necessary. 
This is the lesson taught by Pierre Bourdieu: in his inaugural lecture at the Col-
lège de France, the French sociologist emphasized the historical nature of this 
logic: “Sociology has to make its aim the fight for the monopoly of the legitimate 
representation of the social world, this struggle of classifications which concerns 
all kinds of class struggles, be they age classes, gender classes or social classes”.12 
The political significance of knowledge thus becomes explicit: “The anthro-
pological classification is distinguished from zoological or botanical taxonomies 
insofar as the objects it assigns their places are themselves classifying subjects. 
It is enough to imagine what would happen when, as in the fables, dogs, foxes 
and wolves could co-write the chapter about the family of canines.” In other 
words, “the classified, the badly classified, can reject the principle of classifica-
tion that relegates them to the worst places.”13 That classification is in the same 
measure a subject of investigation as the classes themselves “does in no way lead 
to an extinction of science in relativism”.14 The sociologists become those who 
“attempt to express the truth about the struggles in which among other things 
truth is on the line”.15 
The value of such an approach for the conceptual comprehension of sexual 
categories is clear. Let us bear this in mind when we go back to reading Alfred 
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Kinsey’s work on the categorization of sexuality.16 One figure became part of pop-
ular knowledge after the 1948 publication of his study on male sexual behavior: 
supposedly, 10% of men were homosexual. This remarkable percentage caused 
a shock in the United States; it later encouraged gay activists to appropriate the 
figure to emphasize their numerical and thus political weight. However, this 
makes no sense in Kinsey’s study. The problem is that the question is incorrectly 
phrased, which points to a misunderstanding about what it means to categorize. 
Let us follow the scale he suggests, i.e. from 0 to 6 or from exclusive heterosexu-
ality to perfect (absolute) homosexuality (to quote an ironic phrasing widely used 
in the gay culture: ‘a perfect 6!’). Indeed we find that ‘10 per cent of the males 
are more or less exclusively homosexual (i.e., rate 5 or 6) for at least three years 
between the ages of 16 and 55’.17 
This is a construction that draws its value from what it can explain. To put it 
differently, the arbitrary (or at least conventional) discontinuity of the categories 
reveals by contrast a continuum of practices and fantasies. This is clarified by 
Kinsey “While emphasizing the continuity of the gradations between exclusively 
heterosexual and exclusively homosexual histories, it has seemed desirable to 
develop some sort of classification which could be based on the relative amounts 
of heterosexual and of homosexual experience or response in each history.”18 
The sexologist knows the difference with his work as a zoologist: “Males do not 
represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual. The world is 
not to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are black nor all things 
white. It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete 
categories. Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into 
separated pigeon-holes. The living world is a continuum in each and every one 
of its aspects.”19 
This analysis bears on sexuality; but since Kinsey, the same argument op-
posing categorization and continuum has been made with regard to sex. In 1993 
Anne Fausto-Sterling published in a scientific journal an article entitled: “The 
Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough”.20 The feminist biologist 
proceeded from the case of intersex persons, but instead of suggesting a third 
sex, she divided them into three categories, the herms (so-called ‘true’ herma- 
phrodites), the merms (male so-called pseudo-hermaphrodites) and the ferms 
(female so-called pseudo-hermaphrodites). Together with the two traditional sex-
16 | Kinsey, A. C., Pomeroy, W. B., Martin, C. E. (1948): Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. Philadelphia/
London: W.B. Saunders Company, p. 651.
17 |See ibid., p. 651.
18 |Ibid.
19 |Ibid., p. 639.
20 | Fausto-Sterling, A. (1993): The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough. In: The Sciences, 
March/April, pp. 20-24.
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es, that equals five. This thesis was so provocative that it even caused concern in 
the Vatican, almost as much as the work of Judith Butler did. Even biology no 
longer conforms to nature as it is commonly defined.
The biologist develops the paradox further: “But if the state and the legal system 
have an interest in maintaining a two-party sexual system, they are in defiance 
of nature. For biologically speaking, there are many gradations running from 
female to male; and depending on how one calls the shots, one can argue that 
along that spectrum lie at least five sexes − and perhaps even more.” Fausto-Ster-
ling concludes: “sex is a vast, infinitely malleable continuum that defies the con-
straints of even five categories.”21 In the text, the parallel with Kinsey is explicit. 
The point is to show that our binary notions of sex, as of sexuality, are in no way 
natural, on the contrary.
All the same, Fausto-Sterling’s argument can be questioned at least in one 
point, which she does herself in a revision of her article “The Five Sexes, Revisit-
ed” published in 2000 in the same journal:22 “It might seem natural to regard in-
tersexual and transgendered people as living midway between the poles of male 
and female. But male and female, masculine and feminine, cannot be parsed 
as some kind of continuum. Rather, sex and gender are best conceptualized as 
points in a multidimensional space.”
This raises the question of representations, namely metaphors, that do jus-
tice to reality. In France, Vincent Guillot, a leader of the intersex movement has 
later suggested a different ‘signifier’:
“A good option to locate ourselves on the gender map, i.e. to define ourselves, is the notion of the 
archipelago. It is a series of islands and smaller islands that possess on account of their proximity 
or distance common features - or not. [...] We therefore submit the notion of the intersex archipela- 
go, if not the gender archipelago, without asking ourselves where this or that type of person is po-
sitioned, but instead only showing an interest in the persons themselves and in what they have in 
common: being beyond the binary of male-female.”23
As with every image, this one offers both advantages and disadvantages. On 
the one hand, it serves to avoid the polarization of the two sexes, but on the 
other hand it also inscribes discontinuity into reality itself. Therefore, instead 
of using another metaphor, why not shift our perspective from categories to cat-
21 | Ibid., pp. 43-44.
22 | Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000): The Five Sexes, Revisited. In: The Sciences, July/August 2000, pp. 18-23.
23 | Guillot, V. (2008): Intersexes: ne pas avoir le droit de dire ce que l’on ne nous a pas dit que nous étions. In: 
À qui appartiennent nos corps? Nouvelles questions féministes, vol. 27, No. 1, coordinated by  Kraus, C., Perrin, 
C.,  Rey, S., Gosselin, L. and Guillot,V., pp. 37-48. 
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egorization? In that case, the issue is not so much the continuum that defines 
reality but rather the discontinuities induced by representation. Perception is 
categorization: analyzing the world means categorizing it, which implies a form 
of violence: classifying means forcing into ‘pigeon-holes’. The point is not so 
much to avoid this but rather to direct the focus on the categorization and thus 
denaturalize this operation and its result – categories.
Sex and Gender
In light of this discussion, we can finally return to the opposition between sex 
and gender. First, it is worth pointing out that sex is a State category – even 
more than a biological one. This is obvious if one considers sex change: the law 
defines the conditions required. The State comes first. The biological distinc-
tion between different definitions of sex (chromosomes, gonads, and phenotype) 
only comes second. As a consequence, we should not be looking to determine a 
‘true sex’ (to borrow from Michel Foucault’s preface to Herculine Barbin’s “Sou-
venirs”),24 but rather to analyze the social production of the truth of sex. 
This leads to a shift of perspective: the point is not so much ‘true sex’ (as 
the Demo for All would have it) but ‘true gender.’ This becomes apparent when 
Fausto-Sterling revisits her argument about the ‘Five Sexes’:
“What is clear is that since 1993, modern society has moved beyond five sexes to a recognition that 
gender variation is normal and, for some people, an arena for playful exploration. Discussing my 
‘five sexes’ proposal in her book Lessons from the Intersexed, the psychologist Suzanne J. Kessler 
[...] drives this point home with great effect: ‘The limitation with Fausto-Sterling’s proposal is that 
... (it) still gives genitals ... primary signifying status and ignores the fact that in the everyday world 
gender attributions are made without access to genital inspection. ... What has primacy in everyday 
life is the gender that is performed, regardless of the flesh’s configuration under the clothes.’ I now 
agree with Kessler’s assessment.”25
Fausto-Sterling’s work follows a constructivist approach in which gender studies 
occupy a crucial place. But criticism of constructivism today no longer comes 
from alleged ‘essentialists,’ who want to preserve an untouched and thus un-
changeable sexual order beyond history and politics. The anthropologist Priscille 
Touraille develops a critique of what she calls the ‘constructivist error’26 from a 
feminist perspective that still eschews ‘naturalism’:
24 | Foucault, M. (1980): “Introduction”, Herculine Barbin, translated by Richard McDougall, Pantheon/Vin-
tage, Random House, pp. vii-xviii. Originally: Le vrai sexe. In: Arcadie, vol. 27, No. 323, pp. 617-625, included 
in Herculine Barbin, dite Alexina B.. Paris; Gallimard, 2013.
25 | Fausto-Sterling, Fives Sexes Revisited, p. 22.
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“Even though the radical constructivists do not assert that in a completely de- 
gendered society people would no longer be born with genitals, no longer de-
velop breasts or facial hair or begin to menstruate during puberty, claiming that 
the connection between these features only stems from a social will is not the 
right epistemological strategy. Worse, it is an error, and the social sciences run 
the danger of paying for it dearly in their conflict of legitimacy with the natural 
sciences. If we want the concept of ‘gender’ to be accepted, then we have to ne-
gotiate the definition of ‘sex’ with the natural sciences”.
Touraille here aims at Butler, but also at Fausto-Sterling: “A feminist critique 
of biology that questions the scientific legitimacy of sex cannot be the only arena 
for such a negotiation.” As a consequence, she suggests “a point of view that po-
sitions itself between the moderate constructivism of the initial opposition of sex 
and gender, which leaves sex to natural sciences, and the radical constructivism 
that takes sex away from them.” The point is not that sex becomes what is left 
after gender, but, rather that it is at least in part its result. She asks: “And what if 
the gender norms had in the course of time been able to increase the number of 
specific biological gender variations, of selecting them?”
In other words, for Touraille, a recognition of sex does not mean denying 
gender or reducing sex to gender (as the radical constructivists do) and/or gen-
der to sex (as the conservatives of all stripes do). The point is rather to speak up 
against a disciplinary entrenchment that separates the natural sciences from the 
social sciences.
However, the perspective adopted in the present text is a different one. The 
question is not so much to know what sex truly is. Nor is it about negating or 
affirming its truth. It moves from truth to the production of truth. Ian Hacking’s 
definition of constructivism as a proliferating scientific discourse of our times 
helps clarify this:
“Social construction work is critical of the status quo. Social constructionists about X tend to hold 
that: (1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not de-
termined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. Very often they go further, and urge that: (2) X 
is quite bad as it is. (3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically 
transformed”.27 
26 | Touraille, P. (2011) : L’indistinction sexe et genre, ou l’erreur constructiviste, Critique, 2011/1 n° 764-
765, pp. 87-99, quotes pp. 87-88. See also from a different perspective  Kraus, C. (2005): Avarice épistém-
ique et économie de la connaissance: le pas rien du constructionnisme social. In: Rouch/Dorlin/Fougeyrol-
las-Schwebel (eds.): Le corps entre sexe et genre. Paris: L´Harmattan, pp. 39-59. (ed.), Le corps, entre sexe et 
genre, Paris, l’Harmattan, p. 39-59. 
27 | Hacking, I. (1999): The social construction of what? Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, p. 6. 
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The question we wanted to raise in the present text is not about what X really is 
(and it is remarkable that Hacking here uses a letter that is reminiscent of the 
sex chromosome) or whether it exists or not. Rather, it is about the fact that we 
only have access to truth (here biological sex) via representations passed on to 
us that we can also transform. In other words, since categories are only one rep-
resentation of reality, we must devote our attention to the process of categoriza-
tion. Here it is not so much about the pure reality than about its very real results: 
in Foucault’s term, it is about the articulation between knowledge and power. 
Other categories are possible; the world could be different; indeed, it already has 
changed, and is changing. 
The binary separation of sex has long been deemed ‘good to think’ (to use 
a phrase from anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss). But today, we are confront-
ed with an epistemological question: do we still want to categorize this way? It 
derives from a political one: do we still want to be categorized thus? Not that it 
would be possible to escape the operation of power that is inherent in categoriza-
tion; but at least we could hope that alternative categories might be less violent. 
At least, they would not claim to reflect truth itself, at the expense of those who 
do not fit in this ‘true sex’: They would only purport to offer a conventional truth, 
that is, a tool to think whose worth only resides in what it makes thinkable. If 
the order of things is not the true reflection of things themselves, then we can 
transform it: thus politicizing the anatomy, that is, of our representations of the 
anatomy, makes room for those who are now left out of the sexual order. This is 
a way to draw on Foucault’s idea: the aim is less not being governed (here: cate-
gorized), but “not in this manner and not at this cost”: The French philosopher’s 
definition of the critique of governmentality can equally apply to categorization: 
“The art of not being governed in this manner” – neither so nor so much. 28
28 | Foucault, M. (1990): Qu’est-ce que la critique? Critique et Aufklärung. In: Bulletin de la société française 
de philosophie 84, 2, Pp. 35-64. English edition: What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth Century Answers and 
Twentieth Century Questions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. p. 38.
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Who has a Disorder? Who gets to Decide?1
Jörg Woweries
SUMMARY
This paper discusses the definitional power of medicine in the assignment of 
intersex persons, followed by a brief historical overview of the importance of 
notions of social norms particularly with reference to dichotomically organized 
normative concepts of body and mind. The right of self-determination and oth-
er human rights occupy a special place in the discussion about ascriptions of 
disorders, since it is precisely those incapable of giving their informed consent 
that are particularly affected by the application of medical measures. The critical 
discussion of certain hitherto standard medical practices not only sheds light on 
the implications for the individuals concerned and their personal environment, 
but also for medical practice. Looking ahead, the author also discusses the sig-
nificance of legal solutions for individual and social practices.
INTRODUCTION
Whoever turns to a doctor or a psychiatrist has to reckon with the likelihood that 
the mentioned issues are classified under the rubric of disease. The ICD 10 (In-
ternational Classification of Diseases, 10th Version) constitutes the guideline 
for the work of these professional communities.2 This is moreover used as the 
currently valid basis of the billing system doctors and psychotherapists use with 
health insurance organizations. Terms such as ‘intersexuality’, ‘hermaphrodite’ 
or ‘intersex-related constitutiveness’ do not figure in the systematic overview of 
the ICD 10. Specific diseases are named and assigned figures of the ICD 10, e.g. 
E25 adrenogenital disorder, E29 testicular dysfunction, E34.5 androgen insensi-
tivity syndrome, Q56.0 hermaphroditism and others.
1 | Original version in German.
2 | URL: http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/icdonlineversions/en/ [20.06.2013].
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The nomenclature of the Chicago “Consensus Conference” (Hughes 2006) 
substituted traditional terms such as ‘hermaphrodite’, ‘hermaphroditism’, 
‘intersex-related constitutiveness’ or ‘intersex’ with Disorders of Sex Develop-
ment (DSD)3 translated in the German medical guidelines4 with Störung der 
Geschlechtsentwicklung. According to this medical classification we have a case 
of DSD in “congenital conditions in which development of chromosomal, go-
nadal and anatomic sex is atypical”.5 This also applies to people to whom neither 
an unambiguously male nor an unambiguously female genital can be assigned. 
The term ‘disorder’ was fiercely attacked, intersex persons were dismayed at be-
ing ascribed to disorder and disease. Self-help groups,6 but also the network 
Intersexualität, based at the University of Lübeck, now uses the phrasing of ‘pe-
culiarities of sex development’ (Besonderheiten der Geschlechtsentwicklung).7 
The self-help groups want to tone down the pathological implication of disorder 
in American usage. The proposal made by representatives of the intersex com-
munity to speak of Variations in Sex Development was turned down in Chicago 
(Thomas 2006). The Swiss Ethics Commission however supports this demand 
and speaks of Varianten der Geschlechtsentwicklung, translated as differences 
of sex development.8 Disorders of Sex Development are considered in the sys-
tematic view of ICD 10 exclusively under physical aspects. In such cases, current 
procedures in medicine and sexual psychology presume a norm. What is hap-
pening here is thus a norming of biological diversity, referring to the dichoto-
mous or binary notion of sex and gender?
As a next step in medical procedure, a deviation from the norm is regarded 
as a disease, illness or disorder. Everything that questions this normative order 
is portrayed as abnormal, unnatural or pathological. If we reject these concepts 
of medicine we can arrive at a different point of view.
Are variants of sex development really deviations from a norm? What is the 
norm here? Or is it about biological diversity? Milton Diamond speaks of biolog-
3 | URL: http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/118/2/e488.extract# [12.11.2014].
4 | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kinderheilkunde und Jugendmedizin (DGKJ) (2010): Leitlinien: “Störungen der 
Geschlechtsentwicklung”. In: AWMF online — Leitlinien-Register Nr. 027/022. URL: http://www.awmf.org/
leitlinien/detail/ll/027-022.html [01.08.2013].
5 | URL: http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/118/2/e488.extract# [12.11.2014]. 
URL: http://www.uksh.de/kinderhormonzentrum-luebeck/Forschung/Netzwerk+DSD.html [01.08.2013].
6 | “Intersexualität, was ist das? Der Begriff bezeichnet biologische Besonderheiten bei der Geschlechtsdiffe- 
renzierung.” URL: http://www.intersexuelle-menschen.net/intersexualitaet/ [01.08.2013].
7 | Intersexuelle Menschen e.V.: the network ‘DSD/Intersexualität’ deals with congenital particularities of sex 
development, or in the ‘official’ terminology Disorders of Sex Development (DSD).
URL: http://www.uksh.de/kinderhormonzentrum-luebeck/Forschung/Netzwerk+DSD.html [01.08.2013].
8 | Swiss National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics (Schweizer Nationale Ethikkommission im Be- 
reich Humanmedizin) (2012): Zum Umgang mit Varianten der Geschlechtsentwicklung. Ethische Fragen zur “In-
tersexualität”. English version: On the management of differences of sex development. Ethical issues relating 
to “intersexuality”. 
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ical variants.9 Mind games about the so-called third sex are of little help (Black-
less 2000; Fausto-Sterling 1993). Because of the great diversity of phenotypes 
there is no unambiguous third sex. Biological sex is very complex and cannot 
always be clearly demarcated (Voß 2010). What is more important for intersex 
persons themselves, however, are the legal and cultural aspects, which can con-
tribute crucially to their becoming visible and accepted? Drawing on Gronen-
berg (2012), it would be more appropriate to speak of persons ‘in-between-sexes 
and genders’ than of ‘intersex’. This term has the advantage that it ‘constitutes a 
clear rejection of questions of sexuality’ (such as hetero-, homo- or bisexuality) 
and can avoid ‘confusing intersexuality with bisexuality’. Due to the historical 
and socio-cultural contingencies and the different biological theories the terms 
are based on, the term ‘inter’ 10 seems to make a lot of sense.
In their internet forums many intersex people demand that in the registry 
of births and in personal files there should be no registered sex whatsoever. They 
say they find it degrading if – possibly inexperienced – delivery nurses or doctors 
determine the sex at birth based on the outer appearance as either exclusively 
male or female. This is why some intersex persons, when they reflect their situ-
ation as adolescents or adults, see themselves as, for instance, male and female, 
as both one and the other or as neither nor. But only very few are prepared to 
publicly admit to this status.
Intersex is however often confused with transsexualism,11 mostly out of ig-
norance. The term ‘transsexualism’ is listed in the ICD 10 under gender identity 
disorders. This classification too remains linked to the system of illnesses.12 In 
Germany for instance, changes of first name and gender are regulated in the 
Transsexuellengesetz (TSG) (Transsexual Act).13 In 2006 the psychologist Ahler 
9 | In the original: ‘biological varieties’, Diamond, M., Sigmundson, H. K. (2009): Management of Intersexuality: 
Guidelines. In: Arch Ped Adol Med. 
URL: http://www.hawaii.edu/PCSS/biblio/articles/2010to2014/2010-intersexuality.html [08.12.2011].
10 | See contribution by Jörg Woweries in this publication: Intersex – Medical Measures on the Test Bed.
11 | On the definitions: besides transsexualism there are also other terms in use with very different backgrounds 
and meanings that frequently defy fixation such as: trans identity, transgender, transsexuality, cross-dresser, 
drag king, drag queen. Here too the term ‘Trans’ seems appropriate. 
URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transsexualism [01.08.2013].
12 | In the medical classifications transsexualism is listed as follows: in the ICD 10, F64. For adolescents in 
the period of puberty also F66. In SOC-Vl of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association 
(Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders. Sixth Version, 2001). In DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, American Psychiatric Association, 1994, fourth edition). DSM-V is due to be issued 
in 2013. Trans person organizations may possibly manage to have Gender Identity Disorders completely deleted 
from DSM and ICD. This term had been introduced in the version DSM-IV, substituting the term ‘transsexualism’. 
The guidelines of the German Society for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Psychotherapy (published by the 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wissenschaftlichen Medizinischen Fachgesellschaften/AWMF) agree with the state-
ments of the ICD 10. As yet there are no German guidelines for adults. In the DSM-V, which has meanwhile come 
into effect, the term ‘gender identity disorder’ (in German ‘Geschlechtsidentitätsstörung’) has been replaced 
by the term ‘gender dysphoria’ (in German ‘Geschlechtsdysphorie’). It denotes that there is no psychological 
disorder, but instead a significant psychological strain that justifies the application of medical measures. 
URL: http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf [10.07.2015].
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gave a talk about transsexualism and transvestism.14 He frequently mentioned 
dichotomy, a concept that can also be found in the text books. In psychoanalytical 
understanding the dichotomy of male and female has hitherto been taken for 
granted (Quindeau 2012). One can however observe that dichotomy is a guarded 
border. There a people who want to reach the other side of the border, men or 
women, each in the respective other direction.
The only thing they can show in the way of a border document is their own 
conviction that they want it this way: “I want to cross!” Ahlers identified gen-
der by the normal physique, i.e. by whether one can detect a penis or a vagina, 
ovaries or testicles. Medical practice classifies persons attempting to cross this 
border as pathological and as having gender dysphoria,15, 16 because of the disor-
der of their gender identit y, 17 and refers them to psychiatric treatment. Howev-
er, neither psychology nor psychiatry nor anyone else in medicine is capable of 
reading the border pass of these people, i.e. their own will, meaning there is in 
effect not one single psychological or medical means of diagnostics. As a result, 
border fortifications are erected: long-term monitoring by psychological evalua-
tors, numerous bureaucratic obstacles before being able to choose another first 
name, compulsory surgery and resulting infertility.18
But the German federal constitutional court took a different view and grad-
ually eased the opening of the border.19 “Pedagogical measures for re-education 
are nonsense” says the psychologist and psychotherapist Udo Rauchfleisch 
(2012), who believes it is important to dissociate ourselves from the concept of 
the pathological. There are therefore people who want to cross, want to cross 
completely. Others only want to do so temporarily. One thing has become clear 
here: there is life on the border. There are not many, but there are people on the 
border. It is not a no-man’s land.
13 | Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen 
Fällen (Transsexuellengesetz – TSG). (Law on changing the first name and gender status in exceptional cases) 
Federal law, 10.9.1980. The TSG does not concern intersex people.
14 | On 12.09.2006 Ahlers presented the official stance of the Charité Berlin, Institut für Sexualwissenschaft 
und Sexualmedizin (Institute of Sexology and Sexual Medicine) in the Fachbereich für gleichgeschlechtliche 
Lebensweisen (unit for same-sex lifestyles, currently LGBTI Unit) of the Senate of Berlin.
15 | Schweizer and Richter-Appelt also use this term for intersex people. Schweizer, K. Identitätsbildung und 
Varianten der Geschlechtsidentität, p. 459-484. Richter-Appelt. Psychologische und psychotherapeutische In-
terventionen: p. 357-361. Both in: Schweizer/Richter-Appelt (Eds.) (2012): Intersexualität kontrovers. Gießen: 
Psychosozial.
16 | In her research on many intersex persons Richter-Appelt (2012b) also detects a great deal of vagueness 
in gender identity.
17 | ICD 10: F64.
18 | Law on changing the first name and gender status in exceptional cases (Transsexuellengesetz, TSG, §8).
19 | BVerfG: 2 BvR 1833/95 of 15.08.1996 (Addressing transsexual persons after a name change). 1 BvL 
3/03 of 06.12.2005 (naming rights and sexual self-determination). – 1 BvL 1/04 and 12/04 of 18.7.2006 
(TSG and foreign transsexuals). – 1 BvL 10/05 of 27.5.2008 (transsexuals may remain married after gender 




So where are the intersex people? The author’s experiences
For almost three decades I worked at a large hospital in Berlin and was mainly 
occupied with the care for newborns. In the course of this work I encountered, 
in my initial examinations, newborns whose genitals did not correspond to the 
medical norm. When I began to enquire about what had become of these peo-
ple I received no information. Only later did I realize that this is precisely part 
and parcel of the medical system. These people – we have now accustomed our-
selves to referring to them as intersex people – had a genital which was treated 
as atypical, as a flaw, as a defect. Medicine and surgery in particular offered to 
make external adjustments to this so-called flaw by making it look like a genital 
determined as normal.20,21 Due to a lack of craftsmanship – “it is easier to make 
a hole than to build a pole” (Diamond 2008) – in almost 80-90% of the cases 
superficially female-looking genitals were created. The parents were discouraged 
from discussing this with anybody, telling anyone about it, not the relatives, not 
even their own child, let alone the neighbors. The medical practioners involved 
had caught themselves in a trap of their own making: With their conspiracy of 
silence, endocrinologists and surgeons have turned their backs on science. Be-
cause an indispensable attribute of science is transparency and critical evaluation 
of one’s own results. For this reason there is to this very day a lack of controlled 
evidence-based findings,22 i.e. proven findings (Clayton et al. 2002; Creighton/
Minto 2001; Creighton 2004; Crouch et al. 2008; Hughes et al. 2006; Lee et al. 
2006; Pagon 2010; Speiser et al. 2010; Stein et al. 2005). This is also a violation 
of the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki. It demands that even 
the best current interventions be evaluated continually through evidence.23 Some 
text books of psychiatry and somatic medicine only know the principle of right 
or left for the division of men and women. One frequently comes across the 
word dichotomous. That is Greek and means: separate, cut apart. Then there is 
nothing in between. Others speak of binary, that means yes or no, in the sense 
20 | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kinderheilkunde und Jugendmedizin (DGKJ) (2010): Leitlinien: “Störungen der 
Geschlechtsentwicklung”. In: AWMF online – Leitlinien-Register Nr. 027/022. 
URL: http://www.awmf.org/leitlinien/detail/ll/027-022.html [01.08.2013].
21 | Dr. Dagmar l’Allemand, for instance, writes in the Swiss journal “Beobachter” 20, 2012, p. 25, about gen-
ital surgery on a girl: “Why shouldn’t one determine the sex right away instead of letting this child grow up with 
ambiguousness? Why shouldn’t one make sure right away that everyone – also the parents – are not reminded 
every day that it has a defect?”
22 | Evidence-based medicine (EbM) operates with various levels of evidence: “Level 1: Evidence from system-
atic review of numerous randomized clinical trials. Level 2: Evidence from at least one randomized controlled 
trial Level 3: Evidence from at least one well-designed cohort or case control study, i.e. a controlled trial which 
is not randomized Level 4a: Evidence from clinical reports. Level 4b: Opinions of respected authorities, based 
on clinical experience, descriptive studies or reports of expert committees ”. Text based on Wikipedia, URL: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence-based_medicine#Assessing_the_quality_of_evidence [01.08.2013].
23 | (WMA), Version 2008: A7, B 18. URL: http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.pdf [01.08.2013].
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of modern scientific language: only occurring in two conditions, from the Latin 
binarius, twofold. There, too, there is nothing in between.
That is exactly what has happened to intersex people: dichotomy – they have 
been cut apart. These surgical interventions are performed as early as possible 
in infancy so that the children do not remember them (Eckhold 2008). In the fo-
rums of the individuals concerned one can read that they see themselves more as 
monsters, as freaks.24 The word ‘flaw’ is used in a diplomatic obfuscation. Initial-
ly this was linked to intersex children because their genital did not correspond 
to the so-called normal appearance. Later they saw themselves as victims of a 
genital mutilation. Today they write about their feelings, anger and hate, even 
decades after surgery. Many suffer from serious psychological trauma. Schwei-
zer and Richter-Appelt (2009) speak of a high degree of psychological strain and 
demand that the psychological needs of those who have undergone surgery be 
acknowledged. Intersex in particular graphically underscores the implications, 
one would like to call it insanity, of this construction – the construction of yes or 
no. One the one hand, there is the definition that there can be nothing between 
yes and no. On the other, people who find their own sex/gender identity, contest-
ed by no one, in the middle are denied their desired registration in the birth reg-
ister as hermaphrodite. They are assigned arbitrarily and on compulsion to one 
side as male or, because of the simpler surgical technique, usually as female.25 
This can lead to the gender being entered contrafactually, i.e. incorrectly in the 
birth register. In so-called Western societies there is a strong pressure to decide 
for either male or for female. Presumably the great majority of people have no 
doubt about their own sex/gender. The parents of an intersex child can choose 
a sex/gender of rearing for their child, so either male or female. They can also 
paint the nursery pink or blue. But after that they should patiently wait and see 
how their child later decides for itself. But none of this can be seen as proof that 
the dichotomous or binary model also has a scientific/rational base.
This dichotomous, binary conceptual model of the yes or no can be ex-
plained with a glance into the history of science and is described in the socio-cul-
tural science in different and partly contradictory ways.26,27 I would like to offer 
a different perspective. If we look in other places of biological and medical lit-
erature we find descriptions of the human being that fit another, non-binary 
sex/gender model: there are indications that the personality of a human being 
24 | Very frequent statements by persons on whom this kind of surgery had been performed. URL: http://
zwitterforum.ath.cx/index.php [02.10.2011].
25 | Netzwerk Intersexualität: Erste Ergebnisse der Klinischen Evaluationsstudie im Netzwerk Störung der 
Geschlechtsentwicklung/Intersexualität. 2008 (First findings of the clinical evaluation study in the network 
gender identity disorder/intersex): “until about 15-20 years ago there were a lot more children with ambiguous 




consists of many internal features that range on a spectrum between the two 
polar ideals of male and female. For Beier (2012) the behaviour of gender roles 
is of a statistical-descriptive nature and only becomes evident in the comparison 
of gender groups (Beier 2012: 747). At no point is it claimed that a feature, e.g. 
mathematical talent, only occurs in one single (male) gender and not also in the 
other (female) gender. Medical text books describe that typical male and female 
hormones should occur in both sexes (Fine 2010; Hines 2004; Lautenbacher 
et al. 2007; Pfaff 2011; Pinker 2008). All human beings combine features and 
behaviours which are, according to some views, assigned to either male or fe-
male on the grounds of evolution and biology, or, according to other opinions, 
are only read into them through cultural influences. One should be skeptical 
towards both of these interpretations and await further scientific results. They 
maintain that so-called women have a disposition for female and so-called men 
for male attributes, advancing proven gender-typical differences as evidence.28,29 
Through education, in particular gender roles, this development can be varied 
in the sense of nature versus nurture (Fausto-Sterling 2012). But we are dealing 
with individuals, so that role clichés, i.e. dichotomous thinking, do not do justice 
to the individual complexity and interindividual diversity. If we were to draw 
distribution curves for men and women of readings of, for instance, testosterone 
or estrogen, as well as of empathy, language ability, spatial awareness and many 
other characteristics, we would get curves that display a significant degree of 
overlap.
One can also phrase it differently: the sex/gender identity of every human 
being is constituted of a series of characteristics that are governed by the principle 
of much or little. For instance a great variation in physical form and size, as seems 
characteristic of men and women and that includes pronounced overlapping,
is accepted by our culture. This is why some authors point to developmental 
biology and realize that believing in an absolute dimorphism is erroneous. The 
neuroscientist Cordelia Fine (2012) observes the numerous characteristics that 
are assigned in different ways more or less to men and women. She considers 
the views of other authors as prejudices and gender fairy tales, in which the 
26 | Honegger, C. (1991): Die Ordnung der Geschlechter. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus. Laqueur, T. (1992): Auf den 
Leib geschrieben. Die Inszenierung der Geschlechter von der Antike bis Freud. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus. Mai-
hofer, A. (1995): Geschlecht als Existenzweise. Frankfurt a.M.: Ulrike Helmer.
27 | “Feminist theory generally makes a distinction between [...] sex and gender [...].” [...] “The separation 
between biological and social gender insists that there is no causal relationship between the two.” Maihofer, A. 
(1995): Geschlecht als Existenzweise. Frankfurt a.M.: Ulrike Helmer, p. 19.
28 | Spatial awareness. Aggressiveness in men. Men and women score differently in group coordination tests. 
Women score better than men in verbalization tests. Differences are also noted in sexual orientation. Fegert, J. M. 
et al. (2012): Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie des Kindes- und Jugendalters. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, p.747.
29 | Lautenbacher, S. et al. (2007): Gehirn und Geschlecht. Neurowissenschaft des kleinen Unterschieds zwi-
schen Mann und Frau. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, p. 65.
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differences between men and women are portrayed with much imagination. 
Many differences that used to be considered as unalterable have meanwhile dis-
appeared. Ultimately she can detect no biologically founded difference in the 
behaviour of the two sexes/genders.
I would like to choose the polar model to describe the man-woman dualism. 
This model describes a continuum with two ends, is derived from the Greek 
polos and signifies an axis. This refers to the continuum between the two poles. 
There is therefore always something in between.30 In this model, like the Earth 
with its two poles, all individuals will find themselves somewhere: every human 
being, not only intersex people, is somewhere on a continuum, on a broadly 
distributed spectrum between the poles.
Knowing this is important for dealing with each other: knowing about the 
variability of gender. I here also think of the term inclusion.31 This term shows 
us that difference is completely normal. Intersex people are not the only hu-
man beings who show that difference is completely normal. Milton Diamond 
(2008a) speaks of biological variants. Susan Pinker (2008) applies this positive 
view also to the relationship of so-called normal men and women and observes 
it is after all an advantage if there are not only extremes. A broad diversity in 
social behaviour and in the biological constitution in men and women should be 
regarded with optimism. This is an enrichment of the diversity of human life. 
Why the dualism male/female in evolution has won over in the observations of 
the present will continue to remain a subject of debate.32 I see an explanation in 
the principle of much or little. I do not here wish to elaborate on the socio-cultur-
al literature on sex/gender identity and sex/gender roles. It is quite different to 
the medical-psychiatric system of definition. I would only like to mention Judith 
Butler (1995, 2003, 2009) here. With her critique of the traditional dichotomous, 
binary point of view she identifies problems at the gender border and the ensu-
ing gender trouble. Defectors and border inhabitants, this is what we know from 
real life, also need border guards, barriers etc. Without a border, without binary/
dichotomous divisions this would lead to mixings, to ambiguities and indeter-
minacies as well as uncontrollable relationships in a society that wants to defend 
gender dimorphism. Diamond (2008b) phrases this idea in the following way: 
“Biology loves variation, but society hates it”. One always needs to ask: how do 
individuals find their way in the contradiction between their own choice and the 
social constraints of a frequently intolerant environment? In this sense there is 
a psychological and biological diversity of intersex people and there are different 
30 | In contrast to my own view, socio-cultural literature very frequently uses the terms dichotomous, binary, 
polar and bipolar as synonyms.
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31 | Journal: Frühe Kindheit, Kindheit, 2, 2010: Inclusion of children with and without a handicap.
32 | EMBL (2010): The Difference between the Sexes: From Biology to Behavior. Conference in Heidelberg. URL: 
http://www.embl.de/training/events/2010/SNS10-01 [02.08.2012]. EMBL (2012): Biodiversity in the Bal-
ance: Causes and Consequences. Conference in Heidelberg. URL: http://www.embl.de/training/events/2010/
SNS10-01 [02.08.2013].
33 | Evidence-based medicine (EBM): see footnote 22.
forms of expression of representations of gender that elude a strict rigid con-
trol and, because of the violation of their human and children’s rights by third 
parties, that should be subject of an anti-discrimination office that denounces 
phobias and intolerance.
Practical implications of this kind of medical approach
The medical approach adopted over the years has led to two effects that significant-
ly influence practice and are palpable in everyday life. The conspiracy of silence 
surrounding intersex people that has been an intrinsic part of the treatment sys-
tem of doctors, has served to conceal information about this phenomenon from 
the public, resulting in large knowledge gaps in public perception. But the doc-
tors themselves are often left clueless about the subsequent fate of these people.
Numerous consensus statements and reviews clearly registered a very sig-
nificant lack of follow-up examinations (Clayton et al. 2002; Creighton/Minto 
2001; Creighton 2004; Crouch et al. 2008; Hughes et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2006; 
Pagon 2010; Speiser et al. 2010; Stein et al. 2005). There is a lack of proven, i.e. 
evidence-based33 controlled studies that are based on a high level of evidence. All 
there is at the moment are opinions of expert committees which corresponds 
to the lowest level of evidence, since these constitute subjective case-related as-
sessments. Moreover there are for instance no data that compare the sexual-psy-
chological health of girls and women that were subjected to early surgery (in the 
first year of life) and of those who had undergone later surgery (as adolescents or 
adults) (Speiser et al. 2010).
Hardly anyone of us knows intersex people in our everyday lives, as they 
usually conceal themselves to evade the kind of pathological evaluation as com-
monly applied by medicine. Zehnder and Streuli (2012) use the term ‘stigma’ 
and argue that intersex people endeavour to conform to normality and conceal 
their otherness. All figures are however just rough estimates. The only attempt 
at a very comprehensive count from 2000 to 2002 by the ESPED34 was not suc-
cessful, with only 21% responses from the many relevant clinics in Germany 
(Thyen et al. 2006). One estimate (Hughes et al 2006) based on an older calcu-
lation by a self-help group (ISNA)35 states roughly 1 in 4500 births (Kleinemeier/
Jürgensen 2008).
With approx. 680 000 births for 2008 one thus arrives at a total of around 
340 intersex persons. This is a lot of people, possibly we can even assume one 
Who has a Disorder? Who gets to Decide?
104
intersex person in every 1000 births, depending on which variants were not re-
corded. Voß (2010) describes a great number of genetically-related changes in 
the hormonal or anatomical blue print. Here another border appears, i.e. the 
principal question: which variant to take on board and which to ignore? If one 
includes hypospadias36 then there are significantly more: again, roughly estimat-
ed, this affects one boy per couple of hundred births.37
Another source calculates after a detailed review of the pertinent literature 
in 2% of births a deviation from the ideal-typical male or female sex-related fea-
tures and arrives at probably one or two cases with genital surgery, including hy-
pospadias, in 1000 births per year (Blackless et al. 2000). One should note here 
that in approximately half of all intersex newborns the genital does not appear 
unusual, so the diagnosis of intersex is not yet obvious (Thyen et al. 2006), but 
only years later, for instance during or after puberty. In half of the intersex people 
with 46,XY-DSD the biological and patho-physiological cause remains unclear 
(Hughes et al. 2006).
Are there possible solutions?
Until recently a number of demands put to legislative politicians included the 
deletion of a sex/gender entry in the civil register at any age, or at least the de-
letion of a sex/gender entry in the births register for all persons under 18 years 
of age (or until marriage) (Woweries 2011a). It is important to add that not only 
‘sex’ plays a crucial role in society, but ‘gender’ too. Since 2009 it is possible to 
dispense with the entry of sex/gender in the birth certificate, but not in the reg-
ister.38,39 Only later, i.e. in adulthood, is the introduction of a further description 
besides ‘female’ and ‘male’ advocated, for instance ‘other’, as the German Ethics 
Council has proposed (but not: no sex/gender, for every intersex person has a 
sex/gender: their own), always without any compulsion and without legal pro-
ceedings. Sex/gender assignments or attributions by medical evaluators should 
in any event be forbidden by law. Only the persons concerned should be allowed 
to comment on this.
34 | Survey unit for rare pediatric disorders in Germany (Erhebungseinheit für seltene pädiatrische Erkrankun-
gen in Deutschland).
35 | Calculation of specific variants see: Intersex Society of North America. URL: http://www.isna.org/faq/
frequency [01.08.2013].
36 | Hypospadias is a condition where the opening of the urethra is on the underside of the penis, on the scro-
tum or in the area of the perineum.
37 | For instance in 1:125 to 1:300 of male live births. URL: http://www.hypospadie.com/index.html?menu=2 
[01.08.2013] or 1 to 8 in 1.000 births. URL: http://www.urologielehrbuch.de/hypospadie.html [01.08.2013]. 
The Hypospadie Zentrum Wien (Vienna Hypospadias Centre) gives 0,3 to 3,8 per 1.000 births, URL: http://www.
hypospadie.info/3.html [01.08.2013], with significant regional differences owing to the effects of dioxins and 
furans, PCP, organochloride pesticides and insecticides, phytoestrogens and other substances.
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In the past only very few intersex people have publicly admitted to leading a life 
between the two dominant sexes/genders. They came out in the open in order to 
draw attention to the situation of intersex people.
Parents are very confused, often even under a heavy psychological strain, 
if they are told that their child’s sex cannot be determined unequivocally (Rich-
ter-Appelt/Schimmelmann/Tiefensee 2004). They are easily urged by doctors 
advocating an intervention or persuaded by others to choose surgery for their 
child. As a rule, this is performed when the infant is between two and twelve 
months old. A newborn child should however not be classified, provoked by the 
presence of medicine, under categories such as normal or not normal, or happy 
or unhappy (Woweries 2011b).
Diamond was one of the first to point to a different approach, namely dis-
pensing with medical measures in intersex children (Diamond/Sigmundson 
2009 [1997]).
On 31.01.2013 the Bundestag amended §22(3) of the Civil Status Act (PStG).40 
From now on children with ambiguous genitals need not be registered either 
as female or male, but are recorded in the birth register as children “without 
sex entry” (ohne Eintrag), besides boys and girls. This is a totally new situation. 
One the one hand, it should be appreciated that the existence of intersex people 
is also legally recognized. On the other hand, parents of a newborn intersexual 
child can be expected to possibly resist such a registration.41 This new provi-
sion of §22 (3) PStG should above all not lead to the wish for cosmetic surgery 
(Woweries 2011a). It is however conceivable that in practice a doctor could, for 
a child "that can be assigned neither to the female nor the male sex", neverthe-
less have it registered under one or the other, either female or male. Here, the 
doctor either erroneously does not follow the procedure proscribed by the law 
or else – anticipating the presumed development – he advises the parents after 
the child's birth to have it registered either as a girl or a boy, thus in effect ignor-
ing, deliberately or unwittingly, the legal provision for children with ambiguous 
genitals. The legislator has failed to take a changing development of sex/gender 
into account. What has remained unresolved and undiscussed is the question 
how to proceed if the parents come to realize in the course of the child's devel-
38 | § 59 birth certificate: “(1) The birth certificate will include 1. the child’s first name and name at birth, 
the child’s gender, [...]. (2) If so requested, information according to section 1 No. 2, 4 and 5 is not included”. 
However, a certified copy of the birth register has to be presented when marrying, enrolling at school and for 
numerous social welfare benefits applications.
39 | Since the term ‘gender’ is actually wrong it should say ‘registered civil status’.
40 | §22 (3) PStG: “If the child can be assigned neither to the female nor the male sex, then the civil status case 
must be entered into the birth register without this information.”
41 | German ethics council, Intersex, statement: (personal translation) “Experts report from professional expe-
rience that a significant number of parents cannot accept their children if their gender remains undetermined.”, 
p. 88.
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opment and education before, during or after puberty that they, or their child, 
regard a different sex/gender than the one previously assigned as the more ade-
quate one. What can these people, as adolescents or adults, apply for themselves 
at their own initiative and under what medical and administrative conditions? 
Such – multiple – changes must not and cannot be declared every time as a 
“rectification by” reviewing doctors. It is only a person's own free choice for their 
gender that should be considered in social life and legislation. Comprehensive 
information of all those concerned is necessary to ensure that intersex people 
are not discriminated in the family, in the neighbourhood, in the kindergarten 
or at school, which would ultimately lead to psychological stress. The network 
Intersexualität has already identified many cases in the past where it was possi-
ble to avoid discrimination. Moreover, the majority of parents with an intersex 
child who discussed it with friends or neighbours did not experience any stress. 
Only 6% of the intersex people reported as adults today negative reactions when 
mentioning their own situation.42 On the other hand, ¾ of all adolescents do 
not want their parents to discuss their situation with others.43 The majority of 
parents of intersex children will presumably choose to raise their child in one of 
the two traditional gender roles as a boy or a girl. Richter-Appelt’s recommen-
dation is important here that the parents speak candidly and lovingly with their 
children: about day-to-day life and about the sex/gender identity the child will 
later choose for itself – this is very important for the developing gender identity 
(Richter-Appelt 2012b).
It would be desirable and should be demanded that § 22 (3) PStG permits 
a choice via implementation regulations laid down in new paragraphs of the 
PStG. There should not be a permanent entry already after birth, for this new 
provision induces an outing (compulsory outing) in day-to-day life that is not the 
child’s choice.
Here it should be ensured that only the persons concerned can decide on 
the identity of their gender. A low-threshold transition has to be possible too, 
because with some intersex children it is only during or after puberty that a dif-
ferent situation emerges. With around half of all intersex newborns (Thyen et al. 
2006) an intersex variation can only be detected at the time of puberty or after.
It remains important that health-related self-help groups and independent 
psychological counseling become an integral part and are financed. The ethical 
guidelines and principles contain a number of recommendations (Wiesemann 
42 | Kleinemeier, E., Jürgensen, M. (2008): Erste Ergebnisse der klinischen Evaluationsstudie im Netzwerk 
Störungen der Geschlechtsentwicklungen. p. 34. URL: http://www.netzwerk-dsd.uk-sh.de. [03.05.2011].
43 | Ibid, p. 35.
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2008), including: “Categorizing gender exclusively on the basis of biological and 
morphological facts fails to do justice to the individuality and subjectivity of the 
individual as well as the contingency of gender identity on social and psycholog-
ical factors.”
All human beings have a body of their own.
All human beings have a gender identity of their own.
All human beings should be able to decide for themselves!
Imposed, dichotomous concepts, norms for body and mind 
curtail human rights.
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An Unusual Way of Addressing Sex/Gender 1
Tanguy Trillet
This contribution reproduces the performance of the actor Tanguy Trillet, illus-
trated with selected material. The photographs were taken by Michel Burmat.
I don’t have the expert’s perspective of some of those present here have. Instead, 
my observations stem from an experimental quest. A personal and empirical 
analysis. I hope this won’t bother you and that you will show leniency towards 
the spontaneity of my observations ... Right! I think the coffee is beginning to 
have effect. Let’s get started!
First of all, I’d like to introduce myself. My name is Tanguy. Tanguy Trillet. 
In my professional life I am playing at being an actor.  Yes, things like that hap-
pen! As an actor, I work with a cultural Association for politics and education 
‘Impulsions Femmes’, which is based in France, in Niort. Niort is situated in 
Deux-Sèvres, which Luxembourg has nothing to be envious about!  Our asso-
ciation endeavours to question norms of society and of the family, as well as 
forms of socialization, and we reflect on the reproduction of modes of behav-
iour, sexualities, and the sexed and gendered organization of our society and 
corresponding patterns of action. Our field of practice is culture. Our mission is 
that all people have the opportunity to reflect and evolve at any time, at any age. 
Good morning everyone.
I feel particularly flattered to be able 
with you speak this morning. Well, 
I am a bit excited. But then I think 
the coffee I had this morning has me 
geared up. Add to that a good dose of 
confidence and I can share my view 
about sex and gender with you. A 
very modest view, mind you!
 
1 | Original version in French.
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About a year ago I met Dr. Erik Schneider. Erik Schneider who is present here 
today. Erik? Erik. Hi there, Erik! So, about a year ago I met Erik. We met during 
a conference organized by the Institut Émilie du Châtelet in Paris. Hi Emile, if 
you happen to be listening. While we were discussing my work, Erik had the 
idea that I could contribute something to the colloquium today. Erik wanted to 
attempt a totally new approach to the concept of sex and gender. The guests were 
to be challenged directly with the subject of ‘Gender Trouble’. Judith, that was 
meant for you. And to all the other thinkers of modernity. Yes, you there. You, 
who hone wise words that heal our aching wounds! Your words on our wounds. 
What wholesome words, what worthy wisdom ...2
Where were we? Anyway to you, you who are addressing the question that gen-
der poses: who am I dealing with?  Is he he? Is she she? Is he he or she? Is she 
she or he? Is she he or she? Where is he she or he? Is he or is she she or he? 
Where is she or he, he or she? Where is he or she he or she? Where is she/he he 
or she? Where is s_he s_he? Where is s*he s* he? Where is s_he s* he? Where 
is s*he s_he?
In short, I have tried to perform or incarnate these questions. Showing 
through performance that gender is always performed. And I speak of incarna-
tion in the literal sense. My profession makes it possible. To use the tools of trans-
formation for being another person, for slipping into another role. So, I created 
the character, Marion. Marion, whom you met yesterday and this morning and 
2 | Vous qui pensez des mots pour panser nos maux! Penser/panser, mots/maux. Penser e-n des mots m-o-t-s 
pour panser a-n nos maux m-a-u-x. E-n/a-n, m-o-t-s/m-a-u-x...
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who is now on the point 
of disappearing before 
your eyes.
In the theatre there 
is nothing strange about 
a man assuming the role 
of a woman. In antiquity 
people always wore masks 
and costumes. Only men 
were allowed to enter the 
proskene. In Elizabethan 
theatre of the 16th cen-
tury, which included for 
instance Shakespeare, we 
also find this particularity. 
Our Juliet was actually a 
Julius! Today, too, men 
play women, for instance 
in some strongly codified 
theatre forms in Asia 
such as Kabuki or Bunra-
ku. That was history of the 
theatre in 35 seconds... 
But careful, playing a 
role is not lying, don’t get 
me wrong. 
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In playing many of Molière’s characters, you are fooled by no one. I assure you, 
performing is not tricking. On the contrary, performing is creating a truth. And 
creating a new truth means fighting against the logic of the social majority who 
wants to squeeze people into preconceived categories. With my performance 
yesterday, I wanted to make clear that the categories imposed on us can be trans-
gressed and that this transgression is a truth. To be true. To be honest. That's 
what we learn in the theatre! To be honest in our role. We learn and refine this 
in the course of our training. In the end it becomes a ‘play’. Slipping from one 
role into another.
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Playing with the identities, as in child’s play, but maybe not adolescent play. Ado- 
lescence! The casting room where these developing social creatures challenge 
each other. Teens! Kinds of stars whose becoming is informed under sufferance, 
by institutions they encounter along their path, just like actors who bow to the 
top brass of the block buster film industry.
The scene of adolescence I refer to here offers a significantly richer enact-
ment of identities in contrast to the simplifying blockbuster. However, success 
is assured to those, alas, who conform to the sex/gender norms more personal 
emancipation which is ‘the happy end’. Thus, gender is first and foremost a role. 
A role you define yourself. Scripts or stage directions can perhaps offer models, 
but in the final analysis it’s you who decides. We are all our own directors. And 
there’s not just one role. There are so many! Our repertoire has more than just 
a Hamlet and an Ophelia! Roles and genders go beyond the binary, two-gender 
representation. They do not limit themselves to female and male. They offer so 
many other possibilities. 
What has caused my transformation now? That is the crucial question! Where 
did the incarnation of Marion get me? Well, I admit, not particularly far! The 
physical search for representing a female character was very fascinating for me, 
to be sure. But the concrete realization was a lot more complex. Not that I felt un-
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comfortable in this role. No. I found it even rather pleasant. But in my relation-
ship with you this was different. I couldn’t talk too much about it. Not talk too 
much about it in order not to disclose my true identity. The contact with you, as 
honest as it was, was also limited. As if I couldn’t take the encounter right to the 
end. Regarding your reactions, I certainly didn’t feel any awkwardness nor did I 
have the idea of being exposed to wary glances. But that was to be expected. We 
have to admit that my contribution here blends into an environment favourable 
to the issue of trans-identity. Here you are well informed and in an empathetic 
environment. Fortunately! But as Howard Becker has said in his book “Outsid-
ers”, a person can at the same time observe the norms of one group and violate 
those of another. We know that the cognitive structures of the social majority 
infiltrate the social world, and that trans-identity is generally regarded as deviant 
behaviour. Let me therefore quote once more Howard Becker: “Deviance is not 
a quality of the act a person commits, but rather the consequence of the appli-
cation by others of rules and sanctions upon an offender.” Let us therefore not 
forget that gender is also defined through the look of the Other. This look of the 
Other is in the broadest sense that of our society. This look which submits the I 
to a classification. And I say I, I say I, but alright, the I, that’s us. Corresponding 
to the codes we have completely internalized we all create a role. According to 
Bourdieu! And these Others who look at us with judgmental eyes, that’s us too! 
The I is us. The Other is we and the we are we. The I-we, the Other-we, the We-
we!
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To conclude I would like to quote 
Jean de la Fontaine and one of his 
countless practical lessons: The fa-
ble of the Woods and the Woodman. 
A wood-chopper had damaged or 
lost the piece of wood that served 
him as a handle for his axe. So he 
asked the forest whether he could 
carefully take a branch from which 
to fashion a new handle. In return 
he promised to take his trade else-
where. The forest, who, it must be 
said, was a bit naive, granted the re-
quest. As soon as this happened, the 
woodchopper attached the handle to 
his iron and felled the forest.
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Therefore I say: 
Let the tormentors come, we will 
concede nothing! Let us fortify 
ourselves against their sanctions 
whatever they may look like. Let 
us reinforce our branches and our 
glorious foliage and let us not let 
our forest of uniqueness be cut 
down by the chainsaw of norma-
tivity!
Thank you very much. 
Salut et liberté!




The Sex of Knowledge: Sexuated and Gendered Anatomy 1
Sylvie Deplus
SUMMARY
This contribution explores the question whether the human body, such as it is 
currently taught in anatomy in France, should be regarded as sexuated and gen-
dered. The author works as an ophthalmologist and teaches general anatomy at 
the University Paris Diderot – Paris VII, and in that capacity her purview is the 
science of the body, from tip to toe, a constellation which in this form is not very 
common in France. The article’s point of departure is an US-American study 
by Lawrence and Bendixen (1992) ‘His and Hers: Male and Female Anatomy 
in Anatomy Texts for U.S. Medical Students, 1890-1989’. This study primari-
ly serves to raise the question which body is seen as reference for anatomy as 
taught in France today. The current teaching situation is discussed in the second 
part of the contribution.2
RESULTS OF THE STUDY BY LAWRENCE & BENDIXEN (1992)  
ON FEMALE AND MALE ANATOMY
The conclusions of this article are clear: the human body is male. The female 
body is discovered via an opposition, in most cases to the its disadvantage. This 
contribution critically assesses the standard anatomy textbooks usually used in 
medical studies in France. Like many of the author’s colleagues (with very few 
female colleagues among them), she also had no choice:
1 | Original version in French.
2  |    For technical reasons of reproduction, the illustrations in the present contribution were partly selected from 
German sources, since the originals presented in the paper were not reproducible. The new selection closely 
follows the original material in consultation with the author and underscores the statements of the text. Also 
note that the contribution follows the paper ‘The sex of knowledge’ (‘Geschlecht des Wissens’) presented by the 
author at the conference “Gender Normativity and its Effects on Childhood and Adolescence” (‘Geschlechter-
normativität und Effekte für Kindheit und Adoleszenz’) held in Luxembourg on 28 September 2012 and therefore 
dispenses with a detailed indication of sources.
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Figure 1: Hierarchization of the sexes 
from: Hier freut sich der Tod, dem Leben zu 
helfen. Anatomie in Heidelberg gestern und 
heute. In: Schriften der Universitätsbibliothek 
Heidelberg, vol. 13. Effinger/Kirsch (Eds.) 
(2013), Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag  
Winter, p. 139.
The basic model of the human body that she could present to the future doctors 
was inevitably male. This contribution will first give a brief historical overview of 
the modalities of the study of anatomy, followed by a number of examples from 
the textbooks used in teaching, first dealing with the representation of non-sex-
uated/non-gendered parts of the body like the head or limbs and subsequently 
with clearly sexuated/gendered parts of the body such as chest and perineum. 
The article, which was written by a curious anatomist, concludes with a number 
of practical applications.
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Table 1: Overview of the anatomy textbooks reviewed by Lawrence & Bendixen; information on 
the edition refers to the one analyzed in the study.
The selected chapters from each of the textbooks discuss parts of the body which 
are regarded as relevant for a sex/gender-related analysis, such as thorax, pelvis 
or the perineum. The analysis shows the following:
1. The sex depicted in the illustrations is male twice as often as it is female. 
Gender-neutral figures (in French: ‘représentations asexuées’ are also de-
picted.
2. A comparison shows that the descriptions of the male anatomy occupy 
twice as much space as those of the female. For example, the description of 
the dorsal nerve of the penis comprises ten lines, while the dorsal nerve of 
the clitoris is given two lines.
3. The oppositions are always made from the man to the woman, or the wom-
an is added in parentheses. For instance, in the homology of penis and 
clitoris or scrotum and external labia, a detailed description of the external 
labia is eschewed. The two body parts are thus ultimately regarded as the 
Title
Anatomy: A regional Study
Essentials of Human Anatomy
Anatomy: A regional Study
Grant’s Method of Anatomy
A Textbook of Human Anatomy
Reconstructive Anatomy
Essentials of Human Anatomy
Basic Human Anatomy
Synopsis of Gross Anatomy
Clinical Anatomy for Medical Students
Textbook of Anatomy
A Textbook of Human Anatomy
Clinical Anatomy for Medical Students
An Introduction for Human Anatomy
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same. In another homology the woman is presented as an inferior man: 
“Imagine that [...] the male perineum is divided longitudinally.” The student 
is expected to discover the female perineum on the basis of a male body 
with “slight changes”.
4. The terms used are likewise not neutral: the descriptions are generically 
masculine, the female terms are added in parentheses. Thus, we find the 
term ‘testicles’ in the continuous text and ‘ovaries’ in parentheses. The ad-
jectives used towards the end of the oppositions always describe the parts of 
the female anatomy as comparable to the male ones, but also always as less: 
less big, less developed etc.
5. In addition, there are almost absurd phrasings using supposedly unisex 
terms: In newborns, the peritoneum supposedly extends to the base of the 
prostate. The peritoneum is a serous membrane that covers the organs in-
side the abdomen and the pelvis. It is evident that the peritoneum of the 
woman does not extend to the prostate. A further example is that of the 
inguinal canal which leads to the external sexual organs, and which is de-
picted as the result of the descent of the testes. This is wrong in 50% of the 
cases. It is nevertheless the accepted definition.
In summary one can say that
in comparisons the male occurs significantly more frequently than the fe-
male;
this conclusion holds true regardless of the historical periods under review;
in illustrations the ratio male to female is 2:1;
male linguistic forms dominate in the text;
the depiction of gender-neutral facts such as muscles or nerves are embed-
ded in male silhouettes and are fashioned with a penis as well.
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Concepts of the male and female body in anatomy textbooks
Two standard models dominate the scientific canon. On the one hand, until the 
17th century we can find a hierarchized, very classical model with a general-
ly similar anatomical and physiological structure. The human body however is 
male, the woman is depicted as an incomplete, vestigial man. The reference is 
the male body, this is not even a point of debate. The woman is depicted in a 
negative comparison to the man. This notion is considered absolutely natural. 
The woman as a man whose organs lie inside the body: the vagina is the penis, 
the uterus the scrotum. The clitoris is not mentioned, since it supposedly has 
no function. An explanation could be that the study of anatomy was primarily 
conducted on the male body and that it was and still is a strongly male-dominat-
ed discipline. On the other hand, we can distinguish from the late 17th century 
onwards a more differentiated model in which the female body appears even 
though it is still represented as being of a different kind of essence. From these 
anatomical models, other functions are deduced. The male body, equipped for 
Figure 2: Examples from the surface anatomy: 
lower leg (2a) Netter (2004: 467) and muscular 
system, frontal view (2b) Schadé (1973: 54-56).
Abb. 2a)
Abb. 2b)
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social life, art and science, is contrasted with the female body, soft, sensitive and 
adjusted to domestic life and family. The only area in which the woman for a 
long time occupied the first place is the size of the pelvis, although this notion 
has by now been disproved by current studies (Peyre 2012). These observations 
are based on the author’s review of the following anatomy textbooks used in 
France:
Title
Anatomie artistique de l’homme
Anatomie
An introduction to human anatomy
Anatomie humaine en fiches
Répertoire illustré d’anatomie humaine
Traité d’anatomie artistique
Anatomie parle mouvement
Atlas of Human Cross-Sectionnal Anatomy
Anatomie topographique, descriptive et fonctionnelle
Anatomie et physiologie humaine
Human Anatomy
Atlas anatomique Sandoz : tête et cou, tronc, membres
Anatomie générale
Gray’s Anatomy
Grand cours d’anatomie artistique
Photographic atlas of practical anatomy





Atlas de neuroscience humaines de Netter
Biomécanique fonctionnelle. Membres – Tête – Tronc
Atlas de poche d’anatomie
Atlas of human anatomy and surgery
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Szunyoghy, A., Feher, G.
Thiel, W.
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In the following, some examples that illustrate the different perspective on bod-
ies attributed as female or male will be discussed:
The male pelvis is usually depicted as smaller than the female one, connect-
ing the latter to the childbearing function of the female body. The vascularization 
of the organs on the other hand is explained systematically using the male body. 
In a classical American atlas of neuroscience by Netter (Felten 2003), the inner-
vation of the pelvis through the hypogastric plexus is also explained using the 
male body, while the pelvis of the woman is depicted as a deviation. The urethra 
is first depicted in the male and then in the female body. The same applies for 
the bladder.
To which degree this gender-discriminating visual representation is also 
reflected in the area of language will be discussed briefly using a number of 
examples: The abdominal cavity is considered completely separated from its ex-
ternal environment, except for in the female body. Actually, 50% of the ovaries 
are located inside the abdominal cavity, which is of particular significance for 
certain diseases such as ovarian cancer which can metastasize in the abdominal 
cavity. The expression except for is therefore misplaced. “Regarding the gonads 
the peritoneum displays a very different behavior. During its movement through 
the inguinal canal the testes remain surrounded by the peritoneum. The process 
that can be observed in the female gonads is completely different.” The refer-
ence here are the testes which indeed move, while the ovary remains inside the 
abdomen and is regarded as completely different. “[...] the pelvis, due to the re-
productive function attributed to it, [...]”. What kind of determinism is attributed 
to the female pelvis? What function does the female pelvis serve? The hypothesis 
that it serves childbirth has been disproven by current studies on the size of 
the female pelvis. In an anatomy atlas with illustrations of anatomical cross-sec-
tions, a sagittal section of the female pelvis is accompanied by the comment: 
“The small pelvis [supposedly contains] the anatomical symbols of life and of 
death.” The chapter entitled ‘The Perineum’ of an atlas of descriptive topography 
by Bouchet und Cuilleret (1991) features a male perineum with the description 
“region where the scrotum is located”, without mentioning or describing the 
female perineum. Elsewhere in the volume, the upper part of the page shows 
a male perineum, the lower part a female perineum. In the introduction to the 
anatomy atlas Gray’s Anatomy it says: “The perineum contains the external gen-
italia and external openings of the genitourinary and gastrointestinal systems.”3 
The female urogenital region is displayed first, while in the text the penis is 
3 | Drake, R. L., Vogl, A. W., Mitchell, A. W. M. (2015): Gray's Anatomy for Students. Third Edition. Pelvis and Perineum. 
Oxford: Churchill Livingstone/Elsevier. URL: http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/mcp/Education/300.713%20
Lectures/2014/Byung_Kang_Pelvis_09.15.2014.pdf [16.07.2015].
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discussed before the clitoris. Frequently the male urinary tract is depicted before 
the female one. Only a few works maintain the equality of women and men by 
showing a bisected perineum, one side representing the male, the other the fe-
male. Highly illustrated works covering the complete male and female anatomy 
also only rarely feature illustrations of the female perineum or the female breast. 
Kamina (1999) shows only patterns of male body hair. According to a definition 
from Le Tronc (the abdomen) by J. P. Chevrel et al. (1995), the mammary gland 
and the breast are “the most-studied parts of the female body.” The description 
however begins with the man and the child, accompanied by adjectival conno-
tations regarding the description of the different shapes of the female breast: 
“pointed, conic, pear-shaped, sagging.”
What is the purpose of these differences in the observation and description 
of physical features that are connoted as female or male? It seems that this is 
not discussed, as if it were normal. Let us take a look at embryology: in the 
embryology of the exterior sex-related organs the development of female organs 
occurs for all embryos in the course of the third month. The clitoris develops 
from the genital tubercle, the urogenital tract remains open, and the labia ma-
jora develop from the genital swellings. In the then possibly developing male 
sex-related organs the genital tubercle elongates, the genital swellings condense 
and the structures grow together to the scrotal raphe. The female phenotype thus 
precedes the male.
The circumference of the waist is understood as a secondary sex-related fea-
ture and is also used to identify overweight. In a textbook on functional bio-me-
chanics (Dufour/Pillu 2005) the waist circumference or the waist has become a 
psychologized separation between top and bottom. In Georges Brassens’ song 
Venus Callipyge,4 the waist even becomes the neck of the pelvis, whose meas-
ures constitute an identity feature that is sufficiently discussed in women’s mag-
azines: “Your back loses its name with such good grace / that one can’t help 
agreeing with it.” (in French: “Votre dos perd son nom avec si bonne grâce // 
Qu’on ne peut s’empêcher de lui donner raison.”) Fat and fatty tissue is generally 
not sufficiently considered. As a rule, only its hormonal significance in the con-
text of some disorders such as HIV  is mentioned. It is not until their first dis-
sections that medical students discover how ubiquitous fat is in the human body.
It remains to be considered whether there is such a thing as the perfect 
body. We are led to believe it when we think of the drawings of Leonardo da Vin-
ci. In anatomy, points of reference, perfect proportions continue to be studied 
and measured on the male body.




Figure 3: Male torso as reference. In: Barcsay, 
J. (1973): Anatomie artistique de l’homme.
In a textbook on functional bio-mechanics (Dufour/Pillu 2005), body posture is 
sexed/gendered through depiction and description. The functional bio-mechan-
ics point to a self-assured posture in the man.
A male back also serves for the depic-
tion of epidural anesthesia, where the 
nerve endings in the lumbar region are 
anesthetized. What is not mentioned is 
that this anesthetic method is common 
practice for pain relief during labor.
If, as mentioned above, there is a 
link between the waist and the meas-
urement of overweight, then we find 
a further gendering of the issue of 
overweight in connection with the cir-
cumference of the thorax. “A too large 
circumference of the thorax can lead 
to a thoracic kyphosis.”5 “There are 
two forms of hernia,6 minor hernias 
in younger people and major hernias 
in older, overweight or multiparous 
women.” When the inguinal region 
Figure 4: Explanation of epidural 
anesthesia using a male torso.
In anatomical art books, for in-
stance, beauty ideals are placed in 
an androcentric focus. Often the 
male torso is depicted between two 
female ones as if it were the model 
torso shown between two others, 
who have attractive, but apparent-
ly less significant features (Barcsay 
1963).
5 | An outward (convex) curvature of the spine.
6 | A hernia is the exit of an organ, such as the bowel, through the wall of the cavity in which it normally resides.
is described using the male anatomy, the following comment clearly reflects a 
discrimination of the female body: “[...], in the woman it (the inguinal region) 
is a source of malformations, hernias etc.” Aging is also represented in a gen-
der-discriminating way when we read: “The first phase is marked by falling hor-
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In conclusion I should point out that this article is the result of a self-critical 
reflection of an anatomy lecturer. In studying the issue, the author became 
aware of the problem and of the fact that for a long time in the course of her 
medical teaching, she completely unconsciously and inadvertently transmitted 
stereotype gender models and thus also the still predominant gender hierarchy. 
After detailed debates with colleagues, this paper aims to sensitize lecturers, stu-
dents and the editors of medical textbooks for recognizing the naturalizing con- 
formism of this stereotype representation of anatomy and for ultimately avoiding it.
mone levels and proceeds in the man without any serious changes, while the 
woman suffers from osteoporosis, overweight as well as physical and psycholog-
ical adynamia.” Contrary to a 19th century study according to which the female 
brain weighs 150 grams less than the male owing to the weak development of its 
frontal, parietal and occipital lobes and the cerebral cortex, there are no current 
studies that could prove a gender-specific difference of the brain that can be 
considered beyond doubt as predetermined by nature. (Vidal/Benoit-Browaeys 
2005: 15).
CONCLUSION
If this brief overview has shown to what extent sex/gender stereotypes are still 
present in anatomy, then let me conclude with a last example that illustrates how 
much this discipline, which primarily works with descriptive techniques, serves 
as a projection surface for gender models.
In Bouchet and Cuilleret (1991) we find the fol-
lowing depiction of a “cross-section of the pelvis 
and the perineum of the man and the woman 
during sexual intercourse”. As a rule, however, 
anatomical depictions are based on cross-sec-
tions of frozen and dissected tissue. This rep-
resentation is therefore the depiction of an im-
agined cross-section.
Figure 5: Drawn cross-section of the pelvis and the perineum of the man and the woman during 
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Determining Sex/Gender:  
Genes and DNA Precisely Do Not Predict  
the Development of a Genital Tract...1
Heinz-Jürgen Voß
SUMMARY
Biological research of the past decades that attempted to attribute the determina-
tion of sex to only a few genes has failed. Neither the gene SRY (sex determining 
region on the Y chromosome) nor additively added genes led to a reasonably 
consistent and convincing understanding of sex determination. With complexity 
already being discussed for quite some time in the natural sciences and biology 
under the terms ‘system organization theories’ and ‘system biology’, this way of 
thinking is now gradually being embraced in biological sex and gender theories: 
it concerns the investigation of developments and processes whose outcome is 
not already presumed by researchers.
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with some historical observations this contribution offers an intro-
duction into developmental thinking and, drawing on current theories of sex 
determination, identifies the potential of such observations for more complex 
and more convincing theories of sex/gender determination than those hitherto 
used. The emphasis on development, on developmental processes constitutes a 
departure from the notion of predetermining elements. Instead it is necessary 
to take the entire organism and its interdependencies with its environment into 
account. This means that from the perspective of current biological science the 
focus has to be on the communication between the various parts of the cell as 
1 | Original version in German.
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well as on the communication between different cells, their integration in the 
organism and the influencing factors from their environment. Genes and DNA 
precisely do not predict the developments of an organism or, in this case, of a 
genital tract. Instead they merely represent one among many factors in the com-
plex interplay of cells.
Preformation or development – opposing concepts
The debate whether physical features are already preformed in the earliest stages 
of the embryo or only develop over time, so that one can observe an increasing 
complexity of the developing organism, has in the past shaped notions in natural 
philosophy, biology and medicine about embryonic development and continues 
to do so.
Already in Greek antiquity we find two different models regarding this 
issue. Drawing particularly on the atomist Leucippus of Miletus (around 460 
BCE) and Democritus of Abdera (460-371 BCE), one school of thought assumed 
that the semen of the parents2 contained extracts (atoms) of all parts of the body. 
According to this theory, arms, legs and other body parts were present in minis-
cule units and constituted the basic elements of an embryo. In the genitals these 
features would supposedly agglomerate, with the features of the corresponding 
atoms of the female and the male semen competing and the semen present in 
greater quantity and strength asserting itself. The embryo would in this way be 
preformed. This school of thought is also referred to as the theory of pangenesis. 
It also forms an important basis of the writings of Hippocrates3, only that accord-
ing to him the semen does not constitute itself from the atoms of the parts of the 
body, but rather from the body fluids and body tissues.
A contrary view associated particularly with the name of Diogenes of Apollo-
nia (499/98-428/27 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE) was the haematogenous 
theory of reproduction. This theory posits that the semen is formed from blood. 
The semen would then not be the extract of the parents’ body parts – as posited 
by the pangenesis theory – but there would occur a real transformation process 
from blood to semen. Aristotle attributed this process to heat by which blood is 
boiled down to semen. And here he saw a major difference between the sexes: 
thus only the man – and here also only one who is not too old, or too young, or 
too fat – would have commanded sufficient heat for boiling the blood to semen. 
The woman, by contrast, due to the greater frigidity Aristotle attributed to her, 
would only have been able to form an incomplete pre-stage of the semen, so-
2 | According to Leukippos and Democritos both women and men had semen.
3 | The Corpus Hippocraticum comprises writings from between the 4th and the 1st century BCE.
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called catamenias. That the woman had, as he believed, no complete semen was 
one of the reasons for Aristotle to reject the pangenesis theory, because it did not 
explain the presence of the uterus.
The 18th century debate over the preformation theories of the ovists and 
animalculists on the one hand and the epigenesis on the other represented an-
other crystallization point, where the theories of preformation and development 
(transformation or developmental processes) were discussed so prominently 
side by side. In the late 17th century the preformation theories emerged. These 
theories presumed that in either the female conception contribution – described 
by the ovists – or in the male contribution to conception – advanced by the an-
imalculists – the individual was already preformed in miniature or that at least 
the extracts of all parts of the body were already present. The corresponding 
theories of the ovists are particularly associated with the names of Regnier de 
Graaf and Marcello Malphigi. Animalculism is fundamentally linked to the use 
of the microscope invented in that time. While examining a drop of male semen 
under the microscope Antoni van Leeuwenhoek and Nicolas Hartsoeker among 
others discovered a host of moving animalculi – little creatures, a meaning that 
is reflected in the term ‘spermatozoa’ still used today (see Illustration 1). The 
essential point of the preformation theories is that from the very beginning on 
the complete individual or all its parts are preformed in the egg or the semen, so 
that there is no real development but a mere increase in size.
These preformation theories of the ovists and the animalculists fitted nicely into 
the prevailing social order and into society’s established notions. It was pre-
sumed that a higher power – a god – had created the world at a particular point 
in time. Everything that existed, exists, or will ever exist can be attributed to 
this creator god. Correspondingly some scholars connected their theories on the 
preformation of the individual in the semen or egg with the Christian religious 
Illustration 1: 
Preformation in the male semen, according to Nicolas Hartsoeker. (source: URL: 
http://www.hps.cam.ac.uk/visibleembroys/s1_4.html [04.07.2011]).
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notions of creation: Adam or Eve would already have contained all subsequently 
living human beings within themselves.
The preformation theories quickly became a target of criticism, since they 
did not serve to explain occurrences such as regeneration and the healing of 
wounds. This was illustrated by a popular experiment: if one cut a polyp (simple 
multicellular organism, Cnidaria) in half it was shown that overnight each of 
the two halves had formed a complete small polyp. These observations were 
hardly reconcilable with the assumption of a creator god. A further important 
point of criticism was that features of a child common to both parents could not 
be easily explained with the preformation theories or only in roundabout ways. 
Both points of criticism were repeatedly advanced by scholars of the time and 
ultimately had the effect that in the late 18th century developmental thinking, 
also regarding the views on embryonic development – epigenesis – gradually as-
serted itself.
Epigenesis no longer assumed that the individual was already completely 
preformed in miniscule units, with only a growth in size occurring, instead it 
was believed that first there was unformed matter from which only through de-
velopmental and differentiation processes increasingly complex, shaped matter 
developed. It was only as a result of these processes that body parts and organs 
of the embryo were formed. And neither would development have stopped with 
birth, instead transformations would have taken place all the time, and in this 
way regeneration and the healing of wounds would be possible. The detailed 
theory of epigenesis goes back to Caspar Friedrich Wolff – he described devel-
opment and differentiation as necessary for embryonic development. While 
Wolff’s ideas were first met with a guarded response, also because he analogized 
the force that was to fuel the development to other mechanical-physical forces, 
the epigenetic view gained currency with the observations advanced by Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach. He had suggested a formation drive as the force fueling 
the development, in the sense of an activity that could only be performed by 
living things.
In the same way the preformation theories have to be considered against the 
background of social conditions, this applies to epigenesist as well. It is remark-
able that as of the middle of the 18th century developmental thinking gained 
currency in all sectors of society. This was evident in scientific geographical and 
physical observations (genesis of the earth through cooling, electricity etc.), in 
philosophical descriptions (one now followed the theories of Spinoza, Spino-
zism) and even in theology (changes in the understanding of god, also drawing 
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on Spinozism). Last but not least the French Revolution made clear that social 
order too is not preordained by a god and thus unchangeable for human beings, 
but that society is shaped by human beings guided by reason. The importance 
of the transition to evolutionary ways of thinking has been variously emphasized 
in research, see for instance Lepenies 1978; Rheinberger 1981 and Engelhardt 
1986. Alfred Schmidt (1984: 10) observed with a view to natural sciences: “The 
most important qualitatively new aspect of the situation forming around 1800 
in the field of natural sciences is the ultimate triumph of evolutionary ways of 
thinking.”
With evolutionary thinking to communalities of the sexes
The significance of evolutionary thinking should also not be underestimat-
ed for the biological-medical sex/gender theories. In the preformation theories 
the female and the male sex were presumed to make very different contributions 
to conception. The embryo was purported to be preformed in the conceptive 
matter of one sex, while the conceptive matter of the other sex fulfilled other 
functions. Both the ovists and the animalculists minimized the female contri-
bution to conception. Thus even the ovists who believed the preformation to 
occur in the female egg held that the motive principle regarded as significant 
for development resided in the male semen. The animalculists reduced the fe-
male contribution to conception even further – it consisted, they said, solely in 
carrying and nourishing the embryo. On the basis of the descriptions of the con-
ceptive matters further differences were identified. Also the places where eggs 
(ovaries) and semen (male testicles) agglomorated would have been different 
– up to the 17th century they had not even been differentiated terminologically, 
rather the term testicles was used both for the female and the male sex, even 
though individual differences were named. In addition there were supposed to 
be differences in the blood vessels supplying the ovaries and the testicles and in 
the vessels transporting the conceptive matter.
Further sex-related differences were identified for the genital tract, but par-
ticularly for breasts and pelvis. Developmental thinking reflects a significant 
change: epigenesis presupposed (mostly) equal contributions to conception by 
woman and man. Correspondingly one dispensed with differentiating termino-
logically between semen and egg or testicle and ovary and the conceptive matter 
of the woman and the man were both denoted as semen. But even though the 
terminological differentiation was retained by a few authors, it was still assumed 
that the contributions to conception were involved in equal measure in the 
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embryo and its development. Based on the mixed, combined contributions to 
conception it was thought that embryonic development would proceed via devel-
opment and differentiation processes (see Voß 2011a: 85 ff., Voß 2011b).
If the preformation theories made it possible to link differential descrip-
tions of additional features to the differences of contributions to conception, 
these became irrelevant with the assumption of (in most part) identical contribu-
tions. Now it was also possible to describe commonalities of the sexes regarding 
the places of formation, the incoming and outgoing vessels and other features of 
the genital tract. This is evident from a closer look at the works published around 
1800. An example: The physician and professor of anatomy Jacob Fidelis Acker-
mann (Ackermann [1805] wrote in 1805: “Each individual can potentially contain 
the conceptive parts [genitalia] of both sexes”; later he added:
“From the presented description of the conceptive parts [genitalia] it is evident that in every indi-
vidual both kinds of genital organs are present (in their rudiments), but that only one sex emerges 
outright and that the penis is analogue to the clitoris, the prostate to the uterus, the urethra to the 
vagina, the testicle to the ovary, the ductus deferens [carrying-away duct] to the tubes [Fallopian 
tubes: oviducts, footnote, HV], the scrotum to the external labia.”
Even though Ackermann differentiates here between the female and male gen-
ital tracts – this is already clear from the differentiating terms –,something else 
seems to have been important to him, namely the similarities of the organs of 
the female and male sex. He builds on the assumption that every embryo in-
itially, i.e. in the first stages of development, contains both genitals and only 
with further development and differentiation a more or less unambiguous sex 
emerges. This observation is by no means trivial but marks a significant change 
of perspective: every embryo would at first have the potential to develop either 
into a female or a male direction. Sex-related differences could therefore not be 
fundamental but merely relative. They would not be describable as being radical-
ly different, as an either-or, like recent sex/gender research has identified for the 
biological-medical sex/gender theories since the 18th century, but would move 
within the framework of a temporal relative or a more-or-less. This was far from 
being a minority view. It is found both in the works of the Romantic natural sci-
ence and the speculative natural philosophy but also in empirically oriented au-
thors such as Ackermann. In the course of the 19th century this theory became 
the dominant perspective of those who concerned themselves in biology and 
medicine with the development of sex in embryonic development. The contro-
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versy was carried out on an entirely different level. The debate was over whether 
in these sex-related rudiments, which had the potential to develop both as female 
and male, the points of departure for both sexes would be present one next to 
the other (which would make them hermaphrodite) or whether both sexes had 
a common point of departure which then differentiated in different directions 
(and more or less unambiguously). A quote by the physician Heinrich Wilhelm 
Gottfried Waldeyer (later Waldeyer-Hartz; Waldeyer 1870: 152 f.) illustrates the 
self-evident way in which the embryo’s initially both female and male potential 
is propounded as well as the point of controversy described above:
“But a different point, also not insignificant for teratology [study of abnormalities of physical de-
velopment, footnote HV], follows with certainty from the observed, namely that the primordial dis-
position of the individual even in the highest vertebrates is a hermaphroditic one. Until now one 
has attempted to interpret the strange comportment of the genitals in their initial development in 
such a way that a neutral common, indifferent condition as it were would exist, from which devel-
opment proceeded either to one side or the other, so that sometimes a male and sometimes a 
female individual is created. But here one has relied far too much on the comportment of minor 
things, for instance that of the external genitals. Here indeed there exists an indifferent, neutral 
primordial condition as it were, which then evolves either towards the male or the female side. This 
can however be nosurpriseto us since we have in the external genitalia of both the man and the 
woman anatomically the same structures that only develop in the different individuals in different 
directions. […] But if one looks at the development of those structures which constitute the nature 
of the two sexes, the two gonads, then an indifferent, neutral, as it were, primordial dispositionis 
difficult to envisage.4[…]; in other words, every individual is on a certain level of their development 
a true hermaphrodite.”
Today, too, the view that the genital furrow or the genital ridge (the first cells 
from which the genital tract evolves during embryonic development) has the 
potential to develop both in a female and a male direction is still the dominant 
position in developmental biology.
Every human being is both female and male at the same time
Others went even further. They held the view that this condition in which female 
and male appeared together is not limited to the embryo or the early stages of 
the embryo, but that human beings combine female and male features within 
themselves all their lives. This view too was not altogether new –a tradition for 
4 | Other authors were not of this opinion, which probably led Waldeyer to explicitly address this subject. The 
works of the medically trained publicist Johanna Elberskirchen, who also contradicted Waldeyer’s view, are of 
interest in this context (see Leidinger 2008, Voß 2011a: 97f., Voß 2011b).
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this perspective in terms of intellectual history emerges for instance with respect 
to the spherical people in Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium and with 
the Chinese notions of Yin and Yang (see Römer 1903; Neuer Berliner Kunst- 
verein 1986). Descriptions that every embryo has the potential both for female as 
well as male development and that the first stages of development are sex-related 
indifferent enabled science to tie into these traditions. One of the representa-
tives for such a perspective around 1800 is Wilhelm von Humboldt, particularly 
known for his theoretical writings on linguistics, but who was also interested in 
natural philosophy and attended lectures on his subject (also see: Rosenstrauch 
2009: 100, 107 ff). Humboldt wrote:
“But the supreme and consummate beauty not only requires unification but the most precise bal-
ance of form and material, of artifice and freedom, of mental and sensual unity, and this one only 
achieves if one welds together the characteristic of both sexes/genders in one’s thoughts and forms 
humanity from the most intimate union of pure masculinity and pure femininity. But to even find 
such pure masculinity and femininity is inordinately difficult, and from experience well-nigh impos-
sible.” (Humboldt 1959b [1795]: 81)
A little later he adds (Humboldt 1959b [1795]: 102): “Of these two characteristic 
features of the human form, whose specific difference disappears in the unity 
of the ideal, there rules in every sex preferably one, while the other is in no way 
lacking.”
Manfred Herzer has suggested in initial overview research that such a view 
had established itself by around 1800 and at the end of the 19th century repre-
sented a common notion in the Bildungsbürgertum5 (see Herzer 1998). With 
this Herzer contradicted the representation that observations describing human 
beings as mixtures of female and male parts had only emerged and gained a 
certain currency around 1900.This understanding was induced by the vehement 
controversies over the publication of “Sex and Character” (“Geschlecht und 
Charakter”) by the young and also medically trained Viennese philosopher Otto 
Weininger. In this otherwise deeply anti-Semitic (Weininger was himself a Jew 
who converted to Protestantism in 1902) and antifeminist essay Weininger had 
also propounded that every human being represented a mixture of female and 
male features. There were (also) vehement objections against this view – for 
instance by the antifeminist Leipzig-based neurologist Julius Möbius, already 
controversial in his lifetime, and by the women’s rights activist Grete Mei- 
5 | Briefly, a ‘Bildungsbürger’ was a member of the pre-war bourgeois German elite whose status was marked 
less by birth than by a solid classical education.
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sel-Heß, trained in philosophy, sociology and biology (see Voß 2010: 186, 355 f.). 
More interesting, however, is that controversies unfolded over who had been the 
first to advance this theory. Wilhelm Fließ, Otto Weininger, Hermann Swoboda 
and Sigmund Freud were involved in the controversies over priority. Magnus 
Hirschfeld also joined the fray, but without claiming priority. But Weininger had 
already acknowledged the tradition right at the beginning of his observations, 
thus preempting the senselessness of such a debate over priority:
“The idea of this kind of bisexuality of all living things (as a result of the never perfectly complete 
sex-related differentiation) is very ancient. Maybe it has not been alien to Chinese myths; in any 
case it was very much alive in Greece. The personification of the hermaphrodite as a mythological 
figure testifies to this; as does the account of Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium; indeed, even 
in later times the gnostic sect of the Ophites considered the primeval human being to be male/
female.”6
Chromosomes, hormones, sex/gender
If the historical observations from developmental biology have shown that 
these in no way strictly differentiated between female and male sex-related de-
velopment, but that rather commonality and sameness was central to the debate, 
then what is irritating today is the self-assuredness with which a strict two-gen-
der difference is presumed, partly with reference to (supposedly) biological find-
ings. Even though in the early 20th century differences in the chromosome sets 
between female and male individuals were also observed, influential biologists 
of the time concluded that on the level of the actually developed appearance 
(in the so-called phenotypical features) an uninterrupted series of transitions 
between male and female of all sex-related features would show. Chromosomes 
were first examined in various species of insects, showing that in certain species 
a chromosome could be lacking in one of the sexes that was present in the other, 
and that in other species one of the sexes displayed a chromosome that had a 
different size and structure than in the other sex, and in 1923 corresponding 
descriptions were carried out for human beings by Theophilus Shickel Painter. 
He concluded that in human beings all male individuals had each one X and one 
Y chromosome, and all female individuals had two X chromosomes.7 These de-
6 | Weininger himself had thoroughly revised the 1st edition published in 1903, so that the 2nd edition con-
stituted a changed version. While contemporary critique reacted almost exclusively to the revised version, the 
reprint from 1980 used the 1st edition making it available to modern research. The textual differences are often 
not observed. For the textual differences see Hirsch 1994.
7 | They were termed Xand Y at the beginning of the 20th century (1905 and 1910) by Edmund Beecher Wilson 
and Nettie Maria Stevens.
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scriptions however in no way contradicted the assumption of an uninterrupted 
series of transitions. Richard Goldschmidt described such transitions, based on 
the assumption that chromosomally there existed two sex variants. He argued 
that the sex development of an individual depended on the quantitative and tem-
poral distribution of the female and the male factor. These factors were said to be 
formative substances for the sex, with the gene’s effect always ensuing via forma-
tive substances which in this case would be hormones.8 While often one of these 
sex-related factors predominated permanently in an individual, these could also 
change. This development would then for instance be marked by the predom-
inant male factor and would then continue in a female direction, because the 
female factor would then predominate. Goldschmidt described the point of re-
versal as the turning point. The point when the reversal occurred determined the 
degree of development of femininity or masculinity in the corresponding indi-
vidual (see e.g. Goldschmidt 1927: 10-37; Goldschmidt 1931: 1-16). An unambigu-
ous chromosomal attribution was thus compatible with a very variably perceived 
appearance of phenotypical features in the individuals of one species – and also 
in human beings.
Already at the beginning of the 20th century also regarding hormones re-
search findings were by no means clear-cut. Rather, experiments showed that 
it was impossible to separate hormones considered as sex-related according to 
female or male organisms of origin unambiguously. Bernhard Zondek was one 
of the important representatives of hormone research. He was able to detect in 
the urine of the male horse (stallion) a surprising amount of estrogen, a hor-
mone then defined as female. These findings and also others published in the 
journal “Nature”cast doubt among researchers and fundamentally questioned 
the unisex effect of hormones(see Oudshoorn 1994: 24 ff.; Sengoopta 2006: 117 
ff.; Satzinger 2009: 295, 376 f.).
However, political developments prevented such findings pointing more to 
complexity and multi-causality from being followed up on both in genetic and 
in hormone research. Their protagonists Goldschmidt and Zondek were Jew-
ish scientists in the German Reich. Both were forced to emigrate in the 1930s 
from Nazi Germany and no longer found such favourable conditions for con-
tinuing their research (see Satzinger 2009). At the same time other concepts 
were pursued– simpler concepts of the effect of genes in the US with which 
Goldschmidt’s models competed. The curtailing of research opportunities had a 
disadvantageous effect on this competition and impeded the reception of Gold-
8 | The term ‘hormone’ was coined in 1905 by Ernest Henry Starling for substances that are transported via the 
blood from the place of their formation to the place of their effect.
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schmidt’s ideas also beyond Germany. On the other hand, the Nazis took over 
the lead in research, also regarding biological sex theories. Thus Adolf Buten-
andt became director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biochemistry in 1936. 
He was an advocate of a clear distribution of roles between woman and man 
propagated by the Nazis and also in hormone research represented the theory 
of the clear sex separation of female and male hormones (see Satzinger 2009). 
Although his hormone research yielded contradictory results, he did not discuss 
these and simply excluded them in his publications (Satzinger 2009: 388 f.). 
Helga Satzinger wrote about his work: “His concept of sex closed itself to scien-
tific counter-arguments which at that time were formulated primarily by Jewisch 
scientists.” (Satzinger 2009: 295 f.) Satzinger also emphasized his anti-Semi-
tism; “which was used, whenever convenient, to discredit a scientific opponent” 
(Satzinger 2009: 296). A letter to his mother from 1930 already reveals Buten-
andt’s anti-Semitic stance with regard to Bernhard Zondek: “The only discordant 
note was injected by Zondek – a very despicable Jew! – who, with a certain arro-
gance and in an ironic tone, attempted to denigrate my work and its validity. I 
gave a retort that made the audience laugh heartily and rendered Mister Zondek 
subsequently speechless!” (quoted from Satzinger 2009: 293).
Later Butenandt made a career for himself in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and continued to dominate research, including as president of the Max 
Planck Society. Helga Satzinger (2009: 399) summarizes the significance of the 
political events and their effect on scientific knowledge with focus on biological 
gender theories: “In the preceding years the concept of genes and hormones 
causing fluctuation between and mixing of the sexes had been widely discussed, 
and the dominance of the bipolar model did not establish itself until the 1930s 
owing to the absence of the representatives of the former model, who were 
forced to emigrate.”
Current theories of sex/gender determination – including multicausality
So now the biological sex/gender model that came to establish itself – at first 
almost unchallenged – was a strictly bipolar one. Here one drew on Painter’s 
descriptions of a homologous chromosome combination of two X chromosomes 
for the female sex and a heterologous combination of an X and a Y chromosome 
for the male sex in the human being. The fact that the heterologous chromo-
some combination showed itself in the male sex, thus that the Y chromosome 
appeared here as a special factor, led to the assumption that the Y chromosome 
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represented the deciding factor in the determination of sex. While a female geni-
tal tract would form as a general development without the Y chromosome, it was 
believed that for a male genital tract to form an active developmental step was 
necessary. This orientation towards chromosomes was connected with the view 
that testicles were particularly significant for the development of the male sex – 
and the differentiation of the sexes in general. Since the late 18th century testicles 
had been in the focus of research as the masculinizing organs par excellence. 
They were thought to induce the male formation of physical and physiological 
features, some authors also emphasized their significance for the development 
of psychological features and (im-)mortal capabilities. Only a little later, since 
the beginning of the 19th century, did various authors with a similar range also 
describe ovaries (or female testicles) as important for the forming of the female 
sex. That the female sex was considered to be temporally delayed was a com-
monly held view in observations on sex/gender in biological-medical science. 
One attempted to explain the pre-existing order of the sexes/genders in society 
– and there the men dominated; it was necessary to find a scientific justification 
for their dominant position. While there were intense debates about this in the 
19th and early 20th centuries, the assumption of a far-reaching and, in contrast 
to ovaries, exclusive significance of the testicles dominated research since the 
middle of the 20th century. This was in particular a result of experiments under-
taken by Alfred Jost at the end of the 1940s and their reception. He had removed 
the gonads of rabbit embryos in early stages of embryonic development and 
subsequently observed a consistently female development, regardless of which 
chromosome combinations there were. Thus the view established itself that for 
male development gonads (testicles) were necessary as an active developmental 
step, whereas female development would merely take its course – passively (for 
a detailed discussion see Voß 2010: 245 ff.).
Focusing on the X and Y chromosomes in connection with the emphasis 
on the testicles shaped the research of the following decades in two ways: on the 
one hand the Y chromosome was now the unique object of focus and identified 
as the factor that activated the development of the testicles, on the other hand, 
in the following decades only male development was investigated. This andro-
centric focus was only tempered in the 1980s by an essay by the geneticists Eva 
M. Eicher and Linda L. Washburn. They explained simply and convincingly that 
ovaries too are very complex organs, so that there was no reason to assume that 
these could simply come about, without an active developmental step (Eicher et 
al. 1986). Now also female development came to the attention of research.
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In 1966 the search on the Y chromosome was narrowed down to the short arm 
of the Y chromosome. There one searched for the gene that would cause the for-
mation of the testicles, the so-called testis determining factor). Various authors 
successively proposed different genes. However, their significance as a testis 
determining factor had to be ruled out repeatedly, because the postulated gene 
turned out to be either missing in cases where testes had formed nevertheless, 
or that no testes had formed despite the gene being present, or that it was de-
tected in so many copies in the human being’s overall set of chromosomes (or 
the gene’s homologue in the set of chromosomes of mice) that a significance 
limited only to the formation of testes was unlikely. Finally, in 1990 the gene 
Sry was suggested as the testis determining factor. It is currently still frequently 
described as the most significant factor of sex determination, even though here 
too contradictory results soon appeared: in some cases testes developed in its ab-
sence and in other cases they did not develop despite Sry being present. Also for 
the female development various genes have been suggested since the late 1980s 
which were believed to activate the formation of ovaries in the sense of an ovaries 
determining factor. One of the genes currently being discussed in this respect 
is Dax1 that can be located regularly on the X chromosome (dosage-sensitive sex 
reversal, adrenal hypoplasia congenital, critical region on the X chromosome). 
But here, too, contradictory findings quickly appeared (for a detailed discussion 
see: Voß 2010: 245 ff.).
In recent decades the contradictions that showed up in the findings have 
resulted in simple models of gene effects being increasingly discarded also in bi-
ological research on sex/gender determination. While for a long time the under-
standing predominated that one single gene was responsible for the formation of 
a complex organ structure – like the ovaries and testes – today one tends to favour 
the view that a network of various genes and other factors are necessary for the 
formation of testes or ovaries. Meanwhile around 1.000 genes are described as 
expressed in the corresponding phases of embryonic development. For around 
80 of these there is at least some degree of, by no means consistent, evidence.
At this point already one basic element of multicausality becomes clear: 
many genes and their products interact in networks. They are expressed in dif-
fering degrees in terms of time and space. And the expression in no way differs 
according to sex – the popularly held belief that in one sex a gene is expressed 
and in the other not is wrong. Rather, all genes both in the individuals regarded 
as female and those regarded as male are, as a rule, expressed. Differences can 
only be detected in the quantity and the temporality of expression – and these 
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differences are in no way to be understood as sex-related. The differences are 
as a rule significantly greater within one group – for instance between the sin-
gle individuals in the male group – than the differences that can be measured 
between the groups of female and male individuals. This is an indication that 
individuality has been a significant, long neglected factor. Thus, in every indi-
vidual manifold genes, their products and additional factors interact in specific 
ways in quantitative and temporal terms. Even when a gene which is present 
in other individuals is absent, structures similar to the other individuals can 
come about by the gene’s effect being substituted by other genes. But this can 
also explain the individual differences of appearance between human beings 
– they could be adduced to individual differences of expression. A final obser-
vation should suffice on the genetic level: just as we meanwhile know that the 
XX chromosome combination and the XY chromosome combination are by 
no means the only existing possibilities of combining the sex-related chromo-
somes X and Y, but that also the combinations X0, XXY, XXXY etc. occur, and 
that a set of chromosomes regarded as typically female can combine with an 
appearance (so-called XX men) regarded as typically male, and a set of chromo-
somes regarded as typically male can combine with an appearance (so-called 
XY women) regarded as typically female, so we should fundamentally question 
the labeling of X and Y as sex-related chromosomes and their differentiation 
from the other chromosomes. For most of the 1.000 genes that are described 
as being possibly involved in the formation of the genital tract, do regularly 
precisely not appear on the chromosomes X or Y, but on the others, the auto-
somes. In fact only very few of these genes are regularly localized on the X or 
Y chromosomes, so that already labeling these chromosomes as sex-related 
chromosomes is misleading (for a detailed discussion see Voß 2010: 283 ff.).
It has become clear so far that with the new findings we arrive also in terms 
of chromosomes and genes at complex and individual possibilities for the for-
mation of sex. But with that we still remain on this chromosomal and genetic 
level, a two-dimensional level, according to which, as repeatedly explained, the 
genes would already contain all information necessary for the formation of 
an organism. But an approach that accords chromosomes and genes the cru-
cial role, that decouples them from the cells, the organism and surrounding 
factors, or only describes these factors merely as subordinate auxiliaries – as 
slaves of the genes –constitutes a too simple and meanwhile already disprov-
en view. It would be comparable to the preformationist theories of the ovists 
and animalculists and the pangenesis theory – development would be pure 
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development of already existing information, processuality would be ignored, 
influences of surrounding factors would remain excluded. As described above 
there were, on the one hand, political and societal reasons for the focus on 
genes, to the detriment of cellular and organismic factors, on the other hand, 
the decryption of the structure of the genetic material DNA (deoxyribonucleic 
acid) by James D. Watson and Francis Crick in the 1950s, based in particular 
on the findings of the X-ray analyses performed by Rosalind Franklin, led to 
the assumption that with DNA one had now found the key to life. Funding 
programs conducted subsequently favoured gene research, while research fo-
cusing on further cellular and organismic factors became marginal and had to 
make do with relatively little funding.9
Meanwhile there is a rethinking process underway. It is assumed now that 
genes and their products operate in networks. At the same time, the results of 
the human genome project aimed at determining the base sequence of the en-
tire human chromosome set were somewhat sobering: The number of genes 
in humans is probably not significantly higher than that of the unremarkable 
barely 1mm long nematode Caenorhabditis elegans. Thus other factors have 
moved more into the foreground – factors of the cell which make it possible in 
the first place that a concrete product is created from a DNA sequence (from 
a gene) which can then take effect in the cell. Observations on this subject are 
also by no means new – every student of biology and biochemistry gets to learn 
something about processes such as transcription, transcriptional modification, 
transport mechanisms, translation, and translational modifications. However 
these subjects are rarely followed up on their implications: If this processuality 
and its multi-phased cellular regulation is taken seriously then the significance 
of DNA, of the genes becomes a relative one. Apparently complex cellular reg-
ulation is required for the approx. 2% coding regions – i.e. which represent 
something like genes to be selected from the DNA sequence. On the way from 
the gene (of the DNA sequence) to the product actually effective in the cell, 
sequence changes occur directly, with various chemical molecules being taken 
up and the spatial structure of the forming molecule produced and actively 
regulated. It is only in this way that the product is formed which then takes 
specific effect in the cell (for a detailed discussion see: Voß 2010: 283 ff.).
DNA does thus not merely constitute a piece of information that only needs 
to be read. Rather, it is only in embryonic development that a specific unit of 
information is produced through cellular processes, embedded in the entire 
organism and dependent on parental influences and those of the wider environ-
9 | See for instance the epigenetic research by Conrad Hall Waddington which was successful, but did not 
receive the same attention as the findings of genetics (Slack 2002, Speybroeck 2002: 61 ff.).
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ment, using a DNA sequence. Which DNA sequence is expressed and which 
product is formed from it depends on cellular processes – in which numerous 
factors are involved that are regulated in a complex way – and is sensitive to 
surrounding influences for instance from the parental organism and the wider 
environment.
This contribution has made clear that sex development – the focus was on 
sex determination– proceeds in a variable way. Numerous factors are involved, 
it ensues processually and the result is at no point predetermined. The popular 
belief that as a result of sex development only the two forms of the genital tract 
result in male or female is, after an analysis of current biological and medical 
research, no longer tenable.
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The following contribution focuses on Cuba’s sex/gender policy as it has been 
reflected in the project ‘Centro nacional de educación sexual’, CENESEX for 
short, since 1989. It reveals how transsexuals in Cuba have been able to change 
their name, how the project CENESEX helped to depathologize transsexual 
persons, and which perspectives approaches such as these can provide.
INTRODUCTION
When I first met J.R. he complained of being a man trapped in a woman’s body. 
He suffered familial and social conflicts that resulted from the continuous con-
tradiction between his female biological sex and his male sex/gender identity. 
After having worked for 40 years in the metal industry he is now retired. His 
older brother describes how from a very early age he strove for as masculine an 
appearance as possible, something frequently reported in the stories of Cuban 
transsexual persons. In 1972, at the age of 23, J.R. was recognized by CENESEX 
as transsexual. This enabled him to change the picture and the name on his 
identity card. He was the first Cuban to receive institutional help in the legal rec-
ognition of his male identity. The changes in his identity card greatly facilitated 
his social integration. In those days, sex/gender reassignment surgeries were 
not yet performed in Cuba. His employer provided a number of testimonies 
emphasizing his human qualities and his excellent professional performance. 
This was also very helpful in the following steps that we took together with him. 
In a letter to the Ministry of Health from 1983 he wrote: 
1 | Original version in Spanish.
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“You cannot imagine how much I am suffering. [...] Cuba helps other people in other countries, so 
why don’t I get any help, although I’m Cuban? My problem is not the result of a whim, it is a humani-
tarian question. Because I can only feel like I am a fully valid human being if I get surgery.”
He wanted to undergo surgery at all costs. I quote from the same letter: “[...] even 
if I’m already old and lose my life in the process.” He said he would be prepared 
to sign the necessary documents in order to be buried as a man in case he should 
not survive the operation.
Similar to other transsexual persons, J.R. expresses the great suffering and 
discomfort that was caused by his body’s nonconformity and that drove him to 
turn to the health authorities. We do not make diagnoses as we do not regard 
transsexuality as pathological. As a government institution we support these 
people, discuss their situation with them and offer them guidance tailored to 
their needs. Since the victory of the Revolution in 1959 the state and the govern-
ment have shown the political will to address different forms of discrimination 
as they were detected in specific moments of history.
Development of the project CENESEX
The issues of trans- and homophobia have been on the agenda since around the 
turn of the millennium. Before that time, they had often not been noticed as 
forms of discrimination. Since the introduction of the public health system in 
1979 the National Workgroup for Sexual Education, with its specialized medical 
and psychological assistance, has been a governmental contact point for trans 
persons. In 1989 this unit was affiliated as ‘National Center for sex education’ 
(CENESEX) to the Ministry of Health. Before this it was part of the ‘Federation 
of Cuban Women’, an important NGO. When the issue of sex/gender education 
was included in the political agenda, the center joined the Ministry of Health in 
order to be able to budget the political activities in the field of sex/gender edu-
cation. The efforts undertaken by this women’s organization and the National 
Center for Sex Education in providing practical assistance to transsexual persons 
enabled CENESEX to redirect its approach in order to better meet the needs of 
transsexual people, and made it clear that it was necessary to overcome the inter-
nationally prevailing biomedical model and develop a social and legally anchored 
perspective on transsexuality. This called for a paradigm shift with respect to our 
understanding of transsexual persons as pathologized and manipulated human 
beings, as well as a focus on social problems and in particular on the power rela-
tionships that deprive transsexual persons of their rights.
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Against this background, today’s situation of transsexual persons in Cuban 
society, their social integration and the possibility of full exercise of their rights 
is no longer only a personal, familial and medical issue, but requires a public 
response in the form of a specific social policy. In 2004, in accordance with the 
accepted criteria of scientific discourse, we renamed ourselves ‘National Com-
mission for the Treatment of Persons with a Gender Identity Disorder’.
We are however aware that psychiatry continues to regard transsexuality as 
a disorder of gender identity.
After thoroughly concerning ourselves with transsexuality as a social reality 
in Cuba and other countries, we were however able to confirm that transsexual 
people demand to be regarded as healthy men and women and as fully valid 
social actors. They do not accept being treated as patients, let alone as a threat to 
public order. For this reason we changed our name to ‘National Commission for 
the Comprehensive Assistance of Transsexual Persons’ in 2005. One of the main 
reasons for this decision was a meeting I organized of more than 40 transsexual 
persons and transvestites, who had requested the support of CENESEX for the 
approval of a surgical sex/gender reassignment and the legal recognition of their 
sex/gender identity, in order to put an end to the inappropriate treatment by the 
police in certain public places. At this meeting we suggested educating them as 
sex advisers as well as cooperating in the framework of the national program for 
the control and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV (Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus) and AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome). The aim was to strengthen their role as social actors in the prevention 
of the AIDS epidemic as persons who do not only have access to certain benefits 
but who contribute to the effort themselves. Later they were also offered a train-
ing for the promotion of the sexual rights laid down by the ‘World Association 
For Sexual Health’ (WAS). Thanks to these trainings, the transsexual persons 
participated in the implementation of a political strategy against the socio-cul-
tural climate of ignorance and discrimination which led to transphobia and thus 
to the discomfort of these people. This is also how ‘TransCuba’ was created, a 
project carried out by activists engaged in the field of sexual health who have 
been enriching our work with very valuable ideas. With their active participation 
transsexual persons are making an important contribution to political change 
with respect to these issues. Cuban specialists had already successfully per-
formed a first sex/gender reassignment surgery on a female transsexual person 
in 1988. This operation was presented and discussed at a scientific conference, 
but the news was published by a paper whose coverage was inappropriate. This 
provoked protest letters from the public and the Ministry of Health retracted 
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its approval to perform further operations. 20 years passed before Cuba’s trans 
population was once more able to make use of this service. Due to resistance 
from Cuban institutions against a legal recognition of the sex/gender identity of 
transsexual persons it was only in 1997 that a few agreements could be conclud-
ed with the Ministries of the Interior and Justice. These agreements finally ena-
bled 13 transsexual persons, whose applications had been submitted a long time 
before, to change their names and photos in their identity documents. However, 
this did not involve a complete modification of official documents. The entries 
in the civil register remained unchanged, because the laws were (and are) always 
interpreted in the sense that the morphology of the genitals determines the legal 
sex/gender. For this reason a change of the name and sex/gender entries in the 
civil register is only possible if a sex/gender reassignment surgery has also been 
performed.
Current situation in Cuba and Implementation of the Project Aims
Later, in the course of a restructuring, CENESEX expanded the composi-
tion of its interdisciplinary team for the support of trans persons. This also 
included changes regarding its function as well as the development of a na-
tional strategy for comprehensive support which now is no longer limited 
to medical aspects. This strategy was presented to the Federation of Cuban 
Women, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and vari-
ous parliamentary commissions in order to hear their assessment and gain 
their support for a corresponding bill. It comprised the following goals:
Development of guidelines for the comprehensive medical support of trans-
sexual persons corresponding to international standards and the charac-
teristics of Cuba’s health system. Since all health services in Cuba are free 
of charge, this point was criticized by some people who consider medical 
support of transsexual persons a luxury and not a medical necessity and 
therefore demand a cost sharing. The Cuban government however remind-
ed them that cost-free access to medical services is a human right und will 
remain so in the future, and that the surgeries to be performed every year 
will be financed by the state budget. To gain access to the health system 
we do not have to declare ourselves ill. Accordingly, we also do not declare 
transsexual persons as sick or mentally challenged. They merely suffer 
from a discomfort and receive the services detailed in the guidelines.
Promotion of interdisciplinary research on the subject of transsexuality.
Development of education and publicity campaigns for the promotion of 
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understanding and respect for transsexual persons on the part of the com-
munity and society.
Implementation of educational programs that sensitize for the realities of 
transsexual persons and the necessity for their social integration.
Promotion of legal mechanisms for regulating comprehensive social sup-
port of transsexual persons in Cuba.
Introduction of educational programs for the support of transsexual per-
sons and their relatives. As will have become clear here we regard education 
as a crucial tool for transforming ways of thinking and culture of contem-
porary Cuban society, a tool in the struggle against discrimination and for 
the strengthening of solidarity as well as for the respect of trans persons’ 
dignity and rights.
Most successes of this strategy concern the Ministry of Health. In June 2008 an 
agreement was passed comprising the medical support of transsexual persons, 
the responsibilities of this commission and the creation of a center for compre-
hensive support.
On the basis of the first goal suggested by us, the Centre for the Comprehen-
sive Support of Trans Persons and their Relatives was established, the facilities of 
which are located in the National Centre for Sexual Education, which is headed 
by myself. The standards applied here are based on the informed consent given 
by the person after receiving comprehensive information about hormonal and 
operative procedures.
In addition, we have developed treatment standards for surgical sex/gender 
reassignment with the support of experts from the University of Gent, Belgium. 
This service is covered by the national health system. Since 1979, a total of 210 
persons have applied for treatment by specialists. Of these 210 persons, 37 were 
recognized as transsexual – recognized, not diagnosed – and on fifteen of them 
sex/gender reassignment surgery was performed in collaboration with doctors 
of the university of Gent.
In 2011, J.R., the person I mentioned at the beginning, was able to undergo 
sex/gender reassignment surgery. According to his own account he is now living 
as a very happy man.
Regarding the second goal formulated by us, several standards and research 
projects were created during the realization of this strategy, for instance an eval-
uation of the strategy for a comprehensive support of transsexual persons as a 
sociopolitical program in Cuba, studies on the societal representations of sexu-
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2 | H for heterosexual persons.
ality, carried out by a group of trans persons from the capital Havana, as well as 
a smaller study on family and transsexuality in Cuba. Work with the relatives 
was very intense and very important, particularly for the support of transsexual 
persons during and after surgery. There were also smaller studies conducted on 
non-normative sexuality and violence as well as transsexuality and employment, 
etc. These studies are published in the scientific journal Sexología y Sociedad as 
well as on the homepage of CENESEX.
In order to approach the third goal formulated by us, CENESEX has been or-
ganizing the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia (IDAHO) 
on the 17th of May of every year since 2007. Since 2008 we have also been work-
ing on a national education strategy for the promotion of respect of the right to 
free sexual orientation and sex/gender identity as a training for social justice and 
equality – with active participation of LGBT activists as well as intersex and het-
erosexual persons. Thus the Cuban LGBTIH2-movement was established under 
the leadership of CENESEX. Besides IDAHO numerous other events are also 
organized. In June we are always very exhausted from all the work!
In addition, the trans activists contribute their voices and experiences in 
expert discussions in which the strategy is presented. Here they become pres-
ent and engage in a dialogue with society. We train them in methods of partic-
ipatory education so that they may share the knowledge of their experiences in 
the debates and help to constructively shape the discussions. They attended, for 
instance, the last three Cuban conferences on education, orientation and sexual 
therapy, various discussion meetings in the framework of the Latin American 
film festival ‘Cine Pobre’, the Outgames of Montreal, Denmark and Belgium, 
conferences on HIV prevention (as AIDS activists) etc. They also participated 
very actively in organizing the various celebrations taking place nationwide for 
the International Day against Homophobia and Transphobia.
Regarding the fourth goal we organized numerous courses, seminars and 
workshops for sensitizing the staff of the Ministries of Health, the Interior and 
Justice, the High Court, the Attorney-General, the police schools and the school 
for training cadres of the Communist Party, the universities for medicine and 
educational sciences as well as the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM). 
In Havana we developed courses for further education for journalists and cor-
respondents, artists, writers, script writers for radio and television, directors of 
feature films and animated films and employees in other audiovisual media. 




Regarding the fifth goal two bills were drafted that are still awaiting a political 
decision. One is a legislative decree on sex/gender identity that comprises all 
aspects which are regarded as fundamentally necessary for the respect of the 
dignity of transsexual persons. This decree refers to the possibility to make a 
change in the civil register without performing sex/gender reassignment sur-
gery, since not all persons desiring a change in the civil register wish to or are 
able to undergo surgery. We are still waiting for a decision by the legislator on 
this decree. A second proposal aims at the revision of family law. Making use 
of its legal power anchored in the Cuban constitution, the Federation of Cuban 
Women has in the past 20 years spearheaded a process of revising and redrafting 
of family law which was promulgated in 1975 by popular vote. Because of the 
importance of this revision for the full exercise of our civil rights regarding our 
protection and well-being as well as on the basis of general human rights and 
our social responsibility, we advocate the adoption of a new article concerning 
the rights of sex/gender identity and sexual orientation. An inclusion of the core 
aspects of this new strategy in a legal structure such as family law permits the 
acknowledgement that it is within our family that we all make our first experi-
ences of learning and socialization which fundamentally shape us for the rest of 
our lives. Thus it can be acknowledged that it is the responsibility of the family 
as an institution to protect all its members without any form of discrimination.
PERSPECTIVES
At the suggestion of the National Commission for the Comprehensive Support 
of Transsexual Persons, the CENESEX and the sexological scientific community, 
Cuba has joined the worldwide campaign for the depathologization of transsexu-
ality in 2010 with a declaration of intent that embraced our arguments published 
on our homepage.
At the conference of the Communist Party of Cuba held in January 2012, 
a guideline for combatting every form of discrimination was adopted, which 
for the first time in our history also included sexual orientation and sex/gender 
identity. While this guideline was included in the political agenda of the Com-
munist Party, we are at the moment still working on its actual implementation. 
The mere fact that this aspect is now on the political agenda is not sufficient.
To conclude I would like to emphasize that due to the special social significance 
and the high humanistic content of this strategy, we demand that it become an 
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integral part of social policy and is also reflected in the national legislation. I 
refer to José Martí who observed: “Justice does not bear delay. Whoever defers its 
execution directs it against themselves.”3
3 | Cuban thinker, publicist, philosopher and poet of Spanish descent, symbol of the Cuban independence 




CHAPTER 4: SEX/GENDER NORMATIVITY AND  
TRANSIDENTITY





People who do not conform to sex and/or gender norms often encounter reac-
tions of shock and/or bewilderment. Not conforming to dominant representa-
tions of sex and gender through the mere act of being one’s self seems to provoke 
defensive reactions, including rejection, shaming, and even physical violence, in 
others – reactions that are rooted in the aggressor’s fears and/or insecurity about 
their own sex/gender. This type of reaction indicates that firmly entrenched 
sex/gender norms continue to prevail in society. In the medical profession, 
which has wide-reaching normative power, not meeting certain normative sex/
gender-related representations has been declared pathological. This process of 
pathologizing an individual includes a number of different treatments, which 
are currently the subject of controversial debate throughout the medical profes-
sion as a whole and within its individual disciplines. The people actually affected 
by such pathologizing are often excluded. Their perspectives and voices, particu-
larly those of children, receive scant, if any, notice.
1 | Children whose sex and gender (German: Geschlecht; French: sexe/genre) assigned at birth deviates from 
their sex/gender related self-perception (in German: geschlechtliche Eigenwahrnehmung; in French: auto-per-
ception sexuée/genrée) and sex/gender-related self-determination (in German: geschlechtliche Selbstbestim-
mung; in French: auto-détermination sexuée/genrée), their sex/gender identity (in German: Geschlechtsiden-
tität; in French: identité sexuée/genrée) and/or their sex/gender expression. The author wishes to point out 
that in French (unlike in German and English) the term ‘identité sexuée’ comprises a further distinction which 
suggests a bodily dimension of identity. Here, it should be noted that the author uses the term ‘trans children’, 
because it encompasses the widest possible spectrum of possibilities. The use of this term does not preclude 
how the children themselves want to be addressed, because only they can give a reliable answer to whether and 
with which term they feel themselves best described.
2 | Original version in German.
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THE EXPERIENCE OF TRANS CHILDREN 
IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM – AN EXCERPT
Children who defy the sex/gender-related representations of Western cultures 
and instead seek acknowledgement by their parents and the wider environment 
of their sex/gender-related self-positioning3,4 are often confronted with a num-
ber of problems: Lack of knowledge and the confidence to support these chil-
dren (RADELUX II 2012: 15, 17, 23), particularly on the part of professionals and 
parents, negative reactions of adults whose sex/gender binary-based expectations 
have been destabilized (Voß5), pathologization6 of people whose sex/gender iden-
tity7 deviates from cultural norms (Schneider 2014), conflation with intersexuality8 
(Baltes-Löhr;9 Groneberg10) and sexual orientation,11 more precisely, homosexual-
ity (Drescher/Cohen-Kettenis/Winter 2012: 568). In an example of the kind of 
experience reported by parents, the mother of a 16-year-old trans daughter with 
Trans-Kinder-Netz e.V. (TRAKINE), a German association organized by and for 
the parents and significant others of trans children, shared the following:
“My first step was to ring the [University Hospital Muenster’s Clinic for Child and Adolescent Psy-
chiatry, author’s note]. I gave them the background info – that gender identity disorder  may be 
the issue – and asked whether they had experience in this area. This question was answered unre- 
servedly in the affirmative and I then made an appointment. […] But once there [my child and I, 
author’s note] were disappointed – the psychologist told us that she had not dealt with such a case 
previously. After talking with my child, the psychologist told me that my teenager had serious de-
pression and also suicidal thoughts […]. Panicking that he could actually harm himself, I then also 
contacted the LWL University Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Clinic in Hamm. He was then treated 
on a weekly basis as an outpatient for depression. They couldn’t help us with the other issue.”12
3 | In French: l’auto-positionnement sexuée/genrée; in German: geschlechtliche Selbstverortung.
4 |The author uses this term to denote sex/gender-related self-determination (German: geschlechtliche Selbstbe- 
stimmung; French: auto-détermination sexuée). It includes the physically sexed self-perception (German: geschlecht- 
liche Selbstwahrnehmung; French: auto-perception sexuée).
5 | See chapter by Heinz-Jürgen Voß in this volume.
6 | Mechanism by which people whose physical, mental and/or social characteristics do not correspond to any 
norms are considered and declared sick by physicians.
7 | Yogyakarta-Principles (2006): Definition of gender identity: “[...] each person’s deeply felt internal and 
individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth”, p. 6.
8 | Biological specificities in the differentiation of sex, in which people with intersex bodies in different ways exhibit 
deviations from the standard sexes, whether female or male. See description of the German Federal Association of 
Intersexual People; URL: http://www.intersexuelle-menschen.net/intersexualitaet/ [31.12.2013].
9 | See Christel Baltes-Löhr’s chapter: ‘Always gender – always different’.
10 | See chapter by Michael Groneberg.
11 | Yogyakarta-Principles (2006): Definition of sexual orientation: “[...] each person’s capacity for profound 
emotional, ability to be affectionate with [in place of affectional in the original text, author’s note] and sexual 
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or 
more than one gender.”, p. 6.
12 | TRAKINE: Report. URL: http://www.trans-kinder-netz.de/pdf/Mutter_eines_16_jaehrigen_Transmaed-
chens.pdf [16.08.2013].183 (in German).
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Some families assume a high burden to find appropriate medical treatment for 
their child, as the following report shows:
“We have to travel from Bodensee [Lake Constance in southern Germany, author’s note] to the 
university clinic in Hamburg, which of course takes a great toll, both physically and financially. Spe-
cialists who believe that development should progress naturally, and who don’t try to cure some-
thing that can’t be cured, still aren’t available in our area. This type of approach, which we consider 
appropriate for our child, is only available in Hamburg.”13
Staff changes can also lead to the threat of halting already commenced hormone 
treatment to delay puberty, and this can pose another stress:
“The hormone blockers [puberty-delaying hormones, author’s note] gave him a stability that al-
lowed him to consider starting anew in a different school, where no one knew him. Consequently, his 
social anxiety decreased significantly. When the endocrinologist rang us to say that they intended 
stopping our child’s treatment, our son was devastated, because without the blockers a new start 
was impossible. The nightmare scenario of having to go through female puberty, which could have 
negatively affected his future physical development as an adult man, was a setback that saw him 
unable to imagine being accepted at the new school suggested to him. He felt like his difference 
would once again single him out and he would be in the same boat as at the current school, which 
he had attended since childhood, and where he felt victimized.”14
These anecdotes, along with many other reports and life experiences, demon-
strate the need for a different approach by the medical profession to trans chil-
dren and their families. Medical intervention has to prioritize the needs of these 
children and their families. The social mandate of the health care system should 
be to improve their quality of life. Examination of how sex/gender is understood 
within medicine can give some clues as to how this can be achieved.
The medical perspective on sex/gender
That human sex and gender is constituted as a binary seems to be an unshakable 
tenet of the medical profession, despite the fact that it is neither demonstrated 
by scientific evidence, nor borne out by closer observation of individuals (Voß15). 
Sex as well as gender cannot be subdivided into just two variations that can be 
considered strictly independent of each other on the level of biology, psychology 
13 |Trakine: Report. URL: http://www.trans-kinder-netz.de/pdf/Lenas_Mutter.pdf [14.02.2014].
14 | Intersex & Transgender Luxembourg a.s.b.l. (previously Transgender Luxembourg, 2012): Field report.
15 | See chapter by Heinz-Jürgen Voß in this volume.
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or sociology. Instead, humans tend to traverse the range between the two ends of 
the spectrum on all three levels. Despite this diversity, in most societies, a child 
is assigned to either the group girl or boy at birth according to their genitalia. 
Anyone whose characteristics defy the assumed unambiguousness is in dan-
ger of being declared sick and made unambiguous by physicians – who claim 
for themselves the definitional sovereignty for the terms ‘disease’ and ‘need for 
treatment’. (Fausto-Sterling 1993: 23; Woweries16).
How a person will come to position themselves in terms of sex/gender – i.e. 
which sex and/or gender, if any, an individual considers themselves as belong-
ing to or identifies with or which sex/gender identity they develop – cannot be 
predicted at birth. Not only the experiences of trans children, but of intersex 
children as well, testify to this (see Woweries17). Cultural sex/gender related re- 
presentations vary and a number of more or less prescribed possibilities for sex/
gender transition (physical and social/in terms of an individual’s relationship 
to themselves and/or their relationship to their surroundings) are known (see 
Baltes-Löhr18). Not all cultures fall back on the concept of sex/gender binarism 
and the mechanism of pathologization to rationalize the existence of people 
with characteristics that fall outside of the sex/gender binary and to “rescue” 
the latter (see Rauchfleisch 2012: 187; Schneider 2014). According to Langer/
Martin (2004: 4), scientifically validated criteria for distinguishing between 
normal and pathological sex/gender identity or gender behaviour do not exist. 
Existing scientific data do not suffice to empirically answer whether a diagnosis 
of pathological sex/gender identity disorder can be attributed to a psychological 
disorder, a physical disorder of some other genesis, or is in fact even a disorder at 
all (Cohen-Kettenis/Drescher/Winter 2012: 573). Additionally, the categorization 
of transsexualism as a psychological disorder is increasingly being questioned 
(Alessandrin 2013: 57; Becker 2012: 26; Rauchfleisch 2012: 23).
The need to stop considering transsexuality as a pathology (see Sigusch 
2011: 286) and especially as a psychiatric disease (Becker 2012: 26-27) is to some 
extent recognized in psychiatry and across medical disciplines. The solutions 
proposed in this context continue to emphasize the importance of making a 
hormonal treatment and surgical reassignment available as part of the health in-
surance system (Becker 2012: 27; Cohen-Kettenis/Drescher/Winter: 573; Rauch-
fleisch 2012: 35). Notwithstanding these advances, steps backward can also be 
observed, for instance the fact that psychiatry has for the first time become an-
chored in the discussion around reimbursement. In some circles the role of 
16 | See chapter by Jörg Woweries. ‘Who has a disorder? Who gets to decide?’
17 | See chapter by Jörg Woweries: ‘Intersex – medical measures on the test bed’.
18 | See chapter by Christel Baltes-Löhr: ‘Always gender – always different’.
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psychiatry is actually being given new emphasis in terms of approving health 
insurance coverage for sex/gender transition measures. For example, a minis-
terial decree19 passed in January 2014 introduced a diagnosis of “syndrome of 
gender dysphoria”, which cannot be scientifically proven, and at least one year of 
“psychiatric treatment” as prerequisites for health insurance coverage of medical 
treatment. These and other inappropriate prerequisites are making20 transition 
more difficult, particularly for minors, and could lead to human rights violations 
and contravention of the rights of children.
Another aspect of the medical discourse is its difficulty in distinguishing 
between sex/gender identity and sexual orientation. Although not the subject of 
scientific study to date, empirical data21 gathered via observations in our self-sup-
port group show that many trans people of all ages consider and experience 
their sex/gender identity as separate from their sexual orientation. Despite this, 
health care professionals pose the question of sexual orientation almost as a 
matter of course. One reason for this is the prevailing assumption that trans 
people do not accept their own homosexual orientation and repress it (Korte 
2008; Rauchfleisch 2012: 22). Becker (2012: 30) writes of seamless transitions 
between homosexuality and transsexuality. The extent to which sexual orienta-
tion is problematized by professionals (Becker/Möller/Schweizer 2013: 267 ff.) 
and researchers (Hill et al. 2007: 68), despite the minimal role it plays in the 
issues faced by many trans people, is astounding. It stands in stark contrast to 
the lack of reliable data on the sexual orientation, sex/gender identity, and the 
relationship between these two factors for the population as a whole, which is 
assumed to be heterosexual and cis-identified.22
The paradigm of the sex/gender binary includes the paradigm heteronor-
mativity, according to which individuals are heterosexual by default. Following 
on from this is the assumption that a trans person simply wants to transition 
in order to live as a heterosexual. Such hypotheses exclude people who pursue 
homosexual or bisexual relationships after transition (Rauchfleisch 2012: 66), 
and those who identify as asexual or pansexual,23 but who did not identify as 
heterosexual prior to transition.
Moreover, the diverse terms and definitions along with their inconsistent 
use and the varying manifold translation between languages, is only given cur-
sory mention. Understanding and definition of terms such as transsexualism, 
19 | Mémorial. Official gazette of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. A – N° 232, 30.12.2013. Caisse nationale 
de santé – Statuts. Annex: “Modifications des statuts de la Caisse nationale de santé Comité directeur du 11 
décembre 2013”, Point f; page 4301. “Chirurgie plastique à visée esthétique et dysphorie de genre”, 1° g) f. 
URL: http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2013/0232/a232.pdf [06.01.2013].
20 |Transitioning to another gender role, which can also lie outside of the sex/gender binary.
21 | Author’s observation (2009-2012) in the self-support group of Transgender Luxembourg.
22 | Congruence of the sex/gender assigned at birth that matches the sex/gender-related self-determination.
Trans-Children: Between Normative Power and Self-Determination
172 Erik Schneider
transsexuality, sex/gender variance and sexual identity vary (see Schneider 2014). 
This complexity contributes to a social definition of sex/gender that is culturally 
circumscribed at a number of levels and the frequent interchanging of sex/gen-
der with sexual orientation, which causes additional confusion and frequently 
feeds into a lack of or mistaken understanding of trans people.
Experiences of parents contacting health-care professionals
Some children realize at a very early age that the sex/gender assigned to them 
at birth does not match their sex/gender-related self-perception. In some cases, 
these children communicate this self-awareness to their parents. For example, 
this conversation between a mother and her 5-year-old child: “Why didn’t you 
give me a girl’s name when I was born?” The mother answered: “Because you 
were born with a willie.” To which the child replied: “Yes, but inside I’m a girl, in 
my heart and in my head. Even when I was first born I already had a girl’s heart, 
I just wasn’t able to tell you.”24 Thinking that they are being understanding, par-
ents often assume their child is going through a phase. For example, the parents 
of a child assigned as boy at birth, might indulge their child’s wish to wear a 
dress at home, but insist on trousers when going out, because they assume their 
child is a boy. Parental fear that their child will be excluded, bullied or physically 
harmed is another key reason for why they do not want their child leaving the 
house like that. Other parents admonish or sanction their child or administer 
corporal punishment in the name of child rearing, hoping that this will make 
their child begin behaving normally again (Brill/Pepper 2011: 88/89; RADELUX 
II 2012: 13). Some teenagers report that their parents label their wish to change 
the gender role as a fad, with the unstated reproach that “following every fad that 
comes along is unnecessary.”25 If this phase goes on too long and/or becomes 
too intense, parents frequently start to worry, especially if they start comparing 
their child to other children of the same age. The suspicion that a child does not 
conform to their assigned sex/gender can often throw a family in disarray. Some 
seek out medical help or therapy to find out what has happened to their child and 
how the child can become normal again. Very few parents at this stage already 
recognize that their child is not sick, but is simply not conforming to society’s 
sex/gender norms. Pressure from the family’s environment, childcare workers, 
teachers or school authorities can also lead parents to impose corrective mea- 
23 | Ability of a person to feel intensely emotionally and sexually drawn to a person independently of sex and/
or gender, and to enter trusting and sexual relationships with these. This includes individuals outside of the sex/
gender binary (see Nieder 2013).
24 |TRAKINE: Report. URL: http://www.trans-kinder-netz.de/pdf/Mutter_von_Lisa.pdf [07.01.2014].
25 |Intersex & Transgender Luxembourg a.s.b.l. (2013): Field report.
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sures, punishments, or, at the very least, to ignore the so-called non-conforming 
behaviour. Parents become alarmed and seek help particularly when psychologi- 
cal problems appear, such as difficulties in social interaction, eating disorders, 
self-harm (Carmichael/Parkinson/Skagerberg 2013), depression or suicidal ten-
dencies (HES/MAG 2009), including in early childhood (Lüthi/Fuchs 2013), 
which often arise when the child attempts to repress their sex/gender-related 
self-perception and/or experiences of social rejection, punishment and correc-
tive measures (Ehrensaft 2012; D'Augelli/Grossmann 2007; McBride 2013: 52; 
RADELUX II 2012: 15). For example, this mother’s experience:
“One night Karl tried to cut-off his willy under the shower with a plastic knife from the general store.” 
Karl: “Then I’ll grow a vagina. There really is a fairy that can cast a spell to turn me into a real girl. I 
want long hair and a vagina, and then I’ll always wear proper girls’ clothes [...] I get sad when I see 
my willy. I don’t want it, when will it be gone?”26
Moreover, society usually puts parents under a great deal of pressure to normalize 
the child, which generally puts the relationship between parent and child under 
extreme pressure (Hill/Menvielle 2009: 255-256). Physicians and psychologists 
often seem ill-equipped for the needs and problems of trans  children. For exam-
ple, parents have reported poor understanding on the part of physicians, some 
of who have been known to suggest the parents are responsible for their child’s 
possible trans  identity (McBride 2013: 57; Hill/Menvielle 2009; Schneider 2013). 
Examples include the following reactions and statements: “He [The physician, 
author’s note] phoned and accused me of rearing the child into schizophrenia, 
of being a great danger to the child, and that child welfare services should be 
informed.”; “I’ve never heard of anything like this.”; “This type of thing doesn’t 
exist!”; “The child needs a good clip around the ear!”. One child and adolescent 
therapist said: “It’s just a phase. And don’t forget your child is from a broken 
home!”27 If divorce actually does play a causal role in possible trans identity, one 
would expect a significantly higher number of trans people in the general popu-
lation. Countries with a higher divorce rate like Luxembourg28 would therefore 
have more trans children than countries with lower divorce rates.
26 | TRAKINE (2012): Report by a 6-year-old trans girl. URL: http://www.trans-kinder-netz.de/pdf/Mutter_von_Lisa.
pdf [27.12.2013].
27 | TRAKINE presentation at a public information event on transsexuality, 04.12.2013, in Magdeburg, Germany. URL: 
https: //www.facebook.com/events/669464496419434/ [05.01.2014].
28 | The divorce rate in Luxembourg in 2010 was by 60%. URL: https://www.allianz.at/v_1353506042000/privat-
kunden/media-newsroom/news/aktuelle-news/pa-download/20120213_chart_eu_vergleich.pdf [17.08.2015].
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29 | See chapter by Achim Wüsthof.
30 | Biography.com: ‘Christine Jorgensen Biography. Film Actor/Film Actress, Singer (1926–1989)’.
URL: http://www.biography.com/people/christine-jorgensen-262758 [08.09.2015].
31 |Champenois, S. (2013): ‘Bambi’, douce trans. Libération. URL: http://www.liberation.fr/ecrans/2013/06/04/
bambi-douce-trans_952833 [08.09.2015].
The phases of professional supervision of trans children 
and trans adolescents
The points at which families generally seek professional help from the health 
care system can be categorized in three specific phases of a minor’s life:
Support in deciding whether a child should socially transition during child-
hood, including at (pre-)school and in the wider community.
Prior to the start of treatment with Gonadotropin releasing hormone ago-
nists (GnRh agonists) to delay puberty (Wüsthof 29).
Prior to irreversible medical intervention for adolescents and adults (so-
called cross-sex hormone therapy and surgical reassignment).
 
Time and again health care professionals are required to decide whether and 
how to lend support to a family.
Medical approaches
The demand for hormone treatment and surgical reassignment increased in the 
1950s, when public personalities like Christine Jorgensen30 (1952), Coccinelle and 
Bambi31 (1958-1960) publicized their transitions by means of medical intervention 
in the media. In the 1960s, somatic psychiatrists, endocrinologists and surgeons 
engaged in heated debates, in particular with psychiatrists and psychologists, about 
the most appropriate approach to transsexuality. Researchers focused on so-called 
feminine boys, with the intention of treatment as a form of early prevention and 
as a way to solve the problem of transsexuality in adulthood (Bryant 2006: 26).
What is the best treatment for a child is currently a subject of controversial 
debate in medicine, including in terms of the revised Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric As-
sociation (APA, 2013) in May 2013, and the latest version of the ICD, which is 
scheduled for publication in 2017. According to the APA (2011), consensus has 
only been found for the perspective that the main goal of psychotherapy is “to 
optimize the psychological adjustment and well-being of the child [diagnosed 
with GID (replaced by the term gender dysphoria in May 2013)]”. No agreement 
has been found regarding the following key questions:
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Reduction of atypical behaviours regarding sex/gender norms.
Prevention of transsexuality, particularly hormonal and/or surgical inter-
vention (Meyer-Bahlburg 2002; Zucker 1990).
 
Can the above be regarded as acceptable goals of psychotherapy and in line with 
the physician's professional code of ethics?
Further questions that remain to be answered by society include: Should the 
normalization of the child's self-perception and those behaviours that do not meet 
cultural sex/gender stereotypes and norms as a goal of medical treatment be con-
sidered an ethically sound approach? Should deciding such questions even be the 
domain of medical professionals or indeed professionals of any other discipline?
Many professionals consider sex/gender-related self-positioning and behav-
iour that does not conform to sex/gender norms as something requiring treatment 
or at least changing. But an increasing number of professionals are adopting a 
different perspective that accords the unconditional recognition of an individu-
al’s sex/gender-related self-positioning (Riley et al. 2013), often expressed as a pre-
ferred first name of choice, a pivotal role in their therapeutic approach.
Overall, the handling of trans children in medicine encompasses various 
approaches, of which several are divided below into the categories normalizing, 
avoiding and affirmative. Due to limited space, the approaches highlighted and 
described in terms of aims, methods and evaluation have been selected, because 
they have a key influence on the lives of children and their families.
Normalizing approaches
In normalizing approaches, the attempt is made to adapt a person’s perception 
of his or her own sex/gender, that is, a person’s identity, to the cultural system 
of the sex/gender binary, with the goal of seeing the person remain in the gen-
der role assigned to them at birth. The underlying assumption is that the per-
son displays a deviation from sex/gender norms that requires treatment, which, 
however, varies depending on culture and time. Here, the needs expressed by the 
individual play a secondary role, while maintaining the binary sex/gender norms 
is of primary importance in this approach (Lev 2004: 331; Raj 2002: 3.1.2.).
Methodologically, a number of treatment approaches can be identified32, in- 
cluding different types of psychotherapy, such as behavioural therapy and psy-
choanalysis, but also other techniques used in psychiatry, like electroconvulsive 
therapy33 (ECT) and pharmacotherapy (Lev 2004: 321), all of which have the same 
aim, upholding the sex/gender binary.
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Some therapists recommend in-patient treatment in child and adolescent psy-
chiatric centres lasting several months. The mother of a trans girl described a 
consultation with a senior physician at a well-known German university clinic:
“He tried to convince me that Dominique can only be saved if she was removed from her parents for 
a long time as an in-patient.” Other statements by the physician included: “What are 1.5 years of 
your child’s life compared to the rest of his life, the life of the boy”, and added: “The contact between 
child and parents needs to be severed for a lengthy period, so that the child can be broken at a point 
in time judged appropriate by experts and then rebuilt.”34
It should be noted that 'broken' in the quote above referred to the child’s sex/
gender identity. In light of the fact that a scientific basis for such a corrective 
approach is completely lacking, the suggested treatment is astounding, as is the 
notion of secluding a child in a psychiatric institution for 1.5 years without paren-
tal contact. Other authors recommend that parents ignore behaviours that do not 
conform to sex/gender norms, and that they encourage the child to develop sex/
gender-stereotypical behaviours, which seem to correspond to the sex/gender 
the child was assigned at birth. In particular, Meyer-Bahlburg (2002) advises 
the public, including parents, to bring the child into more contact with children 
assumed to be of the same assigned sex/gender. Parents should also minimize 
contact with family friends with children of the opposite assigned sex/gender 
and to create new acquaintances with children of the supposedly same sex/
gender. Within this context, the author particularly suggests that fathers should 
maintain more contact with their supposed sons – despite the fact that such a 
measure has not been proven to have any positive effect on the sex/gender rela- 
ted self-positioning of a child. This recommendation is based on the assumption 
that a child will alter his or her behaviour to that typical of the assigned sex/
gender of those children they are surrounded with (see Bosinski 2013). How-
ever, according to Steensma (as discussed by Becker/Möller/Schweizer 2013), 
psychosocial aspects (including the quality of the relationships with peers) have 
no influence on the duration of gender dysphoria.
Other measures include systematic contradictions whenever a child ex-
presses themselves in a way or exhibits behaviour that does not correspond to 
sex/gender norms. For example, a trans girl reported the following about her 
consultations with a physician:
“My every word was squashed down. For example, I expressed my anxiety that my hair growth would 
increase, that I have so many pimples and such bad acne. His answer was, and I quote: ‘But other 
34 | Intersex & Transgender Luxembourg a.s.b.l. (2013): Field report.
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boys also have pimples.’ [...] I also expressed my fear of developing more masculine features; that 
my body would continue to develop, because you can’t reverse that. To which he replied: ‘Yes, that’s 
true.’ I was scared of looking like Arnold Schwarzenegger in a dress. He also said: ‘At sixteen puberty 
has been completed, you can’t become more of a man.’ When I said that a boy at school had fallen 
in love with me, because he thought that I was a girl, his response was: ‘He’s gay.’ It was hideous. I 
felt completely undermined; I wasn’t permitted to disagree with anything, my point of view was in no 
way accepted. He tried to convince me of the opposite of whatever I felt and said. I had the constant 
impression that they were trying to dissuade me from my path. My perceptions were stifled before 
they could even be fully expressed; the seeds of my self-understanding were destroyed.”35
This type of process hardly seems indicative of a respectful patient-doctor rela-
tionship and does not comply with medical ethics.
In parallel to the approaches above, other forms of treatment under de-
bate for children include outcome-neutral and supportive approaches (Becker/
Möller/Schweizer 2013: 273; Meyenburg/Richter-Unruh 2012). Elaborating on 
this topic, Meyenburg writes: “The point of psychotherapy is not to eradicate 
sex/gender-atypical behaviour and corresponding wishes, but to explore whether 
a life in the biological sex is not possible after all.” Drawing upon his findings 
that some girls had problems returning to the female gender role, Steensma 
(2011: 16) cautions against socially transitioning from the assigned sex/gender 
any earlier than shortly before puberty. These problems are not specified, inclu- 
ding whether and to which extent factors like misogyny played a role. In terms of 
today’s insights, medical techniques that attempt to maintain sex/gender norms, 
the ongoing lack of support for timely social transition, including at pre-school 
and primary school age, or the prevention of such a transition, should be con- 
sidered to be normalizing approaches and, in light of the lack of scientific evi-
dence, be viewed critically.
Scientific demonstration of significantly positive results in terms of the actu-
al life situation of those affected are lacking for all approaches, as are long-term 
studies. No evidence exists that behavioural patterns or identities that do not cor-
respond to sex/gender norms can be cured or repaired. To date, all evidence36 
suggests that a person cannot be retrained in terms of their sex/gender identity. 
In their review of two investigations that attempted to realign sex/gender identity 
(and moreover, sexual orientation), Zucker and Bradley (1995), arguably advo-
cates of normalizing approaches, found little evidence that the goals of the study 
had been met. Not only is it impossible to change a person’s sex/gender iden-
35 | Intersex & Transgender Luxembourg a.s.b.l. (2013): Report of a person of their experience at age 16. 
36 | See experiences of psychotherapists, such as those of Peter Keins, as well as reports of the parents as-
sociation TRAKINE.
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tity. Sex/gender stereotypes are even reinforced (compare Langer/Martin 2004). 
Several authors consider normalizing approaches as psychologically damaging for 
children by lowering feelings of self-esteem, causing or increasing fear, depression 
and suicidal tendencies (Ehrensaft 2012; Hill et al. 2007; Mallon/DeCrescenzo 
2006; Raj 2002; Rauchfleisch 2012). Moreover, Langer and Martin (2004) refer 
to the paper by Burke (1996), which discusses children damaged by treatment for 
Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood (GIDC). Professionals working with care 
givers37 have described mothers contacting them to report the suicide of their child 
after such treatment. Such corrective treatment has also been described as ‘brutal’ 
(Mallon/DeCrescenzo 2006: 221) and ‘unethical’ (APA 2011; Nieder 2012: 16).
In light of the evidence that normalizing treatment approaches have dam-
aging effects, clinical studies of how adults experienced undergoing such gen-
der normalization approaches during childhood, including their potential dam- 
aging effects, are urgently needed (Lev 2004: 329). In contrast to Steensma's 
observations discussed above, a clinical study by Ehrensaft (2012: 354) observed 
no negative effects of re-transition when the environment of the individual was 
accepting. Strikingly, the approach of Steensma and Meyenburg again implicitly 
prioritizes maintaining sex/gender norms over the needs actually expressed by chil-
dren. Children are not given the space to explore and claim for themselves a path 
of personal development, which might include transition during early childhood.
Avoiding approaches
These approaches are characterized by non-reaction to requests, frequently from 
parents, of how to respond to behaviour by a child that is interpreted as not 
conforming to sex/gender norms. Parents do not receive an answer to their re-
quest for help. The best they can hope for is an admission of ignorance from 
physicians and psychologists. This is often connected with the perception that 
non-reaction will not cause any damage, that a life will take its natural course. A 
discussion about the possible negative consequences of such non-reaction, con-
sidering that the families continue to be exposed to the dangers of social mar-
ginalization, corrective and punitive measures, discrimination and – even the 
children – verbal and physical violence, without any protection. This approach 
cannot be considered neutral. The lack of acceptance of a child’s sex/gender-re-
lated self-perception or self-positioning, or their sex/gender identity, can have 
serious consequences for the child’s emotional stability and their ability to form 
relationships with others. Consequently, no decision or recommendation to fa- 
milies by professionals can be considered neutral at any point.
37 | Intersex & Transgender Luxembourg a.s.b.l. (28.09.2013): Field report.
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Similarly, letting teenagers live through the physical development of puberty 
cannot be considered a neutral decision (Giordano 2008). Firstly, the physical 
changes of puberty increase the suffering of trans minors, which can lead to 
mental health issues, including thoughts of suicide; and secondly, the risk of ver-
bal and physical violence increases, if the teenager does not meet sex and gender 
norms, because the despised physical changes during puberty are irreversible, 
that is, cannot be undone.
Affirmative approaches
In affirmative approaches, a child’s sex/gender-related self-perception and 
self-positioning are accepted unconditionally. The child is supported according 
to their currently expressed needs and encouraged to explore their sex/gender 
identity. The expression of their sex/gender-related self-perception and self-po-
sitioning is explicitly affirmed. This can include social transition in early child-
hood which is increasingly being facilitated for children (Ehrensaft 2012; Hill et 
al. 2010; Lev 2004; Menvielle 2012; Möller et al. 2009; Torres Bernal/Coolhart 
2012). Social transition at an early stage can often reduce psychological trauma 
like fear, depression and suicidal tendencies (Ehrensaft 2012; Rauchfleisch 2013). 
Key to this approach is the concept of intervening in the hostile, marginalizing 
[transphobic, author’s note] environment, instead of individualizing the prob-
lem [of culturally based sex/gender norms, author’s note] (Ehrensaft 2012; Hill et 
al. 2010; Lev 2004: 332, 346; Mallon/DeCrescenzo 2006; Menvielle 2012; Pirelli 
Benestad 2012; Raj 2002). In contrast to the approaches described above, this 
approach expressly states that a sex/gender identity that deviates from cultural 
norms is not pathological (Menvielle 2012: 363). At the same time, hormone 
treatment (delayed puberty and so-called cross-sex hormone treatment) is con-
sidered part of the affirmative approach. For more information about this metho- 
dology, see Wüsthof38 and Spack et al. (2012). Giordano (2008) has described 
positive results using this approach. For many minors, this type of treatment 
has shown a significant improvement of emotional and psychological well-being 
(see Wüsthof39) and quality of life.
Apart from these considerations, the question arises under which conditions 
a child’s desire for hormonal treatment (GnRh inhibitors or so-called cross-sex 
hormones) can or should be met, or more specifically, which criteria should 
be applied in this decision. General agreement on this question seems to in-
clude a high degree of suffering, suicidal tendencies, long-standing difference 
between the experienced and assigned sex/gender. Some therapists call for proof 
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of failed non-hormonal treatments prior to the start of hormone therapy (Becker 
2012: 31) and wish to see hormone treatment viewed as a last resort that should 
only be prescribed after the completion of psychosexual development (also known 
as somatosexual pubertal development) (Korte et al. 2008), because the latter 
could be impeded, including in terms of the development of sexual orientation. 
According to critics, solid scientific evidence is lacking for any of the discussed ap- 
proaches – be it for normalizing or avoiding approaches. This includes the affirma-
tive approach, which however seems to have less detrimental effects than the others.
Making mature psychosexual pubertal development a precondition for tran-
sition is less than convincing considering the lack of scientific evidence regard-
ing hormonal effects on various aspects of sexuality and sexual development and 
the reality of lifelong learning and ongoing experiences. Moreover, the approach 
ignores and discriminates against teenagers living asexually. Whether and to 
what extent the development of forms of sexual orientation are hindered, leading 
to impairment of developmental potential, seems to be more based on specula-
tion guided by agenda, than on scientific insight. The high degree of mental and 
emotional stress placed on teenagers seems to not be an argument for early in-
tervention with GnRh agonists for the proponents of normalizing and avoiding 
treatments. It should be noted that not all professionals support scientifically un-
proven hypotheses such as those described above. However, the one-sided em-
phasis in the debate surrounding the diagnosis of transidentity on the dangers of 
misdiagnosis, at the expensive of a supportive treatment with few side-effects, is 
surprising. This imbalance fails to meet the needs of those in question – young 
people suffering significantly under the consequences of puberty.
Whichever decision is reached regarding the type of treatment – it has to be 
based on a transparent and objective basis, i.e. it should prioritize the articulated 
(and not presumed) needs of the child or teenager, and be based on scientific 
proof that the applied methods will have a positive impact on the child or teen-
ager.
The fear of medical misdiagnosis
One frequent topic of discussion is which young people should be allowed ac-
cess to transition and by which means. Legal professionals limit professional lia-
bility for their decisions regarding applications for name or civil sex/gender sta-
tus changes by drawing on medical opinions that certify something that cannot 
be scientifically proven. Medical professionals and psychologists fear making a 
wrong decision when it comes to approving treatment, in particular at what is 
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considered a young age (Preuss 2013 in Becker/Möller/Schweizer). The conse-
quences of declining a person’s wish for sex/gender transition are not discussed, 
with a few exceptions (Schneider 2013). Any ethical questions and concerns re-
garding the rights of children or human rights in general are discussed outside 
of the health care system, seemingly without playing a role in the medical de-
cision-making process. This blinkered approach on the part of the health care 
system is unjust to children and adolescents. Similarly, the health care system 
must be released from its questionable role as the guardian of culturally specific 
sex/gender norms that serve to maintain sex/gender stereotypes. Unconditional 
recognition of and respect for an individual’s sex/gender-related self-awareness 
and positioning are essential components of medical approaches in a health care 
system that prioritizes the needs of the individual.
SUMMARY
The right to carry a name and to wear the clothing of the so-called opposite sex/
gender, an essential part of an individual’s self-determination, is claimed today 
even as it was a century ago (Becker 2004). Despite the fact that today’s possi-
bilities of hormonal and surgical intervention have brought other considerations 
to bear, insistence on this right rarely meets with acceptance, particularly in the 
case of children. However, along with the right to sex/gender-related self-deter-
mination as well as self-representation, this demand is, on the one hand, a core 
element of an individual’s interaction with society at large and, on the other, 
vital to a person’s self-image and self-esteem. The right to self-determination 
is not only a central tenet of any ethical considerations and many human (and 
children’s) rights conventions, but also central to a person’s emotional and men-
tal well-being. Denying an individual this right impedes their ability to inter-
act with their environment, their understanding of themselves, and ultimate-
ly, their sense of self-worth. Consequently, respecting an individual’s right to 
self-determination, including how they position themselves with regard to the 
binary sex/gender order – without any form of pathologization – is imperative. 
Medical professionals should take the right of trans children and adolescents to 
self-determination seriously, not only by validating how an individual expresses 
their self-awareness, but also by responding to their needs as expressed, without 
placing hurdles in their path. Concrete examples include the right of an indivi- 
dual to be addressed by their given name of choice, both verbally and on paper. 
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Moreover, this should be possible on request, without the need for a court rul-
ing, medical certification or other professional input. Professional input, in so 
far as desired and requested by trans people and/or their families, must abstain 
from disparaging or discriminating against the individual. This is not only a 
central tenet in ethical standards, but is also necessary to halt the common spiral 
of self-loathing, psychosomatic complaints and social marginalization caused 
by transphobia.40 A key element is recognizing a person’s sex/gender-related 
self-positioning in terms of law, jurisdiction, medicine and the education sys-
tem. One possible measure could be reforming the legal framework governing 
‘sex/gender status’ by optional registration of sex/gender, if at all, at birth, and 
altering of registered sex/gender at a later date on application to the appropriate 
bureaucratic authority, without medical input and court ruling. Such measures 
would ensure that the legal framework surrounding transition is no longer de-
pendent on empirically unproven concepts of sex and gender, but instead solely 
prioritizes the rights of children and human rights in general. Moreover, deci-
sion-making by both medical and legal professions should take into account the 
possible consequences of denying a person’s desire for transition as a matter-of-
course. A legal framework that is particularly important with regard to children 
is the Argentinian law on gender identity,41 particularly Article 12, which allows 
children to be addressed by their first name of choice, as well as the correspon- 
ding pronoun. Specifically, it says in this act: “Whenever requested by the indi-
vidual, the adopted first name must be used for summoning, recording, filing, 
calling and any other procedure or service in public and private spaces”. Discus-
sion about scrapping the category of sex or gender in law and jurisprudence in 
Germany and other political and social spheres has to continue. The needs of the 
individual, instead of maintaining binary sex/gender norms, must become the 
priority of the health care system.
On a political level, medicine should be released from a certain responsi-
bility, because when it comes to sex/gender-related self-determination, the only 
reliable criterion is the individual’s own assessment of the stability of this assign-
ment, and in how far this self-assignment is accurate and serious. The attempt 
to formulate objective expertise or to promote the notion of stable sex/gender 
identity beyond reasonable doubt as prerequisite for a name change, change 
of sex/gender in the birth register or for medical interventions like hormone 
treatment and surgery is doomed to failure and also risks maintaining further 
human rights violations.
40 | This includes discrimination against people who do not meet cultural sex/gender norms.
41 | Global Action for Trans*Equality (GATE) (2012): Argentina Gender Identity law. Article 12 – Dignified treat-
ment. URL: http://tgeu.org/argentina-gender-identity-law/ [14.08.2015].
183
For this reason, the option of changing one’s sex/gender status and legal 
given first name easily and independently of input by health-care professionals 
is crucial. What is needed are pragmatic solutions that harm nobody, that con-
form to international conventions on the rights of children and human rights in 
general, and above all, that do justice to the children themselves.
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Hormone Treatment of Transsexual Adolescents1
Achim Wüsthof
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SUMMARY
A gender identity disorder in children and adolescents usually does not reveal any 
anatomical, chromosomal or endocrinological deviations: the body is perceived 
as being out of sync with the felt sex/gender which usually leads to considerable 
psychological stress. Hormone treatment arrests the changes in puberty per-
ceived as extremely stressful and prevents irreversible changes such as deepen-
ing of the voice in biological boys or breast development in biological girls. Such 
a treatment is only recommended after a thorough psychological assessment by 
two independent gender experts from the field of child and adolescent psychia-
try; the Endokrinologikum Hamburg, where the author is employed, works in 
close cooperation with the University Medical Centre Hamburg-Eppendorf. In 
addition, the parents have to give their consent to a hormonal procedure. In gen-
eral, injections of GnRH analogues are used for suppressing puberty; also oral 
medications (cyproterone acetate) can arrest masculinization and, occasionally, 
gestagens are used to suppress menstrual bleeding. Once the adolescents then 
go on to live their daily life over a longer period in the desired sex/gender, the 
administration of cross-sex hormones (with estrogen or testosterone) has the 
effect that the body aligns with the perceived sex/gender.
INTRODUCTION
Children who do not feel at home in their assigned sex/gender frequently ex-
press the desire for breasts if they have a penis or vice versa. Such remarks not 
only cause confusion in their families but sometimes also overtax the attending 
doctors. The children concerned are often for a long time left to their own devic-
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es, unable to find anyone who is prepared to help them. And the treatment of 
transgender children and adolescents with hormones is by no means uncontro-
versial in expert circles. The recurring issue is whether and when it is appropri-
ate to intervene with drugs in the development of puberty. In this article I would 
like to report on our experiences at the Endokrinologikum Hamburg where we 
have already advised and partly accompanied over the last 15 years more than 500 
people with a gender dysphoria or a transsexual development.
Definition and frequency
Almost all of those seeking advice have a very similar history: already since early 
childhood they feel as belonging to the other sex/gender. They reject their gen-
itals and wish to change their bodies in such a way that it harmonizes with the 
sex/gender they feel themselves to be. How frequent are such gender identity 
disorders? Medical literature supplies very varied incidence data – from 1:3.000 
to 1:100.000 (Möller et al. 2009).
Causes
In their search for biological causes Australian researchers in Melbourne estab-
lished that the CAG repeats of the androgen receptor is longer in transsexual 
women than in control subjects. Thus there could be a link between transsexu-
ality and an atypical interplay between hormones and corresponding receptors 
(Hare et al. 2008). Also certain brain structures of transsexuals show similarities 
to those of the desired gender (Zhou et al. 1995). So far however no unambiguous 
biological explanations have emerged why a transsexual development occurs.
Controversies of hormone treatment
The question concerning the age at which adolescents should begin a therapy 
is a point of much controversy among experts. A more guarded stance towards 
hormone treatment of transsexual adolescents is adopted by child and adoles-
cent psychiatrist Alexander Korte from the University of Munich. He argues that 
“considering the low rate of permanent transsexual developments in children 
with a gender identity disorder, irreversible body-changing measures are indi-
cated at the earliest after psychosexual development is completed”. According 
to Korte, the experiences that create identity through the body’s own hormones 
should not be constrained by puberty-blocking LHRH analogues (Korte et al. 
2008). At the VU (Vrije Universiteit) University Medical Center Amsterdam, by 
contrast, puberty is suppressed from a Tanner stage 2-3 onwards (Tanner stage 
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2 in biological boys signifies a testes volume of > 3 ml and in biological girls an 
incipient breast development).
The latter position, also favored by experienced Amsterdam colleagues such 
as Peggy Cohen-Kettenis and Henriette Delamarre-van de Waal, is the one we 
adopt in Hamburg. The precondition to starting treatment is of course that the 
child and adolescent psychiatrist or psychologist have through careful evaluation 
arrived at the conclusion that such a treatment is indicated. Then we first begin 
with a GnRH analogue treatment, i.e. with drugs that put puberty into a state of 
hibernation as it were.
Proponents of a later suppression of puberty such as the child and adoles-
cent psychiatrist Korte fear that a drug therapy could influence further develop-
ment iatrogenously, i.e. induced by medical measures. This is also taken up by 
psychiatrists such as the sexual medicine specialist Hartmut Bosinski from Kiel 
who argues that hormone treatment constituted a therapeutic suppression of a 
homosexual orientation. The question of homosexuality thus has to be careful-
ly examined together with the adolescents concerned, because from a medical 
perspective a same-sex sexual orientation is a considerably simpler procedure: 
both medicalization and surgery can be dispensed with entirely and the individ-
uals becomes sexually active with their biological body. However, the majority of 
transsexual adolescents were able to prove convincingly that theirs was not a case 
of homosexual orientation.
But what then are the arguments for an early suppression of puberty? To 
make it clear from the outset: in our view the advantages of an early treatment 
outweigh the disadvantages. The main argument: irreversible changes in the 
body, such as a deepening of the voice and growth of breasts, can be prevent-
ed. In addition, the adolescents are relieved of their psychological pressure, the 
depressive symptoms usually diminish considerably, and where this is not the 
case then this can be an indication that the diagnosis of transsexuality may be 
incorrect after all.
There is an interesting study by Steensma et al. (2011) on desisters and per-
sisters conducted in the Netherlands: which patients adhere permanently to a 
transsexual development and which do not? Here, the age between 10 and 13 
seems to be a very decisive one. When puberty sets in there is either a reconcile-
ment with the biological sex or rejection increases dramatically. And when the 
latter is the case treatment should not be postponed any longer.
In Amsterdam, cross-sex hormone therapy has until now been recommended 
from the age of 16, which in many cases we find rather late, because this makes 
2| Aufhörende und Bleibende.
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the adolescents differ markedly in their appearance from their peers. They then 
live in the status of a neuter, which can be quite agonizing for them. In the Nether- 
lands this age limit of 16 does however not always seems to be strictly observed 
in practice, as can be inferred from informal conversations on the sidelines of 
conferences.
A cross-sex hormone treatment can already be indicated when the transsex-
ual development has been clear and stable for many years and the individuals 
concerned strongly desire a pubertal development that corresponds to the sex/
gender they actually feel themselves to be. It is important for transsexual ado-
lescents to develop in a similar way to their peers – so indeed already at thirteen 
or fourteen. Otherwise, an unequal situation of development arises: the risk of 
social exclusion increases. Further surgical measures are as a rule recommended 
for an age after eighteen. There are, however, individual persons who were op-
erated already at sixteen, with mastectomies as well as feminizing surgery being 
performed.
Performing hormone treatment
What guidelines do we observe at our centre regarding the start of a puberty-sup-
pressing hormone treatment?
A gender expert recommends such a treatment.
Puberty has set in and irreversible physical changes are to be expected.
The patients have been living for some time already in the desired sex/
gender and are receiving psychotherapeutic support.
The parents agree with the treatment.
How do we carry out such a therapy in practice? The adolescents are given GnRH 
analogues. These are in fact endogenous hormones (of the hypothalamus) that 
are reconstructed by pharma companies. They block the hypophysis and prevent 
the release of gonadotropins, the hormones that stimulate the testes and ovaries 
to produce sex-related hormones. This treatment is therefore very effective in 
suppressing puberty. In general, we use the drug Trenantone® (with the active 
agent leuprorelin acetate) that only needs to be injected subcutaneously every 
three months. Treatment is rather expensive; one single injection costs around 
450 Euros. The costs are fortunately covered by insurance, at least in Germany. 
In transsexual girls who have progressed relatively far in their pubertal devel-
opment, we usually use cyproteronacetate (Androcur®); surprisingly very low 
dosages of 5 to 15 mg per day are already sufficient to counteract a masculiniza-
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tion. In biological women who live as boys it is also possible to very effectively 
suppress the menstrual cycle with a gestagen (Oragametil®).
When is the right time to begin a cross-sex hormone therapy? The adoles-
cents have already lived for some time in the desired sex/gender. In most cases 
they can’t wait to get started with a cross-sex hormone treatment. For my first 
patient we still involved the ethics commission of the university clinic Hamburg 
which, after a hearing, delivered a favourable vote. The parents’ consent is of 
course also necessary, since we are dealing with juveniles. In order to initiate 
cross-sex hormone treatment we require assessments by two different gender 
experts, even though almost all of our patients are presented in cooperation with 
the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at the University Medical 
Centre Hamburg-Eppendorf.
In most cases, cross-sex hormone treatment has been preceded by puberty 
suppression for 6 months or a whole year. At this point the adolescents are al-
ready living in the desired sex/gender, have informed their surroundings about 
the situation and are accepted as they are. Fortunately the majority of them re-
port a favourable acceptance after coming out, teachers and co-students usually 
react with understanding. Some of the schools make an effort to add the desired 
name in brackets and the new name already appears also on the class roster. 
Changing rooms, physical education (PE) and the use of toilets are usually no 
longer an issue. Of course there are also schools where transsexual students are 
not treated so compassionately.
How do we then in practice go about such a cross-sex hormone treatment? 
In transsexual boys we begin with the administration of testosterone, with the 
dosage slightly depending on the bone age and body height. If I were to start with 
a lot of testosterone in somebody who is small, I would reduce the final body 
height. Exactly the opposite is true for transsexual girls: if I wait too long with a 
cross-sex hormone therapy these transsexual women will tend to become taller. 
That is why I frequently increase the estrogen doses faster, in order to arrive at a 
final height that conforms to the desired sex/gender. In transsexual girls we use 
estradiol valerate. In boys, testosterone undecanoate (Nebido®)intramuscularly 
is very effective in causing virilization. As soon as the Testosterone treatment is 
started the GnRH analogue can be discontinued.
Difficult decisions
Many parents are afraid of making a mistake when consenting to a hormone 
treatment and think it better to let nature run its course. This is not an alter-
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native because non-intervention can cause these adolescents to be caught up 
in a negative vortex, particularly in psychological respect. My colleague Co-
hen-Kettenis (2008) already mentioned above has expressed this very clearly: 
“Non-intervention is not a neutral option.” I myself have experienced many very 
impressive cases of how hormone therapy helped these young people to regain 
their balance, how their performance at school improved and how they again 
managed to establish positive social contacts. With the help of hormone treat-
ment the physical changes take place in a similar period of time as in members 
of the peer group and the adolescents are not forced to wait in an extra neuter 
category until all the others have already become either men or women. In my 
view, aligning physically with the peer group is very important, for otherwise 
transsexual adolescents are frequently relegated to a corner, very unhappy, even 
though partly accepted or tolerated. The hormone treatment not only bolsters 
their confidence and promotes their general psychosocial development, but also 
facilitates the development of romantic relationships.
What are the long-term side effects of such a hormone treatment? As yet, not 
many long-term studies exist, but the risks seem to be manageable. For instance, 
the risk of breast cancer in transsexual women is even lower in comparison to 
that of biological women and thus constitutes an increased risk compared to that 
of breast cancer in biological men. In connection with hormone treatment we 
also discuss with the adolescents the prospect of infertility. And at this juncture 
I would like to report about a 17-year-old transsexual girl who six months after 
beginning cross-sex hormone treatment decided to discontinue everything for 6 
months, only to have her sperm cells frozen in case she should wish to have a 
child later in life. I was very impressed that someone who shortly before a sex/
gender reassignment surgery – which has since then taken place – should want 
to keep this option open for herself. She also has quite specific ideas about one 
day having a child of her own, either with the help of a Lesbian couple, where 
here sperm cells can be activated, or through a surrogate mother.
CONCLUSION
An early hormone treatment usually yields a significantly better result for the 
body to align itself with the desired sex/gender than if one waits longer, allowing 
the body to develop in the wrong direction. From my experience, it is extremely 
agonizing for many of the young people concerned if they are expected to un-
dergo this pubertal development which they themselves perceive as dreadful. 
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pubertal development should be completed before being allowed to begin with 
hormone treatment. Of course, for young people only at the onset of puberty it is 
almost impossible to assess how life will be as an adult. Sexuality, too, is usually 
still quite an abstract notion for them. We are able to change these young people 
physically in the desired direction, but in the process they do not automatically 
learn everything that belongs to being a woman or a man. I regard myself as 
someone giving advice and support to these adolescents, someone who also ad-
dresses the issue of sexuality and supports them in dealing with their body and 
their emotions. Debate continues over the question whether an early hormone 
treatment iatrogenously cements and fixates a certain development, thereby pos-
sibly preventing a homosexual development. A few years ago, when hormonal 
treatment options did not yet exist, a person with a sex/gender identity disor-
der would almost perforce have tended towards a homosexual orientation – as 
a feminine homosexual man or as a masculine lesbian woman. For this reason 
a certain doubt always lingers with us who administer the treatment that there 
could be a mistake in the assessment and that we are changing the fate of a 
human life with our therapy. I am aware of this great responsibility and at the 
same time prepared to take on the risk of this interference with nature, because 
I experience almost on a daily basis that most of the young people concerned 
are quite clearly happier with themselves and their lives thanks to my treatment.
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All scientific studies on the subject of trans parenthood show that transsexual-
ism of one of the parents has no negative effect on the development of the child. 
There are numerous arguments in favour of trans persons also having the right 
to reproduce. Many of the arguments against reproduction of trans persons can 
be adduced to society’s fear of transsexualism, to heteronormativity and igno-
rance of current technological possibilities. The demand, still common in many 
countries, that trans persons be sterilized as a precondition for a change in the 
civil register is discriminating and eugenic. Current medical practice limits itself 
to freezing sperm cells of trans women before beginning a hormone therapy for 
later use in the context of a homosexual relationship, as well as the insemina-
tion of donor semen in partners of trans men. The technology for using frozen 
ovarian tissue in trans men is not yet available. Here the only option is hormonal 
stimulation and vitrification of egg cells.
INTRODUCTION
Already for several years now it is an established fact that transsexualism is not a 
mental disorder but requires a correct hormonal and surgical treatment in order 
to achieve a congruence between the phenotypical and the lived gender (T’Sjoen 
et al. (2004); see Standards of Care in Levine et al. (1998) and Meyer et al. (2001), 
recently revised [De Sutter 2009; WPATH 2011]). Due to the effects of fertili-
ty treatments, the transition to the desired gender and reproduction in trans 
women and men always seemed to exclude each other. Therefore the loss of 
1 | Originial version in French.
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reproductive capacity was regarded as the price one had to pay for the transition. 
Although the trans persons’ wish and right to reproduce has been recognized 
for almost 20 years (Lawrence et al.1996), even today many medical experts – 
among them also those that treat trans persons – have great reservations against 
possible reproduction after sex/gender reassignment. It is only since 2001 that 
the Standards of Care recommend discussing reproductive options with trans 
persons who desire a hormone treatment (Meyer et al. 2001). Subsequently a 
debate began also among fertility experts whether trans persons who after their 
transition wish to have children in their relationship should be supported. The 
crucial question here was whether trans persons can be good parents or not 
and whether one has to fear a negative influence on the child’s sex development 
or sex/gender identity (Baetens et al. 2003; De Sutter 2003a). There had been 
the same debate already years ago regarding homosexual persons (Hanscombe 
1983) and this issue was then just as insulting for this group of people as it is to-
day for trans persons. The debate should not revolve around the question wheth-
er trans persons should be able to have children or not, but rather address the 
possibilities of supporting them in their wish to have children (De Sutter 2001).
Numerous studies have focused on the well-being of trans persons after 
their sex/gender reassignment treatment (Cohen-Kettenis/ Gooren 1999) and 
many trans persons get on perfectly well with children from their previous rela-
tionships or with the children of their current partners.
Trans persons and their children
Before discussing the practical problems that emerge after transition we will 
first turn to an analysis of the studies on families of trans persons in which 
there were children present already before transition. Even though the relevant 
data are not very abundant, Green has conducted a study with 34 children of 
trans persons who have remained in contact with their parents and came to 
the conclusion that their transsexualism poses no problem for these children 
(Green 1978, 1998). The parental transsexualism has neither a negative influ-
ence on the children’s psychosexual development nor on their sex/gender iden-
tity. Sometimes the children are teased by their classmates, but only briefly and 
without any visible further effects. All children understood what had happened 
with their parent. Certainly, children can suffer under the separation or divorce 
that frequently follows the transition of a trans person, but this suffering re-
sults primarily from the reaction of the other parent, who refuses to maintain 
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contact with the trans person and sometimes even takes legal action in this re-
spect. Green concludes that the trans parent should under no circumstances be 
separated from his or her children. Also studies on children of lesbian couples 
arrive at this conclusion (Brewaeys et al. 1997). These children hardly deviate in 
their development from others, neither in their psychosexual development nor 
in their sex/gender identity. The problems that are sometimes an issue here are 
more related to discrimination and rejection of the parents’ homosexuality by 
others. Here one should combat more the narrow-mindedness of society rather 
than the trans persons’ desire to have children. White and Ettner (2007) have re-
cently confirmed Green’s findings and observed that children can deal very well 
with the transsexualism of one of their parents (particularly when they are still 
young), while they suffer very much under the parents’ separation or divorce.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF PRESERVING REPRODUCTIVE CAPACITY 
OF TRANS PERSONS
The right of reproduction 
In today’s reproductive medicine the right to reproduce is recognized for every-
one (Robertson 1987; Schenker/Eisenberg 1997). For trans persons this is how-
ever not so simple, because the hormonal and surgical treatment makes natural 
reproduction impossible. In the fertility centres we also encounter other situa-
tions in which natural reproduction is impossible for obvious reasons: for cou-
ples of lesbian women. Lesbian motherhood is by and large accepted today and 
consequently insemination of donor semen as well as in-vitro fertilization (IVF), 
where one of the women provides the egg cells and after IVF the embryo is trans-
ferred to the uterus of her partner, are meanwhile routine procedures. The belief 
that trans persons can choose their sex/gender identity at will is comparable to 
the assumption that lesbian women would make a conscious choice to be lesbi-
an. If we therefore do not regard homosexuality as a question of personal choice 
and support homosexual persons in their wish to have children why should we 
not do the same with trans persons?
Even if sexual orientation or sex/gender identity were a question of free 
choice this would change nothing in the argument that every person has a right 
to reproductive-medical support. Also people in more conventional settings have 
the free choice to control their fertility through sterilization and in case of a later 
change of heart to achieve a pregnancy through surgical restoration or artificial 
reproductive technology.
Genetic or Biological Trans Parenthood: Dream or Reality?
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The legal argument 
Transsexualism is the only medical case where most countries demand steriliza-
tion as a precondition for a change in the civil register. This implies that children 
born after transition cannot from a legal point of view have been conceived by 
a trans person. In the past, this demand for infertility may have resulted from 
technological constraints, but the technology has meanwhile made significant 
progress and thanks to the preservation of gametes a person can very well con-
ceive children also after his or her transition. Law has to adjust to the techno-
logical possibilities, not the other way round. Even if a child cannot be legally 
recognized, the obvious thing is in the case of a lesbian couple to preferably use 
the frozen sperm cells of the trans partner instead of those of a donor.
The argument that trans persons give little thought to reproduction
Many trans persons, particularly adolescents, do indeed devote little thought to 
reproduction. This is however not an argument for not addressing the topic. Just 
as young people who have to undergo chemotherapy due to cancer are systemat-
ically advised to preserve their gametes in advance, this should also be possible 
for trans persons. Once the issues regarding their sex/gender identity have been 
resolved and life has returned to normal they can find partners with whom they 
want to have children. If they have frozen gametes at their disposal they retain 
the possibility of conceiving genetically related children. It is the responsibility 
of the attending psychiatrists or psychologists to address the subject before be-
ginning treatment.
The argument of transmission of transsexualism
An occasional argument against the reproduction of trans persons is based on 
the assumption that transsexualism is a genetic predisposition and can there-
fore potentially be passed on to children of trans persons. From what we know 
today transsexualism is a so-called multifactorial phenomenon and certainly not 
directly transmittable. If in the coming years a corresponding genetic feature 
should be identified it would still be up to the trans persons to decide whether 
they want to have children or not, in the same way that this applies also to people 
with disorders, illnesses or particular genetic features. Fortunately we no longer 
live in a world where it is the doctors who get to decide what is best for their 
patients.
In summary one can say that the arguments against the reproduction of 
trans persons feed from society’s fear of transsexualism and heteronormativity 
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and the ignorance about current technological possibilities. The example of les-
bian women has shown that access to new procedures also leads to the develop-
ment and use of new modes of treatment (Hodgen 1988) and there is no reason 
whatsoever why this should not also apply to trans persons.
The cryopreservation of sperm for trans women
In the following I will discuss the possible theoretical options. Even if many 
trans persons enter heterosexual relationships after their transition, a not in-
significant number of trans persons identify themselves as homosexual. This 
makes clear that sex/gender identity and sexual orientation have to be consid-
ered independently from one another (Leavitt/Berger 1990; Main 1993). In this 
sense not all options listed here apply for all trans persons.
In trans women the feminizing hormone therapy leads to a termination of 
spermatogenesis and finally to azoospermia (absence of sperms in an ejaculate). 
After a certain time this becomes irreversible and of course surgical removal 
of the testes leads to definitive infertility. In this case, the only possibility for 
preserving fertility is cryopreservation of sperm cells, ideally before beginning 
hormone therapy. Provided their quality is sufficient they could be used at a 
later date by a partner for insemination, or an in-vitro fertilization (IVF) or even 
intracytoplasmatic sperm injection (ICSI) can be performed. Basically, also a tes-
ticular biopsy can be frozen since only very few spermatozoids are required for 
the ICSI procedure. In each case a child conceived via this procedure would stem 
genetically from both partners.
In the case of a trans woman with a male partner it is the same as with a 
male couple who today rely on the services of a surrogate mother who also pro-
vides the egg cell.
In 2003 we published a study on the opinions of trans women about freez-
ing sperm (De Sutter et al. 2003a). The majority of the women interviewed (77 
%) stated that the freezing of sperm should be discussed and offered before 
beginning hormone therapy. 51% would also have made use of it had the option 
been offered to them. This wish was strongest among young women (below 
40) who identified themselves as lesbian or bisexual, for whom cryopreservation 
would thus be of particular interest.
At present, it is almost impossible for trans women to become pregnant 
and carry a child to full term themselves. Even though uterus transplants are 
possible, the success ratio is low and there are still a lot of technical and ethical 
issues involved.
Genetic or Biological Trans Parenthood: Dream or Reality?
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Insemination of donor semen for female partners of trans men
After their transition, many trans men enter a relationship with a partner with 
whom they might also want to have children. Even if in the future there may be 
new procedures available (see below) the majority of these couples can already 
perform an insemination of donor semen. Basically, this procedure is no differ-
ent from the insemination of donor semen in other heterosexual couples. The 
literature reflects a debate on the acceptability of such a procedure (Baetens et al. 
2003; De Sutter 2003b). For this reason we have initiated a long-term study to 
observe the development of these couples’ children.
Freezing egg cells, embryos or ovarian tissue in trans men
For trans men the situation is a different one than for trans women. Virilizing 
hormone therapy leads to a reversible amenorrhea, but the ovarian follicles re-
main intact. Even though the histology of the ovaries after androgen therapy 
resembles those of women with polycystic ovarian syndrome (Pache et al. 1991) 
these follicles still contain utilizable egg cells. Of course, here too surgery leads 
to definitive infertility. There are three possibilities for the preservation of fertil-
ity: freezing the egg cells, freezing the embryos and freezing the ovarian tissue. 
These possibilities resemble in principle those of women who have to undergo 
chemo or radio therapy due to cancer.
Freezing egg cells
As in the case of IVF, this procedure requires a hormonal stimulation and an 
ovarian puncture with a subsequent freezing of the egg cells. Even if this could 
be an interesting and effective strategy it is unlikely that many trans men would 
be prepared to undergo repeated hormonal stimulations in order to preserve a 
sufficient number of egg cells. If frozen egg cells are available, an IVF with do-
nor semen would be required in case of a female partner. In the case of a male 
partner, a surrogate mother would be required. Here the child would genetically 
be related to both partners.
Freezing embryos
Freezing embryos is performed with the same procedure as freezing egg cells, 
but here sperm from a partner or a donor is required. Freezing embryos is a 
routine procedure where the chance of pregnancy is considerably higher than in 
freezing egg cells. Subsequently here too a surrogate mother or a male partner 
would be required. For the procedure to be effective a number of IVF cycles 
would have to be carried out. It is unlikely that it would be acceptable for many 




This procedure is undoubtedly the most realistic one and is already used by 
women with cancer who had to undergo chemo or radio therapy. Here ovaries 
are extracted without prior stimulation or IVF and parts of them are frozen. In 
trans men this can be done in the course of the ovariectomy (Van den Broecke 
et al. 2001).
Similar to the freezing of egg cells or embryos this requires a semen contri-
bution and a female partner, or in the case of a male partner, a surrogate mother. 
The problem with freezing ovarian tissue is not the freezing itself but the question 
what should happen with the tissue after thawing. It can be transplanted back 
again into the patients (Shaw et al. 2000; recently a first successful pregnancy was 
reported with this procedure: Donnez et al. 2004) (this is certainly not an option 
for trans men), it can be implanted into another person, which can however lead to 
rejection, or it can be implanted into an animal (e.g. into a mouse, but here there 
would be ethical reservations). In all three cases a follicle stimulation would be 
required with subsequent IVF. Another possibility is in-vitro culture with follicle 
and egg maturation, but here results have so far not been particularly encouraging. 
Even if freezing ovarian tissue appears at the moment to be the most promising 
option, much research will need to be done before this procedure could also lead 
to conception of children in the case of trans men.
OUTLOOK
Even when this still sounds like science fiction today, stem cell research has pro-
gressed sufficiently to assume that in five to ten years we will be able to produce 
in-vitro gametes from any somatic cell and thus all options described here will be-
come obsolete. We can also observe new developments in the area of uterus trans-
plant: in 2012 a number of transplants were performed in Sweden, no cases of 
transplant rejection have been reported so far. In addition, immunosuppressants 
are becoming increasingly well tolerated compared to the past. We can therefore 
assume that in five to ten years successful uterus transplants can be performed.
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CHAPTER 5: SEX/GENDER NORMATIVITY AND  
INTERSEX BODIES

Intersex/Gender-Related Constitutiveness:  
Specific Realities, Specific Norms1 
Simon Zobel
SUMMARY
Life loves diversity and is geared towards variation. Variability and complex 
systemic strategies are a fundamental prerequisite of life. Already in terms of 
physical biology all human beings can be regarded as variable or polyvalent in 
terms of sex/gender. The elements constituting sex occur equally in all bodies. 
Variable factors on the genetic, cellular as well as organic levels and different 
hormonal proportions in the life cycle of all human beings condition a more or 
less developed sex-related specialization. Some are more polyvalent than the av-
erage. These are today generally referred to as intersexual. Following traditional 
scientific standards and categories on the basis of classical dichotomies, disorder 
is assigned to these large minorities, thus making the physical image treatable. 
Physical and psychological integrity is violated. Initially excluded from normali-
ty, these people are later included again via special arrangements, thus keeping 
existing scientific and cultural suppositions reproducible.
INTRODUTION
There are new approaches and worldviews in the natural sciences and engineering 
that are based on multilayered and complex systemic approaches and can also 
enrich the social discourse on (inter-)sex/gender-related constitutiveness (Goode/
Machol 1957; Ramo/St.Clair 1998). What Western scientific thought has taught 
us since the 18th century can also frequently be reflected in the realm of sex/gen-
der-related constitutiveness. Politically and in terms of human rights ever more 
concessions are being made regarding the right to physical integrity and self-de-
1 | Original version in German.
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termination, but for the moment renowned representatives of medicine and 
medical research will continue to have the last word in the field of practice. (In-
ter-)sex/gender-related constitutiveness should be regarded as a social cross-sec- 
tional issue, since it is thematically linked to the norming of bodies on the basis of 
traditional cultural, secular or religious notions and categories.2 Even more than 
200 years after Enlightenment societies can still be marked by myths and rituals 
(Levi-Strauss 2013). This also concerns sex and gender. Also from a scientific point 
of view, medicine – primarily a science of pathologies (pathological and abnormal 
processes and conditions in the body and their causes) and of prevention – should 
not be conceded the sole expertise. This is the point of departure of the follow-
ing contribution which also aims to show how disease is constructed in prac-
tice and made treatable with limiting paradigms. Sex/gender is like many other 
things not monocausal or one-dimensional. Variables and steady states co-exist to- 
gether with a whole range of contingencies and strategies. The multi-dimensional 
peek over medicine’s fence to living, complex systems beyond the old paradigms 
is also worthwhile with regard to sex/gender and the evolutionary adventure of 
the human being. The natural sciences are perfectly capable of providing new 
answers across the disciplines. An exponent of new approaches who is today as 
thought-provoking as he was in his time is the much quoted evolutionary biologist 
Haldane who famously remarked that the universe is not only queerer than we 
suppose, but queerer than we can suppose (Haldane 1928).
The crux with categories and applying them
A team of researchers around Veyrunes (Veyrunes et al. 2010) at the Institut des 
sciences de l’évolution/CNRS, Montpellier observed in the fertile female mice of 
the African free ranging mouse population Mus minutoides in 75 to a 100 % of the 
cases an XY karyotype. Mice are genetically closely related to human beings which 
is why they are frequently used in transgenetic research. This example is worth 
mentioning because in the current medical view this constitutes a XY sex reversal. 
The female mice are genetically male. What is rarely mentioned is that something 
similar also exists in human beings. At the 8th Berlin Symposium for Pediatric 
and Adolescent Gynecology a case study was presented on 19 April 2013 involv-
ing a so-called complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS) with persistence 
of Mullerian structures such as uterus and ovaries as well as menstruation (Leh-
mann-Kannt 2013) on the basis of 46,XY and SRY-positive (chromosomal male).3 
2 | See the current debate around circumcision in boys and female genital mutilation in Germany. Rupprecht, 
Marlene (Germany, SOC), Children’s right to physical integrity, Report Doc: 13297, 06/09/2013. Reference: 
3912, Motion: 13042 (MRS). Resolution 1952. Recommendation 2023, Eurovoc Council of Europe.
3 | Apart from the positive sequencing of 46,XY and SRY gene, the diagnosis ‘complete androgen insensitivity 
syndrome’ (CAIS) is today frequently already considered to be questionable and has in this case to be under-
stood as a working diagnosis or a diagnosis of convenience.
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Simplified genetic shorthand forms such as 46,XY are also used for attributing 
disorders and for making pathologizing conclusions. All the more reason to look 
at this in more detail. The majority of sex attributions and thus also diagnoses are 
based on the gene image identified in standard procedure via the light microscope, 
which corresponds to the karyogram with one of the so-called sex chromosomes 
(gonosomes). The term karyotype denotes the totality of all cytologically identifia-
ble chromosomal characteristics of an individual. The karyogram is the schematic 
representation of the chromosome pairs according to size und form that defines 
the karyotype. Here the chromosomes are arranged in pairs by diminishing size, 
followed by the indication of the gonosomes. The so-called genetic shorthand is cre-
ated as follows: number of chromosomes and finally indication of the gonosomes, 
e.g. 46, XY (male-systematized) or 46, XX (female- systematized). The genetic test 
material is usually extracted from amniotic fluid or heparinized blood. The attri-
bution is carried out via the banding pattern characteristic for each chromosome. 
However, a great deal of genetic information or relevant structural variables remains 
invisible and cannot be captured by this standard mapping. For this one would need 
finely structured and more sophisticated molecular tests such as DNA sequencing 
and micro-satellite analyses as well as testing with tissue (e.g. skin biopsy, tissue 
biopsy without removal of gonads). The WHO’s international statistical classifica-
tion of disorders and related health problems also systematizes according to female 
or male malformations on the basis of karyotype and sex attribution in connection 
with gonads (testes, ovaries or ovotestis). What is generally referred to as intersex-
uality is categorized as an aberration or disorder of sex development in the WHO’s 
ICD 104 according to clinical pictures and diagnosis codes, and corresponding treat-
ments would be able to be billed on the basis of the ICD: ICD 10, chapter xvii con-
genital malformations, deformations and chromosomal abnormalities (Q00-Q99); 
Q56 indeterminate sex and pseudohermaphroditism; Q56.0 hermaphroditism, not 
elsewhere classified. Intersexual and ill would in this way be equated.
The terms and their etymology
When two clearly demarcated sexes respectively genders are typified, then those 
persons appear atypical or generally intersexual who cannot be assigned unam- 
biguously to either the female or the male sex in terms of genes (genetical-chromo-
somal image according to nomenclature), anatomy (internal and external genitals, 
gonadal as well as gonoductal5), hormones/endocrinology (quantitative ratios of 
4 | See ICD-10-GM version (2013). Copyright WHO, DIMDI 1994 – 2013. URL: http://www.dimdi.de/static/de/
klassi/icd-10-gm/kodesuche/onlinefassungen/htmlgm2013/index.htm [21.09.2012]. English: www.who.int/
classifications/icd/icdonlineversions/en/ [18.05.2015].
5 | Gonadal: gonads (gonads; ovaries, testes or e.g. ovotestis); gonoductal: gonoducts; spermatic ducts (vas 
deferens), oviducts, fallopian tubes.
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the sex hormones, enzymatic metabolization etc.) as well as the phenotypical 
interplay of all these factors.
In order to be able talk about sex/gender-related constitutiveness one is 
obliged to employ terms for biologies of sexes and/or genders whose etymolo-
gy, vertical historicity and geographical use are not uniform across Europe. If 
in German one refers to people who cannot be assigned to one sex, usually the 
term ‘intersexuality’ is used. These people are sometimes also called intersex-
uals. Beginning in 1911, Richard Goldschmidt, zoologist and geneticist at the 
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Biologie in Berlin-Dahlem researched sex-related 
forms which he regarded as mixtures between an ideal-typical male and female 
phenotype. Goldschmidt coined the term ‘intersexuality’ (German ‘Intersex-
ualität’) (Dietrich 2003). But since he worked in the United States from 1935 
onwards the term came to establish itself internationally. In the English-speak-
ing world the term ‘sex’ denotes the physical part of the sex/gender model 
and loses the inevitable connection to sexuality. With Goldschmidt we find 
however the terminological commingling of intersexuality with transvestit-
ism, transidentity, transgender and sexual orientation (see Dietrich 2003). In 
French the term ‘intersexuation’ (from sexuation) is used instead of intersexu-
ality. ‘Sexuation’ here denotes both the process of biological sex differentiation 
as well as the process of sex assignment/attribution (Ragland-Sullivan 2004). 
For the sake of a clearer distinction between inter-sex/gender-related constitu-
tiveness and some trans sex/gender identities we will in the following use the 
term ‘transident’ or ‘transidentity’ when appropriate.
The present contribution aims to show why the terms ‘atypical’ or ‘poly-
valent’ sex/gender features are preferred over others. ‘Atypical’ or ‘polyvalent’ 
need not necessarily refer to the outer appearance or the external sex features. 
It here refers primarily to the systematization or the categorization itself. The 
congenital physical sex-related constitution on a genetic, organic, anatomical 
or hormonal basis which is systematized as atypical is inert, i.e. stable and 
congenital. It exists independently of opinions about sex voiced by natural and 
social sciences and also independent of historical periods.
We should here take a closer look at the prefix inter as a synonym for 
in-between. All human beings have polyvalent features because elements that 
constitute sex are bipotent or bilateral in their structure.6 Hormones (andro-
gens as well as estrogens)7 do not constitute separate, completely different con-
6 | Cells are referred to as bipotent when they have the ability to differentiate themselves into two different cell 
types within one tissue type. Also organs such as gonads are bipotent, being able to develop into testes, ovaries 
or hybrid forms. Bilateral means on either sides or two-sided. Some organs such as gonads or the lung have a 
bilateral or two-winged structure.
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struction material and their enzymatic docking sites are in various gradations 
equally present in all human beings (Fausto-Sterling et al. 2000).
The biology of sex/gender-related constitutiveness is usually interpreted 
in the light of bimorphism, which is assumed to be a condition created by 
evolution and an optimization of human sex/gender-related constitutiveness 
(Cuozzo/Bratman 2005). Also the brain as a sex-related organ or as a trans-
mitter or the organization of the brain is often investigated along these lines 
(Güntürkün/Hausmann 2007). On this basis anything atypical is then often 
understood as a malformation of binary sex/gender-related constitutiveness 
or as a less effective or less efficient sex/gender-related constitutiveness. So-
cial-cultural sex/gender relationships often form the basis for science or at 
least determine how studies are organized or results are read, since also scien-
tific research does not take place in a vacuum removed from social-cultural cir-
cumstances and the researchers themselves cannot provide completely objec-
tive conditions (Schmitz 2009). Atypical sex(-related) development is therefore 
hardly ever examined as a specific reality with its own specific norms. Usually 
people only see what they can and want to recognize. A reason why the evalu-
ation of field research has often come up with surprises with respect to homo-
sexuality in animals. Seemingly heterosexual partners have turned out to be 
homosexual (Bailey/Zuk 2009). The observation of same-sex sexual behaviour 
in animals is however used not only as an argument for homosexuality but 
also against the acceptance of human homosexuality, as a sin against nature 
(peccatum contra naturam). What is clear here is that the notion of nature or 
of the natural is used both by progressive and conservative camps as required.
Creation of minorities and subsequent inclusion phenomena
Atypical or polyvalent physical sex/gender-related constitutiveness as a crite-
rion first depends on the parameters of attribution themselves. One could for 
instance get the impression that we are here dealing with an infinitesimally 
small number of individuals or at least with particularities. It is only the sex/
gender-related standardizations and the attributions of in-between sexes/gen-
ders and of deviations from the norm that create the large overlap of minorities 
with their corresponding sub-identities. One result of this is that inter sex/
gender-related constitutiveness is often discussed in conjunction with issues 
of equal rights for third sexes/genders. It is then about equal rights for other 
kinds of identities deviating from the norm such as LGBTTIQ.8 The other-
7 | Generally, sex hormones are divided into female (gestagens, estrogens) and male (androgens) hormones 
according to their function for target organs such as the internal sex(-related) organs. But essentially every 
human organism produces these hormones, even though in varying proportions.
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ness of sex/gender identity, of sex/gender expression or sexual orientation is 
assumed as the common denominator. This creates an excluded intersection 
which can be subsumed under other or in-between and which requires spe-
cial attention both in legal and medical terms. Without the previous exclu-
sion from normality the subsequent recognition or equalization would not be 
necessary. Bi, gay or lesbian refers to the sexual orientation or sexual identity 
deviating from the norm.
In this attribution process intersex persons are classed with the group of 
deviating physical sex/gender-related constitutiveness or physical sex-related 
identities. Inter sex/gender-related constitutiveness is however a physical con-
stitution and neither a sexual identity or orientation nor to be equated with 
transidentity or transsexuality. For intersex people this kind of terminological 
fuzziness and the subsumption under different and sexual orientation have 
the effect that important issues such as prenatal diagnostics, compensation for 
involuntarily performed surgical and hormonal assignment measures, off-la-
bel use of drugs9 as well as the review of medical practice are not addressed. 
Mixed representations together with transidentity or trans sex/gender-related 
constitutiveness therefore do not take these important issues into account in a 
satisfactory way for intersex people.
Intersex persons comprise a rather heterogeneous group that can hard-
ly adequately represent its interests quantitatively in LGBTTIQ contexts, as 
becomes particularly clear when regarding children and their parents. It is 
unlikely that parents looking for support would turn to an organization for 
queer life styles for advice. What is as a rule first of all most important for 
parents, besides acquiring access to basic information that is also independent 
from medical practice, is to find access to their child and accept its corporeality 
(Schweizer/Richter-Appelt 2012). At this point of the parent-child attachment 
the question of queer life styles may hardly play an important role or have a 
positive connotation. On the contrary, the connection to different forms of oth-
erness relating to the term ‘queer’ could make young, inexperienced parents 
additionally insecure and favour choices for sex disambiguation measures. 
There only seems to be a minority of adolescent intersex persons that regularly 
attend LGBTTIQ meetings. The reason for this may be among other things that 
inter sex/gender-related constitutiveness has so far generally been concealed 
and that those concerned may not have been aware of it themselves. Finding 
and living one’s own sex/gender or also sexual identity can also be experienced 
as something particularly intense and conflictual and as a very protracted pro-
8 | LSBTTIQ = Abbreviation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer.
9 | Use of drugs for an unapproved indication.
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cess. Many people first have to deal with the chain of imposed clinical histories 
for themselves personally and also regarding, among other things, the access 
to documents; often also legal procedures have to be initiated, for instance con-
cerning the civil register. Finding oneself is often an intense, protracted pro-
cess. This coming of age process10 can in these cases be more intense than it 
is already for adolescents. It could also be even more precarious than the often 
difficult coming of age process of homosexual adolescents. Also as adults, the 
majority of the so-called intersex people do not necessarily see themselves as 
part of LGBTTIQ.11 One should take care that consultation and funds for people 
systematized as intersex are not allotted in bulk in the framework of so-called 
gender multiplicity to meanwhile large and powerful LGBTTIQ organizations. 
As a rule these rarely have detailed knowledge and experiences about medi-
cal conflicts or legal or pension-related concerns of intersex persons. There is 
next to no adequate peer-to-peer support. Associations and cooperations would 
have to be based on mutual respect and competent distribution of portfolios. 
But questioning the current models of sex/gender-related constitutiveness and 
the legal, social and economic exclusions produced in the process is basically 
positive for everybody. It is the exclusions that produce the later necessary in-
clusion in the first place, which then in turn follows the dynamics of society.
Sex/gender biologies, the term of sex/gender identity and 
the consequences for intersex people
Binary sex/gender-related constitutiveness is generally regarded as the effec-
tive mode of reproduction. Social genderizations can however be understood 
as a cultural product. Regarding women and men as fundamentally different 
beings is a comparatively young phenomenon in Europe – it did not develop 
until the 18th century (Laqueur 1990).
Connections between biology and sex/gender(-related) identity as well 
as sexual orientation are often sought. The term ‘gender identity’ by contrast 
comes from psychoanalysis and refers to the social role associated with gender. 
What was frequently seen as a precondition for the development of a consoli-
dated male or female sex/gender identity was a body image that conforms to it 
or at least appears to conform to it externally (Money 1955). For the sex develop-
ment great importance was also attached to a conforming female or male body 
image (Heigl-Ever/Weidenhammer 1988). This was and is also of key impor-
10 |Coming of age denotes the transition of an adolescent person from childhood into adulthood. This can 
constitute a psycho-emotional maturation process, a person’s identitary evolvement as well as the physical and 
psychological experience of puberty (Konrad/Firk/Uhlhaas 2013).
11 | The author regularly participates in German and international events on the subject of intersex, attends 
self-help meetings of organizations such as the German Verband Intersexuelle Menschen e.V. and conducts 
many personal conversations, also across Europe.
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tance in sex assignment or recently sex disambiguation measures in physically 
atypical persons. This has also led to early surgery or prenatal measures being 
recommended in the case of intersex children.
Hardly anyone of adult intersex people in Europe today has managed to 
slip unharmed through the tight net of sex/gender-related images, legal insur-
ance protection plus parental care/guardianship in connection with medical 
recommendations. Therefore there is also little information about untreated 
persons that could question some of the prophylactic treatment methods and 
surgery. Renowned scholars of sexology such as Richter-Appelt and Schweizer 
(2009) do however concede today that, at least from their point of view, the 
sense and results of the current practices and procedures of assignment ought 
to be questioned. Also no reliable prognoses can be made about the devel-
opment of sex/gender-related identity in adulthood (Schweizer/Richter-Appelt 
2009). Hormonal and surgical measures are however irreversible. Surgery on 
the external genitals and on the urogenital tract, partly also on the gonoducts, 
is very painful. In addition, there is an increased risk of infection. Follow-up 
surgery is often indicated. Results are too often an alienated body, alienated 
or painful organs that also in people’s subjective perception no longer belong 
to them (Brinkmann et al. 2007, Bundesverband Intersexuelle Menschen e.V. 
(2008), Schweizer/Richter-Appelt 2009). The specific problems, anxieties and 
conflicts of adolescents have up to now received insufficient attention. Hopes 
that their anxieties and conflicts might be removed through medical measures 
are generally regarded as failed, as for instance in the Hamburg intersex study 
of 2007 (Schützmann et al. 2009).
When atypical body-related sex/gender constitutiveness is discussed then 
this is frequently done in order to question the connection of biologies of sex-
es and social gender roles in general. It seems useful to question gender as 
a concept of the social or psychological side of sex/gender and of the social 
gender roles. One has to note here however that gender discourses in general 
do not signify any kind of relief for intersex children. Relativization of gender 
and social roles does not protect from surgical measures such as the removal 
of the gonads (gonadectomy) and of ovarian or testicular tissue or from so-
called genital normalizing surgery. Inter sex/gender-related constitutiveness is 
often seen as a disorder of sex development and the measures are identified as 
medical therapies or a prophylaxis.12,13 A majority of intersex children can today 
12 | See guidelines of the Gesellschaft für Kinderheilkunde und Jugendmedizin (DGKJ). Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Pädiatrische Endokrinologie (APE) as section of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kinderheilkunde und Jugend-
medizin (DGKJ) as well as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Endokrinologie (DGE). Workgroup Disorders of Sex 





13 | See university clinic Heidelberg. Urology. Störung der Geschlechtsdifferenzierung III. Chirurgische Therapie
des Intersex. URL: http://www.klinikum.uni-heidelberg.de/Stoerung-der-Geschlechtsdifferenzierung-III.10832
8.0.html [10.06.2013].
14 | See footnote 10.
experience a more open, playful approach to gender roles. 90% of the infants 
whose parents are organized in the Bundesverband Intersexuelle Menschen 
e.V. had, to my knowledge, nevertheless received gonadectomy.14
Classes of inter sex/gender-related constitutiveness?
In October 2005 the consensus conference of Lawson Wilkins Pediatric Endo-
crine Society (LWPES) and the European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology 
(ESPE) took place in Chicago, USA. The result was the so-called Consensus 
Statement on management of intersex disorders (Hughes et al. 2006). Instead 
of the hitherto used terms of ‘intersexuality’ or ‘hermaphroditism’ the term Dis-
orders of Sex Development, DSD (German: Störung der Geschlechtsentwick-
lung) was introduced. This now subsumes all atypical forms of body-related 
sex/gender constitutiveness, regarding them as disorders or malformations. 
Sex/gender assignment surgery continues to be recommended, even though 
it is admitted that “no one technique has been universally successful”. A pre-
condition for surgery should be an accurate diagnostics and prognosis of lat-
er sex development. However, “functional outcome” should be given prefer-
ence over “a strictly cosmetic appearance” (Hughes et al. 2006). The question 
whether treatment possibilities have really been reduced cannot be answered 
at the present. It is however doubtful whether intersex can be optimized at all 
within a framework of binary sex/gender-related parameters. Together with 
the WHO’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD) the consensus paper 
constitutes an effective tool to subdivide inter sex/gender-related constitutive-
ness and make some forms of body-related sex/gender constitutiveness treata-
ble. The ICD features the categories of hermaphroditism (true hermaphrodite) 
as well as female and male pseudo-hermaphroditism (pseudo hermaphrodite). 
Other physical conditions are not classified in this form but listed, for example, 
under endocrinological disorders. The ICD serves to encrypt diagnoses and is 
also used for billing inpatient services. In the case of atypical body-related sex/
gender constitutiveness the diagnosis can thus first be found and the diagnos-
tic and treatment facilitated. This division also has the effect that operative or 
hormonal treatments can be declared as sex disambiguation measures inde-
pendently from the rest of a person’s body image, identity or personal sex/
gender-related experience. According to this formula also those persons with 
an atypical physical sex need to have themselves evaluated according to the 
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(German) transsexual law (TSG), who for instance wish to obtain a sex/gender 
entry independent of their karyotype or who are not considered as real her-
maphrodites. In practice there are hardships for intersex people, even though 
the law actually only calls itself “law for the changing of first names and the 
establishment of sex affiliation in special cases” and aims to enable a life in 
the perceived sex/gender. For one thing, the sex/gender can only be changed 
to the other traditional sex/gender, and secondly, the procedure and the two 
expertises that ascertain the permanent perception of belonging to the desired 
sex/gender according to the findings of medical science are very expensive.15 
A disorder of the gender identity is then established.16 Because of the so-called 
shadow reports of NGOs such as Intersexuelle Menschen e.V., which were 
submitted to the UN in the framework of different conventions ratified by the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the German government instructed the German 
Ethics Council to prepare a statement on the situation of intersex people in 
Germany. Genital surgery, the removal of internal sex-related organs and hor-
mone therapies on atypical human beings became a social issue with a broad 
impact and for a time shifted to the centre of public attention. Even though 
the German Ethics Council criticizes in its statement 2011 (Deutscher Ethikrat 
2012) sex/gender assignment measures and basically recognizes the situation 
of intersex people it nevertheless follows clinical practice by differentiating 
between sex/gender-assigning and sex/gender disambiguation measures (e.g. 
according to karyotype and syndromes). The important discussion about abor-
tion and prenatal diagnostics17 is still only led along the fringes of the debates. 
Due to the ongoing progress in molecular-genetic mapping techniques as well 
as the electronic mapping of clinical files (family anamnesis18) the issue of 
abortion for instance in cases of undesirable chromosome constellations is 
becoming a hot topic.
Against the background of these recent developments the amendment of 
the civil register law represents an attempt to provide a deferment of assign-
ment, relief for parents and child as well as space for the child’s development. 
The German Ethics Council considers the obligation to fix the sex/gender to 
either male or female as “an unjustifiable infringement into the right to pri-
15 | Act on the Changing of Forenames and the Determination of Sex/Gender Affiliation in Special Cases (Ge-
setz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen) 
(Transsexuellengesetz – TSG) of 10 September 1980 (BGBl. I S. 1654). Last changed by article by article 1 of 
the act of 17 July 2009 (BGBl. I S. 1978). URL: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tsg/BJNR016540980.html 
[10.06.2013].
16 | See Störungen der Geschlechtsidentität (ICD-10 F64.-). ICD-10-GM Version 2013. WHO (ed.), DIMDI 1994 
– 2013. URL:http://www.dimdi.de/static/de/klassi/icd-10-gm/kodesuche/onlinefassungen/htmlgm2013/
block-f60-f69.htm [21.09.2012].
17 | Prenatal diagnostic (PND) denotes examinations of the unborn child (fetus) and pregnant women for the 
early detection of disorders BJNR016540980.html [10.06.2013].
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vacy and the right to equal treatment” (German Ethics Council 2012). After a 
corresponding decision of the Bundestag from January 2013, § 22 section 3 was 
inserted into the law which came into effect on 1. 11. 2013. The newly phrased 
paragraph stipulates: “If the child cannot be assigned either to the female or 
the male sex then the civil status event shall be entered without such infor-
mation into the birth register.”19 In one sense, the provision, adopted at rather 
short notice, points into a positive direction, yet in another it is also a cause for 
concern. On the one hand this is in effect not a ‘can’ option but a ‘must’ provi-
sion. On the other, the change does not affect the criteria and standards men-
tioned in the text, on the basis of which decisions are usually made. It remains 
for medicine to decide by which criteria the child cannot be assigned to either 
the one or the other sex/gender and which groups are excluded from this.
A peek over the fence
Physical sex is not always as rigid, limited and divided in two as is generally as-
sumed, even though it tends to be classified along the current criteria (Kuiper 
2001). In Devon in Southeast England a hen is said to have varied its sex spon-
taneously and became the proverbial rooster in the henhouse (The Telegraph 
2008). The zoologists and agricultural scientists Jacob and Mather (2000) 
assume in their article that in such cases the physical sex change can occur 
together with spermatogenesis, i.e. the creation of fertilizable sperm. One 
should however be cautious with citing examples from flora and fauna – as 
is often done in discourses around inter sex/gender-related constitutiveness. 
Conclusions about other species such as humans are likewise only possible 
in a limited way considering the complexity of the processes involved. What 
is interesting in Jacob and Mather’s article is that they interpret the described 
physical process of change as pathological even in the animal.
It is widely known that in the realm of flora monoecy and hermaphroditism 
exist beside dioecy.20 Most blossoms are hermaphroditic. Hermaphroditism 
in the animal kingdom has already for decades been a subject of scholarly 
research. Thus a determination or change of the physical sex can occur when 
required for the survival of the species (Crews 2003) or the gonadal determina-
tion occurs under the influence of ecological factors, for instance temperature 
18 | Inter sex/gender-related constitutiveness often has a genetic base and occurs more frequently within one 
family.
19 | German original: “Kann das Kind weder dem weiblichen noch dem männlichen Geschlecht zugeordnet 
werden, so ist der Personenstandsfall ohne eine solche Angabe in das Geburtenregister einzutragen” Federal 
Ministry of Justice: Personenstandsgesetz (PStG), “Personenstandsgesetz vom 19. Februar 2007 (BGBl. I S. 
122), das durch Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3458) geändert worden ist”. URL: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/pstg/BJNR012210007.html [25.11.2013].
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(Avise/Nicholson 2011, Reinboth 1975). What is also remarkable is that for a 
sex-related disposition only in a few cases does there seem to be a direct gono-
somal-genetic basis, for instance also in the form of mosaics or chimerism or 
translocations.21 The development of internal and external sex-related organs 
and their changeability is in many cases subject to further sex-determining 
factors independent of so-called sex chromosomes. For such factors DMRT1 
or the DMRT1 expression is, besides others, a probable candidate that leads to 
the development of male or female sex-related organs. DMRT1 also plays a role 
in the temperature-dependent male sex-related development in the gonads of 
some species. In the sex differentiation of vertebrates, animal as well as hu-
man, DMRT1 homologous genes are also said to have an important function 
(Charlesworth 1996, Manolakou/Lavranos/Angelopoulou 2006).
The architecture of physical sex-related structures is subject to a great 
range of variables that particularly concern the tissue of the ovary and the tes-
tes. We can mention here the SOX gene family (Prior/Walter 1996) or the 
aromatase gene transcription (Ghosh et al. 2009, Pannetier et al. 2006). In 
mammals the transcription factor SRY which is coded for the Y chromosome 
is as a rule responsible for the development of indifferent, bipotent gonads 
to testes instead of ovaries. However, in its absence testes differentiation can 
occur. One single factor, the transcription regulator FOXL2, is necessary to 
prevent transdifferentiation of developed ovaries to testis. Induction of FOXL2 
can apparently lead to an immediate upregulating of testis-specific genes in-
cluding the SRY-critical target gene SOX9. The reprogramming of the Gran-
ulosa and Theca cell lines occurred consistently to lines similar to Sertoli 
cells and Leydig cells22 comparable with those of male siblings. The cells thus 
changed by themselves from a female to a male mode. The results also show 
that the conservation of the ovarial type (of the ovaries) is a life-long, active 
process (Uhlenhaut et al. 2009).
The simultaneous occurrence of ovarial tissue or testicular tissue in one 
of the two gonads is referred to as ovotestis, or less often, as a hybrid of the 
two gonads. Interestingly, the testicular tissue seems to occur more frequently 
on the right side of the body of the (initially bipotent) gonads. The organs are 
always laid out in a two-winged or bilateral design. It is assumed that a gene 
mutation on the X chromosome or alternatively on an autosome makes the 
testis determination possible. In genetics, autosomes refer to the subset of the 
20 | Monoecious = male and female features exist in one individual separate from each other. Dioecious = 
every individual has either only male or only female features.
21 | In genetics, translocation (change of place, from Latin locus: place) signifies a chromosome mutation in 
which chromosome segments have been shifted to another position within the chromosome stock. In extreme 
cases an entire chromosome can dock onto another one.
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chromosomes that does not belong to the sex chromosomes. Here it becomes 
clear in how far already genetic research itself can be sexed/gendered. In addi-
tion, in a few genetically female- systematized 46,XX persons with testis deter-
mination a SRY translocation to the X chromosome was observed. However, 
subsequent examination has revealed the majority of the individuals with the 
female karyotype 46,XX as being SRY negative. This is particularly interesting 
since therefore there exists no known testis-differentiating, male-systematized 
gene. In most cases a typical ovarial function (also menstruation) is further 
observed. The 46,XX karyotype is said to occur in 60% to 70% of ovotestis 
– the so-called real hermaphrodites (Guerra et al. 1998, Güitrón et al. 1998, 
University of Babylon).
(Inter-)sex/gender-related constitutiveness – 
specific realities, specific norms
Studies on the research of the Y chromosome or the sex-determining region 
SRY indicates a development history that has been researched already since 
the 1960s (Ohno 1967, 1969; Watson/Riggs/Grave 1992). The sex/gender-re-
lated as well as general conditions in the realm of life appear to be subject to 
variable and bipotent parameters which are interlinked in interactive, com-
plex systems. The conditions are neither random nor monocausal. Sex-related 
hormones, for instance, are classified as such on the basis of their effect. Bio- 
chemical building blocks, hormones create each other and are reconstruct- 
able. From a specific proportion onwards androgens are changed in all bodies 
via aromatase to estrogens. Aromatase also plays a role in the differentiation 
of the ovaries (Duffy et al. 2010). With increased testosterone uptake e.g. in 
power training, the additional testosterone suppresses the body’s own release 
of androgens in the testes. The testes receive the signal work less which also 
reduces the spermatogenesis, i.e. the development of sperm cells. From a cer-
tain degree of more onwards the aromatase mentioned above triggers the de-
velopment of breasts. Sex-related hormones do not represent a homogenous 
class of substances. They comprise steroids which function as hormones, and 
specific proteins. Varying differentiations according to sex exist in the quantity 
of produced and free sex-related hormones as well as the body’s reactivity to 
the sex-related hormones which varies depending on other conditions such 
22 | Granulosa cells and Theca cells are an important cell type for the maturation and the function of the follicle 
(egg cell). Through the influence of the aromatase, they produce estrogens from an androgen predecessor which 
the ovaries release. The Leydig cells are the most important interstitial cells of the testis. They comprise 10-20% 
of the organ mass of the testis. The most important function of the Leydig cells is testosterone synthesis. Sertoli 
cells protect and nourish the sperms. In the embryonic development the Sertoli cells form the Anti-Mullerian 
hormone (AMH) which is responsible for inhibiting the development of the bipotent Mullerian ducts.
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as gene expression. Sex-related hormones are not male or female substances. 
Rather, they refer to the specific effect or regulative function these messenger 
substances have on the cells of the target organs (Berliner et al. 1996).
Neither are genetical factors monocausal or one-dimensional. Anyone who 
wants to continue to argue with genetics today should among other things not 
forget epigenetics – one of the key issues of genetics in the 21st century. Epi-
genetics defines mechanisms and consequences of hereditary modifications of 
gene activity. Hereditary modifications of gene activity as a term is important – 
they are precisely not chromosome modifications. These can be environmental 
but also social-ecological adaptations. Epigenetics is not based on changes of 
the DNA sequence (deoxyribonucleic acid, DNA) or DNA replication. Rather, 
it involves subsequent modifications of specific DNA elements such as DNA 
bases (DNA methylization), changes of the chromatin (histo-modifications) 
and RNAi-mediated mechanisms. RNAi (RNA interference) is a mechanism 
in the cells of living organisms which serves the targeted deactivation of genes. 
For the sake of simplification one often talks of epigenetic markers that struc-
ture the chromosomes. They regulate gene activity on the level of cells and 
tissue and play an essential role in regulating development processes in plants, 
animals and humans. The processes are however potentially reversible and 
therefore in the course of a life subject to environmental and developmental 
variability. Epigenetic adaptations are not permanent, in contrast to mutations 
(Morgan et al. 2005).
Finally, I would like to point to the molecular-genetical and endocrinologi-
cal research by Holterhus on the cell level. He conducts research on (sex-relat-
ed) hormonal signature which can reflect biological sex features perhaps more 
accurately than chromosomale DNA alone. The function of a gene or a gene 
family is involved in the cellular process. Holterhus assumes that androgens 
not only have permanent effects during sensitive phases of our genital devel-
opment, but also permanently on organs. It is becoming increasingly clear 
that the brain can also display a sex-related development which shows itself in 
relation to the bonding or absence of testosterone. This influences behaviour 
and can also modulate identity. According to Holterhus (2009) these processes 
not only concern the brain but all organs. It is assumed that already on the 
cellular level there are different signatures, e.g. four sex-related signatures. 
This can be an indication that in some people, independently of the androgen 
reception for the development of a male external appearance, a brain cell and 
transmitter-related sex/gender identity and specific metabolism can manifest 
itself, and also that other people can display a brain cell and transmitter-related 
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sex/gender identity and cellular inter sex/gender-related constitutiveness, only 
partly dependent on chromosomes, gonads and external sex-related features. 
In addition it could support the assumption that inter sex/gender-related con-
stitutiveness is already present on the cellular level and is subject to its specific 
realities and norms.
CONCLUSION
In the wiring boards of sex/gender there seem to be intrasystemically different 
levels of organization which in turn are subject to their own subdynamics. 
Subdynamics are not directly hierarchical by nature or deducible from each 
other. Rather, the organizational structure seems to be partly target-oriented 
and partly, via cellular portal systems, permeable in a complex way. Interactive 
interplays exist on all levels, both with the surrounding as well as with regard 
to ecological factors. Sex/gender-related constitutiveness can therefore neither 
be regarded as radically independent from nor radically dependent on biolog-
ical, in particular hormonal factors. Rather, the multidimensional character of 
sex/gender-related constitutiveness should be emphasized and examined. This 
also means: alternating permutation and multifaceted play.
All humans are physically polyvalent; some are just more polyvalent than 
the average.
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Intersex: Medical Measures  
on the Test Bed1
Jörg Woweries
SUMMARY
Intersex persons are regarded by medical practitioners as a disruption of the sex 
order because they have genitals that do not conform to the norm. The aware-
ness for the impact of ‘gender’ also and in particular in the field of medicine does 
not seem to be very pronounced among its professionals, with the result that 
this term is largely absent in medical literature. However, in order to emphasize 
the impact and interrelatedness of both terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ they frequently 
appear together in the following text.2 In the past, but also in the present, inter-
sex persons were regarded as being in need of treatment and as a consequence 
were subjected to primarily genital assignment surgery in order to achieve a 
simulated superficial norming of their sex. In doing so, the norms of the Ger-
man term ‘Geschlecht’,3 also present in medicine, as well as the mechanisms 
of their implementation are ignored because the surgeons referred to here are 
only concerned with the body. What is crucial here is that these intersex persons 
are infants and children who owing to their age could not and cannot give their 
consent. However, surgery involves a high risk and damage to health. This con-
tribution focuses on the special situation of girls with 46,XX-DSD, because it has 
shown that for a not unsubstantial ‘quantity’ surgical interventions in childhood 
can have the result that the sex/gender identity perceived by that person at a later 
age as belonging to her or him can no longer be taken into account.
1 | Original version in German.
2 | This does not apply to German, since the term ‘Geschlecht’ comprises both aspects.
3 | The German term ‘Geschlecht’ includes besides the physical component (‘sex’) also the psychological (‘sex/
gender identity’) and social (‘gender’) components.
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Since the Chicago Consensus Conference (Hughes 2006) and in the medical 
guidelines4 intersex persons are catalogued under ‘Disorder of Sex Development’ 
(DSD) (see Woweries5) thereby according a key position to medicine. This goes 
hand in hand with the assumption that the heterosexual binary sex-related con-
stitutiveness remains the basic point of reference, that sex as well as gender is 
assigned for life and that in intersex people the physical basis for either of these 
two sexes has yet to be established (Götze 2011). What this perspective ignores 
completely is that intersex, viewed from a totally different angle, could be regarded 
as an individual feature to be appreciated and not as a problem that calls for med-
ical treatment (Voß 2012). This kind of sociocultural perspective is what the Swiss 
ethics commission (2012) attempts to take into account when it uses phrasings 
such as ‘sex/gender variants’ or ‘differences of sex development’6 in order to avoid 
a pathological connotation. It is with this in mind that it refers to “infants and chil-
dren who are in principle healthy” but who “with reference to the child’s welfare 
[…] have been subjected until very recently to sex/gender assignment surgery.”7 
This medical view of sex disregards the psychological and social perspective. 
What is being done?
The aim of all medical and surgical measures is to align the external genitalia 
that do not conform to the norm either with the male or the female genitalia. 
As a rule, multiple reassignment operations are performed on the genitalia to 
achieve a spurious superficial norming of the sex. These operations are irrevers-
ible. In general the following operations are performed:
1. In numerous intersex persons with a female phenotype, who however have 
a male 46,XY set of chromosomes, the testes are removed. This is in effect 
a castration which in Germany is punishable as grievous bodily harm.8 This 
4 | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kinderheilkunde und Jugendmedizin (DGKJ) (2010): Leitlinien: Störungen der 
Geschlechtsentwicklung (Guidelines: Disorders of sexual development). In: AWMF-Leitlinien-Register Nr. 
027/022. URL: http://www.awmf.org/leitlinien/detail/ll/027-022.html [01.08.2013]. Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Kinderheilkunde und Jugendmedizin (DGKJ) (2010): Leitlinien: Adrenogenitales Syndrom (Guidelines: 
adrenogenital syndrome). In: AWMF-Leitlinien-Register Nr. 027/047. 
URL: http://www.awmf.org/leitlinien/detail/ll/027-047.html [01.08.2013].
5 | See Jörg Woweries’ contribution in this publication: ‘Who is sick? Who gets to decide?’
6 | Statement of the Swiss National Ethics Commission for Human Medicine (2012): Zum Umgang mit Varianten 
der Geschlechtsentwicklung. Ethische Fragen zur ‘Intersexualität’. (On dealing with variants of sex development. 
Ethical issues in ‘intersexuality’) p. 7. 
URL: http://www.bag.admin.ch/nek-cne/04229/04232/index.html?lang=de [01.08.2013].
7 | Ibid., p. 5.
8 | For children § 1631c BGB: “The parents cannot consent to a sterilization of the child. Neither can the child 
consent to a sterilization.”
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is however circumvented with the assertion that this is a surgical interven-
tion for the welfare of the child by pointing to a debatable later possibility 
of a malignant deformation. Even though in rare cases there is the risk, 
much later in life, of a degeneration to cancer9,10,11  regular preventive med-
ical checkups can keep this risk to an acceptable minimum. However, the 
testes are almost always removed without any recognizable calculation of a 
possible risk of degeneration, because they do not match the external image 
of the female genitals that the surgery attempts to achieve.
2. Shortening of an elongated clitoris (clitorectomy, clitoral reduction).
3. Broadening and elongating a vagina regarded as rudimentary, resulting in 
a so-called neo-vagina.
4. Surgical modifications of internal genitalia.
5. A further complex of intersex phenomena, hypospadia12, is not considered 
in this article for reasons of space.
6. Unilateral dystopic testes are not part of this system of genital surgery dis-
cussed here since they do not regard intersex people.13
Who is sick? Who is made sick?
A vital hormone substitution for loss of salt is necessary in a special form of 
intersex, the adrenogenital syndrome (AGS).14 Medical, i.e. vital surgical inter-
ventions are only indicated in cases when the flow of urine is prevented. In these 
cases the parents have to give their child’s consent by proxy as its life is at stake. 
All other forms of surgery are cosmetic or esthetic operations since they lack the 
medical indication in the sense of preventing a life-threatening condition. It is 
all merely about the external appearance.
Concerning the damage and risk of genital surgery one can safely say that 
it involves high rates of damage and an on the whole elevated risk. The risk of 
damaging sensitive nerves is clearly elevated and, as with all surgery, unavoid-
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9 | “Data on the risk of malignant deformations are lacking completely here. The literature references on a 
definitive risk of a development of gonadal tumors are insufficient. In cases of gonadal dysgenesis and female 
assignment an early gonadectomy is therefore recommended (approx. at the age of 1 year or together with other 
surgery)”. AWMF guideline register No. 027/022, p. 5.
10 | For the complete androgen insensitivity syncrom (CAIS) the risk of a malignant tumor is 0,8%, for ovotes-
ticular DSD it is 2,6% and for the partial AIS it is around 15%. In cases of gonodal dysgeny the risk can be over 
30%. (Pleskacova, J. et al. 2010). The lifelong risk of breast cancer is around 12,2% (according to US National 
Cancer Institute) No doctor would dream of removing the breast in all girls because of this risk.
11 | According to the relevant literature the risk of the development of a gonadal blastoma for XY women with 
dysgenetic gonads is above approx. 30%. Cools, Martine et al.: Germ Cell Tumors in the Intersex Gonads. In: 
Endocrin Rev 27, 5, pp. 468-484. Pleskacova, J. et al. (2010), p. 7.
12 | In hypospadia the urinary tract does not end in the tip of the penis, but on the underside of the penis, on 
the scrotum or in the area of the perineum.
13 | Rudimentary, functionless testes that do not lie in the scrotum without any indication of an intersex de-
velopment.
14 | AWMF guideline register No. 027/047.
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able in practice (Bosinski 2005; Diamond/Sigmundson 1997; Meyer-Bahlburg 
2008). “Even today patients with DSD incur the risk of being traumatized by 
medical and psychological treatment” (Birnbaum et al. 2013). And Kessler asks: 
“Why does the solution for ambiguous genitals always have to be the surgeon’s 
scalpel?” Kessler (1998: 105). Statements on post-operative results have only 
been presented in the last years. With the conspiracy of silence that was part of 
the doctors’ system of treatment the endocrinologists and surgeons obstructed 
themselves by dispensing with a retrospective review of their interventions (see 
Woweries15). A first convincing evaluation after more than 40 years of surgical 
practice concerned statements of intersex people in a retrospective non-repre-
sentative study.16 Surgery was performed almost exclusively on persons who were 
unable to give their consent.17 Of the children of the age of 7 and 12 years 86% 
and 87% had surgery,18 in today’s adults the percentage was as high as 93,6% to 
100% in three of four diagnostic groups. This leaves out of consideration that 
many had multiple surgery (Götz 2011; Kleinemeier/Jürgensen 2008). In many 
cases further operations had to be performed in later years, in puberty and after.19 
In the network study20 25% of the participants operated on complained about 
complications: most frequently about fistula formation in 40,5% of the cases, 
about constriction of the efferent urinary tract in 27%, about inflammation of 
the urinary tract in 32% and about problems with urinating in 21,4%.
In a catamnestic study 78 intersex adults have experienced their medical 
treatment as negative (Brinckmann/Schweizer/Richter-Appelt 2007; Schweizer 
2012). 62% displayed clinically relevant psychological suffering and 47% con-
templated suicide. These reactions are frequently a result of the numerous oper-
ations, together with being exhibited by doctors in the framework of medical stu-
dent and specialist training and the appurtenant experience of feeling helpless 
and exposed. Kessler writes that “excess genital examination is a form of abuse” 
(Kessler 1998: 59). If recognition is a part of human social participation, then 
the “negative experiences with the tabooization of the issue” (German ethics 
commission 2012) and the mere statistical infrequency in public perception are 
sufficient for generating stigmatization. For this reason, intersex people often 
hide their otherness (Zehnder/Streuli 2012). 13,5% report about past self-muti-
15 | See Jörg Woweries’ contribution in this publication: ‘Who is sick? Who gets to decide?’
16 | Kleinemeier, E., Jürgensen, M. (2008): Netzwerk Intersexualität: Erste Ergebnisse der Klinischen Evalua-
tionsstudie im Netzwerk Störungen der Geschlechtsentwicklung/Intersexualität in Deutschland, Österreich und 
Schweiz. Januar 2005 bis Dezember 2007. URL: http://www.netzwerk-dsd.uk-sh.de/fileadmin/documents/
netzwerk/evalstudie/Bericht_Klinische_Evaluationsstudie.pdf [03.09.2013].
17 | Ibid. p. 16.
18 | Ibid. p. 16.
19 | Ibid. p. 16.
20 | Ibid. p. 17.
Jörg Woweries
233
lations – also for the reasons explained above. The parent-child relationship too 
is subjected to severe stress (Richter-Appelt/Schimmelmann/Tiefensee 2004). 
In addition, the network Intersexualität reports about psychological strain in 
45% of adult intersex persons (Kleinemeier/Jürgensen 2008). The findings of 
a meta study indicate that the goal of a normal psychosocial development was 
not reached.21 
A retrospective, non-representative recall study of 57 persons with the male 
XY set of chromosomes, but an at first sight female phenotype (complete or par-
tial androgen insensitivity syndrome – CAIS or PAIS) (Köhler et al. 2012) estab-
lished the following: the participants had had surgery in childhood so that their 
genitals would better match the female sex assigned by the attending doctor.22 
The recall study indicated that 47,1% of the participants experienced discomfort 
in the function of the vagina, i.e. the vagina was too small for tampons, 47,4% 
suffered considerable loss of clitoris sensitivity. 56,3% to 70% complained about 
continuous pains while having sexual intercourse, depending on the subgroup 
(CAIS or PAIS). In the light of these very frequent damages the authors could 
not but recommend that this kind of surgery should not be performed in child-
hood. They demand the consent of the adult patients themselves, not their par-
ents. The German Ethics Council also recommends that the decision should on 
principle be made exclusively by those affected capable of giving consent (Ger-
man Ethics Council 2012: 174).
Additional discussions about girls with 46,XX-DSD 
and andreno-genital syndrome (AGS)
The German Ethics Council refers to the surgery on the genitals of girls with 
46,XX-DSD and AGS syndrome as sex disambiguation surgery (2012: 108). 
One should however attempt to understand which reasons might have led the 
German Ethics Council to differentiate between sex assignment and sex disam-
biguation surgery. From the literature published in the statement of the Ethics 
Council we can deduce the following: after a survey by the network Intersexua- 
lität and the Hamburg study by Richter-Appelt it was possible to establish that a 
large number of women with AGS are also later satisfied with surgery they had 
undergone in childhood. Many do not see themselves as intersex people. These 
persons live as adults in a female role. This fact has to be acknowledged. For this 
reason the German society for child endocrinology and diabetology (Deutsche 
21 | Refers to 21 international studies from the years 1974-2007. Schönbucher et al.: Sexuelle Lebensqualität 
von Personen mit Intersexualität und 46,XY-Kariotyp, ZfS 2008, pp. 26 ff.
22 | According to the consensus statements DSD persons with 46,XY CAIS and most people with PAIS were 
assigned as women. Hughes, I. A. et al. (2006): Consensus statement on management of intersex disorders. 
In: Arch Dis Child 91, p. 556.
Intersex: Medical Measures on the Test Bed
234
Gesellschaft für Kinderendokrinologie und Diabetologie) recommends surgery 
in cases of AGS also in early childhood (Birnbaum et al. 2013: 161, 150). It is 
however surprising if in this situation the council concludes that this surgical 
procedure should include all children with AGS (surgery is recommended at 
the age from two to twelve months).23 This ignores those intersex people who 
later, as adolescents or adults, do not wish to live in the female role. These voices 
thus remain unconsidered. A large proportion however lives either in a male 
role or does not feel it belongs to either sex. The German Ethics Council (2012: 
86) states that 31% of the participants with AGS plead for leaving sex/gender 
reassignment open. Bora (2012: 28), expert of the German Ethics Council, stated 
that this was the case with 35-40% of persons with AGS. According to Nieder and 
Richter-Appelt “we know from research that the majority of persons with AGS, 
despite 46,XX karyotype, live in the male role.”24 The guidelines mentioned in 
the beginning report 17% (of these 5% of 46,XX women and up to 12% of 46,XX 
men with classical 21 hydroxylase deficiency) who complain about problems with 
the assigned gender role.25 Of the women adult today 10% attained an unusual-
ly high score on the transgender scale, further 3% are very unsure concerning 
their sex/gender affiliation (Kleinemeier/Jürgensen 2008). These studies show 
methodological differences in evaluation, depending on whether the so-called 
AGS girls were asked whether they would prefer to be a girl or rather a boy or 
whether they are confused about their own gender identity. The data come from 
diverse sources and are thus inconsistent, but they concern a larger quantity for 
whom such operations constitute sex/gender assignment surgery. These people 
know only the experienced or imposed sharp dichotomous separation of the sex-
es and they mostly find themselves in a situation after genital surgery. Such sur-
gical measures greatly impede a later transition to the other sex (Meyer-Bahlburg 
2008). This prevents to an unknown extent a voluntary affiliation in another 
direction. It is conceivable that other, female-assigned people could profess to 
want to live in the male or in another gender role. This aspect contradicts the 
statement of the German Ethics Council that the surgery performed on children 
with 46,XX DSD and AGS only constitutes sex disambiguation surgery. Here, 
23 |“[...] it is undeniable that in prenatally virilized girls a corrective, feminizing operation of the external gen-
italia has to be peformed” [JW]. Riepe, F. G., Sippel, W. (2008): Das Adrenogenitale Syndrom. In: Kinder- und 
Jugendarzt 39, p. 112.
24 | Nieder, T. O., Richter-Appelt, H. (2009): Neurobiologische Korrelate bei Geschlechtsidentitätsstörungen. 
In: Psychiatrie im Dialog 10: 60.They also quote: Richter-Appelt, H., Discher, C., Gedrose, B. (2005): Gender 
identity and recalled gender related childhood play-behaviour in adult individuals with different forms of in-
ter-sexuality. In: Anthropologischer Anzeiger 63, pp. 241-256; Jorge, J. C. et al. (2008): Male gender identity 
in an XX individual with congenital adrenal hyperplasia. In: The journal of sexual medicine, 5, pp. 122-131; 
Meyer-Bahlburg, H. F. L. et al. (2006): Gender development in women with congenital adrenal hyperplasia as a 
function of disorder severity. In: Archives of sexual behavior 35, pp. 667-684.
25 | AWMF guideline register no. 027/047.
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26 | Girls with 46,XX DSD are sometimes referred to as tomboys. This is however as a rule not regarded as an 
intersex variant. 
27 | Among others Berenbaum, S. A., Hines, M. (2003): Effects on gender identity of prenatal androgens and 
genital appearence: evidence from girls with congential adrenal hyperplasia. In: J Clin Endocin Metab 88, 3, 
pp. 1102-1106.
28 | Holterhus, P. M. (2012): Prägung des menschlichen Genoms durch Androgene. Molekulares Gedächtnis 
der Androgenwirkung. In: Intersexualität kontrovers. Schweizer/Richter-Appelt (Eds.). Psychosozial.
29 | AWMF guideline register No. 027/022.
the social aspect of ‘gender’ was not taken into account in the council's discus-
sion of the issue.
The term ‘sex/gender identity’ also includes, besides the physical features, 
always also one’s own determination of one’s sex and gender, which comprises 
the self-perception as man or woman or something else, for instance whether 
one assigns oneself to one of the two sexes, to none of them or both of them. 
Depending on which subgroup of intersex people has been interviewed,15-30% 
or more have experienced a high degree of insecurity as to which sex/gender 
category they should assign themselves to (Schweizer/Richter-Appelt 2012: 187 
f., 207 f., 225 f., 433 f.). A majority (58%) of intersex people and 31% of the AGS 
persons advocate leaving the educational gender open; this decision should be 
considered in a flexible way and not force children into a particular gender be-
haviour (German Ethics Council 2012: 86 f.). Even though the gender role can 
often be surmised already in early childhood, it is only later, around the time 
of puberty, that children’s awareness and own views are better taken notice of 
(Diamond 2008).
There are indications from medicine and neuropsychology that in so-called 
AGS girls the own further orientation is determined already before birth by tes-
tosterone and testosterone-similar substances such as androgen. In the course 
of their development they see themselves later in a female,26 a male role or one 
deviating from these.27,28 “However, there appears to be no correlation between 
the severity of the genital phenotype and the existence of problems.”29 Diamond 
and Richter-Appelt (2008) comment on this: “The most important sex organ is 
between the ears.”
The following can be considered an undeniable fact:
Sex/gender identity cannot be recognized at birth, neither do the sex chro-
mosomes (XX or XY chromosomes) determine sex/gender identity.
There is no stringent causality between genital appearance and sex/gender 
identity.
Sex/gender identity cannot be determined by any medical or psychological 
measure. This can only be done by the individuals themselves.
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The awareness of one’s own gender comes about in a developmental pro-
cess that goes on for years and can continue beyond the time of puberty.
Whether someone regards themselves as a man, a woman or something 
else cannot be assigned or established by any surgery.
“An assimilation of intersexuals into one of the two sexes doesn’t work”, 
emphasizes Reiter (2000).
These aspects should be considered when judging surgery on infants, children 
and adolescents. Deciding to which sex one belongs is something only the person 
concerned can do, so sex disambiguation surgery on children is also inadmis-
sible under whatever circumstances. Already some time ago Diamond and Sig-
mundson (1997) demanded that surgery that is not vital should be deferred until 
the persons themselves request it. As a consequence of much criticism an ethics 
group in Germany (Wiesemann/Arbeitsgruppe Ethik im Netzwerk Intersexua- 
lität 2008) has demanded that measures that are practiced without satisfying 
evidence, that are irreversible and performed without necessary medical indica-
tion should be postponed until the persons themselves wish to take the decision 
and are old enough to be allowed to do so. For the German Ethics Council (2012: 
112) too it is a primary goal “that the self-determination of the child should not be 
limited unacceptably by unnecessary surgery.” “We also know from the relevant 
literature that a higher than average percentage of people with various forms 
of disorder of sex development decide in the course of puberty or in adulthood 
to change the social gender assigned to them.” (Jürgensen/Hiort/Thyen 2008). 
The German Ethics Council interviewed girls and women with the adrenogeni-
tal syndrome: around 50% of the questions were answered by the parents. This 
raises the question how often the parents’ doubts concerning the surgery they 
approved of in the past have influenced the answers to justify their own deci-
sion, to apologize or to live with the decision they took at the time. One should 
here also note the parent’s pressure for medical action (Kleinemeier/Jürgensen 
2008: 17) and the research conducted by Dayner (2004). The latter showed that 
for 95% of the parents the genital appearance, i.e. the external image, is more 
important than erotic responsiveness. Then female students in the second part 
of the survey were asked to imagine having been born with a 1 cm long clitoris 
and thus, due to the supposedly excessive size, not conforming to conventional 
notions. An overwhelming majority of 93% of the students responded that they 
would not have wanted their parents to consent to surgery in order to change the 
genital appearance if this would have meant the loss of sexual responsiveness or 
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of the ability to experience an orgasm. More than 50% of the students would not 
have wanted surgery, even if the outer appearance would have been perceived 
as unattractive or unpleasant. These students would rather have preferred other 
kinds of surgery, for instance to reduce the size of noses, ears or breasts instead 
of surgically shortening a supposedly too long clitoris.
Lembke’s arguments in her note to the German Ethics Council (2011) also 
belong to this discussion: the imposition of notions about the ‘right’ genitalia, 
unambiguous sex, and the acceptable size of a clitoris or the ‘right’ sexuality vi-
olates fundamental human rights and has furthermore serious negative effects 
on the desired sex/gender equality by reproducing female stereotypes. This is 
exactly what the UN women’s right convention wants to see stopped. Kessler 
(1998: 56 f., 107 f.) criticizes that a vaginoplasty is constructed in a girl for one 
reason only, namely to enable sexual intercourse with a man. The idea that all 
women desire heterosexual intercourse perpetualizes the notion of women as 
passive receptacles of male desire.
In 1961, a highly renowned pediatrician, Prof. Jürgen Bierich (1961: 387), 
wrote a contribution in a standard text book on intersex that was used well into 
the 1970s. While the reduction of a too large clitoris has remained a topic to this 
day, at the time he even demanded the extirpation i.e. the complete carving out 
of the clitoris, because the enlarged clitoris would be in the man’s way during 
intercourse. For this reason Bierich recommended this operation on children 
under 4 years of age. The incredible brutality connected with such a procedure 
can compare with the genital mutilation still practiced on girls in parts of Af-
rica, the female genital mutilations (FMG). These have been denounced since 
1995 by the United Nations as a human rights violation. In 2013 the German 
Bundestag debated over a criminal code amendment act on the punishability of 
the mutilation of female genitalia.30 With his call for genital mutilation Bierich 
had his co-perpetrators and predecessors. Medical journals can tell us that in 
the mid-19th century in Germany and other countries in Europe clitorectomy 
was performed hundreds of times for various reasons, e.g. to combat mental 
disorder and epilepsy, masturbation and lust in women.31 As late as in 1938 the 
Zentralblatt der Gynäkologie (central journal of gynecology) described clitorec-
tomy for treatment of masturbation.32 It is very irritating that echoes of the past 
still linger on today, albeit in a subconscious or suppressed way. In some medical 
centres in Europe the complete removal of the clitoris (clitorectomy) is still the 
method of choice for an enlarged clitoris (Riepe et al. 2002).
30 | Rechtsausschuss (judicial committee), 24 April 2013, StrÄndG. URL: http://www.bundestag.de/bunde-
stag/ausschuesse17/a06/anhoerungen/archiv/46____Str__ndG/index.html [03.08.2013].
Intersex: Medical Measures on the Test Bed
238
In several consensus statements and reviews one can read the following state-
ments33 about children with 46,XX and AGS:34 the consensus statements of 
2002 and 2006 (Clayton et al. 2002 and Hughes et al. 2006) suggest that 46,XX 
DSD children with a significant virilization should be presented as adolescents 
at the earliest. Surgery, such as vaginoplasty, should be deferred until adoles-
cence or adulthood, since there are no controlled clinical tests on the effect of 
early surgery (under 12 months) compared to later surgery (in adults or older 
adolescents). Let me add here some additional study findings: after clitoral sur-
gery 78% showed a high rate of non-responsiveness and a loss of ability to or-
gasm compared with 20% of non-operated women in a comparison study.35 After 
vaginoplasty the appearance may be satisfying, but the vagina is too narrow for 
sexual intercourse, which occurs in more than 80% of the respondents (Creight-
on 2004). If a cosmetic surgery is desired one has to take the possibility into 
account that the artificially created opening will grow together again with the 
consequence that a vaginal dilation has to be performed. A number of articles 
warn against follow-up surgery on children and treatment by bougie, i.e. keeping 
the orifice open via mechanical instruments in many examinations over many 
months. These measures can lead to very severe and long-term psychological 
traumatization.36,37,38 “Inserting a bougie in a girl’s vagina amounts to rape”, says 
Kraus-Kinsky (2012: 162). Kessler rates these numerously repeated procedures 
as sexual abuse. “All research on this subject reports throughout […] reduced sex-
ual responsiveness in AGS patients, which appears to correlate with the degree 
of […] the corrective genital surgery” (Wünsch/Wessel 2008: 41). “Vaginoplasty 
is actually only necessary for penetration and can therefore be postponed until 
adolescence” (Bosinski 2005: 40). For these reasons Krege (2011), as a surgeon, 
prefers to perform surgery in a later period in life, because she can then discuss it 
with the girls themselves. One should therefore wait until the adolescents or the 
31 | Hulverscheidt, M. (2011): Weibliche Genitalverstümmelung. Mabuse-Verlag.
32 | Ibid. p. 19, quote Zentralbl Gynäkol 11, pp. 584-585.
33 | Clayton et al. (2002); Creighton (2004); Creighton/Minto (2001); Creighton/Minto/Steele (2001); 
Crouch et al. (2008); Hughes et al. (2006); Lee et al. (2006); Pagon et al. (2010); Speiser et al. (2010); Stein 
et al. in collaboration with the Canadian Pediatric Endocrine Group (2005).
34 | Kessler reports in detail on the older literature 1998, pp. 52-76. 
35 |Mouriquand, P., surgeon, (text from the ARTE film of 04.10.2010 (in translation)) “It would be window 
dressing to assure the parents that a clitoral reduction would have no effect on responsiveness. No one can 
do that.”
36 | Hoepffner, W. nach Finke/Höhne (2008) (ed.): Intersexualität bei Kindern. p. 133; Riepe F. G., Sippel, W. 
(2008) In: Kinder- und Jugendarzt 2, 39, p. 112; Bosinski, H. A. G. (2006): Sexualmedizinische Aspekte bei 
Intersex-Syndromen. In: Urologe 45, pp. 981-991. 
37 | AWMF guideline register No. 027/022.
38 | Wünsch, L., Wessel L. (2008): Chirurgische Strategien bei Störungen der Geschlechtsentwicklung. In: 
Monatsschrift Kinderheilkunde 156, pp. 234-240.
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adults themselves express the wish to undergo surgery. Anyone who advocates 
clitoral reduction lets himself be guided by randomly established cultural norms. 
Preservation of responsiveness after clitoral reduction cannot be guaranteed. 
Therefore clitoral reduction in childhood is not acceptable, it can only be desired 
by persons capable of consent – as a cosmetic operation – if they desire it at all. 
“Unfortunately there are only very few good long-term postoperative studies in 
this area, and the existing study findings refer to operative methods that have 
long since fallen out of use, since they are no longer regarded as acceptable today” 
(Grüters 2008: 34). Therefore, genital operations are basically all one-off experi-
ments, because impaired sensitivity or too narrow vaginoplasty can be detected by 
the person concerned only after many years, in adolescence or adulthood.
Proposals to policy makers
Human rights organizations, self-help groups of intersex people and others de-
mand an immediate halt to all cosmetic surgery on genitals in infants or other 
children under the age of consent. This also has to apply to people with the 
adrenogenital syndrome (AGS). Any surgical procedures that risk a permanent 
impairment of fertility or sexual responsiveness have to be terminated immedi-
ately.39 These constitute serious violations of children’s rights. This also reflects 
the view of the German federal government.40
The reports to the human rights commission of the United Nations have 
led politicians in the German Bundestag to question the views and practices of 
many medical practitioners and clinicians.41
Have the medical practitioners changed their stance following the accusa-
tions of the UN human rights commission and the German parliament? Up to 
now there have been no joint critical statements on the existing practices and the 
guidelines continue to remain in effect.
39 | Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/ 13253, 24. 04. 2013: The SPD calls on the German Bundestag/
government to “assure that sex assignment and assimilation surgery on juvenile intersex persons before their 
age of consent are banned. At the same time it has to be guaranteed that a unique by-proxy consent of the par-
ents to irreversible sex assignment surgery of their under-age child is not permitted – except in life-threatening 
emergencies or when there is a medical indication.” In addition also further motions by other parties: Deutscher 
Bundestag Drucksache 17/12859, 20.03.2013; Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/12851, 20.3.2013.
40 | Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/11855, 12.12.2012, p. 5.
41 | Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/14014, 14.06.2013: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht. (Decision 
recommendation and report). URL: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/140/1714014.pdf [02.12.2013].
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According to a statement by Luxembourg’s political parties of September 2012 
there are no intersex people in Luxembourg. This is a surprising assessment 
since there are intersex people all over the world. One reason for this invisibility 
of intersex people is that also in the 21st century society is still marked by sex 
and gender binary and heterosexuality. Anyone who cannot or will not fit into 
to these paradigms is regarded as abnormal and has to be aligned. Children are 
still operated on to align them with one of the two standard sexes and respec-
tive genders, some of them are even aborted before birth. But there are also 
countries that do not have this tradition of mutilation, such as Nepal or some 
Indian Federal States. In recent times an increasing number of countries have 
included further gender categories in official documents. In addition, more and 
more international declarations and recommendations are issued that take an 
unequivocal stance against sex/gender assignment surgery and other medical 
interventions on people below the age of consent.2
INTRODUCTION
Participating in a round-table discussion with Luxembourg’s political parties 
on the issue of intersex at the conference “Gender Normativity and its Effects 
on Childhood and Adolescence” I was extremely surprised to hear that there 
are supposedly no intersex people living in Luxembourg. This is hard to believe 
considering that in France according to medical practitioners 8000 intersex chil-
1 | Original in French.
2 | These other medical interventions mainly consist in hormonotherapy, non-health related nude examina-
tions, as well as photography taking, as well as gender role prescription.
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dren are born every year3 and in the Western countries intersex is more common 
than previously thought, with every 2000th birth and a proportion of 1,728% of 
the population on entering puberty (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 53). This raises the 
question how in a small, wealthy and very modern country such as Luxembourg 
something can be named that does not exist (Guillot 2008) and above all, why 
it doesn’t exist? The reasons advanced by the participants of the round-table dis-
cussion were that Luxembourg has only since very recently a cancer registry, but 
as yet no comparable data bank of other disorders – and thus also not of intersex 
–  that the sex/gender assignment operations, which I would like to describe as 
mutilations, are outsourced to neighbouring countries and that intersex peo-
ple are not mentioned in Luxembourg’s legislation. But I believe the essential 
causes for this absence lie somewhere else and a corresponding survey among 
practitioners potentially attending intersex people (gynecologists, endocrinolo-
gists, urologists etc.) could contribute to identifying them. One should also bear 
in mind that the sex and gender binary and heterosexuality shape our Western 
societies for whom a sex(/gender)-atypical person seems to be something incon-
ceivable. The coitus is per force heterosexual, whether penetrating or penetrated. 
A man has to urinate standing up, everything is measured by the presence or 
non-presence of the penis and the rest is regarded as an undesirable fragment 
to be eradicated. In addition, the consistent invisibilization of these non-con-
formable people is the result of a biopolitics (Foucault) and was systematized 
by the psychologist Money in the middle of the 20th century in the form of the 
Hopkins protocol. Children that cannot be assigned to one of the standard sexes 
(male/female) are assigned a sex directly after birth in an emergency operation – 
usually the female one – thereby deleting every trace of their singularity. Parents 
and relatives are expected to continuously stabilize discursively the sex selected 
by the doctors, regarded as the true sex, and to deny the children concerned their 
original otherness. This leads to the intersex paradigm: “We are not allowed to 
say that which we have not been told that we are.” (Guillot 2008). In my view, 
these traditional medical interventions amount to genital mutilations and phys-
ical torture. At best they damage sexual responsiveness, at worst and very often 
they lead to serious problems such as incontinence, fistula formation or chronic 
pain which in turn frequently require numerous surgical corrections. Further-
more, these children are as a rule castrated and artificially turned into life-long 
hormone patients, and this only because they violate sex and gender norms. 
But the interventions also constitute psychological torture because the institu-
3 | Interview by René Frydman with the pediatric surgeon professor Claire Fékété on 22 January 2013 on France 
Culture. URL: http://www.franceculture.fr/player/reecouter?play=4566631 [02.09.2013].
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tionalized silence creates shame and ignorance about one’s own body, which all 
through one’s youth flare up anew with every encounter with the doctors, since 
the repeated treatments are never openly justified – because they cannot be jus-
tified medically. This psychological torture can be reactivated for an entire life 
with every contact with the medical world, since the person’s inter sex/gender-re-
lated constitutiveness is systematically negated or silenced when they ask for 
explanations from the doctors. These interventions are regarded by biopolitics 
as medical and (psycho)social emergency measures whose aim it is not to relieve 
the affected persons themselves, but the supposed psychological suffering of a 
third party, the parents (American Academy of Pediatrics 2000; Fausto-Sterling 
2000; Gueniche et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2006; Meyer-Bahlburg 2008).
In other words, intersex is one of the rare cases in modern medicine where 
the one group of people (the children) are physically mutilated to relieve the oth-
er (the parents) psychologically (Aaronson 2004; Holmes 2008, 2011; Karkazis 
2008). This does not pay off, neither for the children, who do not feel comforta-
ble in their body and will be sick for the rest of their lives, although they enjoyed 
the best of health before, nor for the parents, whose initial anxiety about the birth 
of a child with atypical sex characteristics makes way to a continuing pain which 
places a burden on the entire family for generations with its mixture of taboo, 
secrets and doubts about the choice of the right or wrong sex. There is nothing 
to justify these mutilations, because even if the external sexual organs of intersex 
persons are not conventional, they are nevertheless healthy and functional in the 
sense of sexual responsiveness. Adult intersex persons describe their mutilation 
experiences as very stressful and traumatizing. (Guillot 2008; Karkazis 2008; 
Kessler 1998; Picquart 2009). Since some time some doctors recommend an 
in-utero sex normalization by giving dexamethasone to pregnant women whose 
fetuses are potential carriers of the adrenogenital syndrome (AGS). This practice 
is at the centre of current bioethical debates and exemplifies the desire of biopol-
itics to not only delete sexually non-conventional bodies, but also homosexuality 
and transidentity (Dreger/Feder/Tamar-Mattis 2012). If in the various prenatal 
tests the suspicion of intersex emerges, then abortion is widely recommended 
or even imposed in the West.
Criticism of these mutilation practices common in the Western world is not 
new: the first intersex persons who denounced this voiced their concerns with 
the establishment of the American Intersex Society of North America, ISNA. In 
the following years further associations would be set up, the most significant of 
which is the Organisation Intersex International, OII established in 2002 (Bas-
tien Charlebois/Guillot 2013). Meanwhile, biopolitics insisted on its scholarly 
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position and in the light of growing criticism did no more that revise the pe-
riphery of its discourse, while systematically delegitimizing that of the persons 
concerned (Bastien Charlebois).
Changes in sight?
Nevertheless, successful law suits and the work of human rights organizations 
have created more visibility for intersex people. In dialogue with certain doc-
tors it was furthermore possible to end hormonal-surgical mutilation of in-
tersex children in some places and help them to achieve self-determination, 
as for instance in the Swiss canton Waadt. Thanks to this ground work by 
associations of intersex people across the world – also partly in cooperation 
with organizations of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans persons (LGBT) – it 
was possible to spark off a debate on the issue of intersex which also the leg-
islators of various countries have directed their attention to. Some countries 
have chosen the inclusion of a further gender category in official documents, 
which however does not necessarily need to be understood as a third gender. 
Some made this choice because they have no mutilation tradition, such as 
Nepal, Pakistan and some Indian federal states. Here the traditional recogni-
tion of the existence of persons beyond the gender norm was merely inserted 
into existing laws. Other countries, by contrast, could only be persuaded under 
pressure of so-called sexual minorities and the movement of intersex people 
to take this step, such as New Zealand and Australia. The practice of genital 
mutilation was initially not denounced here. The first country to put the termi-
nation of hormonal-surgical mutilations into law is Malta,4 this last April 2015. 
In Switzerland it is only the termination of hormonal-surgical mutilation that 
is discussed,5  the introduction of a third gender category is however rejected at 
this point in time.6 We therefore experience both in the poor countries and the 
so-called rich countries different new conceptualizations of sex and gender and 
observe at the same time a paralyzing inactivity in modern democracies such 
as the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. And this considering that the enormous 
challenge is not so much the existence of intersex bodies but rather the bio- 
political co-option of the way society deals with the issue that has been going 
on for a good 60 years. Most of the intersex bodies do not deviate externally 
from social gender norms, and where this is the case it is as a rule only visible 
4 | German ethics council (ed.) (2012): Intersexualität. Stellungnahme. URL: http://www.ethikrat.org/
dateien/pdf/stellungnahme-intersexualitaet.pdf [25.07.2013].
5 | Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin, NEK-CNE (ed.) (2012): On the management of dif-
ferences of sex development. Ethical issues regarding “intersexuality”. Opinion no. 20/2012, p.19. Bern.
6 | Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin, NEK-CNE (ed.) (2012): Medienmitteilung. “Intersex-
ualität”: Das Wohl des Kindes steht an oberster Stelle.
Vincent Guillot
249
in private. The numerous testimonies by non-mutilated intersex people that 
we have knowledge of indicate that they can handle their situation perfectly 
well, appreciate their special body and identity and also receive sympathy and 
live a fulfilled private and professional life. Indeed, also in the so-called West 
there are people that have escaped medical mutilation practice, and in coun-
tries without traditional mutilation practice adult intersex people also attest to 
this fact. The medical professionals however ignore this category of persons in 
their studies, since they are not aware of them.
In general, these people see themselves as one of the currently socially 
admitted sexes. A part of them are either women or men, only a minority de-
mands an alternative identity. As grown-ups some of these people want to align 
their bodies to their gender identity via hormonal-surgical measures and have 
in the course of this procedure to shoulder the burden of a psychiatrization via 
an official transsexualism diagnosis, which is the precondition for access to 
corresponding treatments and a change of the sex in the civil register. Consid-
ering the number of intersex persons that there are everyone of us will know 
someone from this group of people without necessarily being aware of their 
being intersex. To give another example: Purely in statistical terms there is at 
least one intersex person sitting in a tram during peak times!
While Luxembourg legislation completely ignores the existence of intersex 
persons, other countries or supranational bodies include these in their legis-
lation or recommendations. Without referring once more to the countries that 
traditionally recognize people with bodies beyond the sex and gender norm we 
will in the following turn to the progress that has been made so far.
International Declarations and Recommendations
The Yogyakarta Principles for the implementation of international human 
rights with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity7 define gender 
identity. This text thereby constitutes a landmark for the legal protection of 
gender identity. Even if intersex persons are not explicitly mentioned as such, 
its chapter 18 is directed at them:
“Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that no child’s body 
is irreversibly altered by medical procedures in an attempt to impose a gender identity without the 
full, free and informed consent of the child in accordance with the age and maturity of the child and 
guided by the principle that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration”.
7 | The Yogyakarta Principles (2008): Yogyakarta Principles. The application of international human rights 
law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity. URL: http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/princi-
ples_en.pdf [04.07.2015].
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In the declaration of Montreal 8 of 2006 the issue of inter sex/gender-relat-
ed constitutiveness is explicitly addressed for the first time. It states that “in-
tersexual individuals experience a particular form of violence, in the form of 
genital mutilation resulting from unnecessary post-birth surgery, designed to 
make them conform to a rigid binary model of physical sex characteristics” and 
demands “that genital surgery on intersexual persons be prohibited, unless 
they are old enough to understand it and consent to it.” In the declaration of 
Stockholm of 2012 9  the Second International Intersex Forum made the follow-
ing demands:
1. To put an end to mutilating and normalizing practices such as genital 
surgeries, psychological and other medical treatments, including infanti-
cide and selective abortion (on the grounds of intersex).
2. To ensure that the personal, free, prior, and fully informed consent of the 
intersex individual is a compulsory requirement in all medical practices 
and protocols.
3. Creating and facilitating supportive, safe and celebratory environments 
for intersex people, their families and surroundings.
4. In view of ensuring the bodily integrity and health of the intersex child, 
psycho-social support and non-pathologizing peer support be provided to 
parents and/or care providers and the child’s immediate family instead 
of surgical or other medical treatment unless such interventions are 
life-saving.
5. The provision of all human rights and citizenship rights to intersex 
people.
6. The provision of access to one’s own medical records and any documen-
tation, and the affirmation of the intersex person’s right to truth.
7. The acknowledgement and redress of the suffering and injustice caused 
in the past.
The Forum urges the United Nations to take on board intersex rights in its 
human rights work. Other regional and national human rights institutions 
are called on to address the human rights of intersex people in their work 
and in turn call on their respective governments/institutions to confirm them. 
8 | Lesbian & Gay Liberation Front e.V. (2004): International Conference on LGBT Human Rights in the frame-






Human rights organizations and LGBTI specific organizations are expected 
to give visibility and inclusion to intersex people and their human rights con-
cerns. OII Francophonie, the francophone section of the International Orga- 
nization of Intersex People, has supported this declaration but points out that 
hormone substitution therapies aiming at normalizing modifications of the 
body should be classified in the category of the questionable further medical 
treatments.10 Furthermore, the increasing rate of abortion of fetuses with inter-
sex diagnosis is regarded with great concern, since here eugenic social effects 
are feared. Further demands are that the persons concerned are made familiar 
with the arguments of groups critical of pathologization and can contact them 
and also have at all times total access to their medical file, i.e. concerning the 
practices they are subjected to, as well as the medical evaluations about their 
body qualified as ‘ambiguous’.
The special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment of the UN human rights commission, Juan E. Mén-
dez, refers in his report of February 201311  for the first time to physical modifi-
cations that are performed without the consent of the persons concerned and 
qualifies these as torture. In 2012 the Swiss ethics commission (NEK-CNE) in 
the field of human medicine has positioned itself against genital mutilation 
and recommends, as a principle for dealing whose sex development vary from 
the norm, not to initiate  sex determining treatments that have irreversible 
effects and can be postponed. the child or person person should decide for 
her/himself. A psychosocial indication alone is in the view of the NEK-CNE 
not sufficient to justify such a procedure.12 In the Australian federal state of 
Victoria in February 2013 an advisory group of medical experts and representa-
tives of intersex people advocated the use of the term ‘intersex’. But it must be 
emphasized that not all people with an intersex condition/constitution identify 
themselves as intersex, only because some of them do, and that not everyone 
regards his/her condition as intersex or even as a condition.13 As a result of the 
Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders (Lee et al. 2006) 
the international medical community has shifted its nomenclature from her-
10 | OII Francophonie (2013): Second forum intersexe international de l’ILGA 2012. Communiqué de presse. 
URL: http://oiifrancophonie.org/156/second-forum-intersexe-international-de-lilga-2012/ [25.07.2013].
11 | Méndez, J. (2013): Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. United Nations. General Assembly (ed.). URL: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.pdf [25.07.2013].
12 | Nationale Ethikkommission im Bereich Humanmedizin (NEK)(2013): ‘Intersexualität’: Das Wohl des 
Kindes steht an oberster Stelle. Medienmitteilung. URL: http://www.bag.admin.ch/nek-cne/04230/index.
html?lang=de [25.07.2013].
13 | State of Victoria, Department of Health (ed.) (2013): Decision-making principles for the care of infants, 
children and adolescents with intersex conditions. URL: www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=d071fb-
da-68aa. [25.07.2013].
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maphrodite and intersex to the newly coined term ‘Disorders of Sex Devel-
opment’. However, intersex activist groups, supporters and academics have 
voiced critiques of this change. Intersex should no longer be referred to as a 
disorder or condition/constitution, since it is rather a genetic, chromosomal 
or hormonally-related human variation. In the light of this terminological dis-
agreement the term ‘intersex condition’ is being used more frequently.
CONCLUSION
Since intersex people have started speaking up in the 1990s they were able 
to acquire a certain visibility thanks to the dissemination of gender theories 
and their integration in feminist movements as well as LGB and finally LGBT 
movements. Some of them have organized themselves in patient association, 
others in various protest movements, in their majority within organizations 
that advocate the rights of sexual minorities or feminist goals. Initially, their 
discourse was systematically delegitimized under the guise of lacking objectiv-
ity by biopolitics, which in turn positioned itself as the only objective authority. 
They were also accused of reporting only personal (and thus insignificant) ex-
periences which were merely expression of a mental disorder from which they 
suffered as opposed to a supposedly silent majority happy with its fate, which 
until now no scientific study has been able to map.
Considering the juridification of the intersex issues of inter-sex/gender-re-
lated constitutiveness as well as the testimonies, situated experiences14  and 
scientific publications from the perspective of intersex people, the boundaries 
have shifted from a demand often mistakenly interpreted as communitarian, 
to a veritable human rights concern, which, against the background of hormo-
nal-surgical mutilation, joins the fight against torture and ritual clitoridectomy. 
The only difference between a ritual clitoridectomy and a hormonal-surgical 
sex assignment – be this a non-consensual medical mutilation or another 
physical modification of intersex bodies – lies in the motives for the deed. In 
the first case the reasons are of a supposedly animist and medieval nature, 
and in the second scientific. But in both cases there is torture, mutilation and 
traditional, cultural practices in the name of a third party (god or society). What 
is surprising is the fact that ritual clitoridectomy are regarded in the West, 
where these practices are marginal features of immigrant ethnic groups, as 
mutilation and torture that can be brought before the French jury court (see 




§ 222-9 and 222-10 of the French penal code), but that the legislators do not 
seem to recognize mutilation and torture in the systematic mutilation of in-
tersex children. The exotic object is punished, the medical fact is untouchable: 
this is undeniably ethnocentrism, the racist, sexist and homophobe result of 
a biopolitics which due to the potential loss of its dominance in the field of 
knowledge production, of power, as well as material gain is not able to question 
itself. In that it is helped by a civil society which mainly remains passive as it is 
kept ignorant about medicine’s current practices. The cause of this ignorance 
is the silence about torture and genital mutilation institutionalized by biopo- 
litics, while intersex issues are hardly taken notice of due to the permanent 
reproduction of heteronormativity in Western societies.
In this sense the issue of intersex is not a communitarian concern, but 
a tool for the emancipation of the masses. The increased visibility of intersex 
people, of both their corporality as well as the varied identities they can be as-
sociated with is one of the crucial basic conditions for the emancipation of all 
those who are not male/man/heterosexual. Inter-sex/gender-related constitu-
tiveness does not mean the end for men, women or heterosexuality, but rather 
offers the foundation of a new awareness of sex and gender. In other words so-
cietal alternatives to heteronormativity offer all people a foundation of aware-
ness of their own sex/gender affinities and thus new possibilities of acceptance 
of their bodies, their sex, and their sexualities. It is therefore a matter of being 
able to make the statement, for instance, “I am female/a woman/heterosexu-
al” (which is rarely made since it is supposedly self-evident) in full awareness 
and not as a pure routine. Not one single element in the debate about intersex 
denies the existence of male-heterosexual men or other categories permitted 
by society. There merely exists something else, something equally normal, and 
in this area of possibilities all humans can evolve.
Intersex should also be put urgently and immediately on the political 
agenda of countries such as the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Here the debate 
must not limit itself to the purely legal level, but has to reach into all sectors of 
society and primarily into the education system, by including intersex in the 
corresponding curricula of schools and medical training in collaboration with 
the persons concerned and from an affirmative perspective.
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Intersex and Human Rights 

Janik Bastien Charlebois, Vincent Guillot
SUMMARY 
Since its establishment in the early 1990s the intersex movement has been at-
tempting to enforce the respect for intersex children’s human right to physical 
integrity and self-determination, as well as the non-pathologization of intersex-
uality. However, this has met with strong resistance from the medical commu-
nity which prefers to reject criticism as subjective and unfounded. Credibility 
is a central issue in this debate, but it is rarely openly addressed. If the medical 
profession puts so much store in the quality of its analysis, what happens if we 
take a closer look?
INTRODUCTION
“The birth of a child with ambiguous genitalia constitutes a social emergency.” 
This statement is taken from the recommendations of the American Academy 
of Pediatrics from the year 2000 (p. 138) on dealing with children with atypical 
sex characteristics. It illustrates preconceptions on our social system – an area, 
however, for which medicine has developed few if any analytical instruments, 
having consistently kept the subjective social sciences at a distance. In reaction 
to the criticism of adult intersex people who have now the means to speak 
their minds about the medical interventions prescribed for them, some doc-
tors, psychiatrists or psychoanalysts are developing a counter-argumentation 
that subverts the credibility of intersex activists and aims to reinforce their 
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1 | Original in French.
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own position as carriers of disinterested and objective expert knowledge (see 
Aaronson 2004; Chiland 2008; Meyer-Bahlburg 2004).
As social scientists, we want to examine the core arguments with which 
the medical community continues to pathologize persons with a sex they deem 
‘ambiguous’ and attempts to brush aside the criticism of a number of intersex 
activists. Since in our view scientific rigor calls for making visible the situat-
ed standpoint from which we develop our thoughts, we would like to point 
out here that the first author of this contribution combines sociological expert 
knowledge with a situated experience as a politicized intersex person who was 
subjected to the medical normalization process.2 The second author is also a 
politicized intersex person who in the course of over a decade has acquired 
comprehensive experiential knowledge, which she has formalized and docu-
mented.3 She holds a Master in Gender studies. We would however also like 
to emphasize that the position of an intersex person is in our view no more 
subjectively coloured than that of non-intersex people. The latter can also be 
aiming to defend their own interests and fear the consequences of our political 
ascent, for instance when urologists and endocrinologists see their financial 
interests compromised, as has already come to light (Davis 2011).4 Further-
more, non-intersex people cannot completely grasp the realities of intersex 
people, since they are not confronted in their everyday lives with the various 
elements that these realities are based on. Claiming to be objective is nothing 
more than a hollow self-ascription of credibility that is only founded on its per-
formative assertion.5 To this claim we prefer intellectual rigor, which requires 
a capacity for reflexivity, honesty, and transparency about our research process 
and results. 
Paradigmatic deletion of intersex in medicine and protest movements
Even though there are some differences in medical approaches to intersex peo-
ple depending on country and institution, certain assumptions and practices 
predominate throughout. The Hopkins paradigm essentially formulated by 
John Money in 1955 was widely accepted in the so-called west until the end of 
2 |  Situated standpoint is here used as a term for a theoretical concept. See Harding, S. (Ed.) (2004): The 
Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader. New York/London: Routledge.
3 | Observatoire Des Transidentités, ODT: Independent information and analysis website on trans, intersex and 
gendeer issues. Besides the permanent staff (the ODT team) it relies on a network of actors in various areas of 
expertise, partner associations and academics. Once a month an article by a writer is published. URL: http://
www.observatoire-des-trans identites.com/ [05.09.2013].
4 | This statement may sound shocking, but it has been conveyed to us by three different sources who are in 
contact with doctors and who have heard such concerns from practitioners in Germany, France and the United 
States. Davis (2011) has documented such statements in interviews with doctors who treat intersex children.
5 | This topic has already been addressed by many scientific investigations. Due to lack of space we cannot 
reproduce them here. 
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the 1990s. According to this paradigm, both the biological sex and the social 
gender are malleable, but it is crucial that a child’s body fits medical norms for 
male and female, and that he/she develops a ‘matching’ traditional male or 
female gender identity and behavior to ensure his/her positive psychosexual 
development and protecting it from rejection by its peers. But this sex/gen-
der-related malleability, so the argument, only exists in the first two years of 
life, which is why early surgery is necessary. With the assumption that any un-
certainty about the assigned sex/gender would limit the parents in their ability 
to rear their child in the corresponding social gender and cause confusion in 
the child, it is recommended to share only partial information with the parents 
and leave the child completely in the dark (Money 1994 [1968]). Early surgery is 
also – and sometimes primarily – recommended to relieve the suffering of the 
parents who are supposedly clueless about how to deal with their unusual child 
and would like nothing more than for her/him to develop like a normal girl or 
normal boy (Aaronson 2004; Holmes 2008, 2011; Karkazis 2008).
In the 1990s the first generation of persons medicalized according to the 
Hopkins paradigm became adults. Therefore, they are now in a better posi-
tion to voice their impressions and experiences. Contrary to the wishes of the 
medical practitioners acting according to the Hopkins paradigm, a number 
of them have succeeded in getting access to information about the surgery 
performed on them, to assess what has happened and in some cases making 
contact with other persons with similar experiences. (Gosselin 2011; Holmes 
2008; Kessler 1998; Still 2008). In the social sciences this making contact is 
considered the crucial element for the development of a social group. Making 
contact enables people to talk about themselves, to invent their own words, 
to analyse shared or similar experiences as well as sometimes design alterna-
tives, and in a next step, formulate demands. In the analyses of intersex people 
who actively demand enabling full consent to the respective treatments or the 
depathologization of the great variety of sex/gender-related bodies, one finds 
some theoretical principles of feminist researchers, activists of the women’s 
health movement, lesbian, gay, queer and trans researchers.
These groups did much to initiate social change on various levels, to in-
creasingly question medical authority and address the cultural foundations of 
its practice, and without them the recent intersex movement would not be as 
strong as it is (Karkazis 2008). In addition, intersex people have even shown 
great creativity in shaping their criticism: they have combined artistic pro-
ductions with the publication of essays and theoretical observations, they are 
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represented in all social spheres and active on all continents. Through their 
involvement and the dissemination of their perspectives they are gaining more 
and more strategic supporters such as parents, sympathizing clinicians, ethics 
experts, jurists, researchers, students and artists. In the last three years, around 
13 international treaty bodies, NGOs and States have spoken out in favour of 
the demands of intersex persons or put them into law. Among them the Swiss 
national ethics commission in the field of human medicine, the special rappor-
teur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, Juan E. Méndez (A/HRC/22.53; 2013), the Council of Europe through its 
1952 on Children’s right to physical integrity, the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC/C/CHE/CO/2-4), the Maltese act. XI forbidding non-consen-
sual, non life-saving medical interventions on intersex children, and the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/29/23), to name but a few.6 
Medical resistance
Exchange with the medical community on the other hand is less productive. 
Since the very beginning, the majority of doctors have considered  the de-
mands of intersex people as irrelevant. The two main arguments for this refus-
al are first, the alleged emotionality or lacking rationality and scientificity of the 
intersex activists’ discourse, and second, the disregard on the part of the sup-
posedly small minority of intersex activists of the interests of an overwhelm-
ing majority of people who, though being subjected to normalizing surgery 
and hormone therapy without their consent, are purportedly nevertheless very 
happy with the results. Accusations such as lack of rationality and scientificity 
of intersex activists claims, along with the way doctors describe these activists, 
are not very complimentary. Some call them zealots, like John Gearhart does 
in an interview in 1996 with N. Angier for the New York Times, as green-wel-
lied loonies7 (Toomey 2001: 39, quoted from Karkazis 2008), as tortured souls 
(Chiland 2008), or as egocentric (Tremblay, 2014). They are accused of relying 
only on their passions, having no hard data and not being able to present any 
scientific research findings to refute the assertion that they constituted an ex-
ception in the mass of persons happy with their fate. Likewise some of these 
doctors have made the following remarks (we quote here excerpts from inter-
views by Karkazis (2008) with various surgeons):
6 | The corresponding statements are available in French on the website of OII-Francophonie: URL: www.oiifran-
cophonie.org [15.08.2013]. See contribution by Vincent Guillot in this publication.
7 | Green-wellied refers to the green Wellington boots worn by persons regarded as hippies or ecos.
Janik Bastien Charlebois, Vincent Guillot
261
“ISNA is the disaffected few, but there’s all these happy women out there who’ve had babies. They’re 
the quiet majority.” (Dr. S.) (Karkazis 2008: 266). “These people are very angry. The patients who 
are happy don’t want to be spoken to; the parents don’t want it. They say ‘That’s in the past, we don’t 
want to discuss it. My kid is well adjusted. Everything is fine.’ (Dr. O.)” (Karkazis 2008: 266)
In 2004 Meyer-Bahlburg et al. published the findings of a research project 
which examined via questionnaires in how far patients were satisfied with 
the medical approach their treatment was based on. Although the questions 
were phrased in such a way as to elicit an approval of the medical perspectives 
(Holmes 2008), two members of the journal’s staff threw their support behind 
the article’s contents in a commentary reproduced in the same edition. One of 
them, Aaronson (2004: 1619), states:
“For much of the last decade those called upon to advise on the management of an infant born 
with ambiguous genitalia have been under assault from patient advocates who have vociferously 
maintained that feminizing genitoplasty is a mutilating procedure. […] Consequently, we are now 
in a state of virtual therapeutic paralysis, which does no service to the many parents who ask that 
something be done to normalize the appearance of their infant’s genitalia.”
The comments are surprising: Why does the medical community introduce 
such heated statements concerning the treatment of intersex people if it pur-
ports to develop its practices and treatment standards according to supposedly 
disinterested, objective and rationally conducted research? This of course is  a 
purely rhetorical question because this assessment of intersex activists has no 
influence anyway on the confirmation or refutation of the Hopkins paradigm. 
Unless the doctors’ aim here is to discredit them through the use of argumen-
tum ad hominem. By depicting the activists as aggressive and impulsive – or 
even as zealots, tortured souls etc., the doctors elegantly avoid their responsi-
bility to examine their own discourse, experiences and arguments and fail to 
deliver answers when the consequences of their actions come under critical 
review. Such a denial of alternative viewpoints – which at its worst is based 
in a non-representation of these standpoints, and at best on a sophistic over-
simplification in the sense of a straw man argument – invalidates de facto the 
doctors’ claim to objectivity, if such a thing as objectivity is at all possible. Here 
one could argue that we are dealing only with individual statements that do 
not reflect the official stance. But such statements are also found in scientific 
journals in which emotional outbursts are frowned upon. Aaronson (2004) for 
instance published his comment as editor of the official Journal of the Ameri-
can Urological Association.
Operations on the Frontline of Credibility
262
Ignoring the interests of a broad, satisfied silent majority?
The wrathful positions of intersex activists are contrasted with a silent mass 
of intersex people who see no fault in the Hopkins paradigm. The activists are 
accused of representing their own position and thus that of a minority, pro-
viding no hard data, and merely personal impressions and anecdotes. Indeed, 
only a small minority of persons whose sex is described as atypical by medicine 
makes its voice heard publicly – but this is the case in every social movement. 
Also, there is disagreement among intersex persons concerning the paradigms 
that should be used for understanding our lives. Among those who have ex-
perienced the phase of socialization with peers there seems to be a general 
difference between political activists and members of patient groups (Karkazis 
2008; Spurgas 2009; Still 2008). Even if the standpoints of these two groups 
differ concerning the rejection or approval of an intersex identity and patholo-
gization, they still agree on their criticism of medicalization without previous 
consent. In addition, some intersex activists are particularly careful not to dis-
advantage other intersex persons by their stances and to remain in contact with 
patient groups. We don’t expect from everyone affected by medicalization that 
they define themselves as an intersex person or as someone beyond the sexes 
– which does not exactly correspond to our understanding of intersex identi-
ty8  – contrary to all prejudices to this effect. Neither do we want to impose an 
identity beyond the sexes on intersex children, but merely ensure that they 
have the possibility to determine for themselves which identity they have. We 
do not demand that all intersex persons should refrain completely from phys-
ical modification, but rather that they should be able to determine themselves 
the modalities of such surgery or hormonotherapy. However, with regard to 
the politics of silence and the medical interventions performed without the 
consent of the children one could say the following:
If the intersex persons concerned were really of the opinion that this is 
a better approach which allowed them to enjoy better psychological develop-
ment, the logical consequence would be that they are less vulnerable or injured 
than we are, and it would also be easier for them than for us to mobilize. Their 
critical voices against the demands which they would regard as harmful for the 
majority of us would also be more numerous.
8 | The intersex identity mainly expresses the consciousness of having one’s body’s sex charactistics subjected 
to medical invalidation, regardless of one’s gender identity. It cuts across diagnoses, since the invalidation 
process and the protocols used on intersex people share many common denominators. To some extent, it is 
often political, since people who use it are critical of medical judgment passed on them, and affirm the beauty 
of physical diversity. Some intersex people, however, also have another gender identity as a man and woman 
and will use ‘intersex’ to designate this other identity as well. In an effort to disambiguate, some intersex people 
identified as non-woman, non-man use a ‘herm’ gender identity.
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In December 2012 the Second International Intersex Forum organized by the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Association (ILGA) brought to-
gether 37 representatives form 33 organizations of intersex persons or their 
allies. Even though their aims and perspectives diverge they formulated a joint 
declaration which denounced the pathologization of intersex persons.9 If the 
blissful, satisfied majority really existed it would have been visible in greater 
numbers.
Tamar-Mattis (2012), who regularly engages in awareness-raising for doc-
tors, psychiatrists and lawyers involved in the treatment of intersex persons, 
remarks:
“There’s a theory floating around the world of medicine that goes like this: while it is widely known 
that patients with disorders of sex development (DSD) [sic] are unhappy with the treatment they 
have received – cosmetic genital surgery, unwanted hormone treatment, and humiliating genital 
exams top the list – they can be safely ignored because there is actually a silent majority of patients 
out there who are doing just fine. This is a comforting idea. It justifies the mistakes of the past, and 
it allows current practice to continue without all the discomfort of change.”
“Those of us who work in DSD advocacy hear the theory of the satisfied silent majority all the time. 
But no one can find them. After almost two decades of patient advocacy and active debate, dec-
ades in which hundreds of affected people have spoken out against the treatment they received, 
not one person with a DSD has spoken out publicly to say that normalizing treatment is just great. 
Not one. ”
Thanks to a broad network in the internet intersex persons and persons iden-
tifying themselves as DSD patients were able to collect valuable knowledge 
about the experiences of others. Thus they could also establish the non-exist-
ence of this ‘silent majority’ and respond to the doctors clinging to this myth 
(Karkazis 2008: 266):
“Let them do their own studies interviewing all the happy intersex people out there, recruiting them 
through a special themed happy campaign to indicate that they are looking for satisfied people who 
want to fade into the woodwork, not carp and complain about monster doctors and their unhappy 
lives.”
What is surprising is the admission of doctors found in numerous scientific 
articles and joint declarations that there are no data on the results of the Hop-
9 | One can access the third statement, which includes the second, at this address. 
URL: http://oiieurope.org/public-statement-by-the-third-international-intersex-forum/ [08.09.2015].
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kins paradigm or on later performed surgery. This is the case with an article 
authored by medical professionals regarding themselves as intersex experts 
(2006: 496):
“In terms of psychosexual management, studies are needed to evaluate the effectiveness of infor-
mation management with regard to timing and content. (…) It is essential to evaluate the effects of 
early versus later surgery in a holistic manner, recognizing the difficulties posed by an ever-evolving 
clinical practice. The consensus has clearly identified a major shortfall in information about long 
term outcome.”
There is no evidence that non-operated adolescents who had no surgery are 
subject to more harassment than ones who have.10 There is no study that could 
attest to an improvement of the parent-child relationship as a result of surgical 
procedures, or an impairment if left intact. The advocacy of secrecy is equally 
unfounded. Tabooing, silence and half-truths can be identified as such. The 
parents cannot ignore the physical integrity of the child and its condition at 
birth. Despite the call for early medical interventions these have in many cases 
to be repeated in the course of childhood, so that they become ingrained in the 
child’s memory. It is in fact these surgical and hormonal procedures that cause 
the trauma, because they convey to the child that its genitals – while causing 
him_her no pain nor discomfort – generate such aversion in their parents that 
corrections have to be made, even before it can deal with it itself (ISNA doc-
ument, quoted from Holmes 2008: 56; Roen 2009). The child notices that it 
has something unspeakable that arouses its curiosity, which spurs it on a quest 
to gain the information on what has happened, but at the same time puts it at 
risk of experiencing a deep sense of betrayal by his_her parents and the doctors 
(Karkazis 2008; Intersex experiential knowledge).
The very ethics at the basis of the pathologizing approaches can be ques-
tioned. Holmes (2008), Kessler (1998), Roen (2009) and Streuli et al. (2013) 
argue that the parents consent to the surgery on their children primarily be-
cause intersex is portrayed by doctors as a medical disorder or illness – even 
when there is no danger for the health of the child. In this respect one can say 
that the parents are misled (Holmes 2008: 54; Kessler 1990).11 Not only do the 
doctors make it impossible for the parents to perceive their child as healthy, 
but in their explanations they also rely on the assumption that the child has 
10 | Here the testimonies by Hida Viloria und Nthabiseng Mokoena as unharmed intersex persons provide 
powerful examples for the possibility of self-development without surgery and hormone therapy.
11 | Also: “The question I am posing is whether or not this way of explaining intersexuality constitutes a failure 
to provide all the necessary information required to obtain consent that is truly informed” (p. 55).
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to be either a he or a she, without leaving room for a development as s/he or 
neither-nor. (Holmes 2011).
In order to establish an approach of voluntary consent doctors need to recti-
fy parents’ expectations and beliefs concerning sex/gender diversity. In addition 
one has to ask oneself how far children in particular are able to give a truly free 
and fully informed consent under a paradigm that depicts its sex/gender-relat-
ed constitutiveness as an error (of nature), disorder or syndrome. Some people 
might feel confused by this criticism of pathologization. But the assumption 
that intersex persons have an incomplete, over- or under-developed, deficient, 
dysfunctional or abnormal sex is based on a teleological perspective that has 
substituted God with nature – with the belief in an intention that is read from 
supposed aims, goals and functions (Bastien Charlebois 2011). In addition, this 
attitude prevents a thorough analysis of sex development. (Voß 2010).
In 1999 a group emerged from the American Urologist Association, com-
prised of medical specialists and ‘patients’ advocates’. Under the name NAFTI 
(North American Task Force on Intersexuality) it has set itself the goal to con-
duct studies on the long-term effects of surgery on the patients’ psychosexual 
condition in order to remedy the lack of information in this regard.12
However, only a few years later this group had to end its activities for the 
following main five reasons: obstacles in the procurement of funds, failure to 
find a definition of acceptable ethical parameters for such research activities, 
difficulties in reaching the patients, problems with the representativity of data 
and fears of being criticized by intersex people and being sued. Before solid 
and representative data can be collected the silence around the situation of 
many intersex patients would have to be broken. How should the well-being of 
people who don’t yet know that they have been subjected to surgery be meas-
ured without informing them about it? They cannot wholly consent to such a 
study since they have no detailed information about their past. It also seems 
to be impossible or too difficult to locate adult patients. Many have moved and 
no longer have any contact with clinical doctors. Furthermore, there is the dif-
ficulty of finding persons who have had bad experiences with surgery and no 
longer trust doctors. The very title of the research project could put off certain 
people, depending on whether the terms ‘intersex’ or ‘DSD’ are used. Final-
ly, numerous senior physicians have voiced reservations about opening med-
ical files of their patients, since they fear being held accountable by an entire 
group of people or being sued by them (Karkazis 2008). The politics of silence 
12 | Further goals were: Determining rules for the support of intersex children, considerations concerning the 
ethical dimensions of current treatment standards and development of new principles for medical practice.
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makes the medical practices irrefutable. It is not only bad faith but also naive 
to continue to adhere to the Hopkins paradigm and at the same time reject the 
experiences and analyses disseminated by intersex people, despite the fact that 
there is serious lack of evidence for the desirability of this paradigm and it is 
impossible to formally refute its position.
Furthermore Karkazis (2008) reports that the doctors interviewed by her 
resort themselves to anecdotal information. They either draw on their own 
clinical experience or that of their colleagues. And the latter are given more 
credibility than those persons who are directly affected by the medicalization. 
In this regard the case of John/Joan is particularly significant since it has con-
tributed – despite being a single case – strongly to questioning the hypothesis 
of the malleability of the social gender. The following quote illustrates how a 
doctor can legitimize not working in a scientifically correct manner and rely on 
his general impression of a patient (Karkazis 2008: 278):
“I don’t need studies. I have my own clinical practice where I can see long-term outcomes when peo-
ple come back and talk to me about their outcomes. A girl just came across my desk today I’d done 
a bowel vaginoplasty on. It was an intersex baby and she does very well – she’s a gender-reassigned 
individual, [and she] does beautifully.”
As Karkazis (2008) correctly underscores, according to which criteria does he 
assess that she does beautifully? According to his or hers? Does ‘she does beau-
tifully’ mean that there were no surgical complications? That she is happy? 
That she has a female identity? That she has a sex life? That she is satisfied 
with the results of the surgery? How then is ‘she does beautifully’ defined? 
Could it also be that doctors filter information because they fear that they have 
failed or caused harm to a person ? We would also add that given the doctors’ 
position of authority, many intersex persons would find it difficult to voice 
their discomfort, doubts or criticism regarding the surgeon’s actions. This, at 
the very least, has been the experience of the main author of this contribution.
Injured ego versus broken integrity – an outlook
A thorough analysis of medical positioning with regard to children with atyp-
ical sex characteristics must comprise an examination of the assumption it is 
frequently based on, i.e. that it is possible to act in a person’s best interest with-
out their consent. In effect, this best interest implies that these other persons, 
who are capable of making their own decisions, are not listened to and not 
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acknowledged. Who can say whether an operation or a surgery was successful 
or not, if not the person concerned? For the medical authorities success can lie 
in the fulfilment of an esthetical norm. For intersex persons success does not 
necessarily mean that they are assigned to one gender in which they feel happy 
but rather that they retain their physical self-determination as well as their 
sexual and orgasmic responsiveness and know themselves to be desired and 
desirable. Some doctors and parents may have seen medicalization without 
the child’s consent as the best way and may have been surprised to perceive 
the regret and the strong disapproval from intersex persons. For them it is 
undoubtedly easier to think that these negative results merely reflect bad treat-
ment practices of their colleagues and not a fundamentally flawed approach. 
The notion that good intentions lead to good results or protect from criticism 
and from questioning one’s own actions is very common in our society. Good 
intentions were indeed attributed to many actions with negative consequences. 
It is our view that good intentions lead to good results when they emerge from 
a full recognition of the capability of others to define their own aspirations. But 
this implies listening to others, acknowledging them as credible and not acting 
against them. From us as professors, researchers or professionals listening 
in this way requires the ability to doubt, the willingness to criticize ourselves 
and a humble attitude. As knowledge producers we command an enormous 
position of power. Criticism can harm – but it is important not to lose sight of 
the context in which it was formulated. Who is in the position of power with-
in this dynamics? Which risks are doctors exposed to? Do these risks weigh 
more heavily than those intersex persons face, i.e. the violation of physical 
integrity, the degradation of their being, the emergence of serious feelings of 
shame, the loss of the ability to have an orgasm or the impairment of their 
sexual responsiveness, the loss of trust towards their parents, the isolation, the 
non-recognition of their injuries or the denial of their existence? The medical 
community will not be able for much longer to sustain the illusion that we do 
not inform ourselves as social actors and examine and analyse the medical 
discourses they build around us, that we do not develop our own ideas and 
critical analyses, and are not represented in the institutional spaces in which 
expert knowledge is created. And perhaps we will improve the situation, since 
the visibility of intersex persons will contribute to the dedramatizing of our 
existence and showing its beauty.
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This contribution begins with two initial hypotheses and then goes on to present 
a number of fundamental assumptions of the attachment theory. This is fol-
lowed by a digression each on normalization and on the rhetoric of difference. 
The contribution concludes with a discussion of the question what a child needs 
to be able to live its idiosyncrasies and differences in a positive way.
INTRODUCTION
There can be little doubt about the significance of the parent-child-relationship 
for the development of a human being. The topic has been the subject of exten-
sive research and the relevant studies have been consistent for decades (Gross-
mann 1988; Grossmann et. al. 1997; Grossmann/Grossmann 2009; Laucht 
2003). The findings of the attachment theory as it has developed since Bowlby 
(1955) and Ainsworth (1985) have in general met with little criticism that can 
hold its ground. While Bowlby was still very much fixated on the mother as the 
only possible attachment figure, we know today that the function of attachment 
is neither linked to sex/gender nor to biological parenthood (Grossmann/Gross-
mann 2009). Furthermore, the crucial significance of the parent-child attach-
ment for the development of a human being is undeniable (Grossmann/Gross-
mann 2009; Strauss 2008). Here, this article might as well end with reference 
to the relevant studies.
The Parent-Child Attachment and  
its Influence on Children Developing beyond  
the Binary Sex/Gender Norm 1
1 | Original version in German.
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However, what do the scientifically based findings of attachment research signify 
for the development of so-called LGT2 children and adolescents, i.e. for homo-
sexual adolescents/children or those whose self-positioning regarding their sex/
gender does not agree with the sex/gender assigned to them at birth?3 The recur-
ring question will always be: which insights does the attachment theory provide? 
Moreover, extrapolated from this: What does this mean for children who develop 
differently, beyond the dualistic sex/gender norm and mandatory heterosexuali-
ty? These are justified hypotheses that have yet to be tested scientifically.
Initial hypotheses
The first initial hypothesis concerns the side of the parents. A secure parent-child 
attachment is an excellent basis for parents wishing to support their child on its 
own individual path.
As a rule parents have their child’s best interests at heart. What these are is 
something they as well as important others (grandparents, teachers, neighbors, 
coworkers etc.) think they already know before the child has been born. It is only 
when they are actually together with their child do they become aware of what it 
really means to have such a fragile and tiny human being entrusted to their care, 
and provided the parents are sensitive enough they will also soon discover what is 
best for their child. There was a time when parents, grandparents, teachers, neigh-
bors, coworkers and doctors believed that it is best not to breast-feed the child.4 In 
my practice as a psychologist I always encounter mothers who even today confess 
with a guilty conscience: “But it was important for me to breast-feed my child, and 
I did.” These mothers have persevered, have stood up for their child against the 
zeitgeist prevalent at the time. From where did they take their strength? Mothers 
often respond to this question of mine with “The love for my child gave me the 
strength.” Experts also describe this love as a sensitivity for the child’s signals and 
the resulting attachment. Parents need a similar strength when they want to stand 
up for their homosexual child or when it does not correspond to the usual sex/
gender norms. The zeitgeist, society, grandparents, teachers, neighbors and cow-
orkers have their own ideas. The widely held view is that what is supposedly best 
for the child is adjustment, being like everybody else.5  The parents also here need 
the sensitivity to comprehend the signals coming from their child and the attach-
ment gives them the strength to remain on their child’s side or always return to it.
2 | Lesbian, Gay, Trans.
3 | The bisexual adolescents included in the concept of LGBT are not considered here.
4 | Personal reports by mothers in therapy. The WHO recommends breast-feeding children until the age of 
two. But that too rarely happens in Luxembourg and requires a great deal of self-confidence from the mothers.
5 | During supervisions in Luxembourg I frequently heard that it is the task of the educator to teach the child to 
function and conform. These statements come from educators who have been in the profession for some time as 
well as from educators who have graduated one or two years ago.
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So far the first hypothesis: A secure parent-child attachment is an excellent basis 
for parents wishing to support their child on its own individual path. The second 
initial hypothesis concerns the side of the child. Secure attachment is for the 
children the best basis for developing their own potentials and the best protec-
tion against destructive effects of pressure to conform and possible hostilities, 
exclusions and discriminations.
If you want to build a stable house, you need a good foundation. For the 
human being this foundation is a secure attachment. If that is guaranteed the 
child can turn to more exciting things, namely life, can discover and develop its 
potentials. In addition, here the child needs support and assistance. However, 
for the child to be able to discover and develop its potentials in the first place 
secure attachment is essential. Otherwise, the child is too busy trying to figure 
out whether the relationship to its parents is stable, whether it is really loved or 
whether it has to protect itself from injury. Secure attachment forms a security 
net what cushions the small and large imponderabilities of life. Whether it is 
the pet that dies or the parents that separate, or other small and large dramas 
in the child’s life – a secure attachment offers protection. This protection then 
presumably also helps when dealing with pressure to conform, with hostilities 
and exclusions.
At this point, I would like to emphasize that I assume that secure attach-
ment plays a crucial role for the child’s healthy mental development. If this at-
tachment is unstable, however, there is the chance that the necessary support of 
the child is less fruitful and helpful than it could and should be in the case of a 
secure attachment.
Definitions and scientific basis
First, I will give a brief overview of that what is regarded as secure attachment 
and which effects it has on the later life. Secure attachment: All research on 
attachment is based on John Bowlby (1955) and was further developed by Mary 
Ainthworth (1985). In the German speaking countries, key figures of this re-
search are Klaus and Karin Grossmann (2009) and Karl Heinz Brisch (2009). 
Attachment is the emotional tie that develops between an adult, usually a par-
ent, and an infant or toddler. The quality of this attachment can differ greatly. 
The secure attachment is the quality that carries best, in the true sense of the 
word carries a person through her or his life. If a secure attachment is created 
in early childhood, the child will, later in life, achieve a higher degree of social 
competence, show fewer anomalies, develop a better cognitive ability and can 
fully realize its potentials.
The Parent-Child Attachment and its Influence on Children
276
We can therefore say that a secure attachment is the best protection against the 
imponderabilities of a child’s life and in addition has a protective effect in adult-
hood. It is the security to be able, if necessary, to fall back on help and support. 
The toddler, which on the playground crawls away from its mother, pauses, turns 
to look back and continues on its way after a reassuring nod from its mother. Or 
the infant that climbs on its mother’s lap after it has fallen and hurt itself. Here 
one should not equate attachment with love nor with having a relationship with 
the child. Love is surely part of it, and having a relationship is a precondition for 
attachment, but attachment is marked by continuity, intensity, depth and inti-
macy of the relationship. If parents – as I have witnessed – leave their 3 months 
old baby with the grandparents to go on a holiday then something is wrong. I 
also ask myself how a relationship of attachment can develop if the child, from 
two months onwards, spends 8-12 hours a day in the crèche, as is often the case 
in Luxembourg. In such situations, there is a greater risk of an attachment dis-
order.6
What prevents the development of a secure attachment?
The lack of secure attachment means, among other things, insufficient support 
for the child when it develops beyond the so-called norm. In the following we 
will name a number of phantoms that often frequent the nursery and prevent a 
secure attachment from developing. The term ‘phantom’ is used here because 
we are dealing with invisible phenomena whose effect has to be regarded as 
dangerous. We can distinguish between phantoms I and II.
Phantoms I refer to those that have emerged from the mother’s early childhood 
and can stand in the way of a secure attachment. These phantoms I in the nurs-
ery include the mothers’ own bad experiences or of the person that spends most 
time with the child and is the principal caregiver. If this person herself has not 
experienced sufficient sensitive care as an infant and perhaps suffered from ne-
glect, there is a great risk that she will not be able to meet the needs of the child 
in a sufficiently sensitive way. In addition, these can be the mothers’ traumatic 
experiences of neglect in early childhood that lead to new enactments in the 
nursery.
Phantoms II refer to those that cannot be so simply traced back to the moth-
ers’ individual and specific experiences. These are rather general, mostly adopt-
ed guidelines of behavior and being that are projected onto the children. Not 
being able to be as I am. Subordination, the obligation to perform, fear of exclu-
sion and accompanying pressure to conform, ideologies and religions as well as 
social pressure play a significant role here.
6 | Bertelsmann-Stiftung (2007); Brisch, K. H., Hellbrügge, T. (2003); Stroppel, S., Weyer, K. (2007). 
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The more of these phantoms haunt the nursery the more they will know how to 
prevent the development of a secure attachment. Social pressure is one side; the 
other should be the true appreciation of differences, which is sadly often not the 
case. Diversity is invoked in an attempt to be politically correct, but more often 
than not this is pure rhetoric.
Rhetoric of difference
There is increasing more talk of diversity management, and also gender main-
streaming and gender pedagogy7 are increasingly addressed. But with initiatives 
such as these one has to ask how much diversity is really desired. How much dif-
ference do we want to bear, live, encourage? We all remember the advertisements 
of years ago which featured a row of men sitting in always the same uniform, 
called suit, and one dared to wear colored socks. This was an advertisement for 
diversity. In addition, this exactly is my impression of the diversity, which is just 
tolerated by large sectors of society. Conforming diversity as difference, which 
can perhaps show in the color of skin or in sexual orientation. However, with the 
uniform way of dressing – at least for men – there is no question of acceptancy, 
let alone tolerance or even habitus, when dealing with the so-called feminized 
behavior of men.
The following example from gender pedagogy is closer to the issues ad-
dressed: a few years ago, the Luxembourg ministry for women’s affairs organ-
ized a lecture on gender-inclusive pedagogy. Employed in the ministry at the 
time, I suggested the title “Anna builds a tower and Paul paints his fingernails”. 
This was rejected and ultimately the lecture was called “Anna builds towers and 
Paul knits a shawl”. The homophobia and transphobia behind the decision is ob-
vious. A boy may knit, but painting fingernails – that is taking gender pedagogy 
a bit too far.
I often feel the same with the much-invoked multicultural society. Here we 
get a child care institution championing multiculturalism and at the same time 
not allowing the children to speak their mother tongue. If they speak it never-
theless they are punished. What kind of appreciation for other cultures does this 
convey? Another pedagogical institution has codified in its concept that it is also 
open for people with a handicap. My question as supervisor how a wheelchair 
user would be able to enter the premises sparked a debate which revealed that 
it was possible without too much trouble to create such an access. However, co- 
workers were not prepared to give up their parking space that would have had to 
be sacrificed for it. On the one hand codifying in writing the openness towards 
handicapped persons, but on the other hand not implementing it in everyday 
7 | Ministère de l´égalité des chances (2012).
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life is astonishing, to say the least. My questions stimulated further discussion 
and finally the passage about accessibility was removed from the concept for the 
sake of honesty. Diversity requires much more than rhetoric, it is a process that 
can be exciting if one is prepared to go along with it. But it is also a process that 
questions self-evidences, habits and securities and always shows us the bounda-
ries of our own tolerance. Embracing it is sometimes exhausting and requires a 
certain amount of alertness in order to recognize, reflect and change one’s own 
exclusive and norming behavior.
In a final example, I will show how little difference we actually allow. Chil-
dren who play, jump, romp, who are not capable or willing to conform at the age 
of  three, four and five to an everyday life that consists predominantly of sitting 
down, are medicalized. The diagnosis is ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder) and methylphenidate the drug of choice. The child is expected to func-
tion at school and in the care facilities, sit, preferably still, and play, preferably 
at the table, at best in the play corner. After all, we do want to encourage the 
abilities and potentials of the children, provided they don’t disrupt the strictly 
organized run of affairs. More difference is medicalized away, then everyone 
proceeds in lockstep to washing their hands. Oh, hold on, with the little ones we 
call this, more pedagogically correct, making a train for washing our hands. The 
essence from my observations could be: when it says ‘difference’ on the package 
or in a concept then it should also be realized.
I would like to end this digression by emphasizing the joys and the gain in 
insight that embracing diversity yields. Today, I am always happy when I become 
aware of an old prejudice, when I stumble across my own boundaries and can 
shift these another bit further in the direction of more understanding, of seeing 
more, including more. Because I can only change those self-evidences, generali-
zations and prejudices that I know about, that I notice.
WHAT DOES A CHILD NEED TO BE ABLE TO LIVE A FULFILLED LIFE  
IN DIFFERENCE?
Knowledge of the child
The diversity of possibilities of life can be made clear to a child starting from 
birth. A very religious friend asked me once: “Don’t you first have to explain the 
biology, I mean, the normal?” Such a question presupposes deviation, abnor-
mality etc. I also used to say that – in the old days. But when our son asked me 
at the age of three whether he will become a woman later, my first reaction was 
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very close to that of my friend and I replied: “You’re a boy and will later become 
a man”. Since at that time I was already working on this lecture, I was not quite 
happy with my reply. Shouldn’t I have said that we’ll see about that later or even: 
“You can decide for yourself later”. That too would not have been very satisfying. 
To formulate all the complexity of the correct reply spontaneously in a way that 
is appropriate for children and pack it into the attention span of two to three 
short sentences was simply not possible. In addition, maybe it is not possible. 
However, what then? My temporary solution: in case he should ask again I will 
not reply but ask: “What do you think a woman is or a man?” or “Why do you ask 
whether you will become a woman?”
Openness of the parents and a climate of true appreciation of differences
It may sound good, right and simple, but it isn’t. We have all grown up in a 
society in which there are and have been prejudices. We can consciously decide 
to put these ideas aside. For many studies still show (Stapel/Koomen 1998) that 
prejudices (also those we consciously reject – and some others we are simply 
not aware of) have their effect. This is shown for instance by the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test on all kinds of prejudices. The test can be found on the internet;8 
it deals with areas such as sex/gender, sexual orientation, religions, color of skin, 
disability. The test maps implicit associations with selected terms. As a rule, 
the reactions of people are significantly faster if the suggested associations cor-
respond to the common clichés as, for instance, man and success. Even if we 
have explicitly worked on prejudices this does not mean that we are completely 
free of them. The only thing that helps here in my view is to perceive emerging 
prejudices and use them as an opportunity to get to know each other better. An 
“I’m tolerant and have no prejudices” is, as a rule, an extreme overestimation of 
oneself and a self-delusion that serves no one.
Supporting the child’s own path
Recognizing, appreciating and offering possibilities for further development 
does not refer to the ballet class for two-year-olds or the music activities for tod-
dlers. Supporting the child’s path requires also courage from the part of the 
parents. In many situations, the parents have to decide whether they want to 
support the child or attempt to avoid a possibly emerging complication. I myself 
have experienced a vivid example in my personal environment. On the kinder-
garten toy day when children can bring toys from home, our son filled his doll’s 
pram enthusiastically with diapers, nursing bottle and a change of clothes. We 
were, for a brief moment, confused and asked ourselves whether we should not 
8 | Implicit Association Test (IAT). URL: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/ [14.07.2013].
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try to divert and persuade our son to take along another toy. Our questions and 
thoughts went something along the lines of: “He’s so proud and enthusiastic 
about preparing his pram, let’s just hope it won’t be spoilt for him.” “Will he be 
made fun of?” “O dear, the son of a lesbian couple bringing along a pink pram ... 
with all the prejudices you can think of ...” In the end we let him take the pram 
and we braced ourselves for giving our son, possibly hurt and offended on his re-
turn from the kindergarten a morale-boosting pep talk. However, things turned 
out differently. The teacher reported that the pram was very popular, particularly 
with the boys. She said, maybe it was good that it was a boy who brought the 
pram, in this way the other boys could safely take an interest in the pram.
All parents want to support their child, but meeting the critical glances of 
mothers- and fathers-in-law and the neighbors and whoever is not always that 
easy. Parents do not have to have prior knowledge, openness or appreciation, 
but a secure parent-child attachment is the best basis for parents to be willing 
to adopt and develop them. A further example from my own biography may 
illustrate this development process on the part of the parents. As a little girl I 
resented putting on dresses. Every attempt by my mother ended in a struggle 
with tears and a foul mood on all sides. When I was around three the fights had 
stopped. My mother wanted above all her child to be happy and, for the most 
part, dropped the issue with the dresses. At the First Holy Communion there 
was a compromise between conformity and independence. I was to put on the 
dress for church and would be allowed to change immediately afterwards into a 
fancy pair of trousers. Seen from today, this is not an ideal support of the child. 
However, around 40 years ago this good compromise attempted to respect the 
wishes of the child. “I know you don’t like the dress, and that’s okay”, this was 
one message, and the other was: “Important for me is that I don’t want to have 
any stress with the teachers, grandma and the vicar, it’s supposed to be a nice 
day for everyone.” A few things have been mentioned now that parents can do 
to support their child.
A secure parent-child attachment thus generates the strength that parents 
need to stand up for their child and assert their influence on those institutions 
the child is exposed to, so that it can find a framework there that supports it in 
its being and development. The phantoms that have developed owing to own 
bad experiences of the parents at an early age are best hunted down and de-
fanged during a psychotherapy. Ideally, psychotherapy should take place before 
these persons become parents. The phantoms that emanate from beliefs and 
social circumstances can be influenced and eliminated through self-reflection, 
self-experience, exchange with others, openness and curiosity. Standing up for 
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a child, supporting it, engaging in the necessary struggles with the child and, 
depending on the situation, for the child, requires considerable strength from 
the parents. These struggles include discussions with the teacher in the kinder-
garten, the teachers at school and possibly also with the doctors and others, for 
instance about whether one shouldn’t purchase also other picture books in the 
kindergarten, such as “And Tango Makes Three”, or discussing with the teach-
er that the son has chosen pink plush slippers and one expects her or him to 
support this choice, in case other children should make fun of it. The teachers 
should be made aware to statements and epithets such as ‘Yuck, he’s gay’, ‘fag/
dyke’ or ‘tranny’ and asked to not tolerate them and call in, if necessary, higher 
authorities in order to protect children exposed to such slurs. Another possibility 
consists in advocating more tolerance and acceptance among parents, at one’s 
workplace and in society in general.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this contribution was to emphasize that the two initial hypotheses are 
well founded. I will repeat them here again:
A secure parent-child attachment is an excellent basis for parents wishing 
to support their child on its own individual path. Secure attachment is for the 
children the best basis for developing their own potentials and the best protec-
tion against destructive effects of pressure to conform and possible hostilities, 
exclusions and discriminations.
Research is needed in order to support these hypotheses scientifically. In 
giving, a more specific form to the significance of discourses and their applica-
tion to individual educational and pedagogical situations can serve to enhance 
them with more diversity and tolerance. Therefore, if the theories are applied in 
a way that is relevant to practice and an impulse is relayed back to the formation 
of theory via this application, then there is a chance of social change to the ben-
efit of all human beings.
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Transmitting Gender Competence  




This articles deals with the most recent developments in teacher training for 
secondary school in the subject biology at the teacher training college in Ge-
neva. The focus is on the question how the gender aspect can be appropriately 
addressed as a transversal study content and how pupils as well as teachers react 
to this study program.
GENDER ASPECTS IN EDUCATION IN GENEVA
Since 1981 the Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Education Directors (EDK) of 
the Swiss Cantons recommends a joint education for girls and boys. This aim 
is supported by the federal law of 24 March 1995 on the equality of women and 
men which includes a demand for targeted policy measures for the equal treat-
ment of girls and boys in education.
In 2005, integration of gender aspects in education became a clear political 
goal in the Canton of Geneva, after the governing council and the Director of 
Education had declared it a priority.2 The Geneva university teachers took the 
municipal authorities at their word and demanded, together with feminist asso-
ciations and the Swiss equal opportunities office, that obligatory gender-relevant 
courses be introduced in the training of all teachers when the new secondary 
school teacher training was incorporated in tertiary education in 2007. In this 
way the subject of gender was integrated in the training of primary and second-
1 | Original version in French.
2 | République et canton de Genève: Instruction publique, culture et sport. 13 priorités pour l'instruction pub-
lique URL: http://www.ge.ch/dip/priorite12.asp [15.12.2013].
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ary school teachers. In particular in the training of secondary school teachers 
there was to be no gender-relevant course outside of the general curriculum, so 
as not to create the impression that the subject of gender is an isolated element 
within education. Gender has to be recognized by the students as a key compe-
tence of their professional practice which they need to be able to mobilize at any 
time during their teaching activity and not merely as another curriculum subject 
(such as specific courses on sustainability, religion, citizenship etc.).
The students at the Institut universitaire de formation des enseignants de 
Genève (Geneva University Institute for Teacher Training) are confronted with 
the subject of gender in the first year of study in general subjects that address 
various aspects of the teacher’s profession. In the second year of study the sub-
ject returns in the didactics seminar which aims at enabling the student teachers 
to analyse their subject area from a gender perspective.
The present text offers an overview of our approach to encourage future 
teachers in the biology didactics seminar to develop gender competences. Here 
we will notice that despite their master degree in biology, students are only rarely 
informed about the history of the biology of sex and are unaware that the rep-
resentation of a binary sex is a historical construction. The deconstruction of this 
representation with illustrations from the 16th and 17th centuries serves as an 
introduction to the topic and enables a critical analysis of the illustrations used 
in biology textbooks. This helps to make clear which implicit statements these 
illustrations convey.
Insufficient gender competence of teachers
Even though equal treatment of girls and boys in the schools of francophone 
Switzerland is a relatively young topic, it is, in the view of the future teachers of 
the Institut universitaire de formation des enseignants de Genève, today already 
fully ensured. Baurens and Schreiber (2010) also share this assessment. In the 
courses, students frequently experience the topic of gender as a rather abstract 
issue, since the majority of them is convinced that they conduct themselves ab-
solutely identically, entirely independent of the pupils’ gender (Mosconi 1994). 
The study by Collet & Grin (2011) makes clear that even though the students re-
alize that there are still cases of unequal treatment of women and men in society 
they do not regard school as being the cause of it. Instead, they hold a number of 
immaterial, supposedly overpowerful entities responsible, such as the state, the 
world of employment, society in general, mentalities, traditions etc. The study 
also shows that students tend to accept the contents of the available textbooks or 
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other teaching material unquestioned and believe the issue of sexism is already 
solved here. We know, however, that the problem is anything but solved, despite 
some progress already achieved in this area (Détrez 2006; Sinigaglia-Amadio 
2010; Tisserant/Wagner 2008). We can establish that the future biology teachers 
are very uncritical towards their own discipline, whose history they barely know 
and who don’t have the necessary tools to question it from a gender perspective.
A French debate as a didactic example
This development is situated in the context of a controversial debate which was 
triggered by the introduction of gender aspects in biology class.
In the gazette of 30 September 2010 the Ministry of Education supplemented 
the curriculum with a chapter titled Becoming Man or Woman, which deals with 
“distinguishing between socially conditioned sexual identities, sex/gender roles 
and stereotypes on the one hand and private sexual orientation on the other, tak-
ing biological circumstances and societal representations into account.”3
The massive protest from the ranks of the Catholic right that followed on 
this event led to a letter to the minister of education in which 80 UMP delegates 
demanded the deletion of the theory of sexual gender, which is defined as fol-
lows:
“According to this theory, human beings are no longer defined as men or women, but as practicing 
certain forms of sexuality: homosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals. These textbooks therefore impose 
an unscientific philosophical and sociological theory according to which sexual identity is a cultural 
construction that depends on the environment people live in.”4
These protests raise the interesting question of who has the right to define sci-
entific criteria. This aspect is also at the heart of the petition ‘Teaching gender 
– against an archaic censorship’ (in French: ‘Enseigner le genre: contre une cen-
sure archaïque’) in which a number of French scholars point out that
“in no way can it be the task of politics to judge the scientificity of research subjects, methods or the-
ories. Only the scientific community can assess the work of its members […] Analysing ‘prejudices’ 
and ‘stereotypes’ in order to question them is the core of every scientific activity. This is all the more 
necessary when we are dealing with difference between the sexes which even today are represented 
as natural to justify unequal treatment […].”5
3 | Gazette of the French Ministry of Education No. 9 of 30 September 2010.
4 | Letter of 30 August 2011 by 80 UMP delegates of the National Assembly to the Minister of National Educa-
tion, Luc Chatel.
5 | Institut Emilie du Chatelet (2011): Enseigner le genre. 
URL: http://www.institutemilieduchatelet.org/Enseigner_le_genre.html [15.07.2011].
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This debate lends itself to illustrating the study objective in the competence area 
1 of the future Geneva teachers, i.e. “situating themselves as experts in their 
teaching subject, adopting a critical stance towards it, as well as being familiar 
with its history, methods and teaching materials”. In addition, the debate serves 
us as an introduction to the topic, as the following example of a lesson will show.
Method
In order to sensitize students to the in-
fluence of gender-specific elements on 
teaching material we developed a two-
hour study module together with uni-
versity professors for didactics in the 
subject of biology.6 This module is part 
of a series of didactics lessons on ana-
tomical illustrations and their possible 
forms of interpretation. In the course 
of this series the university professors 
remind the students of the fact that pu-
pils can spend their time at the micro-
scope drawing air bubbles in all detail, 
even though they are supposed to ex-
amine a cell. But if these pupils do not 
know what a cell looks like they could 
in effect take air bubbles for the actual
object of examination. The teacher, in turn, may not even notice the air bubble 
since she/he immediately recognizes it for what it is and systematically discards it.
Together with the future teachers, we will here draw a parallel to the rep-
resentations of the genital tract to show them how prefabricated stereotyped 
theories about sex can lead to distorted anatomical illustrations. First we show 
the students an anatomical table from the work of Thomas Laqueur (1992) 
which shows the female genital tract. In this illustration André Dulaurens 
identifies a seminal duct (PP), which partly blends into female testes (OO), as 
well as ejaculation vessels (QQ) that disembogue into the uterus (M). Laqueur 
(1992) declares that Dulaurens represented the female genital tract in this way 
because he was convinced – like other anatomists of his time such as Vésale 
– that the female genital tract was the inner version of the male genital tract, 
6 | My thanks go to Rémy Kopp and François Lombard, research assistants at the Institut universitaire de forma-
tion des enseignants de Genève (IUFE), for their support in the introduction of this module.
Figure 1: Female genital tract, André Du-
laurens, De dissectione, Paris, 1600.
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7 | Platon (360 BCE.): Timaios 91 c), in: Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9 translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1925. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0180%3Atext%3DTim.%3Apage%3D91.
somewhat like a glove turned inside out. It is therefore very much the con-
victions of the time that have led to androcentric anatomical illustrations and 
technical terms, even though dissection could already prove that these did not 
match with reality. We can therefore say that the scientific community of the 
17th century did not assume a specific anatomy of women that distinguished 
itself from that of men, owing to the gender theory of the time that implied 
a continuum between male and female. From the perspective of the binary of 
sex these are blatant distortions in the representation of reality. On the other 
hand, the notion of a continuum between the sexes offers the advantage to 
also include intersexuality, which has no place in the strictly binary sex theory.
Where is the womb?
We begin by analysing medical-historical texts about the assumption, widely 
held from the ancient Egyptians until the 19th century, of a wandering or at 
least mobile female genital tract. Hippocrates explained mental disorders in 
women with a lack of sexual activity, as a result of which the womb dries up 
and has to wander around searching for humidity. It thus supposedly wanders 
through the body and causes contusions of the hypochondrium (leading to res-
piratory distress and seizures), of the heart (causing restlessness and anxiety), 
of the liver (responsible for hysteric cramps) and the head (causing spasms). 
In the same period Plato describes the uterus as an
“indwelling creature desirous of child-bearing, – remains without fruit long beyond the due season, 
it is vexed and takes it ill; and by straying all ways through the body and blocking up the passages 
of the breath and preventing respiration it casts the body into the uttermost distress, and causes, 
moreover, all kinds of maladies.”7
These disorders are called hysteria, from the Greek hystera (uterus). It is obvi-
ous that the social interest of such theses lies in the control of the female body. 
The doctors were able to persuade her in her own best interest to have frequent 
sexual intercourse and numerous pregnancies.
These assumptions outlasted centuries, for even Charcot, although hardly 
believing the thesis of the wandering womb any more, prescribed his female 
patients compression bandages for their ovaries to protect them from major 
hysterical attacks.
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The notions that the womb determines the women’s moods or that a non-preg-
nant woman acts against nature are widely held even today. Regarding the 
womb or uterus, biologists and doctors know very precisely where it is located, 
but what about the pupils?
Indeed, knowledge about sex-related organs is far from self-evident, both 
for boys as well as for the girls, particularly because this knowledge is often 
strongly tabooed. In addition, a large part of the female reproductive apparatus 
is inside the body. Contrary to the penis, the external genitals (labia, vulva, and 
clitoris) are seldom mentioned, featured or depicted. Sometimes pupils don’t 
even know the corresponding terms. In addition, we have to state that many 
young parents have a lot to say about the willy of their little boy (its size, its 
mobility...) while they have nothing to say about the minnie (or other possible 
names) of their little daughter. When parents later talk to their little girls about 
their sex, then this is often combined with the instruction to have a wash down 
there, implying they are somehow dirty (Détrez 2006).
In biology lessons the pupils can learn to better understand their bodies – 
provided they are given adequate illustrations that are not stuck in the binary 
pattern and contain as few implicit attributions as possible.
Let us now take a look at the following illustrations which were taken from 
a secondary school I science workbook (8th grade, age 13-14 years):
These two illustrations of the female and the male genital tract are often used 
by teachers; it is the sort of illustrative material that they like to hand out to 
their pupils for labeling. It is however evident that the illustration of the male 
genital tract not only has a better image quality (more detailed, more grada-
tions of grey), but that it also includes a part of the body. Here the pupils can 
identify the penis, the testicles and the muscles of the buttocks. The illustra-
Figure 2: Female genital tract, from the 
written notes of a pupil.
Figure 3: Male genital tract, from the writ-
ten notes of a pupil.
Isabelle Collet
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tion of the female reproductive apparatus, by contrast, is a simple sketch with-
out any reference to proportions, or an indication in which part of the body the 
organs are located. The fact that the female genital tract lies inside the body 
does not justify not depicting the body – it would only facilitate to identify the 
exact location.
Puberty
The treatment of the subject of puberty in secondary school biology class is 
somewhat sensitive, since the pupils themselves enter puberty around this 
time. Here then, not only general facts about the human body are conveyed, 
as it is done in the units about the muscles or digestion, but also the chang-
es taking place in the pupils’ bodies are discussed. As already earlier in the 
case of the illustrations of the genital tract, we decided to approach the dis-
cipline via its history, to make clear how social roles and moral codes tend to 
be biologized, thereby portraying as unavoidable and situating social power 
relationships as something natural. Thus we can for example read in Antoine 
Marro’s treatise on ‘The puberty of men and of women’ from the year 1902: 
“Besides physical flaws we could observe that premature unions produce more 
criminals, thieves and even violent perpetrators.” He concludes that marriage 
should be delayed as much as possible. Nevertheless, premature unions “are 
for the body and for morale significantly less dangerous than [male] onanism.”
Regarding young women, Bureaud-Riofrey writes in his work ‘Physical 
Education for Young Ladies or Hygiene for the Woman Before Marriage’ (in 
French: ‘Education Physique des Jeunes filles ou Hygiène de la Femme avant 
le Mariage’) published in 1835 that during puberty
“there is something like the movement of nerve fluids that run through the system with desire to 
entrench themselves; such physical phenomena explain perfectly the fluctuations in the nature of 
young girls, their constant but still fleeting afflictions that constantly shift inside the body like fluids 
in a container carried around.”
This is followed by a list of the various afflictions of young girls which some-
times even drive them to suicide. The list takes up a whole page.
In this description we again encounter the image of wandering inside the 
women’s body – this time not of the uterus, but of fluids – which reminds us 
of the Hippocratic theory of moods from the 6th century B.C.E which was 
still widespread well into the 18th century. This theory depicts women as cold 
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and humid, making them more vulnerable, susceptible to all sorts of disor-
ders, weaker. Owing to these constantly undulating fluids they supposedly had 
vapours and mood swings and were therefore fickle. Here, too, the question 
seems appropriate whether we continue to adhere to the concepts the Hippo-
cratic theory is based on although we have long ago discarded the theory as 
such.
Let us once more return to the written notes of the pupils taken during a 
learning unit on puberty. The teacher asks the class to list various changes that 
occur during this phase of life. He presents the following table to the class:
Looking at this table we encounter numerous errors and inaccuracies. First 
we can criticize the strict binary categorization which is set unmarked as a de-
fault. Thus for instance the fact that only men can have an Adam’s apple does 
not mean automatically that all men have an Adam’s apple. It is similar with 
the other listed elements (not every man has automatically stronger muscles 
than every woman). We also notice with concern the connection of the first 
menstruation with cellulitis (which by no means occurs systematically during 
puberty), since some young women at this age can feel urged by normative 
body schemata to extreme thinness, well aware that anorexia can also suppress 
menstruation.
The division of the table in two columns creates the impression that every-
one can place themselves either in one or the other category. According to sta-
tistics, in the Canton of Geneva alone there live around 300 intersex persons.
Features
Primary sex/gender features
First signs of puberty   





















widening of the pelvis
feminine
make-up, hairstyle
Table 1: The changes in puberty, from the written notes of an 8th grade pupil. 
Isabelle Collet
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What is also problematic is the logical connection between the first signs of pu-
berty (menstruation and ejaculation) and the significance the teacher accords 
to puberty: it is the phase of life in which human being acquire the ability to re-
produce. Such a depiction reduces sexuality to reproduction and puberty to the 
development of reproductive organs. We should remind ourselves that the term 
‘puberty’ originates from the Latin pubertas, which means covered with hair.
The further contents of the table are even more questionable: In the ru-
bric of behaviour-related secondary sex/gender features beard growth (which 
incidentally does not appear on the genetic map of all men) is put on the same 
level as the (purely cultural) making-up of women. The table thus implies that 
cultural behaviour is biologically conditioned and attributes to both sex-related 
categorizations the respective behaviour – virility is expected of real men, femi-
ninity of real women. Anyone that cannot be put into this binary categorization 
is therefore regarded as biologically abnormal.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of these topic areas aimed, on the one hand, to show future teach-
ers that the knowledge conveyed to them with regard to gender aspects is not 
neutral, and on the other, that the ideological influences in the representations 
are often hidden, because they correspond to our convictions about the one 
sex difference (in French: ‘La différence des sexes’) (Marro 2012) and sexuat-
ed stereotyping (in French: ‘stéréotypes sexués’) that permeates our society. 
In addition, the future teachers have to recognize that the pupils also absorb 
this knowledge through the filter of their respective youth and family culture, 
which is also strongly marked by sex/gender stereotypes. Thus the secret cur-
riculum (Forquin 1985) of the biology class contains unscientific elements 
which contradict those values promoted by the school, but nevertheless flow 
into the knowledge transfer. We therefore think it important to degender this 
field.
While the future teachers certainly expressed interest in the topic, it has 
shown that their knowledge barely goes beyond the discovery stage. Some 
groups needed our support to make the sexed/gendered representations of 
their teaching materials visible. It seemed obvious to us that for the majority 
of them it had never crossed their mind to take up a gender-sensitive, criti-
cal stance towards the teaching contents conveyed to them (see study targets 
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competence area 1). Many of the future teachers were amazed at their newly 
acquired insights. Some students also went beyond the mere sensitizing stage 
by mobilizing more general knowledge about gender aspects conveyed to them 
at an earlier point in time (for instance in the first year of study). One group 
established, in the framework of a thorough comparative analysis of different 
illustrations presented to pupils, that the manner of depicting the female and 
male bodies can lead to merely partial or erroneous representations of reality. 
These teachers now choose their teaching material with a fresh perspective 
and use, for instance, illustrations of the genital tract from various angles or 
three-dimensional depictions that better reflect reality.
It seems evident to us that for the majority of these teachers an acclima-
tization phase is necessary before they can apply their newly acquired knowl-
edge in class. Even though we were able to detect a certain general degree of 
sensitization, it is difficult to conduct an accurate survey of the actual learning 
effects on the teachers as well as of their ability to absorb the newly gained 
competencies (Boutin 2004). Nevertheless we can agree with Progin and 
Müller (2012) and say that we have laid the foundation for a sex/gender com-
petency which could make it possible to respect sex/gender-related diversity 
and give guidance to the pupils in an environment free of discrimination.
REFERENCES
Baurens, M., Schreiber, C. (2010): Comment troubler les jeunes enseignant-e-s 
sur la question du genre à l´école. In: Nouvelles Questions Féministes 2, 19, 
pp. 72-87.
Boutin, G. (2004): L’approche par compétences en éducation. Un amalgame para-
digmatique. In: Connexions 1, 81, S. 25-41. URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-
connexions-2004-1-page-25.htm [15.12.2013].
Collet, I., Grin, I. (2011): En formation initiale des enseignants. In: Les Cahiers 
pédagogiques 487, pp. 29-30.
Détrez, C. (2006): Il était une fois le corps ... La construction biologique du corps 




Forquin, J.-C. (1985): L’approche sociologique des contenus et programmes d’en-
seignement. In: Perspectives Documentaires en Sciences de l’Éducation 5, pp. 
31-70.
Laqueur, T. (1992): La fabrique du sexe. Essai sur le corps et le genre en Occident. 
Paris: Gallimard.
Marro, C. (2012): Dépendance-indépendance à l’égard du genre. In: Recherche 
et for mation 69. URL: http://rechercheformation.revues.org/1722. [08.01.2013].
Mosconi, N. (1994): Femmes et savoir, la société, l'école et la division sexuelle des 
savoirs. Paris: L'Harmattan.
Platon (360 BC): Timaios 91c-d. In: Schubert/Huttner (Eds.) (1999): Frauenme- 
dizin in der Antike. Griechisch – lateinisch – deutsch. Düsseldorf: Ar temis und 
Winkler.
Progin, L., Müller, A. (2012): Les dimensions transversales en formation des en-
seignants du secondaire. In: Analyse d’un dispositif. 24e colloque international 
de l'ADMEE-Europe, Luxembourg.
Sinigaglia-Amadio, S. (2010): Place et représentation des femmes dans les ma-
nuels scolaires en France. La persistance des stéréotypes sexistes. In: Nouvelles 
questions féministes 29, 2, pp. 46-59.
Tisserant, P., Wagner, A.-L. (2008): Place des stéréotypes et discriminations dans 
les manuels scolaires. Metz: Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations 
et pour l’égalité.
Transmitting Gender Competence in Biology Teacher Training 

Prisoners of Lexicon:  
Cultural Cisgenderism and Transgender Children1
Natacha Kennedy
“I am not trapped by my body. 
  I am trapped by your beliefs.”
SASS ROGANDO SASOT
SUMMARY 
This paper focuses on cultural cisgenderism and its effects on trans people and 
trans children in particular. Based on a sociological analysis of the key assump-
tions of the construct of cultural cisgenderism, the author examines how cultur-
al cisgenderism impacts the development of self-perceptions in trans people and 
trans children, and clearly reveals in detail the different effects of the system of 
cultural cisgenderism. Cultural cisgenderism is here primarily contrasted with 
transphobia, in the hope of contributing to a better understanding of the prob-
lems that trans people face with cultural cisgenderism.
INTRODUCTION
Whilst trans people, and in particular, trans children often suffer from trans-
phobia, that is, direct discrimination and prejudice,2 often it is not possible to 
(exclusively) put this down to an individual attitude of a particularly transphobic 
individual or group. In many cases the negative effect on trans people’s lives is 
systemic, ideological and cultural. Being clear about this, and giving it a name, 
‘cultural cisgenderism’ develops an understanding of this concept and may make 
1 | Original version in English. The author characterised the term ‘cultural cisgenderism’ in the early 2010s; to-
day she uses the terminology ‘cis-mythologization’ which seems to be more appropriate for sociological discourse.
2 | For instance, Mcdonough, K. (2013): Colorado school bans 6-year-old transgender child from girls’ bathroom. 






3 | Or, more in line with the terminology developed in this volume: variant sex/gender identity vs. unmarked 
sex/gender identity.
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it easier to identify and reduce its effects in a constructive way. This essay exa-
mines cultural cisgenderism and its effects on trans children and young people. 
Background
There is a growing body of evidence (eg: Kennedy 2008, Kennedy/Hellen 2010, 
Riley et al. 2012, Wyss 2004) to suggest that many trans people can trace their 
feeling of unhappiness or discomfort in their assigned genders back to early 
childhood. Additionally a significant proportion of trans people seem to have ex-
perienced an epiphany as transgender in their mid-teens despite the seemingly 
widespread belief that this represents an adult issue. However the numbers of 
apparent trans children (Kennedy 2008) still seem small compared to the esti-
mated number of trans adults.
There also appears to be a significant body of research, largely published 
by psychologists (Drescher/Byrne 2012, Green 1987, Money/Russo, 1979, Zuger 
1984, Zucker/Bradley 1995) which suggests that between 70% and 98% of trans 
or gender non-conforming children becoming apparent prior to puberty do not 
become transgender adults. Yet if this is the case, where do all the transgen-
der, transsexual and gender non-conforming adults come from? Kennedy and 
Hellen (2010: 2) estimated that between 90% and 95% of trans children are 
non-apparent. Non-apparent is defined as a trans child not known to any adult 
as transgender. So why do these children conceal or suppress their sex/gender 
non-conformity?
Cultural Cisgenderism
Research carried out by Ansara and Hegarty (2011: 5) suggests that there exists a 
culture within psychology they characterize as cisgenderism. Their definition of 
cisgenderism in the area of psychology is as follows:
“…a prejudicial ideology, rather than an individual attitude, that is systemic, multi-level and reflect-
ed in authoritative cultural discourses. […] Cisgenderism problematises the categorical distinction 
itself between classes of people as either transgender or cisgender (or as gender variant or un-
marked)3 […] We consider cisgenderism to be a form of othering that takes people categorised as 
‘transgender’ as the effect to be explained.”
It is important here to emphasize the distinction they make between cisgender-
ism and transphobia; cisgenderism is clearly conceptualized as an ideology as 
opposed to an individual attitude. In this way, if it were viewed in Saussurian 
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terms transphobia may be characterized as the parole to the langue of cisgen-
derism.4 In the case of the esoteric5 domain of psychology, cisgenderism also ap-
pears to be characterized as integral to discourses about trans people. However 
it would be difficult to suggest that cisgenderism in society in general (which I 
refer to here as cultural cisgenderism) is reflected in authoritative cultural dis-
courses as it is in psychology (or possibly indeed in associated esoteric domains 
such as neurology).
In order to understand the difference between cisgenderism in psychology 
and cultural cisgenderism and to come to a useful definition of cultural cisgen-
derism it is necessary to analyse the way cisgenderism works in psychology in 
comparison with the way it functions in society in general. I shall draw on Social 
Activity Method (Dowling 1997, 2009) in order to analyse this area through the 
sociological gaze. In this instance analysis will consist of consideration of levels 
of institutionalization and discursive saturation.
In this context institutionalization refers to the extent to which a practice 
is regular emergent on autopoietic action. A strongly institutionalized practice 
(I+) is characterized as being very regular and consistent whereas a weakly in-
stitutionalized practice (I-) is irregular and inconsistent. Discursive saturation 
refers to the way practices may be distinguished in the way they deploy strategies 
which establish discursively available principles (Dowling 2009). A highly dis-
cursively saturated practice (DS+) is characterized as dependent, to a relatively 
large extent, on language. A weakly discursively saturated practice (DS-) in con-
trast, tends to rely to a much lower extent on language.
4 | grammar.about.com (2013): In linguistics, language as an abstract system of signs (the underlying struc-
ture of a language). URL: http://grammar.about.com/od/il/g/langueterm.htm [15.12.2013]. Saussure, F. de 
(1916): Course in General Linguistics, translated by Wade Baskin, 1959. Bally/Sechehaye (ed.), New York: 
Philosophical Library. Interdependency of Langue and Parole ‘Saussure’s Cours’: this aspect was incorporated 
for a metaphorical representation in the use of concepts more familiar to sociologists and others. While the 
terms ‘langue/parole’ are no longer employed in linguistics they were recruited by sociologist and constitute a 
regularly used concept.
5 | In sociology, esoteric refers to a highly specialized field that can only be accessed with a high degree of 
expertise; Dowling, P. (1998): The Sociology of Mathematical Education. London: Routledge Falmer.
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The relational space in fig 1 shows how these concepts can be used to situate 
cisgenderism in psychology relative to cultural cisgenderism.
Level of Institutionalisation
As the relational space shows, cisgenderism in psychology and cultural cisgen-
derism are both strongly institutionalized practices. However whilst cisgender-
ism in psychology is characterized as relatively highly discursively saturated, 
cultural cisgenderism is relatively weakly discursively saturated. So, bearing in 
mind Ansara and Hegarty’s definition of cisgenderism in psychology, we can 
now draw on that to work towards a definition of cultural cisgenderism.
Cultural cisgenderism may be characterized as a detrimental and predominantly 
tacitly held and communicated prejudicial ideology, rather than an individual 
attitude. It represents a systemic erasure and problematizing of trans people and 
the distinction between trans and cisgender people. It essentializes sex/gender 
as biologically determined, fixed at birth, immutable, natural and externally im-
posed on the individual. Here cultural cisgenderism appears in many ways to 
be an example of Bourdieu’s (1977: 164) concept  of doxa: “[…] the established 
cosmological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e. as one possible 
order among others, but as a self-evident and natural order which goes without 
saying and therefore goes unquestioned.”
The two right fields of the diagram show transphobia as a weakly institution-
alized practice, since here it is not so much an ideology rather than a personal 
attitude. Transphobia appears to be largely due to cultural cisgenderism and is 
thus weakly discursively saturated. It primarily emerges from individual nega-
tive emotional reactions in situations that involve a trans person. This is referred 
to in the lower right field as reactive transphobia. Organized transphobia (upper 
right field), as a discursively relatively strongly saturated, but at the same time 
weakly institutionalized transphobia, may at first appear to be a contradiction 
regarding the terms used here, but it is, for instance, exercised by politically 
extreme right-wing Christian groups and Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminists 









Table 1: Cisgenderism; DS = discursive saturation; I = institutionalisation
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(TERFs). These groups, particularly the latter, are associations of transphobic 
individuals that rally around their common denominators of hate and phobia 
and that can generate a group identity or culture. But since the discourse of such 
groups is highly inconsistent and even contradictory, and because they represent 
extremist minority opinions and oppress and mistreat trans persons and abuse 
us (Stryker 2008: 110), it would be inappropriate to regard these as constituting 
forms of cisgenderism. The difference between the transphobia of TERFs and 
the DS+ ideology of cisgenderism is that the former is a deliberate practice closed 
to rational arguments. Cisgenderism, on the other hand, is a culture or an ide-
ology that seems to be substantially easier to combat with reasoned arguments. 
Cultural cisgenderism represents a tacit ideology, which, in this instance also 
appears to be manifest as an element of culture (Geertz 1973). It appears to be so 
well established in our Western European culture that it may be expressed and 
transmitted tacitly. As such it represents an unspoken discrimination against 
those whose gender expression or identity does not conform to the cultural ideal 
representing that to which they were assigned at birth.
Analysis of Cultural Cisgenderism
This section attempts to elaborate the above characterization of cultural cisgen-
derism in a little more detail.
A Systemic Erasure
Cultural cisgenderism, as a tacit ideology, causes the marginalization of trans 
and other gender non-conforming people because it does not acknowledge their 
existence in both cultural discourse and social structures. Linking Paechter’s 
analysis of the gender binary (2007) with Lave & Wenger’s model of commu-
nities of practice (CoP, Lave/Wenger 1991) illustrates how, in particular for chil-
dren, there may appear no means of conceptualizing any sexes/genders outside 
male and female or the possibility of moving between sexes/genders. These gen-
dered communities of practice also appear to encourage and reward the adop-
tion of strongly stereotyped gender performances that are reinforced by external 
cultural input ranging from immediate family to the media. Trans people here 
are erased by their cultural non-existence. Indeed many trans people, despite 
identifying feelings of not fitting in from a young age, relate how they feel unable 
to express this in language (Kennedy/Hellen 2010); for example by not having 
acquired any trans-related vocabulary such as ‘transgender or transsexual’. This 
probably represents one of the most significant ways that cisgenderism exerts 
itself as an ideology, and, as I intend to argue later, one of the most significant 
hurdles for trans children and young people to overcome.
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6 | For example Ria Cooper who was effectively forced to detransition because of social pressures rather than 
ceasing to identify as transsexual. See Macaskill, G. (2012): “I was a boy ... then a girl ... now I want to be a 
boy again”: Agony of teen who is Britain’s youngest sex-swap patient. URL: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-
news/britains-youngest-sex-swap-patient-wants-1403321 [29.11.2013].
Cultural cisgenderism makes trans people systematically invisible, and this 
is problematic precisely for identifying and counting trans persons in general 
and trans children and adolescents in particular. Most estimates for the percent-
age of trans persons in a particular population are around one percent, even 
though this figure will vary in different cultural environments. However, the 
problem of counting a part of a population that is in its majority invisible is that 
the results will, in all probability, merely confirm the predominant view, i.e. that 
there are in fact very few trans children. On the basis of these considerations, 
a small country such as Luxembourg will have a population of presumably at 
least 550 trans children, a figure only slightly smaller than the number of trans 
children currently receiving treatment at the Tavistock Institute in Britain. If the 
number of children treated at the institute is representative of the percentage of 
trans persons in the population, then there should in fact be only 70.000 trans 
persons living in Britain. 
Problematizing of trans people
The labeling of trans people as problematic appears to be a feature of cisgen-
derist ideology. Since trans people have been studied in depth, by researchers 
such as Hirschfeld (1910) we have been characterized as inherently problematic. 
Indeed causes for all forms of sex/gender non-conformity have been explored 
with advocates of these ideas focusing particularly on neurological differences 
(Kruijver et al. 2000; Rametti et al. 2010), which effectively position trans people 
as ‘brain intersex’ despite these claims being significantly undermined by broad-
er overviews of neurological research (Fine 2011; Jordan-Young 2011). However, 
this problematization is still likely to have effects on young trans people and 
trans or gender non-conforming children themselves. Referral to psychologists 
or psychiatrists almost certainly results in trans children perceiving themselves 
as suffering from some kind of affliction that requires treatment or cure, this 
may go some way to explaining the apparently large number of so-called desist-
ers, i.e. those that prefer to remain invisible rather than exposing themselves to 
stigmatization. Indeed while psychological explanations of why trans children 
under 12 more often than not appear to stop being trans are focused on, there are 
other, social explanations which are often overlooked.6 Possible reasons could 
be: pressure from the family through rejection, poor passing in terms of lack 




The problematizing of the difference between cisgender and  
transgender people
Cisgenderism does not merely affect trans people, it affects everyone. It repre-
sents one of the main ways by which the gender binary and potentially everything 
stemming from it, such as male hegemony and misogyny, exerts its influence. 
Although it has different consequences for trans people, it still functions to pre-
vent cisgender people, in particular those assigned male gender at birth, from ex-
pressing preferences for activities or items associated with any other sex/gender. 
It is important to stress that cisgenderism affects men and women differently, 
and men and women differently in different cultural environments. It is also im-
portant to emphasize that trans people identifying as trans for specific purposes, 
such as political organization in defence of, or in the struggle for human and 
civil rights, represents productive categorization, in other circumstances these 
categorizations are less so and potentially represent problematic distinctions.
The essentialising of gender as biologically determined, fixed at birth 
and immutable
Current ideology of gender appears to conceive of gender in an essentialist way. 
Even within the trans community this cultural influence can be detected7 being 
employed as an apparent means of legitimation, the effectiveness of which is far 
from established. Messner (2000) illustrated a tendency by adults to essentialize 
sex/gender in young children even when few, if any, innate differences were 
apparent. Adults seemed to pick up on small elements of gendered behaviour, 
which were often themselves culturally induced, and interpret these as essential.
If sex/gender is commonly viewed as essential then it is likely that anyone 
who fails to conform to the rules of sex/gender will be considered to be suffering 
from some kind of problem. However, Kane (2006) showed how parents, espe-
cially fathers, whose children identified as trans or sex/gender non-conforming, 
and particularly male-assigned children, appeared to change their ideology to a 
social constructivist one, blaming themselves for failing to bring their child up 
in a sufficiently sexed/gendered way. In both instances trans and sex/gender 
non-conforming children are likely to find it difficult to assert their genders in 
the face of de-legitimation.
Sex/gender as externally imposed
We characterize gender as assigned at birth and we also use the phrase ‘gender 
attribution’ when we describe the way others assign gender to someone they en-
counter. Many trans persons understand gender as something assigned at birth. 
7 | For instance: Blog: Women born transsexual. URL: http://womenborntranssexual.com/about/ [29.11.2013].
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The phrase ‘gender attribution’ also denotes the way others assign a particular 
gender to someone they encounter. In both cases the active agent is the other 
person, the person doing the gendering is not the person who is being gendered. 
In this situation they are culturally positioned as the passive individual. Cultur-
ally, gendering is something done to us by others. This represents a significant 
problem for those whose sex/gender identity or expression differs from the one 
they were assigned at birth. It is also likely to result in significant difficulties in 
terms of self-intelligibility for children in this position. If, at a very young age 
one is continually told that one is a boy, when one does not feel like a boy that is 
likely to result in confusion and potential psychological or emotional problems. 
Yet this cultural imposition of gender, when combined with other characteristics 
of cultural cisgenderism, in particular the systemic erasure and essentialising of 
gender represents a formidable epistemological, cultural and social hurdle for 
trans children to overcome.
However it is not solely the external imposition of gender that represents 
a significant problem for trans people; it is the way this external imposition of 
gender is not perceived as problematic. Examples of this may be difficult to find 
since cultural cisgenderism is a largely tacit, DS- (weakly discursively saturated) 
practice. The following extract, however, from an article in the Daily Mail about a 
trans child represents a good example. It can be understood as an instance of the 
culture or ideology of cisgenderism speaking through the voice of one individual:
“The grandmother of a five-year-old boy who is now living as a girl has admitted she would rather he 
were back to his old self than going around in pink dresses. For more than a year Zach Avery from 
Purfleet, Essex, has worn his long fair hair done up in bunches and insisted on living his life as a 
member of the opposite sex. But Jill Recknell, from Alderney in the Channel Islands, who is in her 
mid-50s, confessed she cannot accept that her grandson has suddenly become a granddaughter. 
Mrs Recknell added she was upset by Zach’s parents’ decision to go public, telling the People: ‘I’d 
rather see him kicking a football than parading in a pink dress.’ But Mrs Recknell says, although she 
loves her grandchildren no matter what, Zach will always be a boy to her – ‘the sex he was born with 
and is on his birth certificate.’ ” (Daily Mail 1st March 2012)
In this example, the cisgenderist ideology of externally imposing one’s own sex/
gender attribution on another is evident on two levels. Firstly the Daily Mail follows 
its apparently normal editorial policy of employing the gender of the individual as 
assigned at birth. This is in direct conflict with the Trans Media Watch Style Guide8 
and could thus be argued to represent deliberate transphobia, especially since 




this misgendering, i.e. the incorrect attribution of sex/gender, seems to be edi-
torial policy for many newspapers like the Daily Mail. However, it is difficult to 
characterize the coercive misgendering of Zach by her grandmother as anything 
other than a manifestation of cisgenderism.
Yet in both instances it is apparently considered unproblematic externally 
to impose someone else’s sex/gender identity on a trans person. Whilst we may 
have to accept the possibility that Mrs Recknell may have been misquoted or 
encouraged to deliberately misgender Zach, the apparently banal way the Daily 
Mail journalist deliberately misgendered her, and the way Recknell has decided 
to take it upon herself to decide Zach’s gender is indicative and illustrative of the 
way society views the means by which people are gendered. In the opinion of 
the author both Recknell and the editor of the Daily mail appear to feel  that it is 
appropriate to apply their own coercive attribution of gender to a child and they 
do not appear the least defensive about it. In addition it has to be acknowledged 
that the effect of this and other instances of cisgenderism is to de-legitimize 
trans people and reinforce their unintelligibility to themselves and others.The 
next section explores how the concept of cisgenderism might affect the lives of 
young trans people in terms of their life narratives.
Sex/Gender as Narrative
Bakhtin’s (1981: 84-258) concept of chronotope theorized the nature of narrative. 
It characterized narrative as comprising time (chronos) and space (tope). Howev-
er Vice (1997) argues, with particular reference to the movie ‘Thelma and Louise’ 
(Scott 1991), that narrative is also sexed/gendered. So instead of narrative being 
conceptualized as
space x time
as Bakhtin does, she argues that narrative should be conceptualized as
space x time x sex/gender
Vice’s case is that ‘Thelma and Louise’ represents a qualitatively different type of 
road movie from previous examples of this genre because the main characters 
are women. It is easy to see why this was never explored by Bakhtin; as a man, 
the default sex/gender, the idea that narrative could be any different from the 
way he perceived it from his gendered point of view would have been difficult to 
identify. However if we accept Vice’s argument that narrative is gendered then 
it is arguable that, for most people there exist more-or-less ready-made life nar-
ratives for both genders within the gender binary. Whilst these may be quite di-
verse and have changed significantly in the course of history they rarely include 
trans life narratives.
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Adult trans people may have different narratives available to them insofar as they 
can either live alternative lifestyles or change a male life narrative to a female one 
or vice versa. Indeed this is a familiar concept since it used to be the advice given 
to all those undergoing gender confirmation surgery. Post-operative transsexual 
people were often advised not only relocate to a different part of the country 
(something potentially quite difficult in small states such as Luxembourg) but 
to create a retrospective life narrative as though they had always been cisgender. 
This is something Stone (1991) questioned when she advocated post-transsexual-
ism and that transsexual people should live their lives as openly transsexual peo-
ple. The problem, for young trans people and trans  children, is that as a result 
of the function of cisgenderism there are no life narratives immediately available 
to them, no narratives of children becoming another gender and growing up and 
living happy and fulfilled lives in anything other than the sex/gender assigned at 
birth. Whilst there are narratives of adult trans  people’s lives (e.g. Morris 1974, 
Davidson 2012, Drummond 2012) there are none easily available for children 
unless one knows where to look on the internet.9
Cisgenderism as culture
Life narratives are determined by culture, and in a culture influenced by cisgen-
derist ideology available life narratives will also be cisgenderist and will exclude 
the possibilities of trans narratives. This does not merely affect the intelligibility 
of trans people to others but trans people’s intelligibility to themselves.
Stryker (2006) suggested that the exclusion of trans people from Europe-
an culture stemmed from cultural developments roughly 500 years ago that re-
sulted in the cultural primacy of the material over the spiritual/psychological. 
This is exemplified by the recent discovery of a 5,000 year-old transsexual10 in a 
grave in Prague, where a body with male DNA was interred in the same way a 
woman would have been, strongly suggesting that transgender people have been 
accepted in past cultures in Europe. However it is possible that the tendency to 
culturally exclude trans people also stems from what Douglas (1966: 24) identi-
fied as a cultural desire for purity: “We can conclude that holiness is exemplified 
by completeness. Holiness requires that individuals shall conform to the class 
to which they belong. And holiness requires that different classes of things shall 
not be confused.” As such it appears that people’s attitudes to categorization 
have become one-dimensional and, when it comes to human beings, the desire 
9 | 11-year-old transgender girl Jazz. URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AelO2L4HneE [05.07.2015]




to categorize one-dimensionally may result in problems for people who do not fit 
easily into one single category, or who appear to move between categories. The 
theories of Stryker and Douglas would both seem to go some way to explaining 
the way transgender people experience this cultural erasure as a result of cisgen-
derism. In a media-saturated world it is likely that it becomes magnified and so, 
when trans children become apparent it is more likely that they will be treated 
as problematic.
CONCLUSION
Kennedy and Hellen (2010) identified one of the key factors inhibiting young 
trans people from coming out or becoming aware of their sex/gender identities 
as this lack of vocabulary. Typically, trans people learn trans-related vocabulary 
(trans, transgender, transsexual) at an average age of 15 years 6 months. This is 
clearly not merely an instance of simply learning a new item of lexicon; it repre-
sents the key to an entire new world. Not merely does it enable children to cate-
gorize themselves and begin to identify with a particular group but it represents 
a revelation in the way they think of themselves. This was repeatedly identified 
as an important moment:
“I never had the trans words to use.”
“I never put a name to it and wasn’t even aware of the names TV, TS etc.”
“Reading about someone who did so in a magazine when I was 12 and 
feeling astonished that I wasn’t alone.”
“I guess back then I felt a freak because there was no-one I knew who was 
like me.”
This inability to access trans-related vocabulary; a direct result of the cultural era-
sure of trans people which is a feature of cisgenderism, represents a significant 
barrier to many, if not most, young trans people and trans children. Since cis-
genderism functions as a DS- (weakly discursively saturated practice) ideology, the 
erasure of trans people requires merely that we are not named. The inability to 
express one’s feelings or identity in language represents, for many at least, a po-
tentially significant obstacle to any kind of self-intelligibility. Whilst it is possible 
that some young children may be able to express their gender non-conformity 
with language such as “I am a girl.” Or “I am not a girl.” it is perhaps less likely 
that they will be understood by parents, who may put it down to a phase they may 
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be going through, or simple confusion. However the advent of groups of parents 
of trans children coalescing via the internet has perhaps resulted in more of 
these children being understood and subsequently helped and supported than 
previously, as parents of children displaying gender non-conforming behaviour 
are able to access help and support. Yet the problem remains of trans children 
and young people whose parents are unable to find help sites such as Mermaids11 
or, possibly more likely, who do not want their child to be transgender. These 
children, like many others, effectively remain the prosoners of cultural cisgen-
derism until they acquire a trans-related word in their lexicon. For these children 
the communities of trans people online and their wealth of information, sup-
port and signposting of services, remain hidden, like a mountain in the mist, 
until one of these keywords unlocks the online transgender networks for them. 
Locating any information or social network on the internet is determined by 
language. Once a trans-related word is learned, young trans people’s lives can 
be transformed very quickly. This might come from a resultant epiphany, which 
enables the understanding of previous feelings of not fitting in, or the under-
standing that they are not alone and that there are others who are like them. The 
acquisition of this vocabulary is, however, currently likely to occur in an arbitrary 
manner, often depending on young people’s access to popular media (which is 
often presented in a negative way). However these lexical keys remain the crucial 
determinant of at what age and how, trans or sex/gender-non-conforming chil-
dren can begin to make sense of their lives and start to map out for themselves 
a future life narrative which might suit them. The exclusion of this crucial word 
by cultural cisgenderist culture from access by children represents the one of 
the most destructive elements of epistemological gentle violence experienced 
by trans people and potentially remains a factor negatively impacting on mental 
health, self-confidence academic success and social integration.
The emergence of trans people as a group able to begin to exert its own 
group identity and engage in self-support, signposting of information and po-
litical pressure to obtain human and civil rights has occurred concurrently with 
the development and spread of the internet (Whittle 1998). It has become a vital 
medium for possibly the first group in human history to establish itself and 
coalesce predominantly via the internet. However, this demonstrates that it is 
still heavily dependent on users knowing the appropriate vocabulary to access 
it. Ensuring that trans children have access to this vocabulary is essential, so 
that they can realize that they are not alone and can access support from other 
young trans people online even if they cannot themselves come out at home or 
11 | British parents association Mermaids: family and individual support for teens and children with gender identity 
issues. URL: http://www.mermaidsuk.org.uk [15.12.2013].
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at school. Since trans children are very likely to remain non-apparent It should 
therefore be the most basic requirement of any equal opportunities policies in 
schools including primary schools, that these keywords are made available to all 
children even if school staff do not know whether or not any given class contains 
any trans children.
This paper has set out to establish and characterize the concept of cultural 
cisgenderism and its effects on trans children and young people. Although trans 
children still suffer from transphobia12 it is important to recognize that prejudi-
cial individual attitudes do not constitute the only problem for trans people; the 
ideology of cultural cisgenderism, prevalent throughout society, is responsible 
for many problems, and has been exemplified here particularly by its effects of 
children and young people.
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Educational Activities:  
From Binary to Gender-Plural Approaches1 
Christel Baltes-Löhr
SUMMARY
Even if parents, educators and teachers often still unwittingly or unreflectedly 
raise and educate children to internalize typical male or female behavior, a glance 
at everyday life in today’s society shows that children who do not want to be cat-
egorized as female or male, as well as parents who no longer correspond to the 
stereotype patterns of femininity and masculinity are not an exception but rather 
provide an insight into the diversity of actually lived lifestyles. What kind of peda-
gogy would be required to do justice to the diversity of all those forms of existence 
– along with a regard to the manifold manners of existence in terms of gender?
RELEVANCE OF GENDER FOR PEDAGOGICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 
If since the 1970s the women’s movement has contributed to educational prac-
tices being reviewed regarding their inherent, normative notions of gender, and 
if the women’s movement has, in connection with the demands for equal rights 
for girls and women, brought the encouragement of girls by providing specific 
offers for girls in day-to-day pedagogical work to the foreground of the pedagog-
ical debate, then it has become increasingly clear that, with the departure from 
essentialist notions of the nature of women and thus also of men, we can no 
longer assume homogeneously conceived genders of ‘woman’ and ‘man’, but 
rather that the differences among women and the differences among men are 
just as manifestly present as different forms of gender relationships. The call 
for a pedagogy that fosters boys became louder, with both the feminist work for 
girls’ development as well as that for boys’ development often remaining rooted 
in essentialist notions of the right girl and the right boy. Thus, in an edition of 
1 | Originial version in German. 
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2 | Rohrmann, Tim: Gender im Kontext der Arbeit mit Kindern in den ersten drei Lebensjahren. URL: http://www.
kita-fachtexte.de/fileadmin/website/FT_Rohrmann_OV.pdf [03.01.2014].
3 | For an attempt at a definition of terms see the contribution by Christel Baltes-Löhr in this publication: Always 
Gender— Always Different.
4 | “If we are not recognizable, if there are no norms of recognition by which we are recognizable, then it is not 
possible to persists in one’s being, and we are not possible beings; we have been foreclosed from possibility.” 
(Hegel according to Butler 2004: 31).
professional texts related to daycare (‘KiTa Fachtexte’) with the title ‘Gender in 
the context of the work with children in the first three years of their lives’ (‘Gen-
der im Kontext der Arbeit mit Kindern in den ersten drei Lebensjahren’), Tim 
Rohrmann (n.d.) writes that there are highly diverging opinions about the point 
in time when children recognize their own sex as such and comes to the conclu-
sion: “Children may from a very early age refer to themselves as a boy or girl. But 
only later do they understand that there are two sexes, which sex they themselves 
belong to and – above all – that this will not change.”2
Besides such still active essentialist and essentializing approaches, the un-
derstanding of the constructedness of gender based on interactions and discur-
sive performances has made clear that the two categories of female and male are 
in fact unable to represent a supposed essentiality of specific groups of human 
beings and thus fall short of conceptually encompassing the actually lived di-
versity of genders. The suggestion made by Baltes-Löhr3 to situate gender on a 
continuum which is not limited by the cornerstones of female and male but is 
comprised of the four dimensions corporal/physical, psychological, social and 
sexual gender, and thus considered modifiable, plural, polypolar and intersec-
tional, could represent a possibility for describing the different genders in their 
historical, cultural, spatial and biographical variance. On the basis of this, sug-
gestions could be developed for pedagogical work with children and adolescents 
regardless of their gender, without gender-appropriate, -reflecting or -sensitive 
pedagogy stabilizing precisely what it purports to overcome, i.e. a traditional 
gender order of women/girls and men/boys that regards – often surprised, fre-
quently irritated – trans and inter persons as a singular exception at best, and 
essentially as confirming the normality of gender binarity.
Gender as a norm
If Spinoza talks of bodily persistence as a human condition, and if Hegel ex-
pands this idea by positing that persistence is only possible where there is mu-
tual recognition,4 then Foucault supplements this with the concept that “the 
norms of recognition function to produce and to deproduce the notion of the hu-
man” (Butler 2004: 31-32). According to Butler (2004:48) “the norm has no in-
dependent ontological status, yet it cannot be easily reduced to its instantiations; 
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it is itself (re)produced through is embodiment, through the acts that strive to 
approximate it, through the idealizations reproduced in and by those acts.”
Gender in its normative dimension can thus far be understood as “a form 
of social power” and as an apparatus “by which the gender binary is instituted. 
As a norm that appears independent of the practices that it governs, its ideality 
is the reinstituted effect of those very practices.” (ibid.). The triad norm – practice 
– ideal however also contains the possibility of a subversive change of the triad’s 
respective aspects through repetition and the repetitions' inherent possibility of 
gradual shifts, e.g. of gender practices in space and time. In this, the performa-
tive and historical structure of gender is revealed. Gender not only determines 
the “very criterion by which we judge a person to be a gendered being […] or 
the recognizability of the human” (Butler 2004: 58), but also “how we do or do 
not recognize ourselves at the level of feeling, desire, and the body […]” (ibid.). 
This debate is embedded in the question of how the human condition comes 
into being. Here too the principle holds that “the history of the category is not 
over, and the ‘human’ is not captured once and for all.” (Butler 2004: 13). At this 
point Butler makes a remarkable reference to pedagogy when she emphasizes 
that “part of rethinking where and how the human comes into being will involve 
a rethinking of both the social and the psychic landscapes of an infant’s emer-
gence.” (Butler 2004: 14).
However, it remains doubtful in how far the offer for infants demanded as a 
necessity by Butler is tenable in this form. With reference to the observation that 
queer theory radically questions a categorial gender attribution, Butler writes:
“It does not follow, therefore, that queer theory would oppose all gender assignment or cast doubt 
on the desires of those who wish to secure such assignments for intersex children, for instance, who 
may well need them to  function socially even if they end up changing the assignment later in life, 
knowing the risks.” (Butler 2004: 7f)
This raises the question of whether the perspective of a dedramatization of gen-
der would not benefit the children much more, as it would relegate the issue of 
gender towards the background cause it to lose its importance altogether. Nev-
ertheless, it is not only difficult to understand why children should be offered 
an orientation which needs to be overcome later; one should also consider at 
this point whether a less rigid and more plural understanding of gender would 
not also benefit those children who have been attributed the gender female or 
male and who have adopted this attribution. How much energy could be saved 
which so far has been mustered by children, adolescents and also by adults in 
order to be recognized as a proper girl/woman or as a proper boy/man, how many 
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gender-related conflicts could be defused or avoided. The definition of gender as a 
continuum suggested by Baltes-Löhr (see footnote 3, p. 314) would in its practical 
use and implementation provide everyone with more breathing space for a wider 
range of developments.
In the following, it will be demonstrated how a pedagogy that aims to do jus-
tice to such a demand for manifold possibilities of development could look like.
Pedagogy and gender
Issues of education and socialization as well as concepts of femininity, mascu-
linity and gender relations have increasingly become the focus of public and aca- 
demic debate since the beginning of the women’s movement in the late 1960s.
Thus Tervooren (2006) describes the path from gender-specific sociali-
zation to performative gender, Kunert-Zierl (2005) orders the phases of peda-
gogical girls’ and boys’ work in decades  from 1970 onward, and Rhyner and 
Zumwald (2008) observe gender through different lenses to gain new perspec-
tives. Regarding youth work, Rose and Schulz (2008) point to the constraining 
limitations of various gender terms. These four perspectives will be discussed 
briefly in the following, concluding with the work of Olaf Stuve (2001) and Jenny 
Howald (2001) who argue from the viewpoint of queer theory.
Drawing on Liegle (2003), education is to be understood as “a bipolar – 
transferring and acquiring – activity in the framework of (inter- and intragen-
erational) relations.” (Liegle 2003: 16). Both poles of education – transfer and 
acquisition – relate to and depend on each other. “Transfer can only become 
effective if it encounters the willingness and the ability to acquire.” (Liegle 2003: 
16). Education is attributed to the field of the acquiring activity, i.e. the acquisi-
tion pole of schooling and parenting.
“Learning can be understood as an individual and in each case distinct processing of information 
and experiences within the environment, and thus the notion of learning has a close relationship 
with the aspect of acquisition in the concept of schooling and parenting and hence with the concept 
of education. Learning describes the mechanisms and the regularity of the processes for the acqui-
sition of the world.” (Liegle 2003: 17)
Likewise significant is the term ‘development’, which denotes the shifting of 
the human personality in its biographical course regarding physicality, knowl-
edge, skills, views as well as behavior. In this, biological principles play as much 
of a role as experience and learning. “Enabling, accompanying, supporting and 
stimulating education, learning and development can be described as the most 
general goal of schooling and parenting.” (Liegle 2003: 18)
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The significance of the gender dimension for pedagogical theory and practice in-
volves explaining the forms of those processes of development and construction 
which contribute to someone choosing whether or not to adopt a gender, and 
thus the question which role parenting and schooling, education, learning and 
socialization inside and outside the family or other forms of socialization within 
the private sphere can play in these development and construction processes.5
And again:  
social determinacy versus active appropriation/assignment of gender
According to Tervooren, theoretical models of socialization tend to be located more 
on the side of passive experiencing (according to Liegle: the pole of transfer in 
the concept of schooling and parenting) (Tervooren 2006: 10), while constructivist 
approaches emphasize the subjects’ own activity (the pole of acquisition in Liegle’s 
concept of schooling and parenting) (Tervooren 2006: 20). According to Tervoor-
en, the debate of the 1970s about the gender-specific socialization, particularly re-
garding the emancipatory aspect of schooling and parenting (Dausien quoted by 
Tervooren 2006: 10), increasingly centered around the socialization of girls whose 
opportunities in life are seen by Metz-Göckel (2000: 105 f.) as disadvantaging and 
deficient. The concept of the ‘gender role’ developed in 1970s socialization theo-
ry principally stems, according to Tervooren, from a notion elaborated by Talcott 
Parsons of socialization as an internalization of social values and norms, in which 
however the subject is accorded little space as an agent. The gender roles fixed by 
society are something to be adopted by the child, who occupies a position vis-à-vis 
the adult that is deficient in every way and dimension (Tervooren 2006: 11 f.).
Biological determinism gives way to social determinism (Hopfner 1999: 135 
ff.), unless, as with Hurrelmann (1983, 1986), the concept of the “productively 
reality-processing subject” (Hurrelmann 1983: 91) gains importance. Neverthe-
less, the differences between gender groups conceived as bipolar are frequent-
ly regarded, in terms of socialization theory, as considerably more significant 
than the differences among girls and among boys. According to Tervooren, 
Hagemann-White (1984) sees socialization as the appropriation of the gender 
binary, which is however fashioned by children acting as active subjects. Hage-
mann-White nevertheless remains in the bipolar spectrum of the gender binary.
The departure from a deficient perspective on the receiving, socializing child 
is replaced in the field of childhood studies established in the late 1980s by the 
view of children “as producers of culture, as social actors and equal members 
of society whose perspectives have to be developed.” (Honig 1999 according to 
Tervooren 2006: 13). The everyday practices of children are examined with the help 
5 | For non-familial forms of the private see Butler (2004).
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of ethnographic research tools. The everyday practices of children are examined 
with the help of ethnographic research tools. Besides gender, great significance 
is for instance attached to the children's ethnic background (Tervooren 2006: 13).
According to Tervooren there is an increased perception of individuals’ own 
actions not only in childhood studies but, with the beginning of the 1990s, also 
in gender studies, with a new emphasis on the construction of genders and the 
concept of ‘doing gender’ (West/Zimmermann 1991) underscoring the interde-
pendent actions of social actors: gender is continuously produced and reinforced 
interactively by the individuals themselves. This constructivist turn is taking place 
in educational sciences just as much as in educational sciences and sociology of 
education, and has an enormous influence on the gender debate (Bilden 1991; 
Lemmermöhle et al. 2000). This approach continues to be criticized – from 
the perspective of the theory of socialization as well – for its the overemphasis 
of intersubjective interactions at the cost of structure-theoretical categorizations 
(Lindemann 1993). Ethnographical childhood studies tend to ignore the power of 
structures and the social-historical evolvement, but the approaches based on the 
theory of socialization instead tend to lack emphasis on the actors’ own and co-con-
struction – in particular when involving the staging, the construction of genders.
The staging of gender identities corresponds to the performative turn, fu-
eled in particular by the works of Judith Butler. Staging and performance does 
not mean that the agent has a free choice in the representation of the genders 
(Goffman 1994: 15). In the context of all environmental circumstances it is the 
performative act of the acting subject by which gender is continuously produced 
through acts of speech and physicality. In the necessity of repetition lies the per-
spective of a subversive shift of gender identities and gender.
However, so far it remains unclear “how from the constant everyday failures 
to achieve the ideal norm, which are however extremely diverse in their concrete 
realization, new patterns can emerge that acquire normative as well as formative 
authority.” (Tervooren 2006: 20). In the near future it will therefore be necessary 
to closely observe the processes of the performative practice of gender, and to 
leave sufficient room both for the interactions and the impact of structures and 
norms. This approach is ultimately able to take an intersectional perspective into 
account which, besides the plurality of the genders, considers aspects such as 
socio-economic status, ethnic orientation, age, regional background etc.
Gender-sensitive children’s and youth work:  
more than girls’ work or boys’ work? 
With regard to girls’ and boys’ work, Kunert-Zierl (2005) provides theoretical 
comments on the individual decades from 1970 onward, together with a de-
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scription of developments in the field. For instance, in the German version of 
Montessori educator Elena Gianni Belotti’s work from 1975 we find notions of 
gender-specific conditionings of girls and women that begin with pregnancy and 
orientate girls ineluctably towards their role as housewife and mother (Kunert-
Zierl 2005: 28). Ursula Scheu (1977) describes the same in her work: “Wir 
werden nicht als Mädchen geboren, wir werden dazu gemacht” (‘We are not 
born girls, we are made to be them’), clearly alluding to Simone de Beauvoir’s 
comment from 1949, when she writes in ‘Le deuxième Sexe’ (‘The Second Sex’) 
that “One is not born a woman but becomes one.” (de Beauvoir 1949). Scheu, 
whose work saw more than 20 editions until 2000, regarded girls as victims of 
patriarchal structures. In her view, they should practice in gender-homogenous 
groups to acquire skills that boys already possess as it is, for instance physical 
resistance. A corresponding program for boys is only demanded in theory, but 
not implemented in practice. Combined with a Marxist critique of society, cap-
italist society is held responsible for the development of a specifically feminine 
identity. In everyday pedagogical practices this leads to specific offers for girls to 
liberate them from what the female educators believe to be a situation of oppres-
sion, and to support and guide them on their path to emancipation. It should 
only be mentioned in passing that, also in the late 1970s, Maria Mies understood 
women’s studies as alignment with oppressed women and as a search for ways 
out of oppression to liberation (Mies 1978).
Attempts to question such essentialist and deficient images of femininity 
emerge when, with regard to the mother-daughter relationship, processes of mu-
tual repression are identified (Osterland 1978 referenced by Kunert-Zierl 2005: 
31). However, in this the differences between women continue to be discussed 
under a negative sign, when women, in this case mothers and educators, are 
seen to be in a competitive relationship with regard to the child, particularly 
the daughter, and not as persons contributing to the construction process of the 
children’s gender – with all its dimensions – , only occupying different positions 
with different perspectives in the same field of education. Thus, even approaches 
that have a critical take on the concepts of motherhood and daughterhood still 
continue to fit the mould of the old, traditional competitiveness between women. 
The rivalry for winning male favor and recognition is substituted by the rival-
ry for gaining the favor of the child (Kunert-Zierl 2005: 32). In the sense of a 
recognition theory drawing on Butler (Butler 2001), motherhood, too, would be 
constructed through the child’s recognition, with the respective gender of the 
actors carrying an importance that should not to be underestimated. We have to 
ask ourselves whether motherliness reacting to an appreciative son would take a 
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6 | In 1984 Hagemann-White already noted: “A mother does not smile at her son more or less frequently than 
at her daughter, but differently: her smile carries a different meaning and different emotions. The meaning and 
the emotions arise from the social significance which being a future man or a future woman carries.” (Hage-
mann-White 1984: 74).
7 | This perspective is still very much evident in the 1997 campain ‘Aktiv gegen Männergewalt’ (‘Active Against Male 
Violence’) (Süddeutsche Zeitung 270/97 p. 38 of 24.11.1997) when the coordinator of the campain, Anita Heiliger, 
replied to the question whether that meant that all men are potential rapists: “I‘m not saying that all men are perpe-
trators, but that in our society male socialization includes elements that can make them become perpetrators under 
certain conditions. With women the opposite is the case […]. There are lots of men who reject violence, that‘s not a 
new phenomenon. But these men are not regarded as those who determine the norm for masculinity.”
different form than the one constructed through the appreciation of a girl,6 and 
in what way a situation in which the child’s gender does not seem to be mor-
phologically unambiguous could generate turbulences. In the same way, one 
would need to examine the constructedness of fatherliness. Another question 
one could add here, with regard to the debate about the professionalization of 
educators, is whether the educator as well becomes an educator through the rec-
ognition of the children, how this process of construction is formed and which 
effects ambiguous gender attributions elicit in education professionals.
With regard to the construction of gender, Kunert-Zierl notes that in the 
1980s the discourse shifted its attention increasingly towards the significance 
of the subjective, active part played by girls and women in the construction of 
gender. The topic was now that of female subjectivity, and with that the ques-
tion whether, according to Breitenbach/Hagemann-White, deeply rooted, and 
also partly cherished, so-called female characteristics thus far regarded as defi-
cient “did not in fact also have their good sides.” (Breitenbach/Hagemann-White 
1994: 254). A revaluation of the still polarly conceived gender difference took 
place in favor of feminity. Female forms of coping with issues in everyday life 
were now in high regard, girls and women could make their voice heard and 
receive more space both in a symbolic and a haptic sense. In the youth centers, 
this was the phase in which girls’ groups, spaces for girls and specific offers for 
girls were created. The aim was to recognize and encourage the girls’ strengths.
In 1981 Michael Brunke called for gender-specific boys’ work, with a view to 
relativizing male role behavior, particularly with regard to male aggressiveness. 
1987 Ottemeier-Glücks explained the necessity of antisexist boys’ work which 
enables boys to reflect their role behavior and to generate “the ability to suffer 
from one’s own role.” (Ottemeier-Glücks 1987: 345). The idea was to expand the 
male concept of self by so-called traditional female features and behaviors such 
as cooking, washing and cleaning. Although antisexist boys’ work was supposed 
to contribute to the “end of patriarchy” (Ottemeier-Glücks 1988: 381), ultimately 
perpetrator-victim schemata remained just as virulent as the general allocation of 
boys to the potential dominant group the girls faced as the potentially oppressed.7 
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Besides the antisexist boys’ work, in which femininity is regarded as superior to 
the tendentially aggressive masculinity, the 1980s also saw the development of the 
concept of boys-specific education work, which dissolves the pattern of dominator 
and dominated by addressing the “other boys not oriented along the male norm, as 
well as the powerful girls in youth work.” (Adloff 1988: 376 f.). Approaches to con-
scious boys’ work “prioritize boys as individuals and point to differences and dis-
advantaging structures among themselves as well.” (Kunert-Zierl 2005: 61). The 
relationship of the genders to each other are observed more from the perspective 
of the adolescents themselves than from a social-political perspective.
In the 1990s, deconstructivism and Judith Butler’s concepts presented 
above had an enormous impact on the gender debate. However, many femi-
nistically oriented youth workers involved with girls’ work saw a threat to their 
subject in the understanding of sexes as results of construction processes and 
the deconstruction of the communal, joint collective subject of ‘we-women’. For 
the boys’ work of this decade it is significant, according to Kunert-Zierl, that be-
sides the antisexist boys’ work, popular-science publications like ‘Kleine Helden 
in Not’ (‘little heroes in distress’) (Schnack/Neutzling 1990) with a clear rejec-
tion of notions of a strong male gender received wide-spread attention. In 1989, 
Sielert designed the concept of a reflected boys’ work for the scientific field, a 
work which ties in with the boys’ strengths, hoping for acceptance on the part 
of the boys by creating in them a willingness to embrace hitherto potentially 
unfamiliar and also so-called atypical behaviors and to incorporate them in their 
own behavioral repertoire.
In the ‘critical boys’ work’, Winter (Winter 1991, 1997) developed the no-
tion of a diversity of maleness and, like Sielert (1989), favours approaches that 
clearly distance themselves from all essentialist notions of masculinity. The 
concept of emancipatory boys’ work emphasizes that men themselves can be 
understood as “victims of a society structured along male rights” (Schenk 1991: 
102), and that boys and men need support and guidance in order to be able to 
develop a male identity beyond traditional norms of maleness (Krüger 1993: 32 
f). Within the approach of gender-specific boys’ work the boys should, accord-
ing to Spoden (1993), be offered gender-homogenous spaces for an independent 
and self-confident development of their own identity beyond the hegemonially 
operating norm of maleness. The focus is now on specific offers exclusively for 
boys, so that the approach can be regarded as a kind of counterpart to the girls’ 
work of the late 1970s, since the gender-specific girls’ work, particularly with 
view to ensuring the existence of spaces providing protection from dominant 
maleness, also established gender-homogenous groups. Kunert-Zierl also men-
tions the mythopoetical approach in her overview (Haindorff 1997), which wants 
Educational Activities: From Binary to Gender-Plural Approaches
322
to see the warrior and lover united in the ‘wild man’ and presumes biogenetic 
differences between the two genders. Drawing on Horx, the new, gentle, profes-
sionally uncompetitive man is frequently regarded as a ‘softy’, as “a grotesque 
bogeyman of emancipation culture.” (Horx referenced by Haindorff 1997: 129).
In the girls’ work of the incipient 21st century, deconstructivism in a way en-
ters through the backdoor, when the concept of ‘doing gender’ (West/Zimmer-
mann 1991) is considered in gender-reflecting pedagogical approaches (Voigt-Keh- 
lenbeck 2001). An open pedagogical stance, an open mind for the construction 
processes of ‘doing gender’, a form of pedagogical support that is not geared 
towards stabilizing and achieving a completed gender identity, presupposes 
on the part of education professionals the acceptance of such a destabilization, 
also for one’s own subjective gender identity. The debate triggered by Kuhlmann 
(2000) which implied that educators would then be unburdened from their mod-
el function regarding the demonstration of changed role behavior falls short of 
the mark here, since the model function in the pedagogical process – doubtless-
ly also mutual – remains intact, but with changed contents: what is exemplary 
then is admitting to oneself that gender can also be changeable in continuous 
construction processes. This can also point to new aspects for the interaction be-
tween education professionals and girls and boys regarding an intergenerational 
perspective. It is not automatically just the adults who ‘possess’ something that 
the adolescents yet have to achieve or stabilize, instead all actors involved can 
communicate with each other about the processes and results of the construction 
processes during different biographical phases, share and become more aware 
of the co-construction of identities. Other dimensions such as age, but also so-
cio-economic status, cultural background etc. can play a role in this as well.
In the spirit of such a gender-reflecting pedagogy, spaces for girls are no 
longer seen as shelters against aggressive masculinity, but as areas of freedom 
that enable the making experiences that go beyond traditional attributions. This 
applies in equal measure to boys’ spaces.
Rauw’s concern (2001), in a mixed traditional-feminist and deconstructive 
approach to girls’ work, is that “the girls experience a space in which they can 
show and live their strengths and weaknesses. They should learn that their opin-
ion is appreciated without having to comply with a normality in order to be rec-
ognized.” (Rauw referenced by Kunert-Zier 2005: 54). At this point one would 
however need to add that, as described above, recognition always operates in 
a normative context. For the girls’ work, the objective should therefore be that 
recognition is not bound to complying with a hegemonially fixed, seemingly 
rigid norm and that the girls – and, in the sense of the gender perspective, also 
the boys as well as other genders – are accorded the necessary space to actively 
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participate with their actions, feelings and thinking in the construction of what 
appears as gender normality. Drawing on the premises set up by Rauw (2001) we 
can establish the following:
1. Girls’ and boys’ work, or work with genders, presumes reflected gender 
images on the part of education professionals, so that clichés can be recog-
nized as such and curiosity can grow for how girls, boys and others enact 
their gender; a projection of the views and assumptions of education profes-
sionals on the adolescents should be avoided.
2. The interest of the girls, boys and all other genders are the point of depar-
ture for educational work.
3. Greatest possible participation and empathy: girls, boys and all others are 
actively involved in shaping the pedagogical activities, with respect for the 
interests of the other, which includes a high degree of empathy.
4. Contact between the genders occurs mutually, across generation boundaries 
and in gender-homogenous as well as gender-heterogenous constellations.
In this way problems, conflicts, obstacles as well as conducive elements in the 
construction processes of ‘doing gender’ can be recognized, and at the same 
time space can be created for solutions and concretizations beyond any estab-
lished or predetermined gender images.
We can identify a multiple ‘as-well-as’: gender work/doing gender should be 
something to be conceived of together; both gender-homogenous and -heteroge- 
nous aspects should be incorporated in the work; education professionals are 
both, model and learners, but in any case constructors; this applies both to the 
education professionals as well as to the adolescents. Here one should also point 
to the intersectionally embedded within the competency to deal with differences, 
in cases when it is necessary to not want to reconcile the described perspectives; 
they are thus frequently allowed to disappear, but this approach lets them exist 
beside and with each other and thus leaves sufficient space to the pedagogical 
support of construction processes not only of gender, but also of identities with 
regard to ethnic background, regional affiliation, age etc. However, the need for 
a specific consideration of trans and intersex children and adolescents is an issue 
that has yet to be addressed.
The lens counts – school as an example for the relevance of paradigms 
for day-to-day pedagogical work of gender constructions
What has become clear up to now is the far-reaching significance which the 
pedagogical attitude of educators holds in the process of pedagogical guidance. 
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This is also explained in a differentiated manner in the work of Thomas Rhyner 
and Bea Zumwald (2008).
If the ‘reading glasses’ are a symbol for the explanations of socialization the-
ory regarding the society-dependent shaping of gender, then binoculars stand for 
explanations from evolutionary biology which have been regaining importance in 
social and personality psychology (Webster 2007) after they had been denigrated 
as reactionary for decades, which in turn was due to the fact that the important 
concept that human beings can increase their chance of survival by adapting to 
surrounding conditions had been misrepresented and abusively implemented in 
racist, national-socialist and sexist notions. Even today such approaches still carry 
the risk of leading to a reinforcement of gender stereotypes.
‘Diving goggles’ symbolize psychoanalytical approaches, “opening the eyes 
for the depth of the soul and interpreting gender differences on the basis of psy-
choanalytical precepts.” (Rhyner/Zumwald 2008: 22). Girls and boys are assumed 
to each have their own distinct spiritual life. C.G. Jung’s archetypes such as Anima 
as the connecting and ‘Animus’ as the differentiating and recognizing element are 
used to explain the choice of girls to to concern themselves with care even while 
playing, and the interest of the boys in the ‘wild man’; here we see a clear link to 
the mytho-poetical approach of Haindorff (1997) described above. The perspective 
of the ‘diving goggles’ can likewise lead to a reinforcement of stereotypical views 
of girls and boys. Furthermore, Rhyner and Zumwald emphasize that these gog-
gles are probably less appropriate for use in a school environment, that they 
may constitute the basis for psychotherapeutical intervention and therapy, rather 
than be used in the context of school work with girls, boys and all others within 
class organizations, groups, and in the sense of mediation and appropriation of 
educational contents. 
The ‘safety glasses’ stand for constructivist explanations which – as mentioned 
several times – regard genders as a result of social construction processes. Boys, 
girls, teaching staff and all others stage and construct gender. With his approach of 
‘doing gender’ for schools, Güting (2004) has distinguished the following levels: in-
stitutional arrangements such as class lists which are organized by gender; gender as 
a criterion for apportioning and ordering: changing rooms in PE; gender-separated 
bathroom and shower facilities; optical stagings: hair, hair style, dress and related 
behavior, e.g. brushing your hair out of your face even though there is no hair in it; 
interactions, e.g. differently staged response behavior when insecure.
Gender stagings should be supported pedagogically and also remain subject 
to questioning. Girls, boys and all others should be accorded sufficient space 
to be able to transgress conventional role images in daily school life as well. 
In this context, it should again be pointed out how important aspects such as 
Christel Baltes-Löhr
325
age, socio-economic status as well as cultural background are in the case of an 
intersectional approach, and which great significance they hold for the identity 
construction of girls, boys and all others.8 According to Rhyner and Zumwald 
(2008), dealing with gender in daily school life involves three possible strategies: 
establishing equality, utilizing differences productively and enabling deconstruc-
tion. This shall, in conclusion, be illustrated with the following example:
It is clear that the teacher’s own attitude regarding the explanation of gen-
der also informs their professional conduct: if observable gender differences are 
understood as biologically based, then the teacher will try to give children the 
space to develop these innate female and male abilities and features. If the teach-
er assumes a construction of the genders then they will, for example, have to 
closely observe where the pupils’ strengths and weaknesses lie beyond normed, 
traditional gender images.
Establishing equality then means not imposing a priori a stereotype on the 
girls, boys and all others, but trying to allow everyone involved to actively par-
ticipate in classroom and break activities. Specific measures of encouragement 
could for instance mean that in particular situations, e.g. depending on the topic, 
differences play a role, by giving girls and boys a space of their own to enable the 
girls to engage in what so far has been regarded as atypical female behavior and, 
conversely the boys in what so far has been regarded as atypical male behavior.
In this way a deconstructivist approach can establish itself if the pupils can 
also move beyond the gender systems or attributions. Here an example regard-
ing the use of the school yard: as a situation of departure, it was observed that 
boys tend to claim a lot of space in their playing, while girls tend to play in a 
calmer, less extrovert and more communication-oriented manner; boys threaten 
others and prominently mark their presence in the school yard.
Equality strategies may result in establishing an equal use of space for boys, 
girls and all others. Girls and boys should partly practice positive aspects of the 
playing behavior of the other gender group, and it should become normal for 
everyone that there are children who want to be neither girls nor boys, or who 
look like a boy but feel like a real girl and vice versa.
The implementation of the difference strategy would ensure that the boys' 
urge for movement is taken into account and that a further piece of playground 
equipment is constructed in the school yard, and that girls can find spaces with 
a cozy atmosphere for sharing and playing. In either case, both girls and boys 
should be involved in the shaping of the school yard and rules should be devel-
oped and established together.
8 | For the concept of intersectionality see Knapp (2005); Lutz/Wenning (2001); McCall (2005). 
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The deconstruction strategy would attempt to dissolve typical female and typical 
male gender attributions and give all pupils the space to deliberate together who 
wants to do what. The educators also encourage children and adolescents to move 
within the other gender group. With this approach, one has to ensure the willing-
ness in the girls’ or boys’ group to let the girls and boys attributed to the respective-
ly other gender group participate as equal members in the playing activity of the 
other gender group. The perhaps gentler and more reserved boy and the perhaps 
stronger and wilder girl should be able to find their place both in the gender-homo-
geneous group as well as in the gender-heterogeneous group and not be excluded 
on the basis of their being different/otherness, at worst by both gender groups – as is 
still all too often the case in daily school life today. This also applies for the sexual 
orientation of girls and boys, and for children and adolescents who do not (want 
to) belong to any specific gender or want to change their gender.
The combination of the three strategies in pedagogical practice enables, 
drawing on Rhyner und Zumwald, a value-free development for girls, boys and 
– I would like to add – for all other genders, the full exploitation of individual po-
tentials as well as identities that go beyond traditional gender images or appear 
in new connotations (Rhyner/Zumwald 2008: 38).9
What becomes clear here is the proximity to the notions of intersectional dif-
ference competency, which makes it possible to deal with differences and simi- 
larities regarding gender as well as cultural background, socio-economic status 
or age in the sense of a creative diversity.
Rose and Schulz also provide evidence for the necessity of breaking out of the 
constraining perspective of the feministically marked, often seemingly essentialist 
difference of the genders, and describe this using the example of a research pro-
ject in Frankfurt youth centers. The traditional feminist discourse is constraining 
if gender pedagogy in youth centers is automatically equated with work in gen-
der-homogeneous groups. According to Rose and Schulz, in the past decades a 
regular pattern has established itself which emphasizes girls’ work but does not 
offer boys’ work enough space, and too frequently discounts the gender stagings in 
the heterogeneous field. Such stagings in the youth center often comprise verbal 
sexisms and gestural allusions to sexual acts. (Rose/Schulz 2008: 73).
It is necessary to understand these stagings in the purpose which the ado-
lescent introduces, and not to react with the apparent ‘panacea’ of gender-homo-
geneous group work in which different behavior is practiced and the behavior 
which the education professional has identified as sexist is discussed. Instead, 
according to Rose and Schulz, it is about being able to decipher and respond to 




the verbal and habitual communications of the adolescents. Gender competency 
would mean not understanding every public remark on the topic of ‘gender/
sex’ as referring to gender. Thus the overlying gender text could be accorded 
its underlying significance which is often not related to gender content. This 
de-gendering of situational meanings offers, according to Rose and Schulz, the 
chance to disengage oneself from gender-fixed interpretations of the stagings, 
and thus to minimize the risk of permanent misunderstandings between ado-
lescents and teaching personnel and to expand restricting spheres of influence. 
“The interpretative performances of social messages have to be multi-perspec-
tivistic in order to increase the likelihood that they are understood and answered 
correctly” (Rose/Schulz 2008: 74), very much in the sense of the intersectional 
difference competency which could enable such a decoding for the aspects of 
age, socio-economic status and cultural background, as briefly outlined for the 
degendering. For the area of gender applies: “If it says gender on the label, it 
does not always mean that there is gender inside.” This notion also corresponds 
to that of the dedramatization of the gender aspect in pedagogical work as de-
fined by Budde, Scholand and Faulstich-Wieland (2008).
Queer pedagogy 
The works of Olaf Stuve (2001) and Jenny Howald (2001) will serve as an exam-
ple to cast another glance at those approaches in pedagogical work with children 
and adolescents that derive explicitly from queer theory. Is it a coincidence or 
– despite queer theory’s clear critique of heteronormativity – nonetheless a ce-
mentation of precisely this bipolar, binary gender order, if a man writes about 
pedagogical work with boys and a woman writes about pedagogical work with 
girls? Or should this be seen as an expression of the resistance of the gender 
order? Thus, following her observation that gender research is at the moment 
developing new concepts that no longer focus on debating the recognition of 
difference, but rather on issues that concern the dissolution of gender as a man-
datory attribution, Helen Sporbert (2009) emphasizes:
“Until the deconstruction of gender has entered the awareness of human beings and a notion ac-
cording e.g. to that of Judith Butler can become reality, a great deal of time will pass, provided this is 
at all realizable with the help of human mind and action and does not remain in the realm of theory. 
In practice, the gender binary will continue to endure, which leads to ‘the initial, politically intended 
point of departure being maintained: it is still about the dismantling of hierarchies, about the real-
ization of democracy’ (Faulstich-Wieland 2003: 104). This also has to be seen as the current goal 
of a gender-appropriate school and gender-appropriate teaching, where the long-term goal has to 
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be continuously at work, not by presuming a heterosexual gender binary and cementing it through 
manifold processes; rather, the focus should be on the development of a diverse gender culture and 
the individuality of every human being beyond a dual gender order.” (Sporbert 2009: 16)
It is hardly possible to describe the current pedagogical dilemma more pointedly. 
How can a non-cementation of the old gender system be achieved if everyone is 
still using cement? Should girls and boys who become acquainted with a gender 
system be introduced to concepts from which they should, can, want to or also 
must later again dissociate themselves? How can a dedramatization of gender 
fixations occur without allowing too much space for binary systems? Or does 
pedagogy completely get ahead of itself and should we not ask whether, by re-
maining in binary gender systems, it does much more harm than supposedly 
good, when theoretical concepts about the dissolution or shifting of binary gen-
der systems are said to not yet have found their way into society, or, as Sporbert 
seems to suggest, that the deconstruction of bipolar gender systems has not – 
yet – entered popular awareness. Could it not be that lived realities with their 
diversities are light years ahead of theory? Or have theories been developed in the 
meantime that can gradually uncover the discursive-performative and interactive 
construction processes of such things as gender, education, socialization and ed-
ucation? Franziska Hofmann remains, with her empirical work “Transsexualität 
und Sozialisation” (2009), within the binary gender system by postulating a third 
gender, but defining it as a combination of woman and man and concluding her 
study by explicitly supporting Magnus Hirschfeld’s statement from the beginning 
of the 20th century, when he observed: “The human being is not man or woman, 
but man AND woman” (Hofmann 2009: 99; emphasis by Hofmann).
Regarding the issue discussed in this paper, i.e. the significance of pedagogy 
and education in the context of a presumed diversity of genders, the findings 
Franziska Hofmann presents in her study reveal an aspect, as such not exam-
ined by the author, which will be discussed briefly in the following. In the evalua-
tion of the twelve interviews that Franziska Hofmann conducted with adult trans 
persons, she states in the tabular overview of the chronological biographies that 
three of the interviewees put their earliest memory of being transsexual or not 
corresponding to the assigned gender of female or male at four years of age, two 
at five, one at six and another one at eight years of age. In one case such a mem-
ory was first experienced at eleven, in two cases at twelve and in one further case 
at fourteen. One of the interviewees reported having such remembered feelings 
at fifty years of age, and this person is also the only one of the twelve interviewees 
who stated that they had been forty-nine when they first heard about transsex-
10 | See also Jäckle (2009): Schule M(m)acht Geschlechter.  
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uality, one year before experiencing the remembered feeling of being different. 
Returning to the other eleven interviewees; regarding the ages for the first mem-
ory of being transsexual without even knowing this term, we can distinguish 
two groups: one group that situates this memory before entering puberty, and 
another group that situates it after entering puberty. Seven of the interviewees 
can be assigned to the pre-puberty group and four to the puberty group.
With the exception of one person’s life situation, we see that the coming-out occurs 
substantially later than the first remembered feeling of not corresponding to the as-
signed gender, and that these twelve people alone have lived a combined 226 years 
in a life situation that did not correspond to the way they felt about themselves.
What is remarkable here are the conclusions that Franziska Hofmann 
draws from her findings: “We can recognize that about half of the interviewees 
chose to suppress their feelings and comply with the expectations of society.” 
(Hofmann 2009: 90). The author emphasizes the importance of the media as a 
socialization factor and attributes to them the function of “providing an anony-
mous platform for sharing ideas” (Hofmann 2009: 92). The interviewed trans 
persons are characterized by her as follows:
“We have thus on the one hand found people who have attempted to lead their lives in as normal 
and inconspicuous a way as possible until this situation was no longer bearable. On the other hand 



















































1. First contact 
with TS
Coming out year difference between first memory 
and coming out
Table 1: Excerpts from the table by Franziska Hofmann (2009:89) on the chronological biographies of 
those interviewed by her; own calculation.
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we have very young people who early on already recognized that they are transsexual and have gone 
their own way. This was facilitated by today’s much more open information culture. However, they 
however have one thing in common: they have at some point in their lives rebelled against the norms 
and the value system of their childhood and created their own. It should be obvious to everyone that 
this is no easy path and that it is still often punished with exclusion and intolerance. It shows a great 
deal of courage and willpower.” (Hofmann 2009: 93 f.).
How much could a pedagogy of diversity have contributed here, if children had 
been introduced by their parents, teachers and educators in families, kindergar-
ten and school to the notion that a diversity of genders is something normal. 
This is not about denying one’s own gender as a parent, an educator or a teacher, 
whether it is female, male or anything else. Instead, it is about allowing the 
normality of all genders to enter into familial contexts, child care facilities and 
schools – and not only in biology lessons. How much anguish, worry and anx-
ieties people who do not correspond to a binary assignation of gender could be 
spared? How much energy could they have used for other things? At this point 
it becomes more than clear what kind of tasks pedagogy will have to deal with if 
it wishes to make an adequate contribution to gender plurality. Information and 
knowledge about more than two genders are necessary, terms for what is felt 
have to be provided, everyday life can no longer be limited to two gender forms, 
pedagogy no longer wants to drastically limit people’s life situations.
Thus Olaf Stuve points to the practice of a non-identitary youth work (Stuve 
2001: 288 ff.) and dissociates himself from such approaches to youth work 
which recognize in “irritated masculinity preferably a problem that needs to be 
brought back into balance” (Stuve 2001: 288 f). In contrast to ‘Wild Men’ who 
stage a primordial masculinity, ‘Männerbüros’ (help centers for boys and men) 
who base their youth work on the revitalization of male archetypes (see Hain-
dorff 1997), “boys clubs that send boys with compass and knapsack into the 
field” (Stuve 2001: 288), Stuve defines non-identitary boys’ work as a project that 
“refuses to organize perceptions and experiences by differentiations of male and 
female bodies” (Stuve 2001: 289).
As an example for a work with the body which is no longer attached to hetero- 
normativity, Stuve mentions the ‘body journey’ which enables boys to have new 
experiences and to perceive their body not as an instrument of the mind in the 
traditional sense of the binary gender systems (Stuve 2001: 291), but as a place in 
which they can relax, feel comfortable and familiar. Such body journeys aim to 
give a voice back to ‘the body’s language’ frequently ‘silenced’ (see Kamper refer-
enced by Stuve 2001: 292) in many boys raised within traditional patterns. In her 
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work on recognizing transsexuals regarding personal, political and medico-legal 
embodiment, Zowie Davy (2011) reviews the lived experiences of 24 trans per-
sons, putting the focus on bodily aesthetics that allow us to understand the lived 
experiences of trans persons who have a “passing, non-passing, beautiful, ugly, 
normative and non-normative” body (see Davy 2011: 6).
Similar to Struve, Howald has attempted to develop a design for a form 
of feminist girls’ work that can contribute to the deconstruction of traditional, 
essentialist notions of femininity. This includes role plays on the topic of homo-
erotic infatuations of girls, or of disputes with parents over diverging views on 
partnership, lifestyle and work (Howald 2001: 306), while the postcard game can 
be used for the theatrical representation of 101 types of women or the representa-
tion of the most diverse types of woman in the framework of a fashion show. In 
this game postcards are laid out and the girls are asked to choose one postcard 
with a female representation and explain how they came to make their choice. If 
historical women’s portraits are displayed on the postcards, then the task could 
also be to research the history of those portrayed and present it to the group. It 
is worth remarking that Howald wants to use this to deconstruct the opposition 
between girls and lesbian girls by letting the lesbian girl be regarded as a normal 
girl as well. However, there is no mention in Howald’s work of those girls who do 
not see themselves as girls, even though the article raises these expectations with 
its title ‘Ein Mädchen ist ein Mädchen ist kein Mädchen?’ (‘A girl is a girl is not a 
girl?’). Where does that leave us for day-to-day pedagogical practice?
Gender-reflecting and gender-sensitive pedagogy
A gender-reflecting and gender-sensitive pedagogy recognizes factually existing 
differences between genders and provides opportunities for individual devel-
opment beyond the established clichés. Gender-reflecting and gender-sensitive 
pedagogy thus encourages and demands diversity of life plans of young people 
no matter of what gender (see IEES 2000).
This concept is based on the following underlying assumptions:
genders are results of processes of social construction and therefore modi-
fiable (dynamic aspect);
thus the relationships between the genders are also modifiable (dynamic 
aspect);
genders and gender relationships develop in a historical, cultural and social 
context (contextual aspect);
genders are still linked to stereotype notions (normative aspect);
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genders are still linked to notions of a higher or lower value of one gender 
or specific gender/sex characteristics (normative aspect);
genders are often regarded in the context of a dualistic gender binary (het-
erosexual aspect).
Gender-reflecting and gender-sensitive pedagogy
contributes to gender losing its significance as a social criterion of differ-
entiation;
understands gender in the dimensions of corporal/physical, psychological, 
social and sexual gender; 
gender is regarded as situated on a continuum, as modifiable in space, time 
and in the course of a life’s biography; and as embedded in a polypolar, plu-
ral and intersectional manner;
addresses all genders equally in a specific way, depending on the situation;
provides all genders in gender-homogenous and in mixed gender groups 
with opportunities for developing and realizing their own notion of gender;
encourages the perception of gender differences and similarities;
reflects heteronormative gender images and questions the self-evidence of 
the gender binary;
consciously addresses stereotype gender images and questions them;
frees homo-, bi- and other sexual orientations from taboos;
refrains from assigning a homosexual orientation to trans and intersex persons;
is sensitive to the factually existing gender relations and the prevailing 
forms of discrimination still associated with them;
is sensitive to a utopia regarding gender relations and thus a new gender 
culture;
recognizes the diversity of life situations and attitudes of children and ad-
olescents, and reflects together with them on their ideas of their own per-
sonal path;
offers individual opportunities for development beyond traditional roles;
remains aware of how the gender relationship and the images of gender 
change in adolescents;
advocates gender equality;
subscribes to the equality of all human beings;
can be applied in all areas of day-to-day pedagogical practice (see – network 
point for equality – Vernetzungsstelle für Gleichberechtigung).
 
This results in a number of requirements for education professionals who to-
gether assume the responsibility for a practice of reflected gender-sensitive ap-
proaches and make a conscious choice for the application of such an approach:
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reflection of one’s own notions and images of gender;
reflection of one’s own behavior as a person with a specific gender identity;
reflection of one’s pedagogical practice;
participation in further gender-reflecting trainings.
CONCLUDING QUESTIONS
Which notions and practices of sexuality are virulent in private and profes-
sional day-to-day practice?
Which cultural traditions do I have as an education professional? Which of 
them have become self-evident to me?
Which norms and values are important to me as a person, but also for my 
professional work?
Which norms and values are important in my professional area of activity?
Which space do different cultural habits and traditions occupy in day-to-day 
pedagogical practice?
Is there a prevalent cultural dominance discourse in day-to-day pedagogical 
practice?
Which possibilities do addressees have to participate in day-to-day pedagog-
ical practice with their cultural, ethnic, age-specific or also religious notions 
and habitual customs?
Which religious holidays are observed? Which cultural customs play a role 
in day-to-day pedagogical practice? Are the places or regions of origin of all 
actors known? How does linguistic communication take place?
Which role do parents, family and the social environment play in the frame-
work of my pedagogical practice?
What does strangeness, being different, difference mean to me?
To which ethnic group do I feel connected? To which ethnic group do I be-
long or would I like to belong?
How do I treat ‘others’?
What kind of behavior do I expect from others?
What if the category of gender were to play a less important role in our lives?
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Transidentity and Puberty1 
Tom Reucher
SUMMARY
An early medical support of children’s and teenagers’ gender identity variances 
gives them opportunities for a more harmonious development. Delaying puber-
ty developments can mean gaining valuable time and the effects resemble pre-
mature puberty. If the antigonadotropines are discontinued, the development of 
puberty resumes again, provided there is no hormone cross-sex therapy. In this 
case the desired result is achieved faster, thereby avoiding numerous treatments 
for the correction of an undesirable sex development. The psychological support 
of the children and their families during this phase can prove really useful. 
ON THE TERMINOLOGY
We speak of ‘transidentity’,2 since it is an identity and not a form of sexuality 
or sexual desire. ‘Transidentity’ refers to the identity of trans persons, whether 
they be ‘transsex’ (in the French original version: transsexe) or transgender (in 
the French original version: ‘transgenre’). We have replaced the term ‘transsex-
ual’ with ‘transsex’, since it is not supposed to point to possible forms of sexual 
desire or sexual practices, i.e. to sexuality, and since the term ‘transsexual’, ow-
ing to its terminological proximity to the terms ‘homosexual’ and ‘heterosexu-
al’, is therefore inappropriate. The term ‘transsex’ builds on the concept of the 
term ‘transgender’. With the term ‘trans persons’, we refer equally to ‘trans or 
transidentitarian persons’ and to ‘transgender persons’. As should be common 
knowledge, trans persons can be heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, asexual 
etc. We choose not to use the terms ‘transsexuality’ and, if possible, ‘transsexual-
ism’ and will in the following speak of ‘transidentity’.
1 | Original version in French.
2 | The term ‘transidentité’ used in the French original is derived from the German term ‘Transidentität’, which 
was translated by Support Transgenre Strasbourg into French.
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We understand transidentity as an atypical development or variance of gender 
identity. Just because only a minority displays this variance of an identitary de-
velopment, it is not necessarily pathological – left-handed persons are not diag-
nosed with an ability disorder either just because they belong to a minority.
Benefit of an early medical support
The following section discusses puberty, hormone therapy at the beginning of 
puberty, hormonal treatment of 16-year-old Polynesian girls as well as its phys-
iological and psychological effects. A brief overview presents the advantages of 
early medical support.
A conference held in 1998 in Oxford by ‘Press For Change’ in the course of 
which a Scottish team of doctors presented their results of hormone therapy in 
children and adolescents between 14 and 16, as well as the testimonies presented 
on Lynn Conway’s homepage, in addition to my personal development and the 
statements of numerous trans persons whom I have met in the past 20 years 
have reinforced my long-standing conviction, which is: the early support of chil-
dren and adolescents is a model for the future.
Gender-variant persons must be given particular attention from childhood 
onwards. This refers in particular to the support of youngsters and their families 
as well as the medicinal delay of puberty development from its inception until the 
age of 14 to 16. The ideal time for prescribing a cross-sex hormone therapy would 
be at the average entry age into puberty of the respective target sex/gender, i.e. for 
MtF3 between 12 and 13 years of age, and for FtM4 between 14 and 15 years of age. 
This would enable the young people to undergo developments concurrently with 
their peers. In the French context, this could constitute a great step forward as 
French endocrinologists rarely have the will to support young people they would 
agree then to a delay of puberty as timely as possible, before secondary sexual char-
acteristics have fully developed. It would therefore be desirable to already support 
the children before the  age of eight to ten years. If puberty development is already 
in full swing, an active cross-sex hormone therapy is necessary (as with adults) 
in order to reverse the already completed development and enable in the gender 
corresponding to the adolescent’s identity a satisfactory passing. 
Since the 2000s, I have met around 15 Polynesian girls in the course of my 
work who had begun a hormone therapy in Tahiti between the age of 14 and 16. 
It seemed simply inconceivable to think that these women had not been born 
in the feminine sex. Those who had not undergone hormone therapy before 
their 18th year of life had to resort to plastic surgery. In their region of origin, 
3 | MtF: transition from male to female.
4 | FtM: transition from female to male.
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transidentity is a culturally accepted possibility of development beside the other 
two majority gender identities (woman or man). In Polynesia there is at least 
one trans person in each family’s extended family environment (siblings, cous-
ins). Transidentity is thus a rather common phenomenon. Due to this particular 
context, the personal development is more harmonious, the trans persons have 
not to confront of feelings of shame. Potential psychological problems are no 
different to those of the rest of the population.
If puberty has been prevented to set and if a hormone cross sex therapy has 
begun between 14 and 16 of age it leads to results comparable to those presented 
by the Scottish team mentioned above. Since the male puberty of the MtF cannot 
assert itself, female development is ideal: the skeleton (in particular of the hands 
and feet) remains more delicate and the height is lower. The distribution of the 
fatty tissue leads to the development of female curves (e.g. at the hips) corre-
sponding by favorable proportions with uscle tissue in the shoulder region. The 
vocal range, the Adam’s apple and body hair are only developed in a feminine 
way. The epilation of facial hair, voice training as well as the operative feminiza-
tion of face and neck are no longer necessary. The physical appearance changes 
rapidly towards a definitively feminine aspect. The puberty of FtM, which begins 
comparatively early, has to be delayed right from the start. Subsequently, a hor-
mone therapy beginning at the age between 14 and 16 will also show positive 
results: the skeleton becomes more robust, the length of the body (particularly 
the length of hands and feet) increases by a few centimeters, the development of 
muscle tissue and the distribution of fatty tissue produces favorable proportions 
between shoulders and hip. The voice, the hairs and the beard are developed in 
a masculine way. The mastectomy is no longer necessary.
If entry into male puberty is not delayed, the muscle tissue that has devel-
oped as a result cannot always be reduced with the same effect by a later femi-
nizing hormone therapy. Similarly, the development of muscle tissue by means 
of a virilizing hormone therapy is less pronounced if it is administered only after 
female puberty is concluded.
Some doctors reserve treatmentat the age of majority. They want to main-
tain an alleged neutrality and let matters take their natural course. However, this 
non-action is not neutral. The consequences are just as significant as those of 
a cross-sex hormone therapy. Instead, something approaching a neutral stance 
would consist in agreeing to block the development of puberty, since this not 
only buys valuable time, but the young trans person can also be spared the often 




An early medical support of trans children can help to prevent despair, suffering, 
teasing, stigmatization, collateral damage in the family, failure at school, anxiety, 
depression, suicidal thoughts and their execution. The psychological develop-
ment and the socialization of the adolescents would have the chance to proceed 
as transition in the right gender, are more positive, the relationships with their 
peers turn batter.
In the case of intersex persons, by contrast, medical surgery that is aimed at 
their ‘atypical nature’ and does not serve the preservation of life or health should 
not be carried out. Hormone therapy administered during childhood constitut-
ed a source of great emotional distress for all intersex persons I know. They de-
scribed how this treatment destroyed their lives and wished the hormones had 
never been administered. For them, these treatments have meant a painful abuse.
It is essential not to push intersex or trans children into one or the other 
direction, but rather to listen to them and to support them, as well as their fam-
ilies. Slowing the children down in their development is not a solution. Instead, 
all possible options existing should be discussed with them so that they can 
make the choice that is best for them. It is more effective to involve them as 
equal partners in the decision-making processes.
Maturity
Trans persons cannot be expected to be psychologically more balanced than the 
rest of the population. Such an expectation cannot be demanded as a mandatory 
requirement for the application of the desired treatments. Feeling better with a 
hormone therapy and wanting to continue the treatment seems to me more tell-
ing than any psychological assessment. As long as the barrier of ‘psych’5 approval’ 
continues to be demanded by endocrinologists and surgeons, the relations be-
tween trans persons and ‘psych’’ will remain distorted. Psychotherapy with trans 
persons is difficult, even though sometimes there is indeed a need for it. Persons 
desiring hormone therapy should be able to carry the responsibility for their 
choice by themselves, and health professionals should not be prosecuted for this 
decision but only held responsible for the professional application of adequate 
medical measures. Those unsure of their gender identity should be able to ask 
for help to reach a better understanding of their situation to then make a clarified 
decision. If the persons concerned do not wish to make the choice alone, then 
no one else should be allowed to do so in their place. If they choose the path of 
transition then this bears witness to their maturity. I have experienced several 
times that only those who are actually ready for it will take this path.
5 | Psych’: (adjective) psychiatric or/and psychological or (noun) psychiatrist or/and psychologist.
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Maturity is a complex psychological phenomenon that includes various 
(intellectual and emotional) characteristics as well as several levels that depend 
on various stages of development (oral, anal...), some of which the majority of 
people fail to reach. There are elements that develop only if transidentity gets 
the adequate medical support, others may develop in a later period of life and 
contingent on specific events. This depends primarily on the individuals and 
their personal history. A certain degree of intellectual maturity is certainly nec-
essary for a free and informed agreement to a treatment. However, not all levels 
of emotional maturity need to be completely developed to take a decision of this 
magnitude, even if some of them are helpful in the course of life.
Possible particularities besides transidentity
A not insignificant number of trans persons have an IQ of over 125, which in 
general implies particular cognitive and emotional faculties, these however must 
not be confused with psychological disorders. Examples: a highly developed 
awareness with regard to depression or a heightened emotionality regarding un-
solved emotional problems.
Not rarely, trans persons have been the victims of sexual harassment or rape, 
those occurring within the family or outside. These persons often suffer being 
unwell in their body which makes them easier to notice by sexual predators. Oth-
ers have experienced physical or psychological violence. Here, too, the various 
elements have to be regarded in a differentiated way, and possible symptoms of 
a post-traumatic stress disorder have to be recognized as such. However, these 
have no link with the atypical identity development, particularly if this latter one 
was already present before the attacks or the experience of violence.
I have noticed that a further number of trans persons which has not to be 
underestimated (40% to 50%) suffers from anxiety or depression, about 10% 
of my trans clients (adult as well as juvenile) display signs of autism (Asperger 
syndrome, non intellectual deficient autism). These phenomena are not incom-
patible with transidentity. The ‘World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health’ reachs the same conclusion in the 7th version of its ‘Standards of Care 
for the health of transsexual, transgender, and gender non conforming people’ 
and states on page 12:
“It is relatively common for gender-dysphoric children to have coexisting internalizing disorders such 
as anxiety and depression (Cohen-Kettenis, Owen, Kaijser, Bradley, & Zucker, 2003; Wallien, Swaab, & 
Cohen-Kettenis, 2007; Zucker, Owen, Bradley, & Ameeriar, 2002). The prevalence of autism spectrum 
disorders seems to be higher in clinically referred, gender-dysphoric children than in the general popu-
lation” (de Vries, Noens, Cohen-Kettenis, van Berckelaer-Onnes, & Doreleijers, 2010) (WPATH, 2012).
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From my experiences with transitioning I can say that for some persons, a hor-
mone therapy can have an unbalancing effect on their psychological condition. 
In my opinion, the risk of a development of a bipolar (‘manic-depressive’) dis-
order should not be underestimated. In this sense, a psychological support, 
particularly at the beginning of hormone therapy, is often useful. The depres-
sion-promoting side-effects of the anti-androgene drugs on the market in France 
are also known, in particular, those of cyprotrone acetate. These drugs should 
therefore not be administered to people who have already suffered from depres-
sive moods. Even if they have frequently been rejected due to their relatively high 
cost, anti-gonadotropines constitute an effective alternative, providing they are 
well tolerated.
Forms of therapeutical relationship
It is important to use the grammatically appropriate gender trans persons iden-
tify themselves with, especially if they explicitly request it, and this regardless 
of their outward appearance. Here the therapists should be flexible. This is not 
about sharing the fantasies of trans persons or encouraging them, but above all 
about not humiliating them. They have agreed to therapeutical treatment be-
cause they have already embraced the issue or believe having identified a par-
ticular problem and are looking for professional confirmation. For young people, 
when there is no doubt, they assert their gender identity, speak about it to their 
parents if these ones are sufficiently open-minded and listening for that prob-
lematic option and then ask for a proper transition. If they are in doubt, they 
usually do not agree to therapy and do not address this issue.
The goal of therapy is, first of all, to establish whether trans persons are able 
to give their free and informed agreement, to convey clear information that is ap-
propriate to their level of comprehension, and to check whether they have sought 
counsel elsewhere and are aware of the consequences of the desired treatment. 
Here, therapists have to adjust to the trans persons’ paces, i.e. must not proceed 
too fast, but also not too slowly, and take their needs into account regarding the 
frequency of sessions, the issues to be addressed as well as the kind of hormo-
nal-surgical treatment that is expected 
Meeting and knowing trans persons has given me the opportunity to un-
derstand that love and sexual attraction can change over time. They are social 
constructions which have to be localized in the context of heteronormativity (the 
political system that produces heterosexuals). The people concerned must allow 
themselves to question gender and sexual stereotypes in order to achieve greater 
freedom. Children and adolescents usually have no major problems with the de-
Tom Reucher
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At this point one should note that the division into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
transsexuality still common in France is obsolete and was abandoned interna-
tionally years ago. The criteria have also become more flexible. In psychotherapy, 
elements continuously come to the surface that were suppressed in infancy and 
childhood because they were inconceivable at the time. This phenomenon also 
occurs in the work with intersex persons who have undergone treatment as chil-
dren or adolescents. Just because persons come out as themselves relatively late 
in life, are married and have children, must not be a reason for segregationist 
classification.
Hormones and puberty
Administering the pregnancy hormone progesterone for FtM seems counterpro-
ductive to me. Even though the activity of the ovaries is suppressed, at the same 
time the negative effects of this hormone are encouraged: (in part considerable) 
increase of weight and unfavorable distribution of fatty tissue (contrary to the 
desired distribution). As important as the suppression of menstruation may be, 
it should not be achieved at any cost, since there are more beneficial solutions 
for this.
There are two good ways for a suppression of gonads' function: the first 
consists in long-term, continuous administration of natural hormones produced 
by the gonads (this corresponds to the principle of contraception by continuous 
administration of the pill, which in women causes amenorrhea, the absence of 
menstrual period), but this method is not an option for trans persons of any age. 
The second option suppresses hormone production of the gonads by influencing 
the feedback mechanism. This method can possibly delay puberty in juveniles so 
that they gain a few years in order to address their issue in depth. Such a way is 
more costly than the commonly used cross-sex hormones, the latter are however 
not neutral and through their hormonal effect induce a puberty of sorts.
A third possibility for adult trans persons is the direct administration of 
an active hormone therapy with hormones of the desired sex/gender (testoste- 
rone for FtM, estrogen and progesterone for MtF), or, where it presents itself, 
in combination with the second option. After a treatment period of six months, 
this method is equally effective for the majority of those treated. Nevertheless, 
every hormone treatment has to be tailored to personal needs and discussed with 
every person individually after providing clear information. The decision has to 
be taken jointly by doctor and patient. If a MtF is suggested a treatment with 
anti-androgenes, then these should never be prescribed as the sole medication, 
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but always in combination with estrogens. The daily doses should here not ex-
ceed 100 mg and ingestion has to be ended after a gonadectomy or substituted 
by progesterone. Potential side-effects need to be monitored in particular for 
the liver and the state of mind. Infertility possibly ensuing after two years is the 
only irreversible effect of the treatment. All further changes are reversible and 
ultimately correspond to the changes of the sex-related appearance of adult trans 
persons through hormonal treatment. Furthermore, the administration of all 
three hormones has to be monitored to ensure that the respective level corre-
sponds to the desired result.
Some health experts claim they do not give adolescents a hormone thera-
py and neither want to delay their puberty, for they do not know the long-term 
effects on their health. At the same time, neurochemical treatment of restless 
children6 seems to cause no particular concern regarding the long-term effects 
on the brain. The basic problem, however, is the same. Certainly, anti-gonado-
tropines have not insignificant side-effects, but nevertheless, they are used in 
children whose premature puberty is to be delayed and there is no evidence of a 
negative effect on the neurological development. What is possible for these chil-
dren should also be possible for trans children after they have been candidly in-
formed about the current state of knowledge about this form of treatment, thus 
creating the possibility for an informed decision. Since the 1990s this procedure 
is permitted in several countries: USA, Canada, Great Britain, The Netherlands, 
Germany, Australia etc. Since 2014/15, this became also possible in France.
Hormone therapy as a psychological testing procedure
The changes brought about by hormone therapy in the first three months are not 
noticeable by people living in contact with the persons who want to test if they feel 
better with hormones of the other majority sex. These effects are wholly reversible 
once the hormones are discontinued. Generally, the person becomes aware within 
the first three months whether this is really the right way for them. This hormonal 
test is much more effective than any ‘psych’’ assessment. Anyone who does not feel 
better after a three-month treatment should question the pertinence of continuing 
the treatment. Potentially irreversible and relatively undramatic changes when ter-
minating a virilizing hormone therapy after three months would be an enlarged 
clitoris and a deeper voice (equal to that of a 40 year old woman who smokes more 
than 20 cigarettes a day). Abandoning a feminizing hormone therapy as it is ad-
ministered in France since 2000, would have as only effect an enlarged areola and 
nipple zone (but without an actual development of the gland function).
6 | Children suffering from an attention deficit disorder with or without hyperactivity (ADHS) or a serious devel-




The professional support of trans children can begin as soon as they express the 
desire to receive it, or as soon as they demonstrate a gender identity variance, 
even if they do not move in the direction of a transition. Should they opt for 
a transition during or after professional support, appropriate solutions can be 
offered quickly. If the support begins when the person enters puberty or short-
ly before, it is possible to prevent, through a delay of puberty, a development 
in the wrong direction from the point of view of the juvenile person and gain 
valuable time. Hormone therapy is more effective when preceded by a delay of 
the development of puberty. In case of a termination of treatment, the latter can 
still resume where it was interrupted. Since not everyone enters puberty at the 
same age, it can be delayed for one or two years without any problems. In case 
of a transition, genital surgery is only necessary for those who expressly desire it.
A change of first name can be effected from the beginning, permitting an 
adaptation of the obtained diplomas. A change of civil status could be given from 
18 months of hormonal therapy or from the age of 18. A professional carreer 
could thus be approached in the desired gender from the beginning.
The ideal solution would evidently be to omit the mention of sex in the civil 
status for everyone. This would mean abandoning such a criteria on all kinds of 
documents, like it was done before with the colour of skin, denomination, etc. 
The sex and gender  distinction fills the bed of sexism as the racial notion does 





Optimism, Happiness and other Cruelties from a 
Conference on Sex/Gender Norms
Todd Sekuler
SUMMARY 
In addition to a deliberately brief overview of the conference and its contents, 
this analytical outlook focuses on affect in its interwovenness of subject and 
object and examines the question how one could, particularly at a conference 
on sex/gender norms, deliberate, reflect and discuss – or not – the force of af-
fects for these same sex/gender norms. How and where is affect accorded space, 
where does it claim space itself? The outlook discusses how, by means of the 
powerful emotions of ‘happiness’ and ‘optimism’ as forces of affect, some bodies 
are included and others excluded, and how, in revealing the cruelty of prom- 
ises of happiness and conference optimism, such cruelties can be overcome or 
turned to productive effect. 
BODIES – AFFECTS – SCIENCE
Endlessly emerging, accumulating, transforming in the shifting of bodies and 
relations, the force of affect is never as absent from scholarship as claims of 
objectivity would like for us to believe. Despite all efforts, the rhythms and mo-
dalities of affective intensities resist attempts to control or eliminate them. The 
proposition that knowledge is situated – that it deals with “particular and specific 
embodiment” and not the “transcendence of all limits and responsibilities” (Har-
away 1988: 82) – is perhaps already a banality for scholars of ‘sex/gender’1 and 
‘sexuality’, yet one that still warrants repetition and also critical reflection. For 
example, one might argue that affect instead claims knowledge to be positioned 
and dis-positioned simultaneously, or perhaps in a constant state of re-position-
1 | Original version in English. For an explanation as to this phrasing, see footnote 3, p. 9 in this publication. It
 will not be further discussed in this chapter, and has been uniformly applied to conform with the book’s political
 and semantic framework.
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ing that both marks and reflects bodies as well as the worlds within which bodies 
unfold. Affect emphasizes the becomings and un-becomings that are forming 
and residing ‘in-between’ and ‘beside’. It is this in-the-vicinity and in-stability 
that pulls out rather than hides the tensions in and impossibilities of dualistic 
modes of thinking that assume the certainty of being taken for granted. Typically 
encompassing but always more than mere emotion, affect 
“marks a body’s belonging to a world of encounters or; a world’s belonging to a body of encounters 
but also in non-belonging, through all those far sadder (de)compositions of mutual in-compossibil-
ities.” (Seigworth/Gregg 2010: 2)
In this chapter I would like to consider the conference “Gender Normativity 
and its Effects on Childhood and Adolescence”, held in Luxembourg from the 
24th to the 29th of September 2012, as part of a world of affective forces of 
encounter. I do not pretend to place an easy label on the messy type of affective 
display that became for me a critical revelation of the positions or limitations 
of corporeal belonging as well as the abundance of non-belonging at various 
intervals throughout the conference, but the dynamics of both belongings and 
non-belongings resulted in the temporary but no less impassioned departure of 
one participant – a representative of an association for intersex persons – from 
the space of the conference. This displacement signaled most visibly the pres-
ence of affect in a space where any semblance of emotion is seen to have little 
room for expression. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, I would thus like to try to 
understand this conference, not only by its presences, but also by its absences, 
or at least via the pushing out of certain ways of being. However, by the fact that 
even in their non-appearance, or removal, certain bodies trouble those present, 
a division between us and them, subject and object, inside and outside proves 
to be imperfect.
My presence at the conference was facilitated by an invitation from the orga- 
nizers to write a brief summary of findings to be submitted back to the event’s 
financial supporters, the National Research Fund of Luxemburg (FNR: ‘Fonds 
National de la Recherche’). Hence, unlike most other chapters in this book, 
this text is not an extended version of a paper presented at the conference. In-
stead, I draw on one presentation from the conference to reflect upon how it, 
and the conference as a whole, related to the topic and the various groups (un-) 
addressed within its content. This means that I have the luxury of reflecting on 
the complexities of the congress and its topic retrospecitvely. That being said, my 
comments are not meant to undervalue what I see to have been an extraordinar-
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ily successful, enlightening and productive conference – clearly organized with 
much sensitivity and careful reflection.
Given my role, I first offer a very short synopsis of key findings of the vari-
ous presentations and discussions that took place during the conference. I then 
discuss how optimism – an affective force holding the conference together in 
important and necessary ways – may help to make sense of the absence of cer-
tain bodies from the affective, phenomenological and epistemological space of 
the conference. Rather than attempt the problematic task of making sense of the 
aforementioned person’s brief departure, I consider in some detail the affective 
register of a presentation that was among those that, according to the departing 
participant, sparked their exit. Specifically, I will consider one of several photo-
graphs included in a presentation by an endocrinologist who sought to visualize 
the success of his protocol for the provision of sex/gender assignment proce-
dures to transsexual youth. I do not reproduce the image in this chapter, largely 
for ethical reasons, although I consider how its materiality during the lecture, 
in interaction with the discursive, social and especially affective dimensions of 
the presentation, were put to work to sustain the futurity of certain bodies at the 
expense of others.
Brief conference overview
What are sex/gender norms and how do they manifest their impact on young 
people? How are sex/gender norms socially constructed, structurally anchored 
and historically distinct? To what extent is a world without sex/gender norms 
imaginable or even desirable? These are a few of the central questions that ac-
companied the conference “Gender Normativity and its Effects on Childhood 
and Adolescence” held in Luxembourg from the 24th to the 29th of September 
2012. To approach these questions, scholars, activists and politicians explored 
interdependent sites of power and knowledge production that might be summed 
up under the categories medicine, law, and education. In addition, opening lec-
tures helped to situate discussions of these various aspects within the fields of 
philosophy, sociology and ethics. This book offers a comprehensive exploration 
of the issues presented at the conference; I offer a brief summary of points that 
I found to be key ‘findings’.
In general, presenters seemed to agree that the body is a highly contested 
site for reading and regulating sex/gender. Despite the common construction of 
sexed/gendered bodies as naturally categorical or dualistic, conference partici-
pants made clear that they are remarkably varied and malleable. For example, 
one presenter argued that a combination of biological and socio-environmental 
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factors – such as temperature, social interactions and hormonal regulation – in-
fluence the development of the biological characteristics typically used to catego-
rize animals into two sexes. Other presenters demonstrated that alleged truths 
about sexed/gendered and racialized bodily differences have been and continue 
to be used to naturalize socially constructed and hierarchical sex/gender and 
racial categories, and are experienced as violent by sex/gender non-conforming, 
as well as sex/gender conforming, youth. One speaker suggested that categori-
zation may be a sort of ‘necessary evil’ in as much as it helps us make sense of 
a complex world. Thus, rather than try to do away with categorization, it may be 
helpful to recognize that categories of knowledge and categories of representa-
tion are mutually productive and are both involved in the construction of sex/
gender inequalities, but each offers tools to transform the other.
Multiple speakers emphasized that EU and UN rights documents demand 
that signatory states recognize a child’s fundamental rights, including the rights 
to health, identity, freedom and protection. Nonetheless, these and related laws 
have been interpreted in different ways over time, highlighting the plasticity and 
sociohistoric relevance of reading and interpreting legal documents, particular-
ly about sex/gender, sexuality and age. While there are certain international or 
national laws that offer support for young trans people who wish to undergo 
sex/gender confirming procedures, and for the stance that doctors should not 
operate on intersex infants if not medically necessary, many of these legislative 
tools are difficult to make sense of due to their complexity and have not yet been 
applied successfully to individual countries or cases.
All the same, conference presenters emphasized that laws alone do not of-
fer means to improving the situation for trans and intersex youth; they must be 
monitored, interpreted and enforced based on the needs and rights of the youth 
they intend to address, and should be developed in constant exchange with youth 
themselves as well as with other sites of praxis and knowledge production. Edu-
cational processes offer one such space for collaboration. Given that the natural-
ization of sex/gender differences takes place in both formal and informal educa-
tional spaces – such as during child rearing, in medical textbooks or children’s 
literature – these forms of communication introduce important opportunities 
for intervention. Within this context especially, the concept of cisgenderism, in-
troduced by one presenter and defined as a systematic form of prejudice that 
stigmatizes non-cisgender forms of expression, offers a compelling new epis-
temology for thinking about sex/gender norms and structures of oppression.
Many presenters and participants may read this brief summary with dissatis-
faction due to the inevitable reduction of arguments and the exclusion of nuance 
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necessitated by the chapter’s space restrictions and the nature of my responsi-
bilities as rapporteur. More relevant to this chapter, however, it also slights the 
material and inter-corporal complexities of the conference that constitute and 
are constituted of affect. Indeed, within the context of this conference, there is 
still much to gain by exploring the vital role of affect in the (un-)doings, natural-
ization and illumination of sex/gender norms. Without a doubt the conference 
did engage with the significance of emotion and personal history in understand-
ing and communicating about sex/gender norms. For example, one young trans 
person, an invited speaker, described in personal and sobering detail the feelings 
of rejection and suffering that accompanied ongoing interactions with health 
care providers, educators and others. And an unannounced but carefully orga- 
nized artistic performance provoked, at a minimum, reflection about conference 
participants’ own sex/gender norms and the possibilities of sex/gender fluidity 
both corporeally and performatively. All the same, whereas other topics became 
a matter of theoretical and empirical development, affect was left to gather in 
and across the space/time assemblages of the conference, fated to be felt and 
experienced, but never discussed.
As affect insists that both subject and object are intertwined – that the di-
vision of subject/object is not easy to make out – one might claim that engage-
ments with sex/gender norms via affect can be both the objects and subjects of 
the conference simultaneously. Indeed, the process of the conference is already 
part of the world described by the conference, thus the conference generates 
even while it tries to portray. For that reason I’d like to ask what it might mean 
to think about affect as an ‘effective force of sex/gender norms’, especially in the 
context of a conference with sex/gender norms as its topic of investigation. To 
that end, there are two affective registers from the conference that I will explore 
that are not entirely unrelated: ‘optimism’ and ‘happiness’.
The cruelties of conference optimism
Despite the shortcomings of the conference summary I provide above, I think 
it is not an exaggeration to speak of a cohesive and yet chaotic affective energy 
that to some extent permeated the entirety of the events. This ostensible co-
hesion was also reflected in the humdrum details of the conference – during 
greetings or discussions at the coffee table between sessions or upon arrival in 
the morning and departure in the evening, among groups of participants and 
presenters during lunch or dinner breaks, during social events at the hotel and, 
most markedly, after the final event when due thanks were voiced publicly and 
many were taken by the feeling of having accomplished something important 
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over the course of the preceding days’ events. This cohesion and sense of ac-
complishment speaks to the focus of the conference and the remarkable talent 
of the organizers to procure excellent speakers who – in some way or another 
– share a critique of sex/gender norms. Similar, no doubt, to many others who 
attended, I left feeling inspired and motivated, among other feelings, with many 
questions and reflections that I bring with me to my activism, doctoral work and 
other settings.
To borrow from Lauren Berlant, I would like to propose that we think of the 
conference as an object of desire, which she describes as “a cluster of promises we 
want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us” (2010: 93). 
We do not have to look beyond the introduction to the conference program to see 
that it makes certain promises that become proximal to the conference itself:
“This conference will examine, above all, gender norms and their manifestations during develop-
ment and education…The conference will also critically explore ideas about what is ‘best’ for a 
child, who defines this ‘best’ and who knows what is ‘best’… [T]he conference will provide space 
for a result-oriented debate about how to improve familial and social incorporation of gender 
non-conforming youth into prevailing gender norms. It will consider ways to expand the spectrum 
of recognition regarding variability across biological sex, gender identities, social roles and sexual 
orientations, as well as the ways in which they all interact… [A]nother goal of the conference is to 
expand the discussion about gender equality to include youth who evade prevailing gender norms. 
Results and conclusions from the conference will help to provide possible solutions for improving 
equality, especially in the realms of formal and informal education…Discussions and developments 
with regards to ‘good practices’ will be a focus of the conference…”
The possibility – and to some extent the actuality – of fulfilling these (often lofty) 
promises provided for many participants and presenters of the conference a 
sense of optimism – what one might describe as an orientation towards and 
attachment to the event as it happens. This is not to say that there was no dis-
agreement or divergence within the conference, or that the temporality of the 
conference was clearly directional or even linear, or that all presentations shared 
a particular epistemology or political ideology. Given the fact that one participant 
left the space of the conference in aggravation, as I mentioned above, the real but 
sporadic disaccord during the conference has already been established. All the 
same, it is interesting to note that for this participant, the most viable option was 
not to continue to engage in debate or conversation, but instead to leave the room.
The exclusion of this participant may be part of an affective force that became 
entangled with the accumulating optimism of the conference. With each pre- 
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sentation, participants were opened up to a certain way of knowing the topic be-
ing presented, which was, given the context, purportedly connected with sex/gen-
der norms and their impact on youth. One could agree or disagree with part or all 
of one or every presentation, and yet the decision to stay and listen and continue 
the project of the conference was an optimistic investment in the conference as a 
means for attaining the bouquet of promises it was thought to potentially provide.
It is important to acknowledge that the participant returned to the confer-
ence room shortly after their departure. Was it a renewed optimism – no matter 
how faint or uncertain – that brought them back? Berlant uses the term ‘cruel 
optimism’ to describe the unrelenting optimism one brings to an object despite 
eventual, or even certain, disappointment: “Cruel optimism is the condition of 
maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss” (2010: 
94). Why would one persist with an attachment to an object in the face of a cer-
tain disappointment? This question is not easy to answer, but Berlant proposes 
that it may be based in a fear that the loss of the object will make it impossible to 
continue hope about anything at all. Even if failure is certain, there is a desperate 
hope that certainty is at times uncertain so that hope, and life, can continue.
Although I am not proposing that optimism, cruel or otherwise, is what pro-
voked the participant’s return – only he can offer an explanation for that decision 
– what I would like to suggest here is that there is some cruelty in the optimis-
tic ventures of organizing, attending, participating in, presenting at or writing 
about this and similar conferences in as much as they invest in structures that 
are known to (re)produce systems of discrimination. There is a persisting desire 
to make these structures work – to analyze, critique and adjust them – with the 
hope that they will one day be based on equality and justice. An interest in and 
concern about sex/gender norms in the domains of education, medicine and law 
reinforces an investment in those fields even as they are identified as sites of nor-
malization. To help make this clear, I attempt in the next section to demonstrate 
one example of the cruelty embedded in the emotion of happiness as it was put 
to work in a physician’s conference presentation.
Happy sex/gender norms
Sarah Ahmed (2010) calls ‘happy objects’ those objects towards which affect 
pulls us. She uses the example of the family to exemplify how certain objects are 
read as good, as the cause of happiness, because we are oriented towards them 
as being good: “The family provides a shared horizon in which objects circulate, 
accumulating positive affective value.” (Ahmed 2010: 38). According to Ahmed, 
the depiction of families as happy, however, occurs by identifying those who do 
2 | Kongressprogramm. URL: http://idw-online.de/pages/de/attachmentdata18240.pdf  [21.12.2013].
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not reproduce its line as the cause of unhappiness: “Some bodies are presumed 
to be the origin of bad feeling insofar as they disturb the promise of happiness, 
which I would re-describe as the social pressure to maintain the signs of getting 
along. Some bodies become blockage points, points where smooth communica-
tion stops.” (Ahmed 2010: 39). From this light, one might argue that sex/gender 
norms gather some of their force within, and with, objects that promise happi-
ness. Or more concretely, sex/gender norms might also be read as happy objects 
that pull us not just towards them, but also away from those who do not conform 
to, and thus obstruct, an orientation towards those norms.
During the conference, at least one object of sex/gender norms was trans-
mitted through another object that too was painted as happy: a photograph. I 
should clarify that, rather than physical photographs, we were presented with 
digital images within the context of a PowerPoint presentation. That this analysis 
is about a PowerPoint of a digitalized version of a photograph of a body is impor-
tant for understanding the degrees of repurposing that took place – materially, 
socially, technically, temporally and spatially – so that the matter of the image 
could be put to work in the ways intended by the conference presenter, and per-
haps in ways that he did not intend. In this context, it is helpful to think of the 
photograph as a ‘social biography’ (Kopytoff 1986) in as much as the function 
and meaning of the image was likely dependent upon where and when it was 
exhibited as well as the intention of the presenter and their relationship to the 
photograph. Although I am unable to provide anoverview of the complex visual 
economy (Poole 1997) of the image, it is safe to assume that it has been repur-
posed over time and its agency and forms of life include a complexity of shifting, 
divergent and asymmetric affective relations and meanings.
The images in question were presented as part of a talk by one German en-
docrinologist who was invited to offer an overview of the protocol he and others 
utilize to provide sex/gender-confirming procedures to interested trans youth. It 
should first be noted that not all physicians are in agreement that hormono-sur-
gical procedures should be made available to young people. Many fear that per-
sons below a certain age have not yet fully developed their sense of self, and there 
is thus a reluctance to perform interventions that are considered irreversible. 
According to this doctor, however, at the onset of puberty – which he defines as 
between the ages of 10 and 13 – either reconciliation with the so-called ‘biological 
sex’ occurs, or there is an increased rejection of a body seen as ‘wrong’. For him, 
the temptation to ‘wait and see’ does cause harm, as providing young people 
with hormone inhibitors at an age early enough to postpone the development of 
allegedly ‘irreversible’ secondary sex/gender features helps to ensure that their 
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transitions are not only less emotionally and socially straining, but that they are 
also physically and visually more convincing. To demonstrate the success of his 
approach, he included in his slide show before and after pictures, first of one 
trans girl and then of one trans boy. He also made sure to inform us that he 
received approval from the relevant persons for the presentation of these images 
at the conference.
To underscore the success of the procedures, and thus of the work of this 
endocrinologist, he did not rely on the visual power of the images alone. Instead, 
he provided commentary with each image, no doubt in part to ensure that the 
images were packed with a certain affective strength. Indeed, I propose that the 
force of affect accrues within the assemblage of meanings and relations pro-
duced by the presenter and his narration, the pictures projected onto the screen 
and the inter-corporal dynamics of the various members of the audience. To 
accompany a photo of a trans boy, post surgical interventions and shirtless, at 
age 18, the doctor clarifies that the person developed into a “very nice and open 
young man.” The doctor then added that “no one who saw him would think that 
he initially was not a boy.” And later, due to the success of his transition, we were 
informed, “he had a very high graduating grade (Abitur)” and that he “picked up 
one girl after another - a very successful flirt”. Youth who undergo transitions 
early enough, he concludes, are “not in an extra category, but instead belong 
to the group. And this equality with the group is,” from the perspective of this 
endocrinologist, “very important for their general psychosocial development.”
There is a certain irony in the work of this physician as he calls upon images 
as proof of both the invisibility and the success of his work: “No one who saw 
him would think that he initially was not a boy”. The interventions performed by 
him and other doctors on this young person are ‘so good’ (in their construction 
of sex/gender conforming bodies) that the ‘threat of adversity’ (via the potential 
doubting of the young person’s sex/gender) has been all but erased. Of course, 
implicit in the doctor’s statement is the assumption that it would be bad if one 
were to think that the young person initially was or may not have been a boy. 
The implied – and hence unspoken – aspect of this statement reminds us that 
it was taken as a given that sex/gender non-conforming bodies are undesirable 
and that their undesirability is a shared belief if not a basic fact. It is also worth 
pointing out that the visuals and narration selected for this presentation render 
as positive, desirable and happy those bodies that conform to norms, so that 
we are again oriented in their direction as the path towards happiness. It thus 
becomes clear that sex/gender norms are to some extent reinforced as norms by 
making the achievement of those norms part of a promise of happiness.
Optimism, Happiness and other Cruelties
360
Here one might insist that the boy in the photo requested that the doctors do 
all they could to ensure that, following his transition, there be as few remnants 
as possible of the sex/gender he was assigned at birth - often referred to as one’s 
so-called ‘biological sex’  . The doctor’s comment (“No one who saw him would 
think that he initially was not a boy”) makes the assumption that it would be bad 
if one were to think that the boy were anything but a boy, this critic might argue, 
only because the boy himself wishes that to be the case. Since the doctor did not 
provide the details of the boy’s request, this may or not be true. This critique thus 
takes for granted the uncertain stance that all trans youth wish to conform to the 
sex/gender norms of the sex/gender with which they identify (assuming they 
identify with a static and easy to define sex/gender). It also fails to consider the 
complex temporalities of the photo and its affective agency beyond the desires of 
the photographed boy, and beyond the desires of the doctor. In addition to asking 
what the boy or the doctor intend for the boy’s body and the photo of the boy’s 
body (and the PowerPoint slide of the photo of the boy’s body) to communicate, 
one might ask what the image does at the conference, despite or even because 
of those intended messages. What are the futures that the photo enables or ex-
cludes, and what are the histories that it brings to the present?
For this doctor it was not enough to imply that the bodies in the projected 
images have achieved happiness solely based on their convincing transition as 
demonstrated by their inability to be distinguished from sex/gender conform-
ing youth; in order for them to escape suspicion, to ‘pass’ as a success of sex/
gender transition, they must also be bodies that are “not in an extra category, but 
instead belong to the group.” Although the doctor never makes clear to which 
group he is referring, he does provide us with certain clues about the criteria of 
their belonging (or at least the criteria of belonging as a young trans man): the 
acquisition of an Abitur, (hetero)sexual appeal and psychosocial development. 
There is an exchange of positive affect that occurs due to the proximal relations 
between these seemingly desired criteria and the sex/gender norms reinforced 
via the presentation and discussion of the images. The accumulation of their 
various positive registers helps to blur them together such that they all become 
part of the same ‘happy family’.
Of course, the assumed and yet debatable desirability of these criteria is 
worth pointing out. An early transition seems advantageous to this doctor, be-
cause it improves the likelihood that trans youth attain a degree and develop a 
certain psychosocial level and (hetero)sexual prowess. However, just to take one 
example, some people might be less quick to invest in the belief that an Abitur 
is a desired goal. After all, students in Germany are divided at a ver early age 
Todd Sekuler
361
into schools that are based allegedly on achievement and, in so doing, research 
shows, they are also divided based on family income and migration background 
(Baumert/Watermann/Schümer 2003). As a result, people of color and stu-
dents from lower-income families are systematically excluded from access to the 
educational path that makes the acquisition of an ‘Abitur’ possible. Thus, it is 
not all young trans people who might access group membership if they initiate 
sex/gender confirmation procedures early enough so as to eliminate signs of 
non-conformity; it is only those who are white and not living in poverty – two 
characteristics unaddressed and yet part of the affective force of the projected 
photo – who are entitled access to these criteria. This selective acquisition is part 
of what renders the criteria desirable. Hence, we can see here how sex/gender 
norms become inextricably linked with norms about health, sexuality, education 
and, less explicitly, class and race.
Regarding imminent rifts in trans activism in the United States, Jack Hal-
berstam keenly notes: “[T]here is a huge difference between becoming a black 
man or a man of color and becoming a white man” (1998: 159). Indeed, the ab-
sent discussion about the meaning of race and class during transition, or about 
how race and class influence sex/gender norms and experiences of sex/gender 
non-conformity, was perceptible to me throughout the conference. This absence 
was mirrored in, if not to some extent produced by, the class and racial dynamics 
of the conference location, but also perhaps the overwhelming whiteness of the 
conference organizers, participants and presenters. Sarah Lamble (2008) has 
analyzed the events surrounding ‘Transgender Day of Remembrance’ (TDoR), 
a day intended to commemorate those who have been killed in the last year, by 
comparing the typically white middle-class students who organize the day with 
the overwhelmingly poor people of color, often sex-workers, who are in general 
remembered at these events. She argues that TDoR events neglect the role of rac-
ism, poverty, and other forms of stigma in the murderous violence directed at trans 
people, instead reducing motivating factors to specifically anti-trans hostility.
CONCLUSION
Via the unstable but no less powerful energies of ‘optimism’ or ‘happiness’, the 
forces of affect at this conference on sex/gender norms include certain bodies 
and exclude others. To borrow from Sarah Ahmed yet again, one might call these 
others ‘affect aliens’, a term used by Ahmed to label those who refuse to repro-
duce the arrangements of what is perceived to cause happiness or, one might 
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add, to lead to a bouquet of promises. This term is particularly fitting as it de-
scribes two of the excluded alien types who, via their exclusion or rejection at the 
conference, have made apparent how norms are reproduced even in the space of 
their deconstruction: ‘unhappy queers’ and ‘melancholic migrants’.
As we have seen, unhappy queers are those who, despite all of the happiness 
promised by the norm, choose or accept or are stuck with the non-conform-
ing body that may not make possible an ‘Abitur’, sexual success or psychosocial 
development. In short, it is “the queer person who is judged to be unhappy” 
(Ahmed 2010: 43). The melancholic migrant, according to Ahmed, “is the one 
who is not only stubbornly attached to difference, but who insists on speaking 
about racism, where such speech is heard as laboring over sore points.” (Ahmed 
2010: 48). The migrant refuses to allow sex/gender norms to be the only cause 
of their unhappiness, and in this refusal, they are seen to be the cause of their 
own unhappiness.
The exposure of these cruelties in the optimism and happiness of 
the conference must be part of what is taken away as central findings. Af-
ter all, as Sarah Ahmed insists, “it is the very exposure of these unhappy ef-
fects that is affirmative, that gives us an alternative set of imaginings of 
what might count as good or better life.” (Ahmed 2010: 50). And if this pos-
sibility for alternate imaginings produces a new form of optimism, let 
us not forget the potential cruelty of that optimism, but also not the val-
ue that optimism alone makes possible for the ability to face another day.
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Simon Zobel (Dipl.-Ing.,2 Biology and Engineering), after past teaching posi-
tions in France and beside the planning of urban and private projects in Paris 
and Berlin, puts the focus of his freelance work on borders and conflict areas of 
(social) myths and natural science. He is particularly interested in the topics of 
sex/gender and variability in somatic sex.
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